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Calibrated Proportionality

Published online by Cambridge University Press:  01 January 2025

Rosalind Dixon
Rosalind Dixon*
Affiliation:
UNSW Sydney, Australia
*
The author may be contacted at rosalind.dixon@unsw.edu.au.
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Abstract

The High Court currently applies two different tests to determine the validity of laws that effectively burden the implied freedom of political communication (‘IFPC’) under the Constitution—a test of ‘structured proportionality’ and one of ‘calibrated scrutiny’. Both tests have potential advantages, and disadvantages, but there is also a case that, over time, the Court should again adopt a single approach to assessing the validity of laws burdening the IFPC. The article therefore explores what it might mean to create a true hybrid between the two current approaches—that is, a test of ‘calibrated proportionality’. Such an approach, it suggests, should be understood as having three key dimensions: first, explaining how and when certain context-specific ‘calibrating’ factors could usefully inform a test of ‘necessity’ and ‘adequacy in the balance’ under a test of structured proportionality; second, showing how attention to constitutional values can help calibrate the intensity of the Court’s application of the tests; and third, suggesting a well-identified continuum for calibrating the intensity of judicial review, based on four broad categories of case.

Type
Articles
Information
Federal Law Review , Volume 48 , Issue 1 , March 2020 , pp. 92 - 122
Copyright
Copyright © 2019 The Author(s)

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Footnotes

My thanks to Janina Boughey, Lisa Burton Crawford, Evelyn Douek, Joshua Gibson, Zsofia Korosy, Brendan Lim, Sir Anthony Mason, Elizabeth Perham, Shreeya Smith, Adrienne Stone, Murray Wesson and the two anonymous referees for helpful comments on previous versions of the paper and to Melissa Vogt for outstanding research assistance.

References

1. See Adrienne Stone, ‘Proportionality in Australian Constitutional Law’ (Maurice Byers Annual Lecture, NSW Bar Association, 5 December 2018) (‘Proportionality’); Evelyn Douek, ‘All Out of Proportion: The Ongoing Disagreement about Structured Proportionality in Australia’ (2019) 47(4) Federal Law Review (advance); Shipra Chordia, ‘Proportionality in Australian Constitutional Law’ (PhD Thesis, University of New South Wales, 2018).

2. (2015) 257 CLR 178 (‘McCloy’).

3. (2019) 93 ALJR 448 (‘Preston’).

4. McCloy (n 2) 235–7 [141]–[146]; Brown v Tasmania (2017) 261 CLR 328, 377–9 (‘Brown’); Preston (n 3) 485–6 [174], 487–8 [181].

5. Lange v Australian Broadcasting Corporation (1997) 189 CLR 520 (‘Lange’). See below Part III.A.

6. Ibid.

7. Ibid.

8. Aharon Barak, Proportionality: Constitutional Rights and their Limitations (Cambridge University Press, 2012) 542; Adrienne Stone, ‘The Limits of Constitutional Text and Structure: Standards of Review and the Freedom of Political Communication’ (1999) 23(3) Melbourne University Law Review 668 (‘Limits’); Stone, ‘Proportionality’ (n 1); Chordia (n 1); Douek (n 1).

9. Cf Rosalind Dixon, ‘The Functional Constitution: Re-reading the 2014 High Court Constitutional Term’ (2015) 43(3) Federal Law Review 455 (‘Functional Constitution’).

10. Cf Jeremy Kirk, ‘Constitutional Guarantees, Characterization and the Concept of Proportionality’ (1997) 21(1) Melbourne University Law Review 1.

11. (1992) 177 CLR 106 (‘ACTV’).

12. Lange (n 5).

13. Ibid 566–7.

14. (2004) 220 CLR 1, 50 [92]–[93] (McHugh J), 77–8 [196] (Gummow and Hayne JJ), 82 [211] (Kirby J) (‘Coleman’).

15. Ibid 50 [92]–[93] (McHugh J) (emphasis added), quoting Lange (n 5) 567.

16. McCloy (n 2) 195 [2], 216 [76] (on origins in Lange), 217 [79] (on three stages).

17. Ibid 195 [2] (emphasis in original).

18. In McCloy, the Court held that compatibility testing should also be applied to the ‘means’ used to achieve that purpose—ie, necessity—but in Brown, the plurality clarified that compatibility in this second sense should be considered as part of the process of proportionality testing: see Brown (n 4) 363 [104] (Kiefel CJ, Bell and Keane JJ).

19. McCloy (n 2) 269 (Nettle J), 282 (Gordon J).

20. Ibid 234–5 [140]–[141].

21. Ibid 235–7 [141]–[146].

22. Ibid 238–9 [152].

23. Ibid.

24. Ibid 239 [153]–[154].

25. Ibid 251 [197].

26. Ibid 238 [150].

27. (2017) 261 CLR 28.

28. Ibid 72–3 [101]–[107].

29. Brown (n 4) 368–70 [123]–[131]. For the slight refinement of their approach to compatibility testing in this context, see 363 [104] as discussed in n 18.

30. See above n 18.

31. Brown (n 4) 416–18. Edelman J did not reach the question: at 502–6.

32. Ibid 465–6 [432]–[433].

33. Ibid 377–9.

34. Preston (n 3).

35. Ibid 506 [266] (Nettle J), 484–6 [161]–[171] (Edelman J).

36. Ibid 507 [267].

37. Ibid 508 [269].

38. Ibid 546 [469]–[470].

39. Ibid 529–30 [390]–[391] (emphasis in original).

40. Ibid.

41. Ibid 484 [161] (emphasis added).

42. Ibid 486 [174], 487–8 [181].

43. (2019) 93 ALJR 900 (‘Banerji’).

44. Ibid 913–15 [32]–[40].

45. Ibid 941 [188].

46. Ibid 924–5 [96] (Gageler J), 935 [161] (Gordon J).

47. For full citations, see Online Supplemental Appendix.

48. ‘Proportionality…has the advantage of transparency’: McCloy (n 2) 216–17 [74] (French CJ, Kiefel, Bell and Keane JJ). See also Stone, ‘Proportionality’ (n 1); Chordia (n 1) 254–5.

49. Preston (n 3) 544 [463] (Edelman J). See also discussion in Stone, ‘Proportionality’ (n 1); Chordia (n 1) 254–5; Douek (n 1) 1, 21–2. Similarly, when combined with a test of ‘compatibility’, it helps makes clear the importance of asking a fourth, prior question about the legitimacy of the government’s legislative purpose, and specifically its compatibility with the Australian constitutional system of responsible and representative government.

50. McCloy (n 2) 216 [74] (French CJ, Kiefel, Bell and Keane JJ) (emphasis added).

51. Cf Douek (n 1) 22.

52. McCloy (n 2) 235 [142], 236 [145].

53. Preston (n 3) 532 [401]–[402].

54. Cf Ibid 484 [160] (Gageler J). See also discussion in Chordia (n 1) 112; Douek (n 1) 18.

55. For one example regarding Holocaust denial, see Bundesverfassungsgericht [German Constitutional Court], 1 BvR 23/94, 13 April 1994 reported in (1994) 90 BVerfGE 241.

56. See Preston (n 3) 529–30 [390]–[391] (Gordon J).

57. Cf Douek (n 1) 2.

58. [2014] AC 700, 790 [72]–[74], cited in McCloy (n 2) 217 [78] (French CJ, Kiefel, Bell and Keane JJ).

59. Stone, ‘Proportionality’ (n 1). Cf citations in Online Supplemental Appendix.

60. Stone, ‘Proportionality’ (n 1). See also Kirk, (n 10), 48 (noting that the HCA inevitably makes some form of evaluative value-based judgment in various constitutional contexts); Dixon, ‘Functional Constitution’ (n 9); Douek (n 1), 8–10.

61. Cf, eg, Chordia (n 1), Ch 3.V (suggesting that proportionality-based approaches are appropriate if, and only if, the Court already applies a test that requires the making of evaluative judgments of this kind—or what Chordia calls a form of clear ‘balancing problem’).

62. See, eg, McCloy (n 2) 235–6 [144]–[146] (Gageler J); Brown (n 4) 466 [433] (Gordon J); Preston (n 3) 530 [393] (Gordon J). For discussion, see, eg, Stone, ‘Proportionality’ (n 1); Chordia (n 1), 260–1; B Selway, ‘The Rise and Rise of the Reasonable Proportionality Test in Public Law’ (1996) 7 Public Law Review 212, 212.

63. Stone, ‘Proportionality’ (n 1).

64. Ibid. See also Chordia (n 1) 110 ff.

65. Douek (n 1), 2. Cf Preston (n 3) 545 [465] (Edelman J). See also Mulholland v Australian Electoral Commission (2004) 220 CLR 181, 199 [39] (Gleeson CJ) (‘Mulholland’).

66. See, eg, Barak, (n 8); Alex Stone Sweet and Jud Mathews, ‘Proportionality Balancing and Global Constitutionalism’ (2008) 47 Columbia Journal of Transnatinal Law 72; Jacco Bomhoff, ‘Beyond Proportionality: Thinking Comparatively about Constitutional Review and Punitiveness’ in Vicki Jackson and Mark Tushnet (eds), Proportionality: New Frontiers, New Challenges (Cambridge University Press, 2017) 130, 148; Vicki C Jackson, ‘Constitutional Law in an Age of Proportionality’ (2014) 124(8) Yale Law Journal 3094; Vicki Jackson and Mark Tushnet (eds), Proportionality: New Frontiers, New Challenges (Cambridge University Press, 2017). In Australia, see Adrienne Stone, ‘Proportionality and Its Alternatives’ (2020) 48(1) Federal Law Review (‘Alternatives’); Chordia (n 1); Douek (n 1).

67. Barak (n 8), 542. See discussion in McCloy (n 2) 237 [148] (Gageler J).

68. Stone, ‘Limits’ (n 8); Stone, ‘Proportionality’ (n 1); Chordia (n 1); Douek (n 1).

69. Stone, ‘Limits’ (n 8).

70. Chordia (n 1) 122–5.

71. See citations in Online Supplemental Appendix. For discussion, see Douek (n 1) 2, 21–3 (noting both explicit and implicit modifications by the Court to structured proportionality).

72. For the emphasis on the need to reconcile the Court’s approach with the common law tradition, see especially Brown (n 4) 477 [477] (Gordon J), Preston (n 3) [401] (Gordon J) and discussion in Douek (n 1) 22–3.

73. Stone, ‘Alternatives’ (n 66) 16 (emphasis added).

74. Anthony Mason, ‘The Use of Proportionality in Australian Constitutional Law’ (2016) 27(2) Public Law Review 109, 121. Cf also Stone, ‘Limits’ (n 8), on categorisation.

75. McCloy (n 2) 223 [102] (relevant structural factors), 237–9 [145]–[156] (relevant contextual factors) (Gageler J).

76. Cf Preston (n 3) 481 [159] (Gageler J).

77. See, eg, Rosalind Dixon and Amelia Loughland, ‘Democracy and Distrust in Australia: Ely, Gageler and Comparative, Contextual Constitutional Adaptation’ (Unpublished manuscript, 2019).

78. Stone, ‘Alternatives’ (n 66) 28.

79. Kirk (n 10) 16. See also Douek (n 1) 10.

80. That is, both in terms of their own approach to applying it, and their response to the way in which it was applied by lower courts.

81. Lange (n 5) 566–7 (Brennan CJ, Dawson, Toohey, Gaudron, McHugh, Gummow and Kirby JJ).

82. Ibid. Cf Chordia (n 1) 254–5.

83. McCloy (n 2) 195 [2] (French CJ, Kiefel, Bell and Keane JJ); Preston (n 3) 548 [476] (Edelman J).

84. Cf R v Oakes [1986] 1 SCR 103. For discussion of the relevance of Canadian-style proportionality approaches to Australia, Cf Stone ‘Limits’ (n 8).

85. Stone, ‘Proportionality’ (n 1) 13.

86. Ibid.

87. Mulholland (n 65) 200 [39] (Gleeson CJ).

88. See below Table 1. Cf also the US notion of time, place and manner restriction: see, eg, William E Lee, ‘Lonely Pamphleteers, Little People, and the Supreme Court: The Doctrine of Time, Place, and Manner Regulations of Expression’ (1985) 54 George Washington Law Review 757; Elisabeth Aiden Langworthy, ‘Time Place or Manner Restrictions on Commercial Speech’ (1983) 52 George Washington Law Review 127.

89. On democratic experimentalism, see Michael C Dorf and Charles F Sabel, ‘A Constitution of Democratic Experimentalism’ (1998) 98(2) Columbia Law Review 267. For a more cautious approach to the reliance on this logic to defend the necessity of legislation, cf Unions NSW v New South Wales (2013) 252 CLR 530, 575–6 [126]–[127] (Keane J) (‘Unions I’).

90. On the informational dimension to democratic experimentalism, see Dorf and Sabel (n 89).

91. Anti-terrorism Crime and Security Act 2001 (UK).

92. [2004] UKHL 56.

93. Ibid 47 [73] (Lord Bingham of Cornhill).

94. See, eg, Ibid 63–4 [132]–[133] (Lord Hope). See also 82–3 [187]–[188] (Lord Earlsferry), 99 [230]–[231] (Lord Richmond).

95. 508 US 520 (1993).

96. Ibid 546 (emphasis added).

97. Ibid 545 (noting that the ‘The asserted interest in inspected meat is not pursued in contexts similar to that of religious animal sacrifice’) (emphasis added).

98. Ibid 543. For a similar approach by the US Court in the context of the Free Speech Clause, see also Lehman v Shaker Heights 418 US 298 (1974) per Brennan J (dissenting) (Stewart, Marshall, Powell JJ concurring).

99. Brown (n 4) 395 [222] (Gageler J).

100. Ibid (emphasis added).

101. McCloy (n 2) 219 [87] (French CJ, Kiefel, Bell and Keane JJ).

102. See, eg, Mulholland (n 65) 200 [40] (Gleeson CJ); Preston (n 3) 486 [176]–[177] (Gageler J), 527 [371]–[376] (Gordon J).

103. See, eg, ACTV n (11) 146 (Mason CJ). See also Brown (n 4) 407 [258] (Nettle J).

104. Mulholland (n 65) 200 [40] (Gleeson CJ).

105. The plurality in Brown used the term ‘deterrence’ in preference to ‘chilling effects’: Brown (n 4) 373 [151] (Kiefel CJ, Bell and Keane JJ). In earlier cases, the Court was willing to use the language of ‘chilling effects’: see Theophanous v Herald & Weekly Times Ltd (1994) 182 CLR 104, 131 (Mason CJ, Toohey and Gaudron JJ); Roberts v Bass (2002) 212 CLR 1, 40–1 [102] (Gaudron, McHugh and Gummow JJ); Brown (n 4) 366 [115] (Kiefel CJ, Bell and Keane JJ). In my own view, very little turns on the distinction, and thus there is no difficulty in using that as the preferred formulation.

106. See, eg, George Clemon Freeman Jr and Kyle E McSlarrow, ‘RICO and the Due Process “Void for Vagueness” Test’ (1990) 45(3) The Business Lawyer 1003; Andrew E Goldsmith, ‘The Void-for-Vagueness Doctrine in the Supreme Court, Revisited’ (2002) 30(2) American Journal of Criminal Law 279.

107. See Brown (n 4) 419–25 [283]–[294] (Nettle J), 469–70 [447]–[448], 471 [453] (Gordon J), 486–8 [505]–[509] (Edelman J).

108. Ibid 428 [307], 457 [405], 468–75 [443]–[467] (Gordon J), 487 [507] (Edelman J).

109. Ibid 475 [465] (Gordon J).

110. Ibid 356–7 [77]–[78], 373–4 [145]–[151] (Kiefel CJ, Bell and Keane JJ).

111. Ibid 449 [377] (Gageler J), 465 [432] (Gordon J). See Frederick Schauer, ‘Balancing, Subsumption, and the Constraining Role of Legal Text’ in Matthias Klatt (ed), Institutionalized Reason: The Jurisprudence of Robert Alexy (Oxford University Press, 2012) 307, 307–8; Chordia (n 1); Stone, ‘Proportionality’ (n 1); Douek (n 1).

112. Brown (n 4) 449 [377] (Gageler J), 465 [432] (Gordon J).

113. Stone, ‘Limits’ (n 8) 704. For the context for these comments, see Online Supplemental Appendix.

114. Dixon, ‘Functional Constitution’ (n 9); Rosalind Dixon, ‘Functionalism and Australian Constitutional Values’ in Rosalind Dixon (ed), Australian Constitutional Values (Hart Publishing, 2018) 3 (‘Functionalism’).

115. On the role of common law, and its potential connection to international human rights law, as a source of ‘modern common law’, compare also Kirk (n 10) 48–9. The relevance of this is also squarely raised by the recent references to dignity in Preston (n 3). Compare also A Darcy, Dignity as an Australian Constitutional Value? (Working paper, 2019).

116. Dixon, ‘Functionalism’ (n 114).

117. See Dixon, ‘Functional Constitution’ (n 9); Dixon, ‘Functionalism’ (n 114). See also Brendan Lim, ‘The Convergence of Form and Function: Commentary on Dixon’ (2015) 43(3) Federal Law Review 505; Gabrielle Appleby, ‘Functionalism in Constitutional Interpretation: Factual and Participatory Challenges: Commentary on Dixon’ (2015) 43(3) Federal Law Review 493; Jeffrey Goldsworthy, ‘Functions, Purposes and Values in Constitutional Interpretation’ in Rosalind Dixon (ed), Australian Constitutional Values (Hart Publishing, 2018) 43; Jonathan Crowe, ‘Functions, Context and Constitutional Values’ in Rosalind Dixon (ed), Australian Constitutional Values (Hart Publishing, 2018) 61.

118. Dixon, ‘Functional Constitution’ (n 9); Dixon, ‘Functionalism’ (n 113).

119. See Dixon, ‘Functional Constitution’ (n 9); Dixon, ‘Functionalism’ (n 113). See also Lim (n 116); Appleby (n 116); Goldsworthy (n 116); Crowe (n 116).

120. Stone, ‘Limits’ (n 8).

121. See, eg, Brown (n 4) (Gordon J); Preston (n 3) (Gordon J).

122. In Germany, as Shipra Chordia has noted, the German Federal Constitutional Court applies doctrines of proportionality in ways that show systematic attention to ‘constitutional values’, or what German jurists regard as the ‘comprehensive value order’ created by the Basic Law. See Chordia, above n 1, 53–64.

123. See, eg, R v Keegstra [1990] 3 SCR 697. For differences in the relevant constitutional context, see Online Supplemental Appendix.

124. Constitution of the Republic of South Africa Act 1996s 36(1)). Note also that In Victoria, the Charter of Human Rights and Responsibilities Act (2006) s 7 adopts similar language.

125. McCloy (n 2) 219.

126. Compare Douek (n 1).

127. Preston (n 3) 22 [82].

128. Ibid 28 [101].

129. Banerji (n 43) at 13 [31], 19 [42] per Kiefel CJ, Bell, Keane and Nettle JJ; 39 [100] per Gageler J; 58 [161] per Gordon J.

130. For the connection between common law and constitutional law values in this context, see Sir Owen Dixon, ‘The Common Law as an Ultimate Constitutional Foundation’ in Jesting Pilate (Law Book Co, 1965) 203–13. See also discussion in Anthony Mason, ‘Foreword’ in in Rosalind Dixon (ed), Australian Constitutional Values (Hart Publishing, 2018). Compare Kirk (n 10).

131. Coleman (n 14) 12 [32].

132. It also suggests that in applying a test of compatibility, attention to constitutional values will be an especially important touchstone.

133. See Janine Boughey and Greg Weeks, ‘Government Accountability as a “Constitutional Value”’ in Rosalind Dixon (ed), Australian Constitutional Values (Hart Publishing, 2018); Joo-Cheong Tham, ‘Political Equality as a Constitutional Principle: Cautionary Lessons from McCloy v New South Wales’ in Rosalind Dixon (ed), Australian Constitutional Values (Hart Publishing, 2018); James Stellios, ‘Liberty as a Constitutional Value: The Difficulty of Differing Conceptions of “The Relationship of the Individual to the State”’ in Rosalind Dixon (ed), Australian Constitutional Values (Hart Publishing, 2018).

134. On the idea of intermediate values, see Dixon, ‘Functionalism’ (n 114).

135. Cf McCloy (n 2) 42 [122] (Gageler J) (‘The freedom constitutionally afforded to political communication is not the laissez-faire of an unregulated marketplace of ideas’); Unions I (n 89) 28 [82] (Gageler J) (rejecting the idea of an ‘unregulated marketplace’ for ideas).

136. For support for the marketplace for ideas metaphor in US constitutional law see Richard A Posner, ‘The Law and Economics Movement’ (1987) 77(2) The American Economic Review 1; Edwin C Baker, ‘Scope of the First Amendment Freedom of Speech’ (1978) 25 UCLA Law Review 964; Joseph Blocher, ‘Institutions in the Marketplace of Ideas’ (2008) 57(4) Duke Law Journal 821.

137. Cf Renton v Playtime Theatres Inc 475 US 41 (1986).

138. Austin v United States, 509 US 602 (1993); Citizens United v Federal Election Commission, 558 US 310 (2010). See discussion in Justin Levitt, ‘Confronting the Impact of “Citizens United”’ (2010) 29(1) Yale Law and Policy Review 217; Pierre De Vos, ‘Rejecting the Free Marketplace of Ideas: A Value-based Conception of the Limits of Free Speech’ (2017) 33(3) South African Journal on Human Rights 359; Kathleen M Sullivan, ‘Two Concepts of Freedom of Speech’ (2010) 124(1) Harvard Law Review 143; Blocher (n 136).

139. See, eg, RAV v City of St Paul, 505 US 377 (1992). See also American Booksellers Association Inc v Hudnut, 771 F.2d 323 (7th Cir. 1985), summarily affirmed by US Supreme Court, 475 US 1001 (1986).

140. See, eg, McCloy (n 2) 206–7 (the ‘risk to equal participation posed by the uncontrolled use of wealth may warrant legislation action to ensure, or even enhance, the practical enjoyment of popular sovereignty’); Unions I (n 89) 12 [38] (Kiefel CJ, Bell and Keane JJ), 28 [82] (Gageler J), 40 [110] (Nettle J), 52–3 [146]–[147] (Gordon J); Unions NSW v New South Wales [No 2] [2019] HCA 1, [31], [38], [53] (Kiefel CJ, Bell and Keane JJ), [82]–[83], [90], [101] (Gageler J), [108]–[118] (Nettle J), [190]–[191] (Edelman J) (‘Unions II’).

141. See, eg, Richard Holden and Rosalind Dixon, ‘Partially Right: Rejecting Neoliberalism Shouldn’t Mean Giving up on Social Liberalism’, The Conversation (online, 19 June 2018) <https://theconversation.com/partially-right-rejecting-neoliberalism-shouldnt-mean-giving-up-on-social-liberalism-98386>.

142. See Brown (n 4) 44 [165] (Gordon J). Compare Adrienne Stone, ‘Lange, Levy and the Direction of the Freedom of Political Communication under the Australian Constitution’ (1998) 21(1) UNSW Law Journal 117; Adrienne Stone, ‘Rights, Personal Rights and Freedoms: The Nature of the Freedom of Political Communication’ (2001) 25(2) Melbourne University Law Review 374.

143. See above nn 136–8.

144. See above Part I.

145. This, for example, may help explain the statement by Kiefel CJ, Bell and Keane JJ that discriminatory burdens on the IFPC do not ‘necessarily effect a greater burden on the freedom’ as such: see Brown (n 4) 25 [94].

146. See Stephen Gageler, ‘Beyond the Text: A Vision of the Structure and Function of the Constitution’ (2009) 32(2) Australian Bar Review 138.

147. United States v Carolene Products Company, 304 US 144 n 4 (1938).

148. Stephen Gageler, ‘Foundations of Australian Federalism and the Role of Judicial Review’ (1987) 17(3) Federal Law Review 162; Gageler (n 146); McCloy v NSW (2015) 257 CLR 178, 224–5 (Gageler J).

149. See above n 61.

150. See above nn 64–5.

151. See Alexander Meiklejohn, Political Freedom: The Constitutional Powers of the People (Oxford University Press, 1965); Joseph Blocher, ‘Viewpoint Neutrality and Government Speech’ (2011) 52(3) Boston College Law Review 695.

152. See Geoffrey R Stone, ‘Content Regulation and the First Amendment’ (1983) 25(2) William and Mary Law Review 189; Paul B Stephen III, ‘The First Amendment and Content Discrimination’ (1982) 68(2) Virginia Law Review 203, 203–4.

153. On this notion of discrimination, which draws on Aristotle, see Mary Gaudron, ‘Equality Before the Law with Particular Reference to Aborigines’ (1993) 1 The Judicial Review 81; Mary Gaudron, ‘In the Eye of the Law: The Jurisprudence of Equality’ (Mitchell Oration, Adelaide, 24 August 1990); discussion in Amelia Simpson, ‘The High Court’s Conception of Discrimination: Origins, Applications, and Implications’ (2007) 29(2) Sydney Law Review 263.

154. See, eg, McCloy (n 2) 251 [197]; Brown (n 4) 135 [422] (Gordon J).

155. Cf Brown (n 4) 32 [121] (Kiefel CJ, Bell and Keane JJ).

156. On this terminology and its link to Ely’s ideas, see, eg, Douek (n 1) 12; Rosalind Dixon and Amelia Loughland, ‘Democracy and Distrust in Australia: Ely, Gageler and Comparative, Contextual Constitutional Adaptation’ (Unpublished manuscript, 2019). On the value of judicial restraint in the application of a test of structured proportionality in Australia, see, eg, Chordia (n 1).

157. Cf Mulholland (n 65) 16 [41] (Gleeson CJ), 107 [292] (Kirby J).

158. Consider public safety laws. While such laws can be recast as promoting constitutional values (to freedom and security of the person), they will often still be constitutional even if understand simply as promoting a legislative interest in public safety: see, eg, Levy v Victoria [1997] HCA 31 (‘Levy’).

159. Douek (n 1) 11. See also Caroline Henckels, ‘Proportionality and the Separation of Powers in Constitutional Review: Examining the Role of Judicial Deference’ (2017) 45(2) Federal Law Review 181, 181; Murray Wesson, ‘Crafting a Concept of Deference for the Implied Freedom of Political Communication’ (2016) 27(2) Public Law Review 87, 104.

160. Douek (n 1) at 19–21 (‘explicit modifications’). See also Preston (n 3) 18 [66] (Kiefel CJ, Bell and Keane JJ), 99 [292] (Nettle J), 139 [408] (Edelman J); McCloy (n 2) 195 [2].

161. Jeremy Waldron, Law and Disagreement (Oxford University Press, 1990); Jeremy Waldron, ‘The Core of the Case against Judicial Review’ (2005) 115(6) Yale Law Journal 1346. See also Adrienne Stone, ‘Disagreement and an Australian Bill of Rights’ (2002) 26(2) Melbourne University Law Review 478; Adrienne Stone, ‘Judicial Review Without Rights: Some Problems for the Democratic Legitimacy of Structural Judicial Review’ (2008) 28(1) Oxford Journal of Legal Studies 1; Erin F Delaney, ‘Analyzing Avoidance: Judicial Strategy in Comparative Perspective’ (2016) 1 Duke Law Journal 66 (. Compare also Rosalind Dixon and Adrienne Stone, ‘The Invisible Constitution in Comparative Perspective’ in Rosalind Dixon and Adrienne Stone (eds), The Invisible Constitution in Comparative Perspective (Cambridge University Press, 2018).

162. Cf Rosalind Dixon, ‘The Core Case for Weak-Form Judicial Review’ (2016) 38(6) Cardozo Law Review 2193. See also Rosalind Dixon, ‘Creating Dialogue about Socioeconomic Rights: Strong-form Versus Weak-form Judicial Review Revisited’ (2007) 5(3) International Journal of Constitutional Law 391; Rosalind Dixon, ‘A Democratic Theory of Constitutional Comparison’ (2008) 56(4) American Journal of Comparative Law 947; Rosalind Dixon, ‘The Supreme Court of Canada, Charter Dialogue, and Deference’ (2009) 47(2) Osgoode Hall Law Journal 235.

163. Cf Rosalind Dixon, ‘The Forms, Functions and Varieties of Weak(ened) Judicial Review’ (2019) International Journal of Constitutional Law (Forthcoming).

164. For debates about the nature and extent of such a duty, see, eg, Mark Tushnet, Taking the Constitution Away from the Courts (Princeton University Press, 2000). Compare also Vicki C Jackson, ‘Pro-constitutional Representation: Comparing the Role Obligations of Judges and Elected Representatives in Constitutional Democracy’ (2015) 57(5) William and Mary Law Review 1717.

165. Cf Tushnet (n 160). On pro-constitutional approach, see Jackson (n 209).

166. Tushnet (n 160).

167. Cf Stone (n 1).

168. See, eg, Hogan v Hinch (2011) 243 CLR 506, 555–556, as discussed in Preston (n 3) 50 [176] (Gageler J) (‘Hogan’).

169. Cf Tajjour v New South Wales (2014) 254 CLR 508, [151] (Gageler J) (suggesting that the most deferential form of scrutiny under a calibrated approach could involve ‘demonstration that the means adopted by the law are rationally related to the pursuit of [a legitimate]…end’.) (‘Tajjour’).

170. This is consistent with the notion of ‘deference’ articulated by scholars such as Aileen Kavanagh, ‘Defending Deference in Public Law and Constitutional Theory’ (2010) 126 Law Quarterly Review 222, 223–4. See also Dixon, ‘The Supreme Court of Canada’ (n 158); Douek, above n 1, 11–12. It is thus distinct from the idea of ‘deference as submission’ rejected by the Court in McCloy (n 2) 32 [90–91].

171. Hogan (n 168) 38–9 [94]–[95].

172. Ibid 39–40 [95]–[98].

173. Levy (n 158) 609 (Dawson J) (emphasising that the impact was on ‘maximum publicity’ for, not on the right to, protest per se); (Toohey and Gummow JJ).

174. McCloy (n 2) 10 [24] (French CJ, Kiefel, Bell and Keane JJ).

175. Ibid 16–7 [42]–[45], see also at 51 [152] (Gageler J).

176. Ibid 32–3 [93] (French CJ, Kiefel, Bell and Keane JJ), 109 [342], 117–18 [380] (Gordon J).

177. Ibid 80 [241] (Nettle J), 117 [379] (Gordon J).

178. This, of course, assumes that the additional restrictions applicable to property developers were not in fact discriminatory: compare ibid (Gordon J); (Nettle J).

179. Brown (n 4) 353 [62]–[63], 367 [117]–[118], 368 [122].

180. Ibid 354 [67], 373 [145].

181. Ibid 371–3 [139]–[146].

182. Ibid 412 [269].

183. Ibid 423 [291], 425 [295].

184. ACTV (n 11) 143–4.

185. Ibid 143, 145 (Mason CJ), 218, 220–1 (Gaudron J).

186. Ibid 145–6.

187. Unions II (n 140) [65]–[66] (Gageler J).

188. Brown (n 4) 389 [199] (Gageler J); Preston (n 3) 488 [183] (Gageler J). On the appropriate standard of scrutiny, see Brown (n 4) 202–3 (‘very close scrutiny’); Preston (n 3) 484 [161]–[162] (Gageler J).

189. McCloy (n 2) 259 [222] (Nettle J).

190. Ibid 270 [257].

191. Cf Douek (n 1) 21 suggesting that it is important to note that often ‘judges using structured proportionality come to the same substantive outcomes as those that do not’.

192. See Richard H Fallon Jr, ‘Strict Judicial Scrutiny’ (2006) 54(5) UCLA Law Review 1267. For a thoughtful exploration of the relative benefits of proportionality compared to this kind of more US-style ‘categorical’ approach, see, eg, Douek (n 1); Stone (n 8). Cf also Anthony Mason, ‘The Use of Proportionality in Australian Constitutional Law’ (2016) 27(2) Public Law Review 109.

193. Fallon Jr (n 192) 1268.

194. Ibid 1273.

195. Ibid.

196. See, eg, Romer v Evans, 517 US 620 (1996). Cf Department of Agriculture v Moreno, 413 US 528 (1973). On animus grounds, see Barbara J Flagg, ‘Animus and Moral Disapproval: A Comment on Romer v Evans’ (1997) 82(2) Minnesota Law Review 833; Susannah W Pollvogt, ‘Unconstitutional Animus’ (2012) 81(2) Fordham Law Review 887.

197. See, eg, discussion of McCloy above, and how it differed from the approach of Gageler J. Both approaches also necessarily called for an evaluative judgment by the Court as to the relative importance of some factors (ie, the content-based nature of the prohibition, and connection to electoral choice) over others (ie, the indirect nature of the prohibition and alternative potential sources of funding).

198. See discussion in Douek (n 1) 27.

199. Ibid (‘the focus under the categorisation approach is on the form of the burden, rather than its purpose’).

200. In this sense, it is consistent with the judgments of various members of the Court rejecting the idea of different ‘levels’ of scrutiny within the context of the second limb of the Lange test: see, eg, Tajjour (n 169), [27] (French CJ), [123] (Crennan, Kiefel and Bell JJ). Cf Stone (n 8).

201. See Gerald L Neuman, ‘Human Dignity in United States Constitutional Law’ in Dieter Simon and Manfred Weiss (eds), Zur Autonomie Des Individuums: Liber Amicorum for Spiros Simitis (Nomos, 2000); Gerald L Neuman, ‘Equal Protection, “General Equality” and Economic Discrimination from a US Perspective’ (1999) 5 Columbia Journal of European Law 281.

202. American Booksellers Ass’n, Inc v Hudnut, 771 F.2d 323 (7th Cir. 1985), affirmed in 475 US 1001 (1986).

203. See above Part II.

204. Mulholland (n 65) 200 [40] (Gleeson CJ).

205. Ibid 277 [283].

206. Ibid 200 [40]–[41] (Gleeson CJ). See also at 279 [290]–[292] (Kirby J).

207. Ibid 247–9 [186]–[192] (Gummow and Hayne JJ), 298 [337] (Callinan J), 303–304 [354]–[355] (Heydon J).

208. Coleman (n 14) 31–2 [29]–[33].

209. Ibid 89–91 [232]–[236] (Heydon J).

210. Ibid 53–54 [102]–[105].

211. Ibid 53–54[102]–[106]. Other members of the Court decided the case by construing the relevant provisions more narrowly, as effectively not burdening political communication: at 74–77 [182]–[194] (Gummow and Hayne JJ), at 91–97 [240]–[253] (Kirby J). Justice Callinan took a narrower view of the implied freedom: see at 113 [299].

212. McCloy (n 2) 239 [154] (Gleeson CJ).

213. Ibid 208 [49]–[50]. See also 251 [197]–[198] (Gageler J), 292 [359], 294–5 [367] (Gordon J).

214. Ibid 273 [268]–[269] (Nettle J).

215. Preston (n 3) 475 [99]–[101].

216. Ibid [102].

217. Ibid 485 [170].

218. Ibid 486–8 [177]–[183].

219. See Dixon (n 9); Appleby (n 117); Rosalind Dixon, ‘Response to Commentators’ (2015) 43(3) Federal Law Review 517.

220. In the US, for example, this has traditionally been the role of amicus who submit so-called ‘Brandeis briefs’. See David E Bernstein, ‘Brandeis Brief Myths’ (2011) 15(1) The Green Bag 9. For a recent consideration of this issue, see also Unions II (n 140) [55]–[57] (noting the submission by the GCI on inequality on constitutional facts).

221. Unions II (n 140).

222. Preston (n 3) 470 [66]; McCloy (n 2) 194–5 [2], 196 [5]; Tajjour (n 169) 550 [36] (French CJ).

223. Rosalind Dixon, ‘Proportionality and Comparative Constitutional Law Versus Studies’ (2018) 12(2) Law and Ethics of Human Rights 203; Rosalind Dixon, ‘How to Compare Constitutionally’ (2019) Latin American Law Review (forthcoming).

224. Dixon, ‘Proportionality and Comparative Constitutional Law’ (n 224).

225. Ibid.

226. Compare, eg, Unions II (n 140); Preston (n 3).

227. See discussion in Susan Kiefel, ‘Standards of Review in Constitutional Review of Legislation’ in Cheryl Saunders and Adrienne Stone (eds), The Oxford Handbook of the Australian Constitution (Oxford University Press, 2018) 472, 500–508. See also Chordia (n 1) 16, 229–77.

228. See, eg, discussion in Chordia (n 1) 156, 173–97; Gabrielle Appleby, ‘Proportionality and Federalism: Can Australia Learn from the European Community, the US and Canada?’ (2007) 26(1) University of Tasmania Law Review 1; Kirk (n 10); Selway (n 62).

229. See, eg, Re Woolley; Ex parte M276/2003 (2004) 225 CLR 1, 33–4 (McHugh J). See also Chordia (n 1) 18.

230. See Murphy v Electoral Commissioner (2016) 90 ALJR 1027. Cf Carlos Bernal Pulido, ‘The Constitutional Adjudication of Positive Social and Economic Rights By Means of the Proportionality Analysis’ in Martin Borowski, Stanley L Paulson and Jan-Reinard Sieckmann (eds), Reschtsphilosophie und Grundrechtstheorie: Robert Alexys System (Mohr Siebeck, 2017) 497.

231. See, eg, Murphy v Electoral Commissioner (n 230).

232. Cf Anne Carter, ‘Proportionality and the Proof of Facts in Australian Constitutional Adjudication’ (PhD Thesis, University of Melbourne, 2018).

233. See eg, Rosalind Dixon (ed), Australian Constitutional Values (Hart Publishing, 2018).

234. See Joo-Cheong Tham, ‘Political Equality as a Constitutional Principle: Cautionary Lessons from McCloy v New South Wales’ in Rosalind Dixon (ed), Australian Constitutional Values (Hart Publishing, 2018); Janina Boughey and Greg Weeks, ‘Government Accountability as a “Constitutional Value”’ in Rosalind Dixon (ed), Australian Constitutional Values (Hart Publishing, 2018); Lisa Burton Crawford, ‘The Rule of Law’ in Rosalind Dixon (ed), Australian Constitutional Values (Hart Publishing, 2018).

235. John Hart Ely, Democracy and Distrust: A Theory of Judicial Review (Harvard University Press, 1980); Rosalind Dixon, ‘The Core Case for Weak-Form Judicial Review’ (2017) 38(6) Cardozo Law Review 2193; Rosalind Dixon, ‘Creating Dialogue about Socioeconomic Rights: Strong-form versus Weak-form Judicial Review’ (2007) 5(3) International Journal of Constitutional Law 391; Jeremy Waldron, ‘The Core of the Case Against Judicial Review’ (2006) 115(6) 115 Yale Law Journal 1346.

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