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Can Parliament Confer Plenary Executive Power? the Limitations Imposed by Sections 51 and 52 of the Australian Consitution

Published online by Cambridge University Press:  01 January 2025

Lisa Burton Crawford
Lisa Burton Crawford*
Affiliation:
Monash University Faculty of Law
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Abstract

Plenary executive power seems repugnant to the rule of law. It is often said that such power cannot exist: that all executive power must have legal limits. Yet, it remains unclear which principle or principles of Australian constitutional law would prevent the federal Parliament from conferring plenary executive power. The High Court has suggested that a federal statute purporting to confer an entirely open-ended discretion on a Minister would simply not be a ‘law’, or else lack the requisite connection to a head of power found in ss 51 or 52 of the Australian Constitution. This article examines the latter claim. It explains the nature of the limitations imposed by ss 51 and 52 and the role of the High Court in ensuring that those limitations are complied with. It concludes that the scope of executive power that Parliament may confer is constrained by ss 51 and 52, but not to the extent that has been suggested by the High Court.

Type
Article
Information
Federal Law Review , Volume 44 , Issue 2 , June 2016 , pp. 287 - 310
Copyright
Copyright © 2016 The Australian National University

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Footnotes

I wish to thank Professor Jeffrey Goldsworthy, Associate Professor Patrick Emerton and Dr Janina Boughey for valuable discussion of the ideas in this article. I also wish to thank the anonymous reviewers for their very useful comments. All views expressed and any errors are my own.

References

1 Albert Venn Dicey, An Introduction to the Study of the Law of the Constitution (Liberty Fund, 1982) 120. See also Hayek, Friedrich von, The Road to Serfdom (Routledge, 1944)Google Scholar; SirWade, William, Administrative Law (Oxford University Press, 2004) 35Google Scholar.

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4 (2002) 209 CLR 478, 504 [70]. Note, though this is expressed in general terms, the case itself was concerned with the possibility of unlimited judicial (as opposed to executive) power.

5 (2003) 211 CLR 476 (‘Plaintiff S157’).

6 Plaintiff S157 (2003) 211 CLR 476, 512 [101].

7 Ibid 513 [102] (Gaudron, McHugh, Gummow, Kirby and Hayne JJ).

8 See Williams, George and Hume, David, Human Rights Under the Australian Constitution (Oxford University Press, 2013) 122.Google Scholar

9 New South Wales v Commonwealth (‘Work Choices Case’) (2006) 229 CLR 1, 176; Bodruddaza v Minister for Immigration and Multicultural Affairs (2007) 228 CLR 651, 663–4 [28] (Gleeson CJ, Gummow, Kirby, Hayne, Heydon and Crennan JJ); Plaintiff M61/2010E v Commonwealth (2010) 243 CLR 319, 346–7 [56]; Plaintiff M79/2012 v Minister for Immigration and Citizenship (2013) 252 CLR 336, 367 [88] (Hayne J); Momcilovic v The Queen (2011) 245 CLR 1, 159–160 [400] and accompanying note (Heydon J). See also arguments put in Williams v Commonwealth [No 2] (2014) 252 CLR 416, 418–9.

10 Some of the leading expositions of the entrenched minimum provision of judicial review do comment on the issue, but only fairly briefly: McDonald, Leighton, ‘The Entrenched Minimum Provision of Judicial Review and the Rule of Law’ (2010) 21 Public Law Review 14, 27Google Scholar; Bateman, Will, ‘The Constitution and the Substantive Principles of Judicial Review: The Full Scope of the Entrenched Minimum Provision of Judicial Review’ (2011) 30 Federal Law Review 463, 464, 491–2.CrossRefGoogle Scholar

11 Plaintiff S157 (2003) 211 CLR 476, 513 [103].

12 (1920) 28 CLR 129 (‘Engineers’ Case’).

13 See, eg, Allan, James and Aroney, Nicholas, ‘An Uncommon Court: How the High Court of Australia Has Undermined Australian Federalism’ (2008) 30 Sydney Law Review 245.Google Scholar

14 An example of this appears below n 90, which addresses the decision in Williams v Commonwealth [No 2] (2014) 252 CLR 416.

15 See, eg, Australian Constitution s 51(xx): ‘foreign corporations, and trading or financial corporations formed within the limits of the Commonwealth’.

16 See, eg, ibid s 51(i): ‘trade and commerce with other countries, and among the States’.

17 See, eg, ibid s 51(xxi): ‘marriage’. See Commonwealth v Australian Capital Territory (2013) 250 CLR 441, 458 [20].

18 Australian Communist Party v Commonwealth (1951) 83 CLR 1, 258 (Fullagar J) (‘Communist Party Case’).

19 Jeffrey Goldsworthy, The Sovereignty of Parliament (Oxford University Press, 1999).

20 Plaintiff S157 (2003) 211 CLR 476, 512 [101].

21 The reason why this was rightly conceded is explained in Section III.

22 See, eg, Zheng v Cai (2009) 239 CLR 446, 455–6 [28]. Note, this article does not comment on the soundness or otherwise of the current approach to statutory interpretation.

23 Gageler, Stephen, ‘The Legitimate Scope of Judicial Review’ (2001) 21 Australian Bar Review 279, 287 (emphasis added).Google Scholar

24 See, especially R v Australian Broadcasting Tribunal; Ex parte 2HD Pty Ltd (1979) 144 CLR 45, 49; Minister for Aboriginal Affairs v Peko–Wallsend (1986) 162 CLR 24, 44 (Mason J).

25 Kioa v West (1985) 159 CLR 550; Plaintiff S10/2011 v Minister for Immigration and Citizenship (2012) 246 CLR 636, 666 [97].

26 For example, what is required to make a decision making process fair will depend on the nature of the decision, and the identity of the decision maker: Kioa v West (1985) 159 CLR 550, 584; Mobil Oil Australia Pty Ltd v Federal Commissioner of Taxation (1963) 113 CLR 475, 503 (Kitto J); Re Minister for Immigration and Multicultural Affairs; Ex parte Miah (2001) 206 CLR 57, 69 (Gleeson CJ and Hayne J).

27 See also Aronson and Groves, above n 3, 120 (who note that more often than not, the limitations on statutory executive power are implied rather than expressed).

28 Transcript of Proceedings, Plaintiff S157/2002 v Commonwealth [2002] HCATrans 423 (4 September 2002) (Kirby J).

29 See, eg, McDonald, above n 10; Bateman, above n 10; Kirk, Jeremy, ‘The Entrenched Minimum Provision of Judicial Review’ (2004) 12 Australian Journal of Administrative Law 64.Google Scholar

30 See Sections V and VI below.

31 The one clear exception to this may be procedural fairness, which is a constitutionally required aspect of judicial process, and therefore must be afforded by judicial decision makers. See, eg, International Finance Trust Co Ltd v New South Wales Crime Commission (2009) 240 CLR 319, 354–5 [54]–[57] (French CJ), 366–7 [97]–[98] (Gummow and Bell JJ).

32 See, eg, Re Minister for Immigration and Multicultural Affairs; Ex parte Miah (2001) 206 CLR 57; Saeed v Minister for Immigration (2010) 241 CLR 252.

33 (2011) 245 CLR 1, 47 [45]. See also Groves, Matthew, ‘Exclusion of the rules of natural justice’ (2013) 39 Monash Law Review 285.Google Scholar

34 See also Gageler, above n 23, 287; Bateman, above n 10, 485–6.

35 Minister for Immigration and Citizenship v Li (2013) 249 CLR 332, 371 [92]. See generally Plaintiff S157 (2003) 211 CLR 476, 483 [6] (Gleeson CJ).

36 See generally Groves, above n 33.

37 See, eg, the codification of the grounds of review in Part 8 of the Migration Act 1956 (Cth), as considered in Re Refugee Tribunal; Ex parte Aala (2000) 204 CLR 82.

38 See, eg, s 474 Migration Act 1956 (Cth), considered in Plaintiff S157 (2003) 211 CLR 476.

39 Parliament cannot oust the jurisdiction conferred on the High Court by s 75(v) of the Constitution: Plaintiff S157 (2003) 211 CLR 476; Campbell, Enid and Groves, Matthew, ‘Privative Clauses and the Australian Constitution’ (2004) 4 Oxford University Commonwealth Law Journal 51.CrossRefGoogle Scholar

40 See, eg, Income Tax Assessment Act 1936 (Cth) s 175, considered in Commissioner of Taxation v Futuris (2008) 237 CLR 146.

41 Bodruddaza v Minister for Immigration and Multicultural Affairs (2007) 228 CLR 651, 663.

42 Australian Constitution s 51(ii).

43 Ibid s 51(vii).

44 Ibid s 51(xix).

45 Communist Party Case (1951) 83 CLR 1, 262 (Fullagar J). As to why the High Court has such implied authority, see Sackville, Ronald, ‘The Changing Character of Judicial Review in Australia: the Legacy of Marbury v Madison?’ (2014) 25(4) Public Law Review 245.Google Scholar

46 See especially Communist Party Case (1951) 83 CLR 1, 262–3 (Fullagar J).

47 South Australia v Commonwealth (1942) 65 CLR 373, 432 (Latham CJ), quoted in Communist Party Case (1951) 83 CLR 1, 263 (Fullagar J).

48 Ibid 206 (McTiernan J).

49 Ibid 258.

50 Ibid.

51 Stellios, James, Zines's The High Court and the Constitution (Federation Press, 6th ed, 2015) 332.Google Scholar

52 Mark Aronson, James, ‘The Resurgence of Jurisdictional Facts’ (2001) 12 Public Law Review 17, 24–5.Google Scholar

53 (1951) 83 CLR 1, 258. Note, Fullagar J questioned the application of this doctrine during total war, but it is not necessary to consider that issue here. See also Stellios, above n 51, 332; Minister for Immigration v SZMDS (2010) 240 CLR 611, 621 [25] (Gummow ACJ and Kiefel J).

54 Assuming, of course, that a law so empowering would not otherwise be within the scope of the power, including its incidental scope.

55 See, eg, Miller v TCN Channel Nine Pty Ltd (1986) 161 CLR 556 at 613–14 (Brennan J) (regarding s 92); Wotton v Queensland (2012) 246 CLR 1, 9[9], 13–14 [21]–[22] (regarding the implied freedom of political communication).

56 Acts Interpretation Act 1901 (Cth) s 15A. See also the general common law rule, ut res magis valeat quam pereat (‘It is better for a thing to have effect than to be void’): Shrimpton v Commonwealth (1945) 69 CLR 613, 619 (Latham CJ).

57 (1968) 119 CLR 365 (‘Giris’).

58 Ibid 374–5 (Barwick CJ), 376 (McTiernan J), 378 (KittoJ), 380 (Menzies J), 387–8 (Owen J).

59 Note, this language should not be taken to mean that the non-statutory powers of the executive are co-extensive with the legislative power of the Commonwealth. This and other assumptions were ‘exploded’ by the High Court in Williams v Commonwealth [No 1] (2012) 248 CLR 156: Chordia, Shipra, Lynch, Andrew and Williams, George, ‘Williams v Commonwealth: Commonwealth Executive Power and Australian Federalism’ (2013) 37 Melbourne University Law Review 189, 189Google Scholar. That case did not concern executive power conferred by statute (2012) 248 CLR 156, 437 [71] (French CJ), 446 [103], 485–6 [260] (Hayne J), 551 [547] (Crennan J), 562 [596] (Kiefel J). Its successor, Williams [No 2], did; it is discussed below.

60 (2003) 211 CLR 476, 512 [101].

61 Ibid 512–13 [102].

62 See also the criticism of the broad regulation-making power considered in Work Choices Case (2006) 229 CLR 1, 175–6, 181, 197–8 (Kirby J). A majority of the Court found that the legislation was nonetheless valid (Kirby J dissenting).

63 Income Tax Assessment Act 1936–1965 (Cth) s 99, 99A.

64 Ibid s 99A.

65 Giris (1969) 119 CLR 365, 372.

66 Ibid 379–80 (Kitto J). See similarly 381 (Windeyer J).

67 Ibid 382 (Windeyer J).

68 Ibid. See also 372 (Barwick CJ) (‘the wisdom of creating this somewhat unusual situation and the dangers inherent therein are of no concern to the Court, though they might well be to the Parliament’).

69 Ibid 382.

70 Ibid 375–6.

71 Ibid 376 (McTiernan J), 381–2 (Menzies J), 388–9 (Owen J).

72 MacCormick v Federal Commissioner of Taxation (1984) 158 CLR 622, 640. See also Deputy Commissioner of Taxation v Truhold Benefit Pty Ltd (1985) 158 CLR 678; Deputy Commissioner of Taxation v Hankin (1959) 100 CLR 566.

73 Giris (1969) 119 CLR 365, 389.

74 See further GT Pagone, ‘Taxation by Discretion’ (2011) 22 Public Law Review 298.

75 Such a requirement would not necessarily be desirable: Endicott, Timothy, ‘The Value of Vagueness’ in Marmor, Andrei and Soames, Scott, Philosophical Foundations of Language in the Law (Oxford University Press, 2011).Google Scholar

76 Bank of New South Wales v Commonwealth (1948) 76 CLR 1, 186 (Latham CJ), approved in Fairfax v Federal Commissioner of Taxation (1965) 114 CLR 1, 7, 16; Cunliffe v Commonwealth (1994) 182 CLR 272, 294, 213, 251, 373; Re Dingjan; Ex parte Wagner (1995) 183 CLR 323, 369 (McHugh J); Grain Pool of Western Australia v Commonwealth (2000) 202 CLR 479, 492 (where it was said that this principle was ‘well-settled’).

77 Fisher v Fisher (1986) 161 CLR 438. Cf R v Lambert; Ex parte Plummer (1980) 146 CLR 447, 457 (Gibbs J); Gazzo v Comptroller of Stamps (Vic) (1981) 149 CLR 227 (Stephen and Aickin JJ); Re F; Ex parte F (1986) 161 CLR 376.

78 Melbourne Corporation v Commonwealth (1947) 74 CLR 31, 79 (Dixon J); subsequently quoted with approval in Re Dingjan; Ex parte Wagner (1995) 183 CLR 323, 369 (McHugh J); Re Maritime Union of Australia; Ex parte CSL Pacific Inc (2003) 214 CLR 397, 414.

79 Melbourne Corporation v Commonwealth (1947) 74 CLR 31, 79 (Dixon J); Williams, George, Brennan, Sean and Lynch, Andrew, Blackshield and Williams Constitutional Law and Theory (Federation Press, 3rd ed, 2014) 764.Google Scholar

80 For example, the Minister may have had non-statutory power to make this decision, which the statute may have abrogated, extinguished or supplemented.

81 See, eg, Giris (1969) 119 CLR 365, 373; Work Choices Case (2006) 229 CLR 1, 175 [400]. The plurality did avert to this in Plaintiff S157 (2003) 211 CLR 476, 512 [102]. Note, this makes no comment on the scope of the Commonwealth's power to detain aliens as an incident of regulating their entry into or exit from Australia.

82 (1931) 46 CLR 73 (‘Dignan's Case’).

83 Ibid 121. The High Court has elsewhere stated that Parliament cannot abdicate its powers. See, eg, Ex parte Walsh & Johnson, In re Yates (1925) 37 CLR 36, 83, 107; Dignan's Case (1931) 46 CLR 73, 121 (Evatt J); Giris (1969) 119 CLR 365, 373 (Barwick CJ), 379 (Kitto J), 381 (Menzies J).

84 Dignan's Case (1931) 46 CLR 73, 119–20 (emphasis added). See also David Malcolm, ‘The Limitations, if Any, on the Powers of Parliament to Delegate the Power to Legislate’ (1992) 66 Australian Law Journal 247, 249; Wishart v Fraser (1941) 64 CLR 470.

85 Dignan's Case (1931) 46 CLR 73, 101.

86 Communist Party Case (1951) 83 CLR 1, 257.

87 Giris (1969) 119 CLR 366, 373–4.

88 (2006) 229 CLR 1, 197–8 (Kirby J).

89 Transcript of Proceedings, Plaintiff S157/2002 v Commonwealth [2002] HCATrans 423 (4 September 2002).

90 (2014) 252 CLR 416.

91 Williams [No 2] (2014) 252 CLR 416, 457 [36]. The legislation in question in this case purported to retrospectively authorise the Commonwealth to fund the School Chaplains Program (and other programs), such authorisation having been found lacking in Williams v Commonwealth [No 1] (2012) 248 CLR 156. The legislation was found to lack the requisite connection to a head of power, namely s 51(xxiiiA). In general terms, it could be said that the Act failed because it was ‘broad and loosely articulated’ (Andrew Lynch, ‘Commonwealth spending after Williams [No 2]: Has the new dawn risen?’ (2015) 26 Public Law Review 84). But this was only problematic because the word ‘benefits’ in s 51(xxiiiA) was found to have a particular and precise meaning (458 [43]; 472 [47] (Crennan J)). Prior case law and context indicated that the word ‘benefit’ referred to the provision of some kind of material aid ((460 [47]), which was directed at alleviating the consequences of a particular circumstance, such as being unemployed, being sick, or relevantly, being a student (459–60 [46]). The plurality emphasised that the funding purportedly empowered in this case was not directed to the circumstance of being a student (460 [47]). Crennan J emphasised that the word ‘benefit’ did not include the provision of ‘services to undifferentiated persons’ (461 [50]). For these reasons, the funding of the School Chaplaincy Program did not amount to the provision of ‘benefits’ within the meaning of s 51(xxiiA).

92 On that issue, see generally Meyerson, Denise, ‘Rethinking the Constitutionality of Delegated Legislation’ (2003) 11 Australian Journal of Administrative Law 45Google Scholar; Malcolm, above n 84, 257–8.

93 Zines, Leslie and Lindell, Geoffrey, Sawer's Australian Constitutional Cases (Lawbook, 1982) 600.Google Scholar

94 Stellios, above n 51, 202.

95 Re F; Ex parte F (1986) 161 CLR 376, 387–8 (Mason and Deane JJ).

96 Ibid, quoting Actors and Announcers Equity Association v Fontana Films Pty Ltd (1982) 150 CLR 169, 192–4; quoted with approval in Grain Pool of Western Australia v Commonwealth (2000) 202 CLR 479, 492. See also Fairfax v Federal Commissioner of Taxation (1965) 114 CLR 1, 13 (Kitto J); Cunliffe v Commonwealth (1994) 182 CLR 272, 334–5; Murphyores Incorporated Pty Ltd v Commonwealth (1976) 136 CLR 1; Actors and Announcers Equity Association v Fontana Films Pty Ltd (1982) 150 CLR 169. There may be an exception to this: that is, if the other subject matter that the law regulates is ‘the subject of a positive prohibition or restriction’ that appears in s 51: Bourke v State Bank of New South Wales (1990) 170 CLR 276, 285.

97 Stellios, above n 51, 207.

98 Workplaces Relations Act 1996 (Cth) s 4, as considered in Work Choices Case (2006) 229 CLR 1.

99 Work Choices Case (2006) 229 CLR 1, 175–6, 181.

100 Assuming that the direction is not such as to amount to an usurpation of, or interference with, the judicial power of the Commonwealth. See above n 56.

101 Plaintiff S157 (2003) 211 CLR 476, 512–13 [102] (Gaudron, McHugh, Gummow, Kirby and Hayne JJ).

102 See, eg, Plaintiff S157 (2003) 211 CLR 476, where the Court read ‘decisions’ to mean ‘decisions not vitiated by jurisdictional error’ because Parliament could not validly prevent judicial review of the latter.

103 Aronson and Groves, above n 3, 120. See above Section II.

104 Bank of New South Wales v Commonwealth (1948) 76 CLR 1, 186 (Latham CJ), approved in Fairfax v Federal Commissioner of Taxation (1965) 114 CLR 1, 6–7, 16; Cunliffe v Commonwealth (1994) 182 CLR 272, 294, 213, 251, 373; Grain Pool of Western Australia v Commonwealth (2000) 202 CLR 479, 492; Murphyores Incorporated Pty Ltd v Commonwealth (1976) 136 CLR 1 19–20 (Mason J) (‘Murphyores’).

105 Assuming that does not cause the law to exceed some other limitation on legislative power.

106 Herald & Weekly Times v Commonwealth (1966) 115 CLR 418, 433 (Kitto J).

107 (1976) 136 CLR 1. See also Herald & Weekly Times v Commonwealth (1966) 115 CLR 418; Stellios, above n 51, 39.

108 Customs Act 1901 (Cth) s 112.

109 Murphyores (1976) 136 CLR 1, 19.

110 Ibid 18.

111 Ibid 11 (Stephen J), 18–19, 20 (Mason J).

112 Ibid 8 (McTiernan J); 11–12 (Stephen J), 19 (Mason J).

113 Ibid 19 (emphasis added).

114 Ibid 20.

115 Ibid 20–2 (Mason J). See also at 19 and similarly at 8 (McTiernan J), quoting Herald and Weekly Times (1966) 115 CLR, 434 (Kitto J); Murphyores (1976) 136 CLR 1, 11–12 (Stephen J).

116 (1976) 136 CLR 1, 12 (Stephen J). See similarly at 19 (Mason J).

117 (1976) 136 CLR 1, 12 (emphasis added).

118 Ibid.

119 Ibid 19 (Mason J). See also at 21, and the case of Crowe v The Commonwealth (1935) 54 CLR 94–6 (Evatt and McTiernan JJ) quoted therein.

120 Aronson, Mark, ‘Commentary on “The Entrenched Minimum Provision of Judicial Review and the Rule of Law”’ (2010) 21 Public Law Review 3537.Google Scholar

121 Plaintiff S157 (2003) 211 CLR 476, 513.

122 See above n 76.

123 See above n 104.

124 This article is not concerned with whether such a law would be contrary to s 75 itself, but that seems doubtful. See further Bateman, above n 10; McDonald, above n 10.

125 R v Barger (1908) 6 CLR 41; Union Colliery Company of British Columbia v Bryden [1899] AC 580; Russell v The Queen [1882] 7 AC 829, 839–40.

126 Bank of New South Wales v Commonwealth (1948) 76 CLR 1, especially 182–7, but cf 186 (Latham CJ), 332–3 (Dixon J); Work Choices Case (2006) 229 CLR 1, 72 (Gleeson CJ, Gummow, Hayne, Heydon and Crennan JJ); 203 (Kirby J), but cf (2006) 229 CLR 1, 226, 229 (Kirby J), 341 (Callinan J).

127 See generally Nicholas Dour and Greg Taylor, who consider this issue in connection with s 109 of the Constitution: ‘Manufactured Inconsistency’ (2013) 39 Monash Law Review 131.

128 Stellios, above n 51, 344.

129 Ibid.

130 Ibid (emphasis added).

131 The power to make laws ‘with respect to … the people of any race for whom it is deemed necessary to make special laws’Mark.

132 (1998) 195 CLR 337, 366–7 (Gaudron J), 381 (Gummow and Hayne JJ), 414–16 (Kirby J).

133 Goldsworthy, Jeffrey, ‘Interpreting the Constitution in its Second Century’ (2000) 24 Melbourne University Law Review 677, 701–4.Google Scholar

134 See, eg, Amalgamated Society of Engineers v Adelaide Steamship Ltd (1920) 28 CLR 129, 151–2; Burton v Hogan (1952) 86 CLR 169, 179 (Dixon J); Leask v Commonwealth (1996) 187 CLR 579, 602 (Dawson J), 616 (McHugh J); Grain Pool (WA) v Commonwealth (2000) 202 CLR 479, 492 [16], 522–5 [111]–[118]; Work Choices Case (2006) 229 CLR 1, 203–4 [477] (Kirby J); 103–4 [142] (Gleeson CJ, Gummow, Hayne, Heydon and Crennan JJ).

135 See further Public Service Association of SA v Industrial Relations Commission of SA (1991) 173 CLR 132.

136 Stenhouse v Coleman (1944) 69 CLR 457, 472 (Dixon J).

137 Kirk, Jeremy, ‘Constitutional Guarantees, Characterisation and the Concept of Proportionality’ (1997) 21 Melbourne University Law Journal 1.Google Scholar

138 Leask v Commonwealth (1996) 187 CLR 579, 605–6.

139 Communist Party Case (1945) 69 CLR 613, 629–30 (Dixon J).

140 (1945) 69 CLR 613.

141 (1976) 136 CLR 1, 619 (Latham CJ), 623–4 (Rich J) (note, Rich J concluded that the power could not be read down, and so was invalid) 629–30 (Dixon J), 636–7 (Williams J).

142 See above Section VI.

143 There are only three apparent purpose powers: the power with respect to defence, the treaty-implementation limb of the power with respect to external affairs, and the incidental power, express and implied. See Kirk, above n 137.

144 Especially during war. See generally Farey v Burvett (1916) 21 CLR 433.

145 See also and further Stellios, above n 51, 318, 328.

146 Ibid.

147 Public Service Board of New South Wales v Osmond (1986) 159 CLR 656.

148 Stellios, above n 51, 318, 328.

149 (1946) 73 CLR 157.

150 Ibid 181 (Dixon J).

151 Ibid 182. See similarly Giris (1969) 119 CLR 365, 384–5 (Barwick CJ), 376 (McTiernan J), 379 (Kitto J), 381–2 (Menzies J), 368 (Owen J).

152 R v Secretary of State for the Home Department; Ex parte Simms [2000] 2 AC 115, 131 (Lord Hoffman).

153 See, eg, Allan, TRS, The Sovereignty of Law: Freedom, Constitution and Common Law (Oxford University Press, 2013)CrossRefGoogle Scholar; The Constitution of Law: Legality in a Time of Emergency (Cambridge University Press, 2006).

154 Crawford, Lisa Burton, The Rule of Law and the Australian Constitution (Federation Press, forthcoming).Google Scholar

155 Plaintiff S157 (2003) 211 CLR 476, 513 [103].

156 See above n 124.

157 Note, the State Supreme Courts also have some entrenched judicial review jurisdiction: Kirk v Industrial Relations Court (NSW) (2010) 239 CLR 531.