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Attorney-General for Victoria; Ex Rel. Black v. the Commonwealth

Published online by Cambridge University Press:  24 January 2025

David C. Bennett
David C. Bennett*
Affiliation:
Advisings Division, Attorney-General's Department, Canberra
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Abstract

Constitutional law — Law for establishing any religion — Grant of Financial Assistance to States — Validity of Commonwealth legislation providing financial assistance to non-government schools — Constitution ss. 96, 116

Type
Case Note
Information
Federal Law Review , Volume 12 , Issue 3 , September 1981 , pp. 271 - 279
Copyright
Copyright © 1981 The Australian National University

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Footnotes

1

(1981) 55 A.L.J.R. 155; (1981) 33 A.L.R. 321. High Court of Australia; Barwick C.J., Gibbs, Stephen, Mason, Murphy, Aickin and Wilson JJ.

The views in this Case Note are expressed as the personal views of the author, and are not necessarily those of the Department.

References

2 S. 116 provides: “The Commonwealth shall not make any law for establishing any religion, or for imposing any religious observance, or for prohibiting the free exercise of any religion, and no religious test shall be required as a qualification for any office or public trust under the Commonwealth.”

3 Gibbs Murphy, JJ. discussed the standing of the various plaintiffs: (1981) 55 A.L.J.R. 155, 161Google Scholar-162 and 179 respectively. See also 191 per Wilson J., who raised certain questions of standing but left them to be resolved at some later time. Gibbs and Wilson JJ. left open the question of whether taxpayers and parents of children at government schools could have a special interest in the subject matter of the action such as would give them standing. Murphy J. thought that such persons would have standing.

4 The Commonwealth Acts challenged included the States Grants (Schools) Acts passed from 1972 to 1976, the States Grants (Schools Assistance) Acts passed from 1976 to 1979, the Schools Commission Act 1973 (which establishes a Commission, the functions of which include advising the Minister on matters relevant to the granting of financial assistance to schools), the general Appropriation Acts so far as they appropriate moneys to be spent on non-government schools in the Australian Capital Territory and the Northern Territory and the Independent Schools (Loans Guarantee) Act 1969 (which empowers the Treasurer, on behalf of the Common-wealth, to guarantee certain loans to independent schools in those Territories).

5 The relevant legislation and facts are set out in the judgments of Gibbs and Wilson JJ.: (1981) 55 A.L.J.R. 155, 161 and 180-186 respectively.

6 Id. 167.

7 In respect of both arguments Aickin J. agreed with the reasons for judgment of Gibbs and Mason JJ., id. 179.

8 (1939) 61 C.L.R. 735, affirmed by the Privy Council, (1940) 63 C.L.R. 338. The plaintiffs in the present case sought to distinguish Moran's case and did not challenge its correctness.

9 (1981) 55 A.L.J.R. 155, 163.

10 Id. 163, 170, 190. The plaintiffs argued that Moran's case was distinguishable first, because the legislation under challenge in that case was promoted by the States, and secondly, because in that case the States were involved in the administration of the wheat stabilisation scheme.

11 Id. 160 per Barwick C.J., 162-163 per Gibbs J., 170 per Stephen J., 173 per Mason J., 174 per Murphy J., 189-190 per Wilson J.

12 Id. 160 per Barwick C.J., 163 per Gibbs J., 170 per Stephen J., 190 per Wilson J.

13 Id. 164-165.

14 Id. 165. The relevance of the meaning of the phrase current in 1900 is also referred to at 157-158, 159 per Barwick C.J., 172 per Mason J.

15 Pannam, “Travelling Section 116 with a U.S. Road Map” (1963) 4 Melbourne University Law Review 41, 41.

16 In so far as they are relevant, Art. VI of the United States Constitution provides that “… no religious test shall ever be required as a qualification to any office or public trust under the United States” and the First Amendment provides that “Congress shall make no law respecting an establishment of religion, or prohibiting the free exercise thereof … “.

17 (1981) 55 A.L.J.R. 155, 167; see also 158 per Barwick C.J., 169-170 per Stephen J., 187 per Wilson J. Murphy J. decided that the United States decisions should be followed, id. 178.

18 Id. 158 per Barwick C.J., 165 per Gibbs J., 169-170 per Stephen J., 172 per Mason J., 187 per Wilson J.

19 Id. 157, 158 per Barwick C.J., 164 per Gibbs J., 187 per Wilson J. The history of s. 116 and its precursors is discussed in Quick and Garran, Annotated Constitution of the Australian Commonwealth (1901) 951-953; Pannam, op. cit. 51-55.

20 Murdock v. Pennsylvania (1943) 319 U.S. 105.

21 (1981) 55 A.L.J.R. 155, 188 per Wilson J.

22 Id. 165, 167 per Gibbs J., 187 per Wilson J.; Pannam, op. cit. 43-56, 72-73, 82; Hogan, “Separation of church and State: Section 116 of the Australian Constitution” (1981) 53 The Australian Quarterly 214, 214-216, 218-219. In contrast to s. 116, the First Amendment guarantees a number of fundamental human rights. The United States Supreme Court has been influenced in its interpretation of the First Amendment by statements such as that of Thomas Jefferson that the First Amendment builds “a wall of separation between church and State”: cited in Reynolds v. United States (1878) 98 U.S. 145, 164. In Australia, however, the High Court does not have regard to the Convention Debates in interpreting the Constitution: Tasmania v. Commonwealth (1904) 1 C.L.R. 329, 333-a rule acknowledged in the present case by Barwick C.J., Gibbsand Wilson JJ. at 157, 167 and 188 respectively.

23 Id. 167. The current American test is stated in Lemon v. Kurtzman (1971) 403 U.S. 602, 612-613, cited by Gibbs J., id. 167.

24 Id. 178.

25 Infra p. 275.

26 (198l) 55 A.L.J.R. 155, 187 per Wilson J., cf, 170 per Stephen J.; Pannam, op. cit. 84.

27 Id. 166-167.

28 Id. 167; see also 170 per Stephen J., 171-172 per .Mason J.

29 Id. 167 per Gibbs J.;.see also 159 per Barwick C,J., 168 per Stephen J., 171 per Mason J., 187-188 per Wilson J. Murphy J. agreed with the principal argument of the plaintiffs, id. 175, and therefore held that the challenged Acts contravened s. 116, id. 179. For the views that had been taken by commentators see Pannam, op. cit. 81-86; Cumbrae-Stewart, “Section 116 of the Constitution” (1946) 20 A.L.J. 207, 208; Lane, “Commonwealth Reimbursements for Fees at Non State Schools” (1964) J:8 A.L.J. 130, 132-133.

30 Supra p. 272.

31 (1981) 55 A.L.J.R. 155, 168 per Gibbs J.; see also 159-160 per Barwick C.J., 170 per Stephen J., 173 per Mason J., 188-189 per Wilson J.

32 Id. 172 per Mason J.; see also supra n. 18. Latham C.J. referred to the relevance under s. 116 of the purpose of a law in Adelaide Company of Jehovah's Witnesses Incorporated v. Commonwealth (1943) 67 C.L.R. 116, 132.

33 Id. 158 per Barwick C.J. who thought that to infringe the establishment clause a law must have the prohibited objective as its express and single purpose and 187 per Wilson J. who said that the words “for establishing” convey the sense of “in order to establish”; but see 168 per Gibbs J.

34 Id. 188 per Wilson J.

35 Id. 159, 160 per Barwick C.J., 169 per Stephen J., 173 per Mason J., 187-188per Wilson J.

36 Id. 173 per Mason J.; see also 157, 159 per Barwick C.J., 187 per Wilson J. See generally Cumbrae-Stewart, op. cit. 211-212; Lane, op. cit. 134-136.

37 Id. 157 per Barwick C.J., 163 per Gibbs J., 173 per Mason J., 174 per Murphy J., 186-187 per Wilson J. Stephen J. did not consider either point and Gibbs J. did not consider the position of laws enacted pursuant to s. 81.

38 Id. 173 per Mason J., 187 per Wilson J.

39 Id. 157 per Barwick C.J., 164 per Gibbs J., 173 per Mason J., 174 per Murphy J., 186 per Wilson J. See generally Gibbs, “Section 116 of the Constitution and the Territories of the Commonwealth” (1947) 20 A.L.J. 375; Pannam, “Section 116 and the Federal Territories” (1961) 35 A.L.J. 209; Zines, “'Laws for the Government of any Territory': Section 122 of the Constitution” (1966) 2 F.L.Rev. 72; Finlay, ''The Dual Nature of the Territories Power of the Commonwealth” (1969) 43 A.L.J. 256. If s.116 does apply to laws made under s. 122 it would have a wider operation in the Territories.

40 Id. 168 per Gibbs J.

41 Id. 159-160 per Barwick C.J., 167-168 per Gibbs J., 173 per Mason J,, 189 per Wilson J.

42 The plaintiffs had argued, in particular with respect to the Schools Commission Act 1973 (Cth), that the establishment clause prohibits the excessive involvement of the Commonwealth in religion.

43 (1981) 55 A.L.J.R. 155, 164.

44 Quick and Garran, op. cit. 951; see also the articles referred to supra, n, 29.

45 (1981) 55 A.L.J.R. 155, 173 per Mason J.

46 Id. 171.

47 Id. 166-167 per Gibbs J., 170 per Stephen J., 171-172 per Mason J.; supra p. 274.

48 1d. 170.

49 Hogan, op. cit. 223. The three High Court cases on s. 116 are: Krygger v. Williams (1912) 15 C.L.R. 366; Jehovah's Witnesses case (1943) 67 C.L.R. 116; and the present case. See also Judd v. McKeon (1926) 38 C.L.R. 380, 387 per Higgins J.; Smith v. Handcock (1944) 46 W.A.L.R. 21; Kiorgaard v. Kiorgaard [1967] Qd. R 162; Evers v. Evers (1972) 19 F.L.R. 296; The Church of the New Faith v. Commissioner of Pay-roll Tax (Victoria) (1980) 80 A.T.C. 4,667.

50 (1981) 55 A.L.J.R. 155, 188 per Wilson J.

51 Id. 159 per Barwick C.J., 165 per Gibbs J., 172 per Mason J., 187, 188 per Wilson J.; contra 175 per Murphy J.

52 Contra 175 per Murphy J.

53 See generally Pannam, (1963) op. cit. 62-72.

54 Jehovah's Witnesses case (1943) 67 C.L.R. 116, 126-133 per Latham C.J., 149-150 per Rich J., 154-155 per Starke J., 159-160 per Williams J. Latham C.J., Sfarke and Williams JJ., in particular, appear to accept the “undue infringement” approach. However, the High Court has not considered the validity of a law infringing religious freedom in circumstances where the relevant interest of society was less than the continued existence of the Australian community.

55 Id. 131.

56 Id. 129-131 per Latham C.J. In particular, the Chief Justice commented that the decision ofthe Supreme Court in Davis v. Beason (1890) 133 U.S. 333 “appears to make room for any kind of law thought proper by the legislature on grounds of peace and prosperity and the morals of the people, that is, in practice, upon any grounds at all, notwithstanding the constitutional protection of religion” and said that a test this lenient towards legislative restrictions was “difficult to justify … upon any basis of legal interpretation”, id. 130. See also Pannam, (1963) op. cit. 69-70.

57 See, for example, State of Tennessee; ex rel. Swann v. Pack (1975) 527 S.W. (2d) 99, 111 in which the Supreme Court of Tennessee said that although the right to the free exercise of religion is not absolute and unconditional, “the scales are always weighted in favor of free exercise and the state's interest must be compelling; it must be substantial; the danger must be clear and present and so grave as to endanger paramount public interests.” Such an approach finds support in some of the judgments in the Jehovah's Witnessess case, supra, n. 54.

58 (1981) 55 A.L.J.R. 155, 167. Cf. 170 per Stephen J., 175 per Murphy J.; but cf. 168 per Stephen J., 186, 187 per Wilson J.

59 ld. 187. See also 167 per Gibbs J., 172 per Mason J.

60 Id. 157. See also 175 per Murphy J.