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The Choice between Judicial and Administrative Tribunals and the Separation of Powers

Published online by Cambridge University Press:  24 January 2025

Enid Campbell
Enid Campbell*
Affiliation:
Monash University
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Extract

In his Hamlyn Lectures Lord Scarman ventured to suggest that the common law as developed by the judiciary had, by reason of its preoccupation with the defence of private property and distributive justice as between individuals, and its relative lack of concern with public law (meaning the law governing the rights and obligations of the state), come to play a diminishing role in the governance of society. He condemned what he described as “an influential body of legal opinion which would confine the role of the courts and the general law to the interpretation of the statutes and the statutory instruments which are the legal framework of the system”; and which would exclude those courts “from reviewing the merits of a decision”.

Type
Research Article
Information
Federal Law Review , Volume 12 , Issue 1 , March 1981 , pp. 24 - 61
Copyright
Copyright © 1981 The Australian National University

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References

1 English Law-The New Dimension (1974).

2 Id. 41.

3 Id. 49.

4 Id. 50.

5 Id. 71.

6 Id. 15.

7 (1979) 6 Monash Law Review 1.

8 Id. 15-16.

9 Id. 19.

10 Id. 21-22.

11 Id. 22.

12 Ibid.

13 Waterside Workers' Federation of Australia v. J.W. Alexander Ltd (1918) 25 C.L.R. 434.

14 Infra p. 55 ff.

15 (1918) 25 C.L.R. 434.

16 Attorney-General (Cth) v. R. (1957) 95 C.L.R. 529 (Privy Council on Appeal);R. v. Kirby; ex parte Boilermakers' Society of Australia (1956) 94 C.L.R. 254 (High Court).

17 (1957) 95 C.L.R. 529, 540-541.

18 R. v. Davison (1954) 90 C.L.R. 353, 369; Caminos v. Caminos (1972) 127 C.L.R. 588; R. v. Joske; ex parte Shop Distributive and Allied Employees' Association (1976) 135 C.L.R. 194.

19 R. v. Davison (1954) 90 C.L.R. 353.

20 R. v. Trade Practices Tribunal; ex parte Tasmanian Breweries Pty Ltd (1970) 123 C.L.R. 361, 390.

21 Lane, The Australian Federal System (1979) 506-508; Sawer, “The Separation of Powers in Australian Federalism” (1961) 35 A.L.J. 177, 180-183.

22 Drake v. Minister for Immigration and Ethnic Affairs (1979) 24 A.L.R. 577, 584.

23 (1974) 130 C.L.R. 87.

24 Id. 90.

25 Ibid.

26 (1974) 130 C.L.R. 87, 102 per Mason J.; R. v. Joske; ex parte Shop Distributive Allied Employees' Association (1976) 135 C.L.R. 194, 201, per Barwick C.J.; 222 per Mason and Murphy JJ.

27 See generally Finnis, “Separation of Powers in the Australian Constitution” (1968) 3 Adelaide Law Review 159; Lane, “The Decline of the Boilermakers Separation of Powers Doctrine” (1981) 55 A.L.J. 6; Zines, The High Court and the Constitution (1981) Chs 9 and 10; Lane, The Australian Federal System (1979) 483-508.

28 R. v. Davison (1954) 90 C.L.R. 353, 366.

29 R. v. Trade Practices Tribunal; ex parte Tasmanian Breweries Pty Ltd (1970) 123 C.L.R. 361, 394.

30 (1909) 8 C.L.R. 330.

31 Shell Co. of Australia Ltd v. Federal Commissioner of Taxation [1931] A.C. 275, 295; also Labour Relations Board of Saskatchewan v. John East Iron Works Ltd [1949] A.C. 134, 149.

32 (1909) 8 C.L.R. 330, 337.

33 R. v. Davison (1954) 90 C.L.R. 353, 365; The Rubber Plastic and Cable Making Industry Award (1963) 8 F.L.R. 395, 396-397; Connolly v. Connolly (1966) 115 C.L.R. 166, 168; R. v. Trade Practices Tribunal; ex parte Tasmanian Breweries Pty Ltd (1970) 123 C.L.R. 361, 374.

34 R. v. Trade Practices Tribunal; ex parte Tasmanian Breweries Pty Ltd (1970) 123 C.L.R. 361, 374.

35 R. v. Davison (1954) 90 C.L.R. 353; Peacock v. Newtown Marrickville and General Co-operative Building Society No. 4 Ltd (1943) 67 C.L.R. 25; R. v. Joske; ex parte Shop Distributive and Allied Employees' Association (1976) 135 C.L.R. 194; Mikasa (N.S.W.) Pty Ltd v. Festival Stores (1972) 127 C.L.R. 617.

36 Cominos v. Cominos (1972) 127 C.L.R. 588; R. v. Joske; ex parte Shop Distributive and Allied Employees' Association (1976) 135 C.L;R. 194.

37 For discretions held to be “non-judicial” see Queen Victoria Memorial Hospital v. Thornton (1953) 87 C.L.R. 144; R. v. Spicer; ex parte Waterside Workers' Federation of Australia (1957) 100 C.L.R. 312; R. v. Spicer; ex parte Australian Builders Labourers' Federation (1957) 100 C.L.R. 277; United Engineering Worker.s' Union v. Devanayagam [1968] A.C. 356. For discretions held to be exercisable by the judicial branch see The Federal Council of the British Medical Association in Australia v. Commonwealth (1949) 79 C.L.R. 201, 235-236, 284; Steele v. Defence Forces Retirement Benefits Board (1955) 92 C.L.R. 177, 187; Peacock v. Newtown Marrickville and General Co-operative Building Society No. 4 Ltd (1943) 67 C.L.R. 25; R. v. Judges of the Commonwealth Industrial Court; ex parte Amalgamated Engineering Union (1960) 103 C.L.R. 368; R. v. Joske; ex parte Shop Distributive and Allied Employees' Association (1976) 135 C.L.R. 194.

38 R. v. Spicer; ex parte Australian Builders' Labourers' Federation (1957) 100 C.L.R. 277, 291.

39 Id. 305.

40 Ibid.

41 (1957) 100 C.L.R. 277.

42 (1960) 103 C.L.R. 368.

43 (1970) 123 C.L.R. 361.

44 Federal Commissioner of Taxation v. Munro (1926) 38 C.L.R. 153, 176-180; R. v. Davison (1954) 90 C.L.R. 353; Farbenfabriken Bayer Aktiengesellschaft v. Bayer Pharma Pty Ltd (1959) 101 C.L.R. 652; R. v. Quinn; ex parte Consolidated Foods Corporation (1977) 138 C.L.R. 1.

45 Dorney v. Commissioner of Taxation [1980] 1 N.S.W.L.R. 404.

46 The Federal Council of the British Medical Association in Australia v. Commonwealth (1949) 79 C.L.R. 201; Steele v. Defence Forces Retirement Benefits Board (1955) 92 C.L.R. 177; Farbenfabriken Bayer Aktiengesellschaft v. Bayer Pharma Pty Ltd (1959) 101 C.L.R. 652; R. v. Quinn; ex parte Consolidated Foods Corporation (1977) 138 C.L.R. I. Committee on Administrative Discretions: Final Report (1973) Appendix D sets out administrative decisions which were subject to appeal or some other form of review by courts. Some of the appellate jurisdictions have since been transferred to the Administrative Appeals Tribunal.

47 Federal Commissioner of Taxation v. Munro (1926) 38 C.L.R. 153, 176, 178-179; R. v. Trade Practices Tribunal; ex parte Tasmanian Breweries Pty Ltd (1970) 123 C.L.R. 361, 397-398.

48 [1931] A.C. 275.

49 Id. 296-297.

50 (1954) 90 C.L.R. 353, 369. See also R. v. Gallagher; ex parte Aberdare Collieries Pty Ltd (1963) 37 A.L.J.R. 40, 43.

51 Federal Commissioner of Taxation v. Munro (1926) 38 C.L.R. 153, 176; R. v. Trade Practices Tribunal; ex parte Tasmanian Breweries Pty Ltd (1970) 123 C.L.R. 361; Ranaweera v. Wickramasinghe [1970] A.C. 951; Ranaweera v. Ramachandran [1970] A.C. 962.

52 Federal Commissioner of Taxation v. Munro (1926) 38 C.L.R. 153, 177.

53 R. v. Austin; ex parte Farmers and Graziers Co-operative Co. Ltd (1964) 112 C.L.R. 619; see also R. v. Portus; ex parte Thiess Bros. Pty Ltd (1969) 121 C.L.R. 406.

54 R. v. Gough; ex parte Meat and Allied Trades Federation of Australia (1969) 122 C.L.R. 237.

55 Wakefield Corporation v. Cooke [1904] A.C. 31, 36. An appealable decision may be binding and conclusive in the sense that it cannot be recalled or varied by the person or body which made it (indeed the fact that it is appealable may be taken to indicate that it is incapable of such recall) and can be immediately enforced, without risk of its correctness being called into question in enforcement proceedings inasmuch as it is a valid decision, made within jurisdiction.

56 Livingstone v. Westminster Corporation [1904] 2 K.B. 109; Robertson v. Minister of Pensions [1949] 1 K.B. 227; In re 56 Denton Road, Twickenham [1953] Ch. 51; Morrison v. Shire of Morwell [1948] V.L.R. 73; Battelley v. Finsbury Borough Council (1958) 56 L.G.R. 165; Punton v. Ministry of Pensions and National Health (No. 2) [1964] 1 W.L.R. 226; R. v. Moodie; ex parte Mithen (1977) 17 A.L.R. 219.

57 Gibbs v. McCorquodale (1950) 67 W.N. (N.S.W.) 169; Ex parte O'Dea; Re McDonald (1954) 72 W.N. (N.S.W.) 42; Torrisi v. Oliver [1951] V.L.R. 380.

58 (1973) 130 C.L.R. 353.

59 Id. 453.

60 It should be noted that even in the case of courts proper, there are exceptions to the general principle that decisions cannot be recalled or varied after the passing and entry of judgments. These include cases where the judgment is a nullity and where there has been a failure of natural justice (Cameron v. Cole (1943) 68 C.L.R. 571; Taylor v. Taylor (1979) 53 A.L.J.R. 629). See generally Halsbury's Laws of England (3rd ed.) Vol. xxii, 784 ff. On the re-opening of cases before administrative tribunals cf. R. v. Kensington and Chelsea Rent Tribunal; ex parte McFarlane [1974] 1 W.L.R. 1486; Hanks v. Ace High Productions Ltd [1978) I.C.R. 1155; Re Lornex Mining Corporation Ltd and Bukwa (1976) 69 D.L.R. (3d) 705; Reid and David, Administrative Law and Practice (2nd ed. 1978) Ch. 3; Macdonald, “Reopenings, Rehearings and Reconsiderations in Administrative Law: Re Lornex Mining Corporation and Bukwa” (1979) 17 Osgoode Hall Law Journal 207.

61 (1966) 9 F.L.R. 152.

62 Id. 155.

63 Somodaj v. Australian Iron and Steel Ltd (1961) 61 S.R. (N.S.W.) 305; (1963) 109 C.L.R. 285; Meskenas v. British Paints (Aust.) Pty Ltd [1964-65] N.S.W.R. 1640; Cockatoo Docks and Engineering Co. Pty Ltd v. Monteforte [1964] N.S.W.R. 1215.

64 See also Dare v. Dietrich (1979) 26 A.L.R. 18; Bede v. Commonwealth Hostels Ltd (1980) 4 N.T.R. 31.

65 R. v. Agricultural Land Tribunal (South Eastern Area); ex parte Hooker [1952] 1 K.B. 1; Punton v. Ministry of Pensions and National Insurance (No. I) [1963] 1 W.L.R. 186; R. v. National Insurance Commissioner; ex parte Hudson, sub nomine Jones v. Secretary of State for Social Services [1972] A.C. 944.

66 Achilleos v. Housing Commission [1960] V.R. 164; O'Malley v. Chief Commissioner of Police [1961] V.R. 729; Pearlman v. Keepers and Governors of Harrow School [1978] 3 W.L.R. 736.

67 R. v. Medical Appeal Tribunal; ex parte Gilmore [1957] 1 Q.B. 574, 583-585, 588; Punton v. Ministry of Pensions and National Insurance (No. 1) [1963] 1 W.L.R. 186, 191; R. v. District Court; ex parte White (1966) 116 C.L.R. 644, 649, 651-652, 655; R. v. Building Regulations Committee [1970] V.R. 214; Tehrani v. Rostron [1972] 1 Q.B. 182, 187-188; cf. R. v. Justices of the Peace at Yarram; ex parte Arnold [1964] V.L.R. 21. See also de Smith's Judicial Review of Administrative Action (4th ed. 1980) 366; Whitmore and Aronson, Review of Administrative Action (1978) 491-492.

68 British Imperial Oil Co. Ltd v. Federal Commissioner of Taxation (1925) 35 C.L.R. 422.

69 Federal Commissioner of Taxation v. Munro (1926) 38 C.L.R. 153; Shell Co. of Australia Ltd v. Federal Commissioner of Taxation (1930) 44 C.L.R. 530.

70 (1926) 38 C.L.R. 153, 175.

71 (1930) 44 C.L.R. 530, 543.

72 [1980] 1 N.S.W.L.R. 404.

73 Id. 410.

74 In Deputy Federal Commissioner of Taxation (N.S.W.) v. Brown (1958) 100 C.L.R. 32, 40-41, 52 it was stated that tax liability could not be imposed by the Commissioner unless his decision was open to challenge by some judicial process. See also Deputy Commissioner of Taxation v. Hankin (1959) 100 C.L.R. 566, 567-576.

75 Buckland v. Commissioner of Taxation (1960) 34 A.L.J.R. 60, 62.

76 Federal Commissioner of Taxation v. Munro (1926) 38 C.L.R. 153, 181, 196, 212; Federal Commissioner of Taxation v. Lewis Berger and Sons (Aust.) Ltd (1927) 39 C.L.R. 468, 469; Ruhamah Property Co. Ltd v. Federal Commissioner of Taxation (1928) 41 C.L.R. 148, 151; Federal Commissioner of Taxation v. Miller (1946) 73 C.L.R. 93, 98; Commissioner of Taxation v. Finn (1960) 103 C.L.R. 165; Krew v. Commissioner of Taxation (1971) 45 A.L.J.R. 324. The same applies to appeals to s. 71 courts whether they be appeals simpliciter, or appeals from decisions involving questions of law: Farbenfabriken Bayer Aktiengesellschaft v. Bayer Pharma Pty Ltd (1959) 101 C.L.R. 652; Minister of State for the Navy v. Rae (1945) 70 C.L.R. 339, 341; Caroma Sales Pty Ltd v. Philmac Pty Ltd (1972) 46 A.L.J.R. 324. But appeals to s. 71 courts from “administrative” decisions on questions of law are a little different, for the court cannot impeach the fact-findings of the administrator unless he has found facts in contravention of a legal requirement to find according to logically probative evidence; and in an appeal limited to questions of law, the court cannot, strictly speaking, substitute its judgment on the merits for that of the decision-maker below. Its choices are, effectively, the same as those open to a supervisory court to whom an application for certiorari or its statutory equivalent has been made: to quash or not to quash. (A court may, nonetheless, have been empowered to quash, and at the same time give directions to the body below, qua mandamus.) Northrop J. adverted to the distinction between these judicial appellate roles in Committee of Direction of Fruit Marketing v. Australian Postal Commission 0979) 25 A.L.R. 221, 233 in relation to the tax appeals, in contrast to appeals to the Federal Court from the Administrative Appeals Tribunal on questions of law.

77 (1971) 45 A.L.J.R. 324.

78 Id. 326.

79 R. v. Trade Practices Tribunal; ex parte Tasmanian Breweries Pty Ltd (1970)123 C.L.R. 361.

80 Ibid.

81 Id. 415.

82 R. v. Hickman; ex parte Fox and Clinton (1945) 70 C.L.R. 598, 615, 616, 617; Coal Miners' Industrial Union of Workers of Western Australia v. Amalgamated Collieries of Western Australia Ltd (1960) 104 C.L.R. 437; R. v. The Judges of the Commonwealth Industrial Court; ex parte Cocks (1968) 121 C.L.R. 313, 325. See generally Lane, The Australian Federal System (1979) 657-667; Whitmore and Aronson, Review of Administrative Action (1978) Ch. 15.

83 (1950) 82 C.L.R. 54, 92.

84 Fullagar J. reliad on R. v. Assessment Committee of Metropolitan Borough of Shoreditch; ex parte Morgan [1910] 2 K.B. 859, 888 and R. v. Yaldwyn (1899) 9 Q.L.J. 242, 244.

85 (1944) 69 C.L.R. 185.

86 Id. 211.

87 Ibid.

88 Id. 212.

89 Id. 217.

90 Id. 218.

91 Id. 198.

92 Id. 199.

93 Id. 200.

94 Id. 201.

95 See also Federal Commissioner of Taxation v. Munro (1926) 38 C.L.R. 153,176.

96 (1954) 90 C.L.R. 353, 365, 368.

97 R. v. Trade Practices Tribunal; ex parte Tasmanian Breweries Pty Ltd (1970) 123 C.L.R. 361, 408.

98 Bunbury v. Fuller (1835) 9 Ex. 111, 156 E.R. 47; R. v. Marsham [1892] 1 Q.B. 371; R. v. Fulham Rent Tribunal; ex parte Zerek [1951] 2 K.B. 1; R. v. Pugh (Judge); ex parte Graham [1951] 2 K.B. 623; R. v. Rent Officer for Kensington and Chelsea; ex parte Noel [1978] Q.B. 1; R. v. Rent Officer for Camden; ex parte Ebiri [1981] 1 All E.R. 950; R. v. Hickman; ex parte Fox and Clinton (1945) 70 C.L.R. 598, 618; R. v. Blakely; ex parte Association of Architects (1950) 82 C.L.R. 54; Re Cilli's Obiection (1970) 15 F.L.R. 426, 428; cf. Caltex Oil (Aust.) Pty Ltd v. Feenan [1980] 1 N.S.W.L.R. 724.

99 Supra n. 60.

100 R. v. Pugh (Judge); ex parte Graham [1951] 2 K.B. 623; London and Clydeside Estates Ltd v. Aberdeen District Council [1979] 3 All E.R. 876; Manning v. Thompson (1979) 53 A.L.J.R. 582.

1 (1979) 24 A.L.R. 307.

2 Id. 342.

3 Id. 335. See also Deputy Commissioner of Patents v. Board of Control of Michigan Technological University (1979) 2 A.L.D. 711.

4 Toronto Railway Co. v. Toronto (1904) A.C. 809; Nelson Catchment Board v. Waimea County and Richmond Borough (1955) N.Z.L.R. 1126; Yule v. Junek (1978) 52 A.L.J.R. 307; cf. Alan E. Tucker Pty Ltd v. Orange City Council (1969) 90 W.N. (N.S.W.) (Pt. 1) 477, 480-481; Sutherland Shire Council v. Leyendekkers [1970] 1 N.S.W.R. 356, 366-367.

5 Infra n. 30 and Pannam, “Tortious Liability for Acts Performed Under an Unconstitutional Statute” (1966) 5 Melbourne University Law Review 113.

6 (1951) 83 C.L.R. 1.

7 Id. 258, 262.

8 Ex parte Walsh and Johnson; In re Yates (1925) 37 C.L.R. 36, 67; Australian Railways Union v. Victorian Railways Commissioners (1930) 44 C.L.R. 319, 373-374;Attorney-General for Victoria v. Commonwealth (1935) 52 C.L.R. 533, 566;Australian Apple and Pear Marketing Board v. Tonking (1942) 66 C.L.R. 77, 104;Strickland v. Rocla Concrete Pipes Pty Ltd (1971) 124 C.L.R. 468, 486, 493.

9 (1977) 12 A.L.R. 239.

10 Id. 241.

11 Id. 242.

12 Id. 245.

13 Id. 243.

14 Id. 245.

15 For the United States see 73 Corpus Juris Secundum 393, para. 67; 'The Authority of Administrative Agencies to Consider the Constitutionality of Statutes” (1977) 80 Harvard Law Review 1682. For India cf. K.S. Venkataraman & Co. Ltd v. State of Madras, A.I.R. 1966 S.C. 1089, 1099-1100, Sree Maia Kandregula Srinivasa v. Andhra Pradesh, A.LR. 1971 S.C. 71.

16 (1976) 5 V.P.A. 32, 35.

17 (1979) 2 A.L.D. 934.

18 Id. 939. The Allahabad High Court has held that a tribunal cannot examine the validity of subordinate legislation: Tata Iron and Steel Co. v. Orissa (1970) 25 S.T.C. 171.

19 This possible course of action was adverted to in Re Zirnmax Trading Co. Pty Ltd and Collector of Customs (N.S.W.) (1978) 2 A.L.D. 120.

20 R. v. Lydon; ex parte Cessnock Collieries Ltd (1960) 103 C.L.R. 15, 22; Sornodaj v. Australian Iron and Steel Ltd (1961) 61 S.R. (N.S.W.) 305, 307; Clyne v. East [1967] 2 N.S.W.R. 483; Kotsis v. Kotsis (1970) 122 C.L.R. 69, 76. Implications such as those drawn in relation to the constitution of Ceylon from the fact that constitutional arrangements were inspired by the British Constitution (Liyanage v. R. [1967] 1 A.C. 259; Hinds v. R. [1977] A.C. 195, 212) have not been drawn in relation to the constitutions of the Australian States.

21 On the influence of separation of powers doctrine on English judicial thinking see generally Munro, “The Separation of Powers: Not Such a Myth” [1981] Public Law 19.

22 E.g. Duport Steels Ltd v. Sirs [1980] 1 W.L.R. 142, 157; State Government Insurance Commission (S.A.) v. Trigwell (1979) 53 A.L.J.R. 656, 661.

23 The alleged prerogative of suspension and dispensation was outlawed by the Bill of Rights 1689 (relied upon in Fitzgerald v. Muldoon [1976] 2 N.Z.L.R. 615) but judicial refusals to give effect to extra-statutory dispensations or apparent dispensations have not always relied upon the Bill of Rights: R. v. Commissioners of Customs and Excise; ex parte Cooke [1970] 1 W.L.R. 451, 454-455; Maritime Electric Co. Ltd v. General Dairies Ltd [1937] A.C. 610. See also Vestey v. Inland Revenue Commissioners [1979] 3 W.L.R. 915 and Baker “Tax Avoidance, Law Reform and the Dispensing Power” (1980) 96 L.Q.R. 203.

24 Re Lord Bishop of Natal (1864) 3 Moo. P.C.C. 115, 16 E.R. 13; McGuinness v. Attorney-General (Victoria) (1940) 63 C.L.R. 73; cf. Sabally v. Attorney-General [1965] 1 Q.B. 273, 293; R. v. Criminal Injuries Compensation Board; ex parte Lain [1967] 2 Q.B. 864. See also Campbell, “The Royal Prerogative to Create Colonial Courts” (1964) 4 Sydney Law Review 343.

25 Kielley v. Carson (1842) 4 Moo. P.C.C. 63; 13 E.R. 225. But colonial assemblies have been allowed an inherent disciplinary jurisdiction in respect of their own members; Armstrong v. Butt and Stevenson [1969] 1 N.S.W.L.R. 649; Kariapper v. Wijesinha [1968] A.C. 717; Campbell, “Expulsion of Members of Parliament” (1971) 21 University of Toronto Law Journal 15.

26 Anisminic Ltd v. Foreign Compensation Commission [1969] 2 A.C. 147. See also supra n. 82. But the Judicial Committee of the Privy Council has recently sustained a privative clause ousting judicial review for non-jurisdictional error of law: South East Asia Fire Brick Sdn Bhd v. Non-Metallic Mineral Products Manufacturing Employees Union [1980] 2 All E.R. 689. Its opinion preceded that of the House of Lords in Re Racal Communications Ltd [1980] 3 W.L.R. 181.

27 E.g. R. v. Lampe; ex parte Maddalozzo (1963) 5 F.L.R. 160; Sambell v. Cook [1962] V.R. 448; Barnard v. National Dock Labour Board [1953] 2 Q.B. 18; Vine v. National Dock Labour Board [1957] A.C. 488.

28 Re Gosling (1943) 43 S.R. (N.S.W.) 312; Bates v. Lord Hailsham [1972] 1 W.L.R. 1373; R. v. Whalley; ex parte Bordin and Co. [1972] V.R. 748; White v. Ryde Municipal Council [1977] 2 N.S.W.L.R. 909; Gardner v. Dairy Industry Authority of N.S.W. [1977] 1 N.S.W.L.R. 505. But exceptions have been made when the legislature has insisted that the subordinate legislature proceed in an adversary manner: e.g. New Zealand United Licensed Victuallers Association of Employees v. Price Tribunal [1957] N.Z.L.R. 167; R. v. Commonwealth Conciliation and Arbitration Commission; ex parte The Angliss Group (1969) 122 C.L.R. 546.

29 de Smith's Judicial Review of Administrative Action (4th ed. 1980) 106 ff.

30 Judicial officers are, in the exercise of judicial functions, accorded a high degree of protection: see Sirros v. Moore [1975] 1 Q.B. 118; Sutcliffe v. Thackrah [1974] A.C. 727; Nahkla v. McCarthy [1978] 1 N.Z.L.R. 291; cf. Maharaj v. AttorneyGeneral of Trinidad and Tobago (No. 2) [1979] A.C. 385. But this protection is not confined to those exercising judicial power in the strict sense: see Everett v. Griffiths [1921] 1 A.C. 631; Tampion v. Anderson [1973] V.R. 321; [1973] V.R. 715; cf. Arenson v. Casson Beckman Rutley and Co. [1977] A.C. 405; Campbell v. Edwards [1976] 1 W.L.R. 403. Also persons who are protected in relation to the exercise of judicial-type functions may incur liability for non-performance of “ministerial” functions: see Tozer v. Child (1857) 7 El. & Bl. 377, 119 E.R. 1286; Beaurain v.Scott (1813) 3 Camp. 388, 170 E.R. 1420; Ferguson v. Kinnoull (Earl) (1842) 9 Cl. & F. 251, 8 E.R. 412; Partridge v. General Council of Medical Education and Registration (1890) 25 Q.B.D. 90; McGillivray v. Kimber (1916) 26 D.L.R. 164.

31 E.g. Crown Proceedings Act 1958 (Vic.), s. 23(2).

32 A statutory discretion to award costs in judicial type proceedings will not, normally be exercisable in the exercise of another, non-judicial jurisdiction: Boulter v. Justices of Kent [1897] A.C. 556; R. v. Melbourne Magistrates' Court; ex parte Hiscock [1977] V.R. 569; R. v. Nicholl and Van der Voorden; ex parte Webster (1979) 26 A.C.T.R. 19; Cook v. Head and Arnemon [1976] 1 N.S.W.L.R. 176, 181.

33 See Moses v. Parker [1896] A.C. 245; Attorney-General of Gambia v. N'Jie [1961] A.C. 617, 633; R. v. Cornwall Quarter Sessions; ex parte Kerley [1956] 1 W.L.R. 906; Stow v. Mineral Holdings (Aust.) Pty Ltd (1977) 51 A.L.J.R. 672.

34 See Gosford Shire Council v. Anthony George Pty Ltd (1909) 17 L.G.R.A. 129, 137-138; Harker v. Boon (1956) A.R. (N.S.W.) 178.

35 See Attorney-General v. British Broadcasting Corporation [1980] 3 W.L.R. 109; Minister for Community Welfare v. Keating (1980) 25 S.A.S.R. 313; Attorney-General (N.S.W.) v. Mirror Newspapers Ltd [1980] 1 N.S.W.L.R. 374, 383-386.

36 de Smith's Judicial Review of Administrative Action (4th ed. 1980) Ch. 2; Whitmore and Aronson, Review of Administrative Action (1978) 9-12; Sykes, Lanham and Tracey, General Principles of Administrative Law (1979) paras 011-023.

37 Booth v. Dillon (No. 3) [1977] V.R. 143.

38 Gosford Shire Council v. Anthony George Pty Ltd (1969) 17 L.G.R.A. 129,137-138.

39 Attorney-General v. British Broadcasting Corporation [1980] 3 W.L.R. 109. But the High Court of Australia has said that the jurisdiction extends to all tribunals subject to supervisory jurisdiction: John Fairfax and Sons Pty Ltd v. McRae (1955) 93 C.L.R. 351, 363.

40 Legislation establishing tribunals which are expected to hold hearings sometimes deals expressly with the question whether hearings are to be open to the public. In Addis v. Crocker (19611 1 Q.B. 11, 30 Upjohn L.J. stated that: “In general ... a tribunal having judicial functions to perform should deliberate in public”. But he recognised that there could be cases in which justice demanded that the hearing be held in camera. In R. v. Tarnopolsky; ex parte Bell (1970) 2 O.R. 672, 680 Laskin J.A. thought that the general rule was that where the statute was silent on the question of whether hearings be in public or private, proceedings should normally be held in public. See also Bruton v. Regina City Police Men's Association [1945] 3 D.L.R. 437, 452-454.

41 Although commercial arbitrators are bound by the rules of evidence (East and West India Dock Co. v. Kirk and Randall (1887) 12 App. Cas. 738; Re Enoch and Zaretzky Bock & Co. [1910] 1 K.B. 327), it has never been suggested that tribunals are bound to apply curial rules of evidence unless expressly exempted by statute from an obligation to do so. Indeed it has been held that when a right of appeal is given to a court against an administrative decision, the court may admit evidence which, in curial proceedings proper, would be inadmissible, e.g. hearsay: Kavanagh v. Chief Constable of Devon and Cornwall [1974] Q.B. 624.

42 Libman v. General Medical Council [1972] A.C. 217, 221; Re Thompson's Application [1964] Tas. S.R. 129; Treganna v. O'Neal [1955] Tas. S.R. 71; Smith v. O'Neal [1958] Tas. S.R. 66; Re Anderson and the Ulster Hotel [1969] Qd. R. 525, 530; Re Royal Hotel, Cairns [1975] Qd. R. 275; Re Chateau Rosevale Wholesalers (Qld) Pty Ltd [1975] Qd. R. 183; Santin v. Woodville Corporation [1971] 1 S.A.S.R. 336, 339; Twenty Seven Properties Ltd v. Corporation of Noarlunga (1975) 11 S.A.S.R. 188; Barnes v. State Planning Authority (1977) 17 S.A.S.R. 421, 427-428; Pacminex (Operations) Pty Ltd v. Australian (Nephrite) Jade Mines Pty Ltd [1974] 7 S.A.S.R. 401.

43 Stepney Borough Council v. Joffe [1949] 1 K.B. 599; Hammond v. Hutt Valley and Bays Metropolitan Milk Board [1958] N.Z.LR. 720; R. v. Oldham; ex parte Registrar of Motor Vehicles [1960] Tas. S.R. 80.

44 In contrast where the appeal is from a tribunal which does not proceed like a court of law, does not maintain a transcript of evidence or give reasons, the appeal, even if described as an appeal by way of rehearing, is more likely to be characterised as an appeal by way of de novo hearing: Georgoussis v. Medical Board of Victoria [1957] V.R. 671, 676-680; Fox v. General Medical Council [1960] 1 W.L.R. 1017; Commonwealth v. Rutledge (1964) 111 C.LR. 1, 8; Builders Licensing Board (N.S.W.) v.Sperway Constructions (Sydney) Pty Ltd (1976) 135 C.LR. 616, 621, 622; Turnbull v. New South Wales Medical Board [1976] 2 N.S.W.LR. 281; Re Ryan; ex parte Travaglini [1979] W.A.R. 23; Re Mulligan; ex parte Isidoro [1979] W.A.R. 198; Halter v. Darwin Turf Club Inc. and Mitchell (1979) 25 A.LR. 394; Dare v. Dietrich (1979) 26 A.LR. 18.

45 R. v. Visiting Justice at Pentridge; ex parte Walker [1975] V.R. 883.

46 Adams (Deputy Federal Commissioner of Taxation (Victoria)) v. Chas. S. Watson Pty Ltd (1938) 60 C.L.R. 545, 554-555; Peacock v. Newtown Marrickville & General Co-operative Building Society No. 4 Ltd (1943) 67 C.L.R. 25, 37.

47 Kotsis v. Kotsis (1970) 122 C.L.R. 69, 77; see also per Windeyer J. 91; Knight v. Knight (1971) 122 C.L.R. 114, 131-132; Silk Bros. Pty Ltd v. State Electricity Commission of Victoria (1943) 67 C.L.R. 1; Waterside Workers' Federation of Australia v. J.W. Alexander Ltd (1918) 25 C.L.R. 434, 442, 451.

48 Federal Council of the British Medical Association in Australia v. Commonwealth (1949) 79 C.L.R. 201, 236, 257-258; Queen Victoria Memorial Hospital v. Thornton (1953) 87 C.L.R. 144,150, 151-152; Insurance Commissioner v. Associated Dominions Assurance Society Pty Ltd (1953) 89 C.L.R. 78, 85; R. v. Kirby; ex parte Boilermakers' Society of Australia (1956) 94 C.L.R. 254, 315-316.

49 James v. Commonwealth (1928) 41 C.L.R. 442, 458-460, 463-464; Le Mesurier v. Connor (1929) 42 C.L.R. 481.

50 Kotsis v. Kotsis (1970) 122 C.L.R. 69, 92; Knight v. Knight (1971) 122 C.L.R.114, 118-119, 124.

51 Supra n. 49.

52 (1973) 129 C.L.R. 231.

53 Id. 239; also 246, 251.

54 Id. 240.

55 Dalgarno v. Hannah (1903) 1 C.L.R. 1, 10; Federal Commissioner of Taxation v. Munro (1926) 38 C.L.R. 153, 174-175; Commonwealth of Australia v. Goodfellow (1980) 31 A.LR. 533.

56 Commissioner of Taxation v. Finn (1960) 103 C.L.R. 165; Commonwealth v.Anderson (1957) 97 C.L.R. 345; Commonwealth v. Thompson (1960) 104 C.L.R.48; Phillips v. Commonwealth (1964) 110 C.L.R. 347.

57 Consolidated Press Ltd v. Australian Journalists' Association (1947) 73 C.L.R. 599; Jacka v. Lewis (1944) 68 C.L.R. 455, 462.

58 Holmes v. Angwin (1906) 4 C.L.R. 297; cf. Webb v. Hanlon (1939) 61 C.L.R. 313, 319, 323-324, 330, 335. And in relation to appeals to the Privy Council see Theberge v. Laudry (1876) 2 App. Cas. 102; Strickland (Lord) v. Grima [1930] A.C. 285; Patterson v. Solomon [1960] A.C. 579.

59 Medical Board of Victoria v. Meyer (1937) 58 C.L.R. 62, 97; also 71-74, 80-81.

60 Incorporated Law Institute of New South Wales v. Meagher (1909) 9 C.L.R. 655.

61 Smith v. Mann (1932) 47 C.L.R. 426.

62 Medical Board of Victoria v. Meyer (1937) 58 C.L.R. 62.

63 Transport Publishing Co. Pty Ltd v. Literature Board of Review (1956) 99 C.L.R. 111.

64 Adelaide Fruit and Produce Exchange Co. Ltd v. Corporation of City of Adelaide (1961) 106 C.L.R. 85.

65 Stow v. Mineral Holdings (Aust.) Pty Ltd (1977) 51 A.L.J.R. 672. (Barwick. C.J. and Murphy J. dissented on this issue.)

66 Medical Board of Victoria v. Meyer (1937) 58 C.L.R. 62.

67 Id. 93.

68 Ibid.

69 Ibid. See also Kahn v. Board of Examiners (Vict.) (1939) 62 C.L.R. 422.

70 (1956) 99 C.L.R. 111.

71 Id. 131.

72 Federal Commissioner of Taxation v. Munro (1926) 38 C.L.R. 153, 212.

73 [1896] A.C. 245. The Court has been empowered to investigate claims to Crown land grants and make recommendations to the Governor in relation thereto. In the exercise of this jurisdiction the Court was expressly exempted from any duty to decide claims according to law. Rather it was to decide according to equity and good conscience. See also Lovibond v. Governor General of Canada [1930] A.C. 717 and Bradford Third Equitable Benefit Building Society v. Borders (No. 2) [1939] 3 All E.R. 611.

74 R. v. White; ex parte Byrnes (1963) 109 C.L.R. 665.

75 Ranaweera v. Wickramasinghe [1970] A.C. 951.

76 Id. 959.

77 It may therefore be open to the federal Parliament to establish an adjudicatory regime similar to that established by the Victorian Equal Opportunity Act 1977. This creates an Equal Opportunity Board which has jurisdiction to try and determine complaints of unlawful discrimination and to award civil remedies, e.g. damages and orders in the nature of injunctions. Proceedings for enforcement of the Board's orders and awards can only be brought in the courts. There is also a statutory right to appeal to the Supreme Court against orders of the Board.

78 E.g. a statute which provides that the occupant of a designated federal judicial office shall be a member ex officio of some administrative tribunal.

79 Now that appeals from the High Court to the Privy Council have effectively been abolished (Privy Council (Limitation of Appeals) Act 1968 (Cth) and Privy Council (Appeals from the High Court) Act 1975 (Cth) ), the High Court is at liberty not to follow decisions of the Judicial Committee (Viro v. R. (1978) 18 A.L.R. 257).

80 R. v. Kirby; ex parte Boilermakers' Society of Australia (1956) 94 C.L.R. 254, 314, 315.

81 Attorney-General of the Commonwealth v. R. (1957) 95 C.L.R. 529, 543.

82 R. v. Joske, ex parte Australian Building Construction Employees and Builders' Labourers' Federation (1974) 130 C.L.R. 87, 90.

83 It is conceivable that a distinction might be drawn between federal and State courts such that State courts could not be required to undertake federal non-judicial functions without State consent.

84 In non-constitutional contexts the fact that a parliament has chosen to invest a discretion in a court is often taken to signify that the discretion must be exercised independently: Ex parte Duncan (1904) 4 S.R. (N.S.W.) 217; Evans v. Donaldson (1909) 9 C.L.R. 140. As regards the special position of the Conciliation and Arbitration Commission see R. v. Commonwealth Conciliation and Arbitration Commission; ex parte Amalgamated Engineering Union (1967) 118 C.L.R. 219, 242,269,270.

85 The principle of necessity or an implication that Parliament had overridden the rule against bias might sometimes preclude litigants from contesting the qualification of individual judges to adjudicate.