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The Nature of the Australian Constitution: The Limitations of the Institutional and Revisionist Approaches

Published online by Cambridge University Press:  24 January 2025

John SF Wright
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Extract

The nature of the Australian Consitution is usually described as eiher monarchic and parliamentary, or republican and federal. However, more than succinct expressions of the key political concepts behind the Australian Constitution, the two metaphors are the products of particular forms of analysis. Essentially, the terms parliamentary or consitutional monarchy and federal republic are the products of either revisionist or institutional interpretations of the Australian Constitution. The institutional interpretation focuses on tie practical function of the Constitution's federal and parliamentary institutions, and the origins of these devices within the British and American Constitutions. For example, as the Australian Constitution embraces the institutions of both Anerican federalism and British parliamentary government, institutionalists interpret its nature by relating the strucure and operation of Australia's federal and parliamentary institutions to the function of sinilar devices within the British and American Constitutions.

Type
Research Article
Information
Federal Law Review , Volume 28 , Issue 3 , September 2000 , pp. 345 - 363
Copyright
Copyright © 2000 The Australian National University

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