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Published online by Cambridge University Press: 01 January 2025
In 2015, a majority of the High Court of Australia incorporated structured proportionality testing into Australian constitutional law for the first time, but the test’s suitability for Australian law has been contested ever since. The recent case of Clubb is an ambivalent result for the test’s advocates: while structured proportionality testing now seems to have the support of a solid majority of current members of the High Court, the dissentients seem as strongly opposed as ever and continue to be vocal about the test’s unsuitability for Australian law. This article surveys the three main criticisms levelled against structured proportionality in Australia: that it is too indeterminate, that it involves judges transgressing the separation of powers, and that it is inappropriate in the unique context of the implied freedom of political communication (‘the freedom’). There are reasons why these critiques of structured proportionality carry particular weight and resonance in Australia’s constitutional culture, marked as it is by legalism and deference to the legislature. But these reasons are also why adoption of structured proportionality is consistent with Australia’s constitutional commitments and jurisprudence. The question of whether structured proportionality is beneficial needs to start with the question of ‘compared to what?’ Many of the criticisms levelled against structured proportionality apply all the more forcefully against the prior test of whether the legislative measure is ‘appropriate and adapted’ to serve a legitimate end. And the inherent commitments of proportionality make it better suited to Australian law than the increasingly proposed alternative of a categorical approach. The particular method of judicial reasoning in cases concerning the freedom might seem like a highly abstract and theoretical question, especially when the justices applying differing methods largely agree on the merits in the relevant cases. But this continuing uncertainty and divergence on the Court has tangible costs. The project of making reasoning more transparent and constrained is significantly undermined by uncertainty as to whether and how the test will be applied at all. There are also second-order effects in the form of institutional costs. In the context of the freedom, where judicial review has long been controversial, the division of the Court into pro- and anti-structured proportionality factions has particularly high costs to institutional integrity and legitimacy. At some point there will be a question of whether the damage of warring judgments over method outweighs the damage done by choosing even the ‘worst’ of the available options. This article argues that structured proportionality is not that ‘worst’ option.
Sincere thanks to Vicki Jackson and Ros Dixon for their helpful comments and encouragement. Thanks also to the anonymous reviewers, and to the editors of the Federal Law Review for their exceptional work. Financial support received from the HLS Summer Academic Fellowship Program. Errors are indubitably mine.
1. (2015) 257 CLR 178 [24]–[25] (French CJ, Kiefel, Bell and Keane JJ) (‘McCloy’).
2. Alec Stone Sweet and Jud Mathews, ‘Proportionality Balancing and Global Constitutionalism’ (2008) 47 Columbia Journal of Transnational Law 72, 74; Vicki C Jackson, ‘Constitutional Law in an Age of Proportionality’ (2015) 124(8) Yale Law Journal 3094, 3096.
3. McCloy (2015) 257 CLR 178, 234–9 [140]–[154] (Gageler J), 288–9 [339] (Gordon J).
4. (2016) 261 CLR 28 (‘Murphy’).
5. See below nn 46–8 and accompanying text.
6. (2017) 261 CLR 328 (‘Brown’).
7. Ibid 376 [159] (Gageler J); 465–6 [431]–[433] (Gordon J).
8. [2019] HCA 11 (‘Clubb’).
9. Ibid [160] (Gageler J); [390] (Gordon J). The decision in Clubb [2019] HCA 11 was delivered after this article was accepted for publication. The consequences of this decision are referred to throughout, but for timing reasons the case is not dealt with in detail.
10. Lange v Australian Broadcasting Corporation (1997) 189 CLR 520, 566–7 (Brennan CJ, Dawson, Toohey, Gaudron, McHugh, Gummow, Kirby JJ) (‘Lange’), as modified in Coleman v Power (2004) 220 CLR 1, 50 [92]–[93] (McHugh J) (‘Coleman’). Although this test is formally retained as the shell of all current formulations of the test, by nesting structured proportionality within this Lange framework, the ‘appropriate and adapted’ formula is no longer applied directly and so becomes less salient in the reasoning when structured proportionality is employed.
11. See below nn 25–31.
12. McCloy (2015) 257 CLR 178, 238–9 [152].
13. Sir Anthony Mason, ‘The Use of Proportionality in Australian Constitutional Law’ (2016) 27 Public Law Review 109, 121–2.
14. Commonwealth v Tasmania (1983) 158 CLR 1, 259–61 (Deane J) (‘Tasmanian Dam case’).
15. See, eg, Lange (1997) 189 CLR 520, 562 (Brennan CJ, Dawson, Toohey, Gaudron, McHugh, Gummow, Kirby JJ); Mulholland v Australian Electoral Commission (2004) 220 CLR 181, 199–200 [39] (Gleeson CJ) (‘Mulholland’); Roach v Electoral Commissioner (2007) 233 CLR 162, 199 [85] (Gummow, Kirby and Crennan JJ) (‘Roach’).
16. Jeremy Kirk, ‘Constitutional Guarantees, Characterisation and the Concept of Proportionality’ (1997) 21(1) Melbourne University Law Review 1, 2.
17. George Williams and David Hume, Human Rights under the Australian Constitution (Oxford University Press, 2nd ed, 2013) 137.
18. Tajjour v New South Wales (2014) 254 CLR 508, 574 [130] (Crennan, Kiefel and Bell JJ noting that ‘[t]he question whether a test of strict proportionality is useful and appropriate in the Australian constitutional context has not been debated in a matter before this Court since Lange’.) (‘Tajjour’).
19. Carmel McClure, ‘Proportionality: The New Wave’ (2017) 13 Judicial Review 301, 307.
20. Heather Roberts, ‘Ceremony Matters: The Lasting Significance of the Swearing-in Ceremony of Chief Justice Susan Kiefel’ Australian Public Law (Blog Post, 9 February 2017) <https://auspublaw.org/2017/02/ceremony-matters/>.
21. Mason (n 13) 109.
22. Susan Kiefel, ‘Proportionality: A Rule of Reason’ (2012) 23 Public Law Review 85.
23. ‘McHugh’s Angels: 10 Women Fit for High Court, Says Top Judge’, Sydney Morning Herald (online, 19 August 2005) <https://www.smh.com.au/news/national/mchughs-angels-10-women-fit-for-high-court-says-top-judge/2005/08/18/1123958182102.html> (emphasis added).
24. Monis v The Queen (2013) 249 CLR 92, 195 [283] (Crennan, Kiefel and Bell JJ) (‘Monis’).
25. Ibid 213 [345]; see also Tajjour (2014) 254 CLR 508, 574–5 [129]–[133] (Crennan, Kiefel and Bell JJ).
26. McCloy (2015) 257 CLR 178, 194–5 [2]. The form of the test adopted in McCloy can be summarised as:
1. Does the law effectively burden the freedom in its terms, operation or effect?
2. If yes, are the purpose of the law and the means adopted to achieve that purpose compatible with the maintenance of the constitutionally prescribed system of representative government? (‘compatibility testing’). If no, the law is invalid.
3. If yes, then is the law ‘reasonably appropriate and adapted to advance that legitimate object’? This is ‘proportionality testing’ and is assessed in the following three stages—is the law:
a. Suitable—having a rational connection to the purpose of the provision;
b. Necessary—there is no obvious and compelling alternative, reasonably practicable means of achieving the same purpose which has a less restrictive effect; and
c. Adequate in its balance—a value judgment balancing the importance of the purpose of the restrictive measure with the extent of the restriction imposed on the freedom.
A law will only be valid if it meets all of these criteria.
27. Anne Carter, ‘Case Note: McCloy v New South Wales’ (2015) 26 Public Law Review 245, 251.
28. Anne Twomey, ‘McCloy v New South Wales: Out with US Corruption and in with German Proportionality’ Australian Public Law (Blog Post, 15 October 2015) <https://auspublaw.org/2015/10/mccloy-v-new-south-wales/>.
29. McClure (n 19) 325.
30. Murphy (2016) 261 CLR 28.
31. Ibid 52–3 [37].
32. Ibid 72 [101].
33. Ibid 122 [296].
34. Brown (2017) 261 CLR 328, 363–4 [104] (Kiefel CJ, Bell and Keane JJ), 416 [277] (Nettle J) (removing the reference to testing of ‘means’ in step two of the McCloy test.).
35. Ibid 376 [159] (Gageler J), 465–6 [431]–[433] (Gordon J).
36. See Commonwealth, ‘Submissions of the Attorney-General of the Commonwealth (Intervening)’, Submission in Clubb [2019] HCA 11, 25 May 2018, 19–20 [52].
37. See Victoria, ‘Submissions of the Attorney-General of the State of Victoria’, Submission in Clubb [2019] HCA 11, 11 May 2018, 15 [48]. See also Fertility Control Clinic, ‘Annotated Submissions of the Fertility Control Clinic (A Firm)—Applicant to Intervene, Alternatively to be Heard as Amicus Curiae’, Submission in Clubb [2019] HCA 11, 25 May 2018, 16 [52].
38. Clubb [2019] HCA 11, 10 [6].
39. Ibid 91–3 [266].
40. Ibid 140 [408].
41. Clubb [2019] HCA 11, 50 [159].
42. Ibid 51–2 [161].
43. Ibid 133–9 [389]–[404].
44. Sir Anthony Mason, ‘The Role of a Constitutional Court in a Federation: A Comparison of the Australian and the United States Experience’ (1986) 16 Federal Law Review 1, 5; Sir Owen Dixon, Jesting Pilate and Other Papers and Addresses (Law Book, 1965) 157 (‘courts proceed upon the basis that the conclusion of the judge should not be subjective or personal to him but should be the consequence of his best endeavour to apply an external standard’.).
45. See, eg, Sir Owen Dixon, ‘Address On Being Sworn In As Chief Justice’ (1952) 85 CLR xi, xiii–xiv; Stephen Gageler, ‘Foundations of Australian Federalism and the Role of Judicial Review’ (1987) 17 Federal Law Review 162, 175; Robert Woods, ‘Rights Review in the High Court and the Cultural Limits of Judicial Power’ (2013) 41 Federal Law Review 585, 592; Jeffrey Goldsworthy, ‘Constitutional Interpretation’ in Michel Rosenfeld and András Sajó (eds), The Oxford Handbook of Comparative Constitutional Law (Oxford University Press, 2012) 689, 695; Adrienne Stone, ‘Expression’ in Cheryl Saunders and Adrienne Stone (eds), The Oxford Handbook of the Australian Constitution (Oxford University Press, 2018) 952, 956–7.
46. Kathleen E Foley, ‘Australian Judicial Review’ (2007) 6 Washington University Global Studies Law Review 281, 305; Woods (n 45) 586; Theunis Roux, ‘Reinterpreting the Mason Court Revolution: An Historical Institutionalist Account of Judge-Driven Constitutional Transformation in Australia’ (2015) 43 Federal Law Review 1, 7; Nicholas Aroney and Benjamin B Saunders, ‘On Judicial Rascals and Self-Appointed Monarchs: The Rise of Judicial Power in Australia’ (2017) 36 University of Queensland Law Journal 221, 233–4.
47. Lange (1997) 189 CLR 520, 566–7 (Brennan CJ, Dawson, Toohey, Gaudron, McHugh, Gummow, Kirby JJ), as modified in Coleman (2004) 220 CLR 1, 50 [92]–[93] (McHugh J).
48. McCloy, (2015) 257 CLR 178, 214 [71] (French CJ, Kiefel, Bell and Keane JJ).
49. See especially Constitution ss 7 and 24.
50. Shireen Morris and Adrienne Stone, ‘Abortion Protests and the Limits of Freedom of Political Communication: Clubb v Edwards; Preston v Avery’ (2018) 40(3) Sydney Law Review 395, 397–8.
51. Roux (n 46) 23.
52. Jumbunna Coal Mine v Victorian Coal Miners’ Association (1908) 6 CLR 309, 320–2 (Higgins J), citing McCulloch v Maryland, 17 US (4 Wheat) 316 (1819).
53. Adrienne Stone, ‘The Limits of Constitutional Text and Structure: Standards of Review and the Freedom of Political Communication’ (1999) 23(3) Melbourne University Law Review 668, 676–8; Nicholas Aroney, ‘Justice McHugh, Representative Government and the Elimination of Balancing’ (2006) 28(3) Sydney Law Review 505, 519, 526; H P Lee, ‘The “Reasonably Appropriate and Adapted” Test and the Implied Freedom of Political Communication’ in Matthew Groves (ed), Law and Government in Australia (Federation Press, 2005) 59, 61; Mason (n 13) 117. See also the review of the case law in Nicholas Aroney, ‘The Freedom of Political Communication since Lange: Commentary’ in Adrienne Stone and George Williams (eds), The High Court at the Crossroads: Essays in Constitutional Law (Federation Press, 2000) 21, 27.
54. Coleman (2004) 220 CLR 1, 90 [234] (Kirby J).
55. Ibid 110 [292] (Callinan J).
56. Monis (2013) 249 CLR 92, 182 [246] (Heydon J).
57. Mulholland (2004) 220 CLR 181, 266 [247] (Kirby J).
58. Monis (2013) 249 CLR 92, 182 [246] (Heydon J).
59. McCloy, (2015) 257 CLR 178, 216 [75] (French CJ, Kiefel, Bell and Keane JJ).
60. Clubb [2019] HCA 11, 27 [74] (Kiefel CJ, Bell and Keane JJ).
61. See Stone, ‘The Limits of Constitutional Text and Structure’ (n 53); Adrienne Stone, ‘The Limits of Constitutional Text and Structure Revisited’ (2005) 28(3) UNSW Law Journal 842.
62. Stone, ‘The Limits of Constitutional Text and Structure’ (n 53), 845.
63. Elisa Arcioni and Adrienne Stone, ‘The Small Brown Bird: Values and Aspirations in the Australian Constitution’ (2016) 14(1) International Journal of Constitutional Law 60, 74.
64. McCloy, (2015) 257 CLR 178, 195 [2] (French CJ, Kiefel, Bell and Keane JJ).
65. Brown (2017) 261 CLR 328, 376–7 [160] (Gageler J), see also 465–6 [432] (Gordon J); Aroney and Saunders (n 46) 240; Mason (n 13) 121; Murray Wesson, ‘Crafting a Concept of Deference for the Implied Freedom of Political Communication’ (2016) 27 Public Law Review 87, 107–8.
66. See, eg, Niels Petersen, Proportionality and Judicial Activism: Fundamental Rights Adjudication in Canada, Germany and South Africa (Cambridge University Press, 2017) 38–47; Frederick Schauer, ‘Balancing, Subsumption, and the Constraining Role of Legal Text’ in Matthias Klatt (ed), Institutionalized Reason: The Jurisprudence of Robert Alexy (Oxford University Press, 2012) 307, 307–8; Bernhard Schlink, ‘Proportionality In Constitutional Law: Why Everywhere But Here?’ (2011) 22(2) Duke Journal of Comparative and International Law 291, 299; Grégoire C N Webber, ‘Proportionality, Balancing, and the Cult of Constitutional Rights Scholarship’ (2010) 23(1) Canadian Journal of Law and Jurisprudence 179, 196.
67. See Herbert Wechsler, ‘Toward Neutral Principles of Constitutional Law’ (1959) 73(1) Harvard Law Review 1.
68. See, eg, Nettle J in Clubb [2019] HCA 11, 95 [271]. Nettle J accepted this criticism, but said ‘it is to be observed that the need to weigh incommensurables is hardly unprecedented in the law’.
69. See Schauer (n 66) 307–8.
70. See, eg, Caroline Henckels, ‘Proportionality and the Separation of Powers in Constitutional Review: Examining the Role of Judicial Deference’ (2017) 45(2) Federal Law Review 181, 186. See also Arcioni and Stone (n 63) 74; Aroney and Saunders (n 46) 240.
71. Mason (n 44) 5; Dixon (n 44) 157.
72. Jackson (n 2) 3153.
73. See, eg, Lee (n 53) 59; Stone, ‘The Limits of Constitutional Text and Structure Revisited’ (n 61); Tom Campbell and Stephen Crilly, ‘The Implied Freedom of Political Communication, Twenty Years On’ (2011) 30(1) University of Queensland Law Journal 59, 73.
74. Ronald Sackville, ‘An Age of Judicial Hegemony’ (2013) 87(2) Australian Law Journal 105, 118.
75. McCloy, (2015) 257 CLR 178, 193–5 [2] (French CJ, Kiefel, Bell and Keane JJ).
76. Ibid 215–16 [74] (French CJ, Kiefel, Bell and Keane JJ).
77. Ibid 216 [75] (French CJ, Kiefel, Bell and Keane JJ).
78. Ibid 216–17 [77]–[78] (French CJ, Kiefel, Bell and Keane JJ), citing Bank Mellat v Her Majesty’s Treasury (No 2) [2014] AC 700.
79. Stone, ‘Expression’ (n 45) 964.
80. Clubb [2019] HCA 11, 27 [74] (Kiefel CJ, Bell and Keane JJ).
81. Jackson (n 2) 3157.
82. Stone, ‘The Limits of Constitutional Text and Structure’ (n 53) 693.
83. Schauer (n 66) 309 (emphasis added).
84. Dieter Grimm, ‘Proportionality in Canadian and German Constitutional Jurisprudence’ (2007) 57(2) University of Toronto Law Journal 383, 397.
85. Petersen (n 66) 9.
86. Ibid.
87. Ibid 189.
88. Clubb [2019] HCA 11, 137 [400] (emphasis in original).
89. Note that the joint judgment in Brown did not reach the balancing stage because the impugned legislation was found to fail the test of reasonable necessity: Brown (2017) 261 CLR 328, 371−3 [139]−[146] (Kiefel CJ, Bell and Keane JJ). See also Moshe Cohen-Eliya and Iddo Porat, ‘Proportionality and the Culture of Justification’ (2011) 59(2) American Journal of Comparative Law 463, 464.
90. Clubb [2019] HCA 11, 96 [274].
91. See, eg, Petersen (n 66) 11.
92. Kirk (n 16) 63.
93. Arcioni and Stone (n 63) 76.
94. Ibid.
95. Mark Antaki, ‘The Rationalism of Proportionality’s Culture of Justification’ in Grant Huscroft, Bradley W Miller and Grégoire Webber (eds), Proportionality and the Rule of Law: Rights, Justification, Reasoning (Cambridge University Press, 2014) 284, 285.
96. Murphy (2016) 261 CLR 28, 123 [299] (Gordon J); Brown (2017) 261 CLR 328, 477 [477] (Gordon J).
97. McCloy (2015) 257 CLR 178, 235 [142] (Gageler J); Brown (2017) 261 CLR 328, 477 [475] (Gordon J); Clubb [2019] HCA 11, 137 [399] (Gordon J).
98. Henckels (n 70) 181; See also Wesson (n 65) 104.
99. See, eg, McCloy (2015) 257 CLR 178, 35 [77], 36 [82], 38 [89]–[90].
100. Ibid 220 [90]–[91].
101. Brown (2017) 261 CLR 328, 466–7 [434]–[437].
102. Wesson (n 65) 107.
103. McClure (n 19) 308.
104. Mason (n 44) 4.
105. See, eg, Ronald Sackville, ‘The Changing Character of Judicial Review in Australia: The Legacy of Marbury v Madison?’ (2014) 25 Public Law Review 245, 260.
106. Aileen Kavanagh, ‘Defending Deference in Public Law and Constitutional Theory’ (2010) 126 Law Quarterly Review 222, 223–4.
107. Aharon Barak, Proportionality: Constitutional Rights and Their Limitations (Cambridge University Press, 2012) 397–8, citing David Dyzenhaus, ‘The Politics of Deference: Judicial Review and Democracy’ in Michael Taggart (ed), The Province of Administrative Law (Hart Publishing, 1997) 279–307.
108. Ibid 398.
109. T R S Allan, ‘Human Rights and Judicial Review: A Critique Of “Due Deference”’ (2006) 65(3) Cambridge Law Journal 671.
110. Mason (n 44) 6–7.
111. Kavanagh (n 106) 225–6. Kavanagh argues that there is a range of deference from minimal to substantial, and that while judges always owe the legislature the former they only owe it the latter in exceptional cases (227).
112. Ibid 226.
113. Ibid 248.
114. John Hart Ely, Democracy and Distrust: A Theory of Judicial Review (Harvard University Press, 1980).
115. Stephen Gageler, ‘Implied Rights’ in Coper M and Williams G (eds), The Cauldron of Constitutional Change (Federation Press, 1997). (‘The idea is not entirely home-grown. It owes much to first amendment jurisprudence in the United States, and in particular to the writings and teaching of the American scholar Alexander Meiklejohn.…[T]he implied guarantee of political communication in the way it has been expounded by the High Court is consistent with the theory most notably put forward by the influential American academic, John Hart Ely.…The governing principle is one of reinforcing representation’.). See also the beginnings of this theory in Gageler (n 45).
116. McCloy (2015) 257 CLR 178, 227 [114].
117. Ibid 44 [116].
118. Ely (n 114) 88.
119. Cass R Sunstein, #Republic: Divided Democracy in the Age of Social Media (Princeton University Press, 2017) 205.
120. McCloy (2015) 257 CLR 178, 238 [150] (Gageler J); Brown (2017) 261 CLR 328, 390 [202] (Gageler J), 466 [433] (Gordon J).
121. Dixon (n 44) 106.
122. Clubb [2019] HCA 11, 24 [64] (emphasis in original).
123. Ibid 134 [391].
124. This is discussed further below in Part IV(A).
125. Stephen Gardbaum, ‘Proportionality and Democratic Constitutionalism’ in Grant Huscroft (ed), Proportionality and the Rule of Law Rights, Justification, Reasoning (Cambdrige University Press, 2014) 267.
126. Gertrude Lübbe-Wolff, ‘The Principle of Proportionality in the Case Law of the German Federal Constitutional Court’ (2014) 34 Human Rights Law Journal 12, 16.
127. Julian Rivers, ‘Proportionality and the Variable Intensity of Review’ (2006) 65 Cambridge Law Journal 174, 182.
128. See Part IV(A) below.
129. Mason (n 13) 117.
130. Coleman (2004) 220 CLR 1, 48 [87], 78 [196], 82 [212].
131. Susan Kiefel, ‘Standards of Review in Constitutional Review of Legislation’ in Cheryl Saunders and Adrienne Stone (eds), The Oxford Handbook of the Australian Constitution (Oxford University Press, 2018) 472, 498; Mason (n 44) 7.
132. McCloy (2015) 257 CLR 178, 238 [150].
133. McCloy (2015) 257 CLR 178, 236 [145].
134. Brown (2017) 261 CLR 328, 376 [160].
135. McCloy (2015) 257 CLR 178, 288–9 [337]–[340]; Brown (2017) 261 CLR 328, 466 [433]; Clubb [2019] HCA 11, 134 [392]–[393].
136. Clubb [2019] HCA 11, 134 [391].
137. Chief Justice Robert French, ‘The Globalisation of Public Law: A Quilting of Legalities’ (Speech, Cambridge Public Law Conference, 12 September 2016) 9.
138. Clubb [2019] HCA 11, 50 [159] (Gageler J); 134 [391] (Gordon J). This criticism is explored further below in Part IV(B).
139. See, eg, Leask v The Commonwealth (1996) 187 CLR 579, 600–1 (Dawson J) (Dawson J stated ‘[t]o introduce the concept of proportionality, whether it be via the notion that a law must be reasonably appropriate and adapted to some end in view or by any other route, is to introduce a concept which is alien to the principles which this Court has hitherto applied’); Mulholland v Australian Electoral Commission (2004) 220 CLR 181, 197–8 [34] (Gleeson CJ) (Gleeson CJ stated ‘[t]he concept of proportionality has both the advantage that it is commonly used in other jurisdictions in similar fields of discourse and the disadvantage that, in the course of such use, it has taken on elaborations that vary in content, and that may be imported sub silentio into a different context without explanation’); Roach (2007) 233 CLR 162, 178 [17] (Gleeson CJ) (Gleeson CJ states that ‘[t]here is a danger that uncritical translation of the concept of proportionality from [overseas] legal context[s]…to the Australian context could lead to the application in this country of a constitutionally inappropriate standard of judicial review of legislative action’).
140. Clubb [2019] HCA 11, 162 [465] (Edleman J).
141. This is discussed in Part IV(C) below.
142. Murphy (2016) 261 CLR 28, 52 [37] (French CJ and Bell J).
143. Jackson (n 2) 3159.
144. Adrienne Stone, ‘Judicial Reasoning’ in Cheryl Saunders and Adrienne Stone (eds), The Oxford Handbook of the Australian Constitution (Oxford University Press, 2018) 472, 485.
145. Sweet and Matthews (n 2) 93.
146. Robert Alexy, A Theory of Contstiutional Rights (Oxford University Press, 2009) 47–50.
147. Robert Alexy, ‘Proportionality and Rationality’ in Vicki C Jackson and Mark V Tushnet (eds), Proportionality: New Frontiers, New Challenges (Cambridge University Press, 2017) 13, 14.
148. Jackson (n 2) 3121, 3125.
149. Roach (2007) 233 CLR 162, 179 [17].
150. Scott Stephenson, ‘Rights Protection in Australia’ in Cheryl Saunders and Adrienne Stone (eds), The Oxford Handbook of the Australian Constitution (Oxford University Press, 2018) 905; See also Roux (n 46) 17.
151. Dixon (n 44) 102.
152. See, eg, discussion in Brown (2017) 261 CLR 328, 466 [433]–[436] (Gordon J).
153. Stone (n 144) 485.
154. Kiefel (n 22) 85.
155. French (n 137) 9–10; Kiefel (n 22); Brad Selway, ‘The Rise and Rise of the Reasonably Proportionality Test in Public Law’ (1996) 7 Public Law Review 212; Kirk (n 16); Rosalind Dixon, ‘Overriding Guarantee of Just Terms of Supplementary Source of Power? Rethinking s51 of the Constitution’ (2005) 27(4) Sydney Law Review 638.
156. Tasmanian Dam case (1983) 158 CLR 1; Richardson v Forestry Commission (1988) 164 CLR 261.
157. Davis v Commonwealth (1988) 166 CLR 79; Nationwide News Pty Ltd v Wills (1992) 177 CLR 1 (‘Nationwide News’).
158. Castlemaine Tooheys Ltd v South Australia (1990) 169 CLR 436; Betfair Pty Ltd v Western Australia (2008) 234 CLR 418.
159. Kiefel (n 131) 498.
160. David M Beatty, The Ultimate Rule of Law (Oxford University Pres, 2004) 168.
161. McCloy (2015) 257 CLR 178, 206 [42] (French CJ, Kiefel, Bell and Keane JJ).
162. Ibid 215 [73].
163. Beatty (n 160) 175.
164. Barak (n 107) 738, 741.
165. Petersen (n 66) 80.
166. David Kenny, ‘Proportionality and the Inevitability of the Local: A Comparative Localist Analysis of Canada and Ireland’ (2018) 66 American Journal of Comparative Law 537.
167. McCloy (2015) 257 CLR 178, 195 [3].
168. Clubb [2019] HCA 11, 51 [160].
169. Ibid 136 [396] (Gordon J).
170. Ibid 51 [159].
171. See, eg, Ibid 134 [391].
172. Ibid 134 [391], 137 [401].
173. Ibid 163 [467].
174. Ibid 162 [465].
175. McCloy (2015) 257 CLR 178, 195 [4], 212 [67], 215 [72], 219 [88].
176. Ibid 212 [67].
177. Ibid 206 [42].
178. Ibid 206 [41], citing Citizens United v Federal Election Commission (2010) 558 US 310, 365, 469.
179. Ibid 236–8 [146]–[149].
180. Lorraine E Weinrib, ‘The Supreme Court of Canada in the Age of Rights: Constitutional Democracy, the Rule of Law and Fundamental Rights under Canada’s Constitution’ (2001) 80 Canadian Bar Review 699, 737–40 (arguing that this was the approach adopted by the Supreme Court of Canada in the early days of its interpretation of the limitation clause of the Charter.).
181. Stone (n 144) 485.
182. McCloy (2015) 257 CLR 178, 195 [2].
183. Brown (2017) 261 CLR 328, 422 [290] (emphasis added).
184. I am adopting Julian Rivers’ distinction between deference and restraint. Deference describes a court’s acceptance of another authority’s assessment of some relevant matter, while restraint describes the range of options that a court preserves for non-judicial bodies: Rivers (n 127) 175–7.
185. Kiefel (n 131) 505.
186. Ibid (emphasis added).
187. Jackson (n 2) 3147.
188. Clubb [2019] HCA 11, [66].
189. Ibid [102], [128].
190. Ibid [270].
191. Ibid [292].
192. Ibid [408].
193. Clubb [2019] HCA 11, [495]–[497].
194. McCloy (2015) 257 CLR 178, 196 [5].
195. See, eg, Tajjour (2014) 254 CLR 508, 550 [36] (French CJ stating ‘The cautionary qualification that alternative means be ‘obvious and compelling’ ensures that consideration of the alternatives remains a tool of analysis in applying the required proportionality criterion. Courts must not exceed their constitutional competence by substituting their own legislative judgments for those of parliaments’.).
196. Kiefel (n 131) 503.
197. In McCloy, French CJ, Kiefel, Bell and Keane JJ applied structured proportionality in upholding the legislation (220–1 [93]–[94]) while Gageler J (234–40 [140]–[157]) and Gordon J (281–2 [308]–[311]) voiced strong objections to the new test but joined the majority in upholding the legislation. Justice Nettle’s dissent on the issue of the restriction on donations from property developers depended on a view of the facts that led him to conclude that the discriminatory restrictions were not ‘reasonably appropriate and adapted, or proportionate’ (at 273 [269]). His Honour’s conclusion was therefore not dependent on the use of a different framework, and indeed invoked both tests to show as much. Similarly, in Brown, Kiefel CJ, Bell and Keane JJ applied the new McCloy test in finding the legislation invalid ([146]). Nettle J wrote separately but also applied the McCloy test and reached the same conclusion ([278]–[280]). Gageler J continued to voice concerns about the McCloy test but also found the legislation invalid ([232]). Gordon J’s dissent also did not apply the McCloy test, but her decision largely turned on a different characterisation of the burden imposed by the legislation (finding it ‘minimal’ and merely a ‘time, place and manner’ restriction) (at [426]). Edelman J did not address the question of the appropriate test, finding that the legislation did not burden political communication at all (at [557]). The Court unanimously dismissed both appeals involved in Clubb. There were differences of opinion as to whether the constitutional question raised by the Clubb challenge was necessary to answer which are not presently relevant, but all judgments reached the constitutional question in Preston and arrived at the same outcome on the merits regardless of which test they applied.
198. See suggestions to this effect in Brown (2017) 261 CLR 328 [436]–[437] (Gordon J); Murphy (2016) 261 CLR 28 [101] (Gageler J, suggesting that expansion of structured proportionality would mean ‘ill-fitted analytical tool has become the master’).
199. Mason (n 44) 2.
200. Cohen-Eliya and Porat (n 89) 466.
201. See above nn 75–87 and accompanying text.
202. Clubb [2019] HCA 11 [463].
203. Ibid [400].
204. Petersen (n 66) 9.
205. Kiefel (n 131) 508–9.
206. Ibid 508; See also McCloy (2015) 257 CLR 178, 216 [74].
207. Kiefel (n 131) 509 (emphasis added).
208. Clubb [2019] HCA 11 [158] (Gageler J); [401] (Gordon J).
209. Ibid [469].
210. Brown (2017) 261 CLR 328, 377 [161].
211. McCloy (2015) 257 CLR 178, 236–8 [146]–[149].
212. Schlink (n 66) 302.
213. Adrienne Stone, ‘I-CONnect Symposium on “Constitutional Boundaries”—Proportionality and the Boundaries of Borrowing’ I-CONect (24 April 2018) <http://www.iconnectblog.com/2018/04/i-connect-symposium-on-constitutional-boundaries-proportionality-and-the-boundaries-of-borrowing/>.
214. See, eg, Adrienne Stone, ‘Freedom of Political Communication, the Constitution and the Common Law’ (1998) 26(2) Federal Law Review 219, 238; Jamal Greene, ‘Foreword: Rights as Trumps?’ (2018) 132 Harvard Law Review 28, 95 (Proportionality ‘better approximates the common law method than does the categorical frame, for it makes relevant the kinds of comparative factual assessments that motivate common law reasoning; like cases are to be treated alike and different cases are to be treated differently’).
215. See, eg, In re Judiciary and Navigation Acts (1921) 29 CLR 257, 267 (per Knox CJ, Gavan Duffy, Powers, Rich and Starke JJ); Jeremy Kirk, ‘Justiciability’ in Cheryl Saunders and Adrienne Stone (eds), The Oxford Handbook of the Australian Constitution (Oxford University Press, 2018) 510, 528; McCloy (2015) 257 CLR 178, 288 [337] (Gordon J).
216. Frederick Schauer, ‘The Convergence of Rules and Standards’ (2003) New Zealand Law Review 303; Greene (n 214) 95.
217. Brown (2017) 261 CLR 328, 378 [163] (Gageler J); Stone (n 45) 966.
218. Reed v Town of Gilbert, 576 US ___ (2015) (Kagan J). Justice Breyer in the same case argued for less rigidity in the application of categories, arguing against the ‘mechanical use of categories’. The categorical approach is discussed further in the next section.
219. Kiefel (n 131) 504.
220. McCloy (2015) 257 CLR 178, 32 [67] (noting ‘the process of justification called for by Lange’), 33 [69] (stating ‘[i]t was said by members of the Court in Nationwide News and in ACTV that what is called for is a justification for a burden on the freedom. Similar statements were made in cases which followed, both before and after Lange’. These statements are supported by extensive references in footnotes to references in the case law of a requirement of justification.), 37 [86].
221. Cohen-Eliya and Porat (n 89) drawing on the work of Etienne Mureinik.
222. Moshe Cohen-Eliya and Iddo Porat, ‘Proportionality and Justification’ (2014) 64(3) University of Toronto Law Journal 458, 463.
223. Ibid 491.
224. Mattias Kumm, ‘The Idea of Socratic Contestation and the Right to Justification: The Point of Rights-Based Proportionality Review’ (2010) 4(2) Law & Ethics of Human Rights 141.
225. See Part III(A) above.
226. Cohen-Eliya and Porat (n 89) 470–1.
227. McCloy (2015) 257 CLR 178 [70].
228. Brown (2017) 261 CLR 328, 378 [164], citing Tajjour (2014) 254 CLR 508, 580 [151]; Clubb [2019] HCA 11 [161].
229. McCloy (2015) 257 CLR 178 [152].
230. Brown (2017) 261 CLR 328, 477–8 [477]–[478].
231. Mason (n 13) 121–2 (emphasis added).
232. Kiefel (n 131) 506.
233. See, eg, Mason (n 13) 121, cited in Brown (2017) 261 CLR 328 [477] (Gordon J).
234. Mark Tushnet, ‘The First Amendment and Political Risk’ (2012) 4(1) Journal of Legal Analysis 103, 116.
235. Stone, ‘The Limits of Constitutional Text and Structure’ (n 53) 694.
236. Jackson (n 2) 3192.
237. Clubb [2019] HCA 11 [404].
238. Clubb [2019] HCA 11 [159], citing K S Jacobs, ‘The Successor Books to “The Province and Function of Law”—Lawyers’ Reasonings: Some Extra-Judicial Reflections’ (1967) 5 Sydney Law Review 425, 428.
239. Greene (n 214) 33, 74–7.
240. Elena Kagan, ‘Private Speech, Public Purpose: The Role of Governmental Motive in First Amendment Doctrine’ (1996) 63(2) University of Chicago Law Review 413, 515.
241. RAV v City of St Paul, Minnesota, 505 US 377 (1992) (Stevens J, concurring).
242. David A Strauss, The Living Constitution (Oxford University Press, 2010) 62.
243. Greene (n 214) 41.
244. McCloy (2015) 257 CLR 178 [162].
245. Ibid [239].
246. Brown (2017) 261 CLR 328, 464 [426].
247. Ibid 477–8 [478].
248. Ibid 367 [117], 389 [199], 403 [247], 407–8 [258].
249. Ward v Rock Against Racism, 491 US 781 (1989).
250. Clubb [2019] HCA 11 [183].
251. Ibid [183].
252. Discussed below.
253. Ibid [184].
254. Ibid [389].
255. Trump v Hawaii, 585 US ___ (2018).
256. See, eg, Heidi Kitrosser, ‘From Marshall McLuhan to Anthropomorphic Cows: Communicative Manner and the First Amendment’ (2002) 96 Northwestern University Law Review 1339.
257. See, eg, Hill v Colorado, 530 US 703 (2000), and discussion in Kathleen M Sullivan, ‘Sex, Money, and Groups: Free Speech and Association Decisions in the October 1999 Term’ (2001) 28(3) Pepperdine Law Review 723 (commenting that despite the Court holding that the law in Hill was a permissible ‘time, place, manner’ restriction, ‘the law in Hill arguably has a viewpoint-discriminatory effect: requiring listeners affirmatively to consent to speech will inevitably have the effect of discriminating in favour of popular or widely accepted messages’.) See also Jackson (n 2) 3128–9. Justice Gageler noted in Clubb that he did not find the majority’s view persuasive: Clubb [2019] HCA 11 [182].
258. Whole Women’s Health v Hellerstedt, 579 US ___, 11–12 (2016) (Thomas J dissenting).
259. See, eg, Burson v Freeman, 504 US 191 (1992).
260. Schauer (n 216) 314.
261. Richard H Fallon Jr, ‘Strict Judicial Scrutiny’ (2007) 54 UCLA Law Review 1267, 1330–2; Schlink (n 66) 297; Louis Kaplow, ‘On the Design of Legal Rules: Balancing Versus Structured Decision Procedures’ (2019) 132 Harvard Law Review 992.
262. Fallon (n 261) 1295.
263. Stephen Breyer, The Court and the World: American Law and the New Global Realities (Alfred A Knopf, 2015) 257.
264. Leading to the famous saying that strict scrutiny is ‘strict in theory and fatal in fact’: Fallon (n 261) 1304–5.
265. See nn 219–23 and accompanying text.
266. Kagan (n 240) 438–41.
267. Ibid 441; see also 414.
268. Ibid 415 (emphasis added).
269. Project Blue Sky Inc v Australian Broadcasting Authority (1998) 194 CLR 355, 381–2 [69]–[70]; CIC Insurance Ltd v Bankstown Football Club Ltd (1997) 187 CLR 384, 408 (‘[T]he modern approach to statutory interpretation…insists that the context be considered in the first instance’.); Acts Interpretation Act 1901 (Cth), s 15AB.
270. Woods (n 45) 605.
271. Kiefel (n 131) 506.
272. Aileen Kavanagh, ‘Judicial Restraint in the Pursuit of Justice’ (2010) 60(1) University of Toronto Law Journal 23, 30; T R S Allan, ‘Deference, Defiance, and Doctrine: Defining the Limits of Judicial Review’ (2010) 60(1) University of Toronto Law Journal 41, 53.
273. The different tests used in Clubb were not explained.
274. Brown (2017) 261 CLR 328, 378 [163] (Gageler J).
275. Ibid 477–8 [478] (Gordon J).
276. McCloy (2015) 257 CLR 178, 217 [78], quoting Bank Mellat v HM Treasury [No 2] [2014] AC 700, 790 [72]–[74].
277. Mason (n 44) 2, 28 (‘Because policy oriented interpretation exposes underlying values for debate it would enhance the open character of the judicial decision-making process and promote legal reasoning that is more comprehensible and persuasive to society as a whole. This development would lead to a better understanding of constitutional judgments and, no doubt, to a greater capacity and willingness to criticize them’).
278. Roux (n 46) 24.
279. Richard H Fallon Jr, ‘Legitimacy and the Constitution’ (2004–05) 118 Harvard Law Review 1787, 1824.
280. Ibid.
281. Richard H Fallon Jr, Law and Legitimacy in the Supreme Court (Harvard University Press, 2018) 119–20; Kavanagh (n 272) 36 (Noting that judges ‘need to ensure that the courts are respected both by the other branches of government and by the public at large. Just as they are concerned to do justice in the individual case, they must also be concerned with their more long-term ability to fulfil this role’.).
282. Petersen (n 66) 66.