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Apprehended Bias in Australian Administrative Law

Published online by Cambridge University Press:  24 January 2025

John Griffiths SC
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Extract

Although the basic test for apprehended bias is now well-established in Australian law, its application continues to present difficulties. The basic test is whether a fair-minded lay observer with knowledge of the material objective facts might reasonably apprehend that the judicial or administrative decision-maker might not bring an impartial and unprejudiced mind to the resolution of the question at hand. It is equally well-established that, while the same objective test applies to judges as to tribunal members and other public decision-makers, the application and content of that test varies depending on the context, including differences in decision-making roles, functions, powers and processes.

The application of the test can be problematic and somewhat unpredictable. For example, despite the unqualified terms of the relevant parts of the High Court’s decision in Ebner, it now appears that, at least in the context of curial decision-making, the Ebner two-step test is not universal in its application.

Type
Research Article
Information
Federal Law Review , Volume 38 , Issue 3 , September 2010 , pp. 353 - 369
Copyright
Copyright © 2010 The Australian National University

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References

1 Livesey v New South Wales Bar Association (1983) 151 CLR 288 at 293–94, 300; Re Polites; Ex Parte Hoyts Corporation Pty Ltd (1991) 173 CLR 78; Webb v R (1994) 181 CLR 41, 67 ('Webb’); Johnson v Johnson (2000) 201 CLR 488, 492 [11] ('Johnson’); Ebner v Official Trustee in Bankruptcy (2000) 205 CLR 337,344 [6] ('Ebner’); Re Refugee Review Tribunal; Ex parte H (2001) 179 ALR 425, 434 [27] ('Ex Parte H’); Concrete Pty Ltd v Parramatta Design & Developments Pty Limited (2006) 229 CLR 577 ('Concrete Pty Ltd’), 609 [110]; McGovern v Ku-ring-gai Council (2008) 72 NSWLR 504 ('McGovern’); Weinstein v Medical Practitioners Board of Victoria (2008) 21 VR 29 [35].

2 Ebner, 344 [4]; Minister for Immigration & Multicultural Affairs v Jia Legeng (2001) 205 CLR 507, 533, 539 [78], [101], [102] ('Jia’); Ex parte H at [28], [29]; Hot Holdings Pty Ltd v Creasy (2002) 210 CLR 438 ('Hot Holdings’); Greyhound Racing NSW v Cessnock and District Agricultural Association [2006] NSWCA 333 (Unreported, Beazley, Hodgson and Basten JJA, 27 November 2006) [118] ('Greyhound Racing NSW’); McGovern (2008) 72 NSWLR 504, 507-08 [6]–[13], 517-18, [75]–[77].

3 Murlan Consulting Pty Limited v Ku-ring-gai Municipal Council (2009) 170 LGERA 162, 177 [57] ('Murlan’).

4 Jia (2001) 205 CLR 507, 552 [146].

5 See, eg, Johnson (2000) 201 CLR 488; Mid Western Community Action Group Inc v Mid-Western Regional Council (No 2) [2008] NSWLEC 143 ('Mid Western’).

6 Simon, Atrill, ‘Who is the “fair-minded and informed observer“? Bias after Magill’ (2003) 62 Cambridge Law Journal, 279, 289Google Scholar.

7 See South Western Sydney Area Health Service v Edmonds [2007] NSWCA 16 (Unreported, Giles JA, Tobias JA, McColl JA, 16 February 2007) [97]. Jia involved claims of both actual and apprehended bias, reflecting statutory restrictions on heads of judicial review under the Migration Act 1958 (Cth) and their non-application to the constitutional writs. Traditionally, actual bias appears to be the only test applicable to domestic or non-statutory tribunals: see Maloney v NSW National Coursing Association Ltd [1978] 1 NSWLR 60 and J R S Forbes, Justice in Tribunals, (2nd ed, 2006) 279, but see also Bundagen Co-operative v Battle [2010] NSWSC 160 (Unreported, Latham J, 5 March 2010).

8 In Mark, Aronson, Bruce, Dyer and Matthew, Groves, Judicial Review of Administrative Action, (4th ed, 2009) 746Google Scholar, the authors refer to ‘an alarming increase in the number of cases in which bias is now alleged'.

9 See Ex Parte H (2001) 179 ALR 425, 426 [5].

10 Ebner (2000) 205 CLR 337, 345 [7]. As Kirby J stated in Jia (2001) 205 CLR 507, 541 [111], ‘imputed bias does not require the complainant to establish anything about the subjective motives, attitudes, predilections or purposes of the decision-maker.’ Similarly, see Hayne J, 564 [184].

11 Ebner (2000) 205 CLR 337, 343 [3]. Gaudron J went further, stating at 362 [79] that the requirements that a court act impartially and also be seen to act impartially are requirements ‘embedded in common law and in all developed legal systems', but, in addition, ‘they are also required by Ch III of the Constitution'. The High Court has also emphasised the relationship between the apprehended bias test and the need to maintain confidence in the judicial process in R v Watson; Ex parte Armstrong (1976) 136 CLR 248; Webb (1994) 181 CLR 41, 68; Johnson (2000) 201 CLR 488, 492-3 [12]; and Ex parte H (2001) 179 ALR 425, 426 [5].

12 Ex parte H (2001) 179 ALR 425, 246 [5]. There is an ongoing debate in Australian administrative law as to whether the ultimate source of procedural fairness requirements is to be found in statute or in the common law. See, eg, Kioa v West (1985) 159 CLR 550, 584, 609–11 ('Kioa’); Applicant VEAL of 2002 v Minister for Immigration Multicultural and Indigenous Affairs (2005) 225 CLR 88, 93-4 [10]; Ferdinands v Commissioner for Public Employment (2006) 225 CLR 130, 143 [36]; Tubbo Pty Ltd v Minister Administering the Water Management Act 2000 [2008] NSWCA 356 (Unreported, Spigelman CJ, Allsop P, Sackville AJA, 19 December 2008) [52]–[54]; and most recently Saeed v Minister for Immigration and Citizenship (2010) 84 ALJR 507, 511 [12]-[13].

13 J J, Spigelman, ‘The Centrality of Jurisdictional Error’ (2010) 21 Public Law Review 77-91Google Scholar. See Kirby J in Jia (2001) 205 CLR 507, 550 [138].

14 Webb (1994) 181 CLR 41, 72.

15 [2002] 2 AC 357. The Australian basic test has now also been adopted in New Zealand: see Muir v Commissioner of Inland Revenue (2007) 3 NZLR 495, [44]–[64].

16 Webb (1994) 181 CLR 41, 72.

17 For an example of a case where several members of a multi-member administrative body gave evidence in a case raising the first limb of procedural fairness requirements, see NIB Health Funds Ltd v Private Health Insurance Administration Council (2002) 115 FCR 561. For a discussion of the principle in Jones v Dunkel (1958) 101 CLR 298 in judicial review cases, see Minister for Aboriginal and Torres Strait Islander Affairs v Douglas (1996) 43 ALD 203, 222-223.

18 Ebner (2000) 205 CLR 337, 348 [19].

19 Ex parte H (2001) 179 ALR 425, 434-5 [28].

20 Webb (1994) 181 CLR 41, 74. The fourth category operates by reference to a court being bound by the rules of evidence which will have limited or no application in an administrative decision-making context unless the case involves an administrative tribunal which is bound by the rules of evidence.

21 Murlan (2009) 170 LGERA 162 [57]. Other cases suggesting that different principles may apply to particular categories of apprehended bias, such as where an interest or preconception exists independently of the circumstances of the particular case, include Re JRL: Ex parte CJL (1986) 161 CLR 342, 372 ('Re JRL’) and R v Minister for Immigration and Multicultural Affairs; Ex parte Epeabaka (2001) 206 CLR 128 [21].

22 (1994) 181 CLR 41, 73.

23 (1990) 170 CLR 70, 87 ('Laws’).

24 Ibid.

25 Johnson (2000) 201 CLR 488, 493 [13]. See also Concrete Pty Ltd (2006) 229 CLR 577, 609–10 [111], 635–6 [177].

26 See Gascor v Ellicott [1997] 1 VR 332, 342–3 and similarly see IOOF Australia Trustees Ltd v Seas Sapfor Forests Pty Ltd (1999) 78 SASR 151, 182 [185].

27 [2008] NSWLEC 143.

28 (1996) 191 CLR 1, 49–51. See further pages 367–8.

29 (2007) 158 LGERA 250 ('Bonaccorso Pty Ltd’). The danger of excessive selectivity in imputing knowledge to the hypothetical observer was emphasised by Clarke JA in Najjar v Haines (1991) 25 NSWLR 224, 240.

30 Bonaccorso Pty Ltd (2007) 158 LGERA 250, 295.

31 (2008) 72 NSWLR 504, 507 [6]. Similarly, see Greyhound Racing NSW [2006] NSWCA 333 (Unreported, Beazley, Hodgson and Basten JJA, 27 November 2006) [111].

32 Jia (2001) 205 CLR 507, 529 [63].

33 Ibid 528, [61]. See also at 533–4 [78], 538–9 [99]–[102], 546 [125], 551–2 [141]–[143], 562–3 [180]–[182], 565 [187], 583–4 [244]–[245].

34 See, eg, McGovern (2008) 72 NSWLR 504, 508 [13], 516 [70], 517–8 [75]–[77]; Mid Western [2008] NSWLEC 143 [29]–[38]; Winky Pop Pty Ltd v Hobsons Bay City Council (2007) 19 VR 312, 322 [33] ('Winky Pop’); R v Redcar and Cleveland Borough Council [2009] 1 WLR 83, 101 [62] ff, 107–8 [94] ff, 112 [111].

35 McGovern (2008) 72 NSWLR 504, 535 [157]. In local government decision-making and some other areas involving industry regulation, apprehended bias principles may operate in conjunction with statutory provisions dealing specifically with conflicts of interest, including disclosure requirements and the effect on validity where there is a breach: see Winky Pop (2007) 19 VR 312, 318–20 [18]–[26]; Greyhound Racing NSW [2006] NSWCA 333 (Unreported, Beazley, Hodgson and Basten JJA, 27 November 2006) [114] ff.

36 (2009) 168 LGERA 269, 280–1 [43]–[44], 281–2 [46]–[48] ('Gwandalan’). See further below pages 12-13.

37 See, eg, Bennetts v Board of Fire Commissioners of New South Wales (1967) 87 WN (NSW) 307; Builders’ Registration Board of Queensland v Rauber (1983) 57 ALJR 376, 385; Commissioner of Corrective Services v Government and Related Employees Appeal Tribunal [2004] NSWCA 291 (Unreported, Sheller, Giles and Ipp JJA, 31 August 2004) [22]–[24]; Greyhound Racing NSW [2006] NSWCA 333 (Unreported, Beazley, Hodgson and Basten JJA, 27 November 2006) [118].

38 R v Anderson; Ex parte Ipec-Air Pty Ltd (1965) 113 CLR 177, 189.

39 Jia (2001) 205 CLR 507, 529 [63]. See also Franklin v Minister of Town and Country Planning [1948] AC 87, 104 ('Franklin’); CREEDNZ Inc v Governor-General [1981] 1 NZLR 172, 179 ('CREEDNZ Inc’); Hot Holdings (2002) 210 CLR 438, 455 [50].

40 (1989) 100 ALR 383, 417 and to similar effect see Laws (1990) 170 CLR 70, 91.

41 See, eg, Hot Holdings (2002) 210 CLR 438, 448–9 [22]–[24], 455–6 [52].

42 Ex parte H (2001) 179 ALR 425, 435 [32].

43 See, eg, Johnson (2000) 201 CLR 488, 499 [33]; Ebner (2000) 205 CLR 337, 345 [8]; Concrete Pty Ltd (2006) 229 CLR 577, 609–10 [111], 634 [174].

44 See especially Gwandalan (2009) 168 LGERA 269, 296–7 [123].

45 [1948] AC 87.

46 [1981] 1 NZLR 172.

47 Gwandalan (2009) 168 LGERA 269, 298 [134].

48 See ibid 299–301 [140]–[148].

49 See ss 93F–93L of the EPA Act.

50 Jia (2001) 205 CLR 507, 549 [136] (emphasis added). To similar effect, the Supreme Court of Canada in Baker v Canada (Minister of Citizenship and Immigration) [1999] 2 SCR 817 [47] stated that part of the relevant context for defining the applicable standard of apprehended bias was the individualised nature and impact of immigration decisions and their ‘special sensitivity'.

51 See, eg, Kioa (1985) 159 CLR 550, 584.

52 See generally Aronson, Dyer and Groves, above n 8, [7.175]–[7.205].

53 (2001) 206 CLR 128.

54 Ferati v Minister for Immigration and Multicultural Affairs (1998) 54 ALD 381.

55 Similarly, see Mid Western [2008] NSWLEC 143 [28]–[40].

56 See, eg, Re JRL (1986) 161 CLR 342, 372; Vakauta v Kelly (1989) 167 CLR 568, 572, 577; Webb (1994) 181 CLR 41, 53, 91–2; cf 62, 79.

57 (2008) 21 VR 29.

58 Much of the uncertainty concerns the correctness of the following statement by Gummow J in IW v City of Perth (1996) 191 CLR 1, 50:

It has been said that a decision of a collegiate body may be successfully attacked for bias even where but one member was biased and that member was not one of the majority. This is on the footing that in bias cases the court does not enter into difficult evidentiary questions as to the extent to which that person may have influenced the majority.

59 McGovern (2008) 72 NSWLR 504, 510–3 [31]–[47]. Other relevant cases include Attorney-General (Vic) v City of Knox [1979] VR 513; Winky Pop (2007) 19 VR 312.

60 McGovern (2008) 72 NSWLR 504, 524 [103] (emphasis added).

61 Ibid 553 [237].

62 Ibid 508 [14].

63 See, eg, Gwandalan (2009) 168 LGERA 269, 272 [4].

64 See, eg, Stollery v Greyhound Racing Control Board (1972) 128 CLR 509, 519; R v Commonwealth Conciliation and Arbitration Commission; Ex parte Angliss Group (1969) 122 CLR 546, 553; Re JRL (1986) 161 CLR 342, 372; Jia (2001) 205 CLR 507, 549 [135].

65 See also Basten JA's comments in McGovern (2008) 72 NSWLR 504, 525 [105]–[106].

66 Ibid 526 [111].