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The Communist Party Case Revisited: Constitutional Review in the 2020 Term

Published online by Cambridge University Press:  01 January 2025

Lisa B Crawford Open the ORCID record for Lisa B Crawford [Opens in a new window]
Lisa B Crawford*
Affiliation:
Gilbert + Tobin Centre of Public Law, Sydney, NSW, Australia
*
The author may be contacted at l.b.crawford@unsw.edu.au.
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Abstract

This article examines the 2020 decisions of the High Court on constitutional law through the lens of the Communist Party Case, taking the 70th anniversary of that decision as an opportunity to reflect on the ongoing utility and efficacy of the constitutional principles it espoused. It focuses on the way in which constitutional meaning may be informed by ordinary legislation, the common law and the rich backdrop of principles and values against which the Constitution was drafted — particularly, the rule of law. In doing so, the article highlights enduring questions about the scope of the High Court’s power to remedy those deficiencies in the Constitution that reveal themselves over time.

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Articles
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Federal Law Review , Volume 50 , Issue 1 , March 2022 , pp. 20 - 39
Copyright
Copyright © 2022 The Author(s)

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Footnotes

This article is derived from the Keynote Address delivered to the Gilbert + Tobin Centre of Constitutional Law Conference in February 2021.

References

1. (1951) 83 CLR 1 (‘Communist Party Case’).

2. Ibid 193.

3. Ibid 263.

4. Ibid 258.

5. Ibid 262.

6. Ibid 261 (Fullagar J), 175, 193, 201‐2 (Dixon J). See further Lisa Burton Crawford, The Rule of Law and the Australian Constitution (Federation Press, 2017) 59.

7. I leave to the side the well-known fact that the Constitution does not expressly state that the Court has authority to review or invalidate legislative action. Yet, this can be explained on fairly orthodox (one might say, ‘legalistic’) grounds: Crawford, The Rule of Law and the Australian Constitution (n 6) 54‐5.

8. (2020) 94 ALJR 198 (‘Love’).

9. Ibid 267 [350], quoting Re Foreman & Sons Pty Ltd; Uther v Federal Commissioner of Taxation (1947) 74 CLR 508, 530 (Dixon J).

10. Constitution s 51(xviii).

11. Ibid s 51(xvii).

12. Ibid s 51(xxi).

13. Communist Party Case (n 1) 193.

14. (2020) 94 ALJR 502 (‘Smethurst’).

15. Migration Act 1958 (Cth) ss 13‐14 (‘Migration Act’).

16. I say prima facie so as to indicate but leave to the side the emerging body of research which suggests that citizenship has some constitutional content (to which Love might now be added). See, eg, Sangeetha Pillai, ‘Non-Immigrants, Non-Aliens and People of the Commonwealth: Australian Constitutional Citizenship Revisited’ (2013) 39(2) Monash University Law Review 568.

17. Love (n 8) 218 [81].

18. Ibid 263‐4 [329]‐[330].

19. See also Ibid 273 [394] (Edelman J).

20. Ibid 259 [305]. See also at 263 [330].

21. Ibid 215 [64] (Bell J). See also at 260 [310] (Gordon J), 247‐8 [249]‐[254] (Nettle J).

22. Ibid 287 [447] (Edelman J). See also at 283‐4 [434] (Edelman J).

23. (1982) 151 CLR 101, 109 (Gibbs CJ) (emphasis added). See also A-G (Vic) v Commonwealth (1962) 107 CLR 529, 549 (McTiernan J) (‘Marriage Act Case’): ‘The term marriage bears its own limitations and Parliament cannot enlarge its meaning. In the context — the Constitution — the term “marriage” should receive its full grammatical and ordinary sense: plainly in this context it means only monogamous marriage’.

24. Love (n 8) 276 [403], quoting Taylor v United States, 152 F 1, 4 (Lacombe J) (Second Cir, 1907) (‘Taylor’).

25. Love (n 8) 259 [302]. See also Nolan v Minister for Immigration and Ethnic Affairs (1988) 165 CLR 178, 183 (Mason CJ, Wilson, Brennan, Deane, Dawson and Toohey JJ), cited in Love (n 8) 214 [61] (Bell J), 276 [403] (Edelman J).

26. Love (n 8) 257 [289]. See also at 254‐5 [276] (Nettle J).

27. Elisa Arcioni and Rayner Thwaites, ‘Aboriginal Australians Not Vulnerable to Deportation’, AUSPUBLAW (Blog Post, 6 March 2020) <https://auspublaw.org/2020/03/aboriginal-australians-not-vulnerable-to-deportation/>.

28. Keith E Whittington, ‘The New Originalism’ (2004) 2(2) Georgetown Journal of Law and Public Policy 599. While it remains the subject of debate, many see this as a preferable alternative to intentionalist originalism: see Larry Alexander, ‘Goldsworthy on Interpretation of Statutes and Constitutions: Public Meaning, Intended Meaning and the Bogey of Aggregation’ in Lisa Burton Crawford, Patrick Emerton and Dale Smith (eds), Law under a Democratic Constitution: Essays in Honour of Jeffrey Goldsworthy (Hart Publishing, 2019) 5.

29. (1988) 165 CLR 360.

30. Peter Gerangelos, ‘Reflections upon Constitutional Interpretation and the “Aliens Power”: Love v Commonwealth’ (2021) 95 Australian Law Journal 109, 110.

31. Similar opinions have been expressed before. See, eg, SGH Ltd v Commissioner of Taxation (2002) 210 CLR 51, 75 [40]-[44] (Gummow J); a position reiterated by the Court in Commonwealth v Australian Capital Territory (2013) 250 CLR 441, 455 [14].

32. James C Phillips, Daniel M Ortner and Thomas R Lee, ‘Corpus Linguistics & Original Public Meaning: A New Tool to Make Originalism More Empirical’ (2016) 126 Yale Law Journal Forum 21, 23.

33. See Philips, Ortner and Lee (n 32). The weight that can be placed on the etymology of constitutional terms is all the more doubtful. Do the Latin or French origins of a word matter? How would this approach assist in the interpretation of other juristic concepts in s 51, like ‘bankrupt’ or ‘copyright’? According to that most trustworthy source, Wikipedia, the word ‘bankrupt’ originates from the Italian banca rotta, literally meaning ‘broken bench’ but more idiomatically ‘broken bank’, since bankers traditionally dealt from wooden benches. Does this provide any meaningful guidance to the meaning of s 51(xvii)?

34. Love (n 8) 275 [400] (Edelman J).

35. Michael Brown Planning Strategies Pty Ltd v Wingecarribee Shire Council [2020] NSWCA 137, [17] (Moore J).

36. Love (n 8) 234 [172].

37. Ibid 208 [18], quoting Nolan v Minister for Immigration and Ethnic Affairs (1988) 165 CLR 178, 183 [18].

38. Ibid.

39. Ibid. See similarly at 234 [174] (Keane J).

40. Ibid 276 [403], quoting Taylor (n 24).

41. Love (n 8) 274 [399].

42. Ibid.

43. Edelman J admits that this is a difficult task, though not, it would seem, that it entails judicial choice: Ibid 274‐5 [400].

44. (2010) 239 CLR 531. See, eg, Oscar Roos, ‘Accepted Doctrine at the Time of Federation and Kirk v Industrial Court of New South Wales’ (2013) 35 Sydney Law Review 781; Jeffrey Goldsworthy, ‘Kable, Kirk and Judicial Statesmanship’ (2014) 40(1) Monash University Law Review 75.

45. Michael Stokes, ‘Meaning, Theory and the Interpretation of Constitutional Grants of Power’ (2013) 39(2) Monash University Law Review 319, 323 (‘Meaning, Theory and Interpretation’).

46. (1908) 6 CLR 309, 36-8.

47. (2013) 250 CLR 441, 455 [14], 456 [16] (French CJ, Hayne, Crennan, Kiefel, Bell and Keane JJ) (‘Commonwealth v ACT’). See also Communications, Electrical, Electronic, Energy, Information, Postal, Plumbing and Allied Services Union of Australia v Queensland Rail (2015) 256 CLR 171, 183 [21]–[22] (French CJ, Hayne, Kiefel, Bell, Keane and Nettle JJ), 198–9 [65] (Gageler J). Another pertinent example is Re Refugee Review Tribunal; Ex parte Aala (2000) 204 CLR 82 where it was held that the meaning of the terms ‘prohibition, mandamus’ and ‘injunction’, found in s 75(v) should not be taken to tether the scope of those remedies to the pre-Federation case law. The relationship between constitutional meaning and common law, including in the context of s 75(v), is discussed in Part B.

48. Commonwealth v ACT (n 47) 457 [19] (French CJ, Hayne, Crennan, Kiefel, Bell and Keane JJ).

49. Stokes ‘Meaning, Theory and Interpretation’ (n 45); Michael Stokes, ‘The Interpretation of Legal Terms Used in the Definition of Commonwealth Powers’ (2007) 35(2) Federal Law Review 239 (‘The Interpretation of Legal Terms’).

50. Stokes, ‘Meaning, Theory and Interpretation’ (n 45) 328.

51. Ibid 329.

52. Ibid 326.

53. Gerangelos (n 30) 122‐3.

54. See, eg, Patrick Emerton, ‘Political Freedoms and Entitlements in the Australian Constitution — An Example of Referential Intentions Yielding Unintended Legal Consequences’ (2010) 38(2) Federal Law Review 169 (‘Unintended Legal Consequences’).

55. Love (n 8) 199. This is an interesting claim, given (as explained above) the High Court has never endorsed any particular method of constitutional interpretation.

56. See Love (n 8) 218 [83]-[84] (Gageler J), 205 [5] (Kiefel CJ), 234-5 [177] (Keane J). The cases relied upon include Koroitamana v Commonwealth (2006) 227 CLR 31, 46 [48] (Gummow, Hayne and Crennan JJ), citing Re Minister for Immigration and Multicultural Affairs; Ex parte Te (2002) 212 CLR 162, 173 [31], 180 [58], 188-9 [90], 192 [108]-[109], 215-16 [193]-[194], 219-20 [210]-[211], 229 [229]; Shaw v Minister for Immigration and Multicultural Affairs (2003) 218 CLR 28, 35 [2] (Gleeson CJ, Gummow and Hayne JJ).

57. Love (n 8) 219 [86]-[87].

58. (2021) 95 ALJR 166.

59. Ibid 188 [66] (Gageler J).

60. Marriage Act Case (n 23) 560 (Taylor J). See also at 603 (Owen J): ‘There can be no doubt that it is within the competence of the Commonwealth Parliament to declare what shall or shall not constitute a valid marriage’; A-G (NSW) v Brewery Employees Union of NSW (1908) 6 CLR 469, 610 (Higgins J) (‘Brewery Labels Case’).

61. Love (n 8) 219 [86]. See also the judgment of Windeyer J in the Marriage Act Case (n 23).

62. Love (n 8) 219 [86]‐[87] (Gageler J).

63. Gerangelos (n 30) 113.

64. Love (n 8) 219‐20 [88] (Gageler J).

65. Gerangelos (n 30) 113.

66. Ibid.

67. See, eg, the dissent of Hayne J in Roach v Electoral Commissioner (2007) 233 CLR 162, 219 [158] (‘Roach’). See also the 1962 Marriage Act Case (n 23), where a majority concluded that a law that legitimated children born out of wedlock to a couple who subsequently married was a law with respect to marriage — in large part because (as Windeyer J explained it, albeit in dissent) ‘legitimation by matrimony is a doctrine long known in the canon law, interwoven in the civil law and a part of the law of all countries governed by the civil law’: at 589‐90.

68. Roach (n 67).

69. (2010) 243 CLR 1 (‘Rowe’).

70. Ibid 18 [18] (French CJ); Roach (n 67) 174 [7] (Gleeson CJ).

71. Rowe (n 69) 18 [18] (French CJ). See similarly Roach (n 67) 174 [7] (Gleeson CJ).

72. Rowe (n 69) 18 [19].

73. Love (n 8) 206 [7] (Kiefel CJ), 219 [87] (Gageler J), 233 [168] (Keane J), citing Pochi v Macphee (n 23) 109.

74. Love 222‐3 [100]‐[101].

75. Ibid 222 [101]. This is noteworthy, given previous and unresolved disagreement about the full implications of these constitutional changes. See Kartinyeri v Commonwealth (1998) 195 CLR 337, 362‐3 (Gaudron J), 381‐3 [90]‐[94] (Gummow and Hayne JJ), 413 [157] (Kirby J).

76. (2020) 94 ALJR 569.

77. Ibid 614 [212].

78. See the work of Elisa Arcioni, especially Elisa Arcioni, ‘“We, What People?” Constitutional Identity in Australia’ [2017] (2) This Century's Review 34.

79. Gerner v Victoria (2020) 95 ALJR 107 (‘Gerner’).

80. Public Health and Wellbeing Act 2008 (Vic) ss 200(1) (b), (d).

81. Gerner (n 79) 112 [18].

82. Ibid 112‐13 [18].

83. Lael K Weiss, ‘Legislative Constitutional Baselines’ (2019) 41(4) Sydney Law Review 481; Stokes, ‘Meaning, Theory and Interpretation’ (n 45); Stokes, ‘The Interpretation of Legal Terms’ (n 49); Emerton, ‘Unintended Legal Consequences’ (n 54).

84. Much would depend on the nature of the constitutional recognition, and different judges may take different views — for example, for those judges in Love who concluded that an alien ‘just is’ a person who lacks citizenship under the Australian Citizenship Act, it may not make a difference. Others may be satisfied that the fact the Constitution elsewhere acknowledges the First Nations meant that statutory citizenship was not the only way by which someone could come to ‘belong’, in the sense required by s 51(xix).

85. Love (n 8) 229 [135].

86. (1992) 175 CLR 1 (‘Mabo [No 2]’).

87. Native Title Act 1993 (Cth).

88. Love (n 8) 227 [128].

89. Ibid 210 [31]. See also 239 [212] (Keane J).

90. Ibid 211 [41].

91. Ibid 216 [71].

92. Ibid 252 [269].

93. Ibid 253 [272].

94. Ibid.

95. (2020) 95 ALJR 704.

96. The theory of semantic realism, introduced in Part A, provides one potential means of demonstrating that the full and proper meaning of constitutional terms — though fixed — reveals itself over time: see Emerton, ‘Unintended Legal Consequences’ (n 54).

97. Love (n 8) 254 [275].

98. Ibid 235 [182].

99. Ibid 240 [214].

100. Ibid 240 [217].

101. Ibid 228 [134].

102. Ibid 228 [133].

103. Ibid 289 [453].

104. Smethurst (n 14) 516‐7 [25]‐[26], 519‐20 [43]‐[44] (Kiefel CJ, Bell and Keane JJ), 542‐3 [166] (Gordon J), 537 [142] (Nettle J), 531‐2 [115] (Gageler J), 567 [281] (Edelman J),

105. See especially ibid 520 [51], 524 [72] (Kiefel CJ, Bell and Keane JJ).

106. Ibid 520 [48], 525 [83] (Kiefel CJ, Bell and Keane JJ), citing Australian Broadcasting Corporations v Lenah Game Meats Pty Ltd (2001) 208 CLR 199.

107. Ibid 533 [123].

108. (1765) 19 St Tr 1030; 95 ER 807.

109. Smethurst (n 14) 533‐4 [124]‐[125] (Gageler J).

110. Ibid 516 [22] (Kiefel CJ, Bell and Keane JJ).

111. Ibid 534 [126] (Gageler J).

112. Ibid.

113. Ibid 534 [127].

114. See Ibid 542 [165], 545‐6 [179]‐[181] (Gordon J).

115. See, eg, Plaintiff M61/2010E v Commonwealth (2010) 243 CLR 319.

116. See, eg, Thayananthan v Minister for Immigration and Multicultural and Indigenous Affairs (2003) 132 FCR 222.

117. See, eg, Plaintiff S157/2002 v Commonwealth (2003) 211 CLR 476, 513 [103] (Gaudron, McHugh, Gummow, Kirby and Hayne JJ).

118. See especially Graham v Minister for Immigration and Border Protection (2017) 263 CLR 1.

119. Smethurst (n 14) 556 [233].

120. Ibid 537 [143].

121. As implied in SZTAL v Minister for Immigration and Border Protection (2017) 262 CLR 362, 378 [48] (Gageler J).

122. While I agree that the weight of authority, and constitutional logic, supports this reading of s 75(v), it is not uncontested. See the differing views presented in Leighton McDonald, ‘“Graham” and the Constitutionalisation of Australian Administrative Law’ (2018) 91 (March) AIAL Forum 47. Cf Lisa Burton Crawford, ‘Expanding the Entrenched Minimum Provision of Judicial Review? Graham v Minister for Immigration and Border Protection’ (2017) 28(4) Public Law Review 282.

123. An argument I present in Lisa Burton Crawford, ‘The Rule of Law’ in Rosalind Dixon (ed), Australian Constitutional Values (Hart, 2017) 77.

124. (2001) 208 CLR 199.

125. Smethurst (n 14) 520 [48] (Kiefel CJ, Bell and Keane JJ).

126. (2020) 94 ALJR 849.

127. Ibid 874 [107]‐[108] (Gageler J), 886‐7 [159]‐[162] (Edelman J).

128. A recent and notable example is the 2019 decision of Minogue v Victoria (2019) 268 CLR 1.

129. Palmer v The State of Western Australia; Mineralogy Pty Ltd & Anor v State of Western Australia, B52/2020; B54/2020.

130. Nick Seddon, ‘The Palmer Act’, AUSPUBLAW (Blog Post, 31 August 2020) <https://auspublaw.org/2020/08/the-palmer-act/>. See similarly Mineralogy Pty Ltd v Western Australia (n 129) [128] (Martin J): ‘WA is not Rome. And Mineralogy is not Carthage. But the authors of the Iron Ore Processing (Mineralogy Pty Ltd) Agreement Amendment Act 2020 (WA) might be thought to have had the same level of obliteration in mind when that Act was drafted’.

131. Clive Palmer, Plaintiff’s Outline of Submissions, Submission in Palmer v The State of Western Australia, B52/2020, 23 April 2021 [2]; Mineralogy Pty Ltd and International Minerals Pty Ltd, Plaintiff’s Outline of Submissions, Submission in Mineralogy Pty Ltd & Anor v State of Western Australia B54/2020, 23 April 2021 [69]-[75]. Note, at the time of writing this matter had been heard but judgment not delivered.

132. Martin Krygier, ‘Ethical Positivism and the Liberalism of Fear’ (1999) 24 Australian Journal of Legal Philosophy 65.

133. Gerner (n 79) 111 [14].