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Constitutional Resistance in Populist Times

Published online by Cambridge University Press:  01 January 2025

Paul Blokker Open the ORCID record for Paul Blokker [Opens in a new window]
Paul Blokker*
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University of Bologna
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The author may be contacted at paulus.blokker@unibo.it.
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Abstract

The article departs from the discussion of constitutional mobilisation—the ‘process by which social actors employ constitutional norms and discourses to advocate for constitutional change’—to introduce the concept of constitutional resistance—the public invocation of constitutional norms and principles, in defence of a distinctive view of constitutionalism, in opposition to governing or reform action by the authorities. Constitutional mobilisation and resistance are theorized on an interdisciplinary and conceptual basis, suggesting that the study of the critical role of societal actors in constitutional politics and in ‘constituent conflicts’ remains so far underexplored. The analysis of constitutional resistance is particularly relevant in the contexts of authoritarian societies or democratic societies that face increasing populist and authoritarian challenges. The article first briefly explores various scholarly approaches that provide considerable contributions for the development of a political sociology of constitutional mobilisation. It subsequently discusses constitutional mobilisation and focuses in particular on constitutional resistance, a so far undiscussed dimension of constitutional mobilisation, exemplifying the latter by briefly exploring the cases of Italy and Poland.

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Articles
Information
Federal Law Review , Volume 48 , Issue 4 , December 2020 , pp. 511 - 528
Copyright
Copyright © 2020 The Author(s)

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Footnotes

The author(s) acknowledges financial support for the research project Transnational populism and European democracy (TRAPpED), of the Czech Science Foundation (Grantová agentura České republiky) (Standard Project 18-25924 S).

References

1. Ngoc Son Bui, ‘Constitutional Mobilization’ (2018) 17(1) Washington University Global Studies Law Review 113, 116.

2. Ibid.

3. Ibid.

4. One important strand of research is the increasingly significant and insightful debate on gender and constitutionalism: see Helen Irving, ‘More than Rights’ in Susan H Williams (ed), Constituting Equality: Gender Equality and Comparative Constitutional Law (Cambridge University Press, 2009) 75; Helen Irving, Constitutions and Gender (Edward Elgar Publishing, 2017); Dia Anagnostou, ‘Gender Constitutional Reform and Feminist Mobilization in Greece and the EU: From Formal to Substantive Equality?’ (2013) 28(2) Canadian Journal of Law and Society 133; Ruth Rubio-Marín, ‘Women and Participatory Constitutionalism’ (2020) 18(1) International Journal of Constitutional Law 233.

5. Vanessa MacDonnell, ‘Internet Surveillance and Popular Constitutionalism’ in Fergal Davis, Nicola McGarrity and George Williams (eds), Surveillance, Counter-Terrorism and Comparative Constitutionalism (Routledge, 2014) 313.

6. Alba Ruibal, ‘Social Movements and Constitutional Politics in Latin America: Reconfiguring Alliances, Framings and Legal Opportunities in the Judicialisation of Abortion Rights in Brazil’ (2015) 10(4) Contemporary Social Science 375.

7. Maria Akchurin, ‘Constructing the Rights of Nature: Constitutional Reform, Mobilization, and Environmental Protection in Ecuador’ (2015) 40(4) Law & Social Inquiry 937.

8. Jack M Balkin, Constitutional Redemption: Political Faith in an Unjust World (Harvard University Press, 2011); Lani Guinier, ‘Beyond Legislatures: Social Movements, Social Change, and the Possibilities of Demosprudence’ (2009) 89(2) Boston University Law Review 539; Larry D Kramer, The People Themselves: Popular Constitutionalism and Judicial Review (Oxford University Press, 2004); Douglas NeJaime, ‘Constitutional Change, Courts, and Social Movements’ (2013) 111(6) Michigan Law Review 877; Robert C Post and Reva B Siegel, ‘Democratic Constitutionalism’ in Jack M Balkin and Reva B Siegel (eds), The Constitution in 2020 (Oxford University Press, 2009) 25; Mark Tushnet, Taking the Constitution Away from the Courts (Princeton University Press, 1999).

9. See Bui (n 1).

10. Bui (n 1) 121–3.

11. Ngoc Son Bui, ‘Social Movements and Constitutionalism in Japan, South Korea, and Taiwan’ (2019) 14 (Supplement 1) Asian Journal of Comparative Law S51, S60.

12. As Bui also argues, ‘the present study does not pursue normative questions’: ibid S52.

13. Bui (n 1) 116.

14. Jiří Přibáň, ‘Constitutionalism as Fear of the Political? A Comparative Analysis of Teubner’s Constitutional Fragments and Thornhill’s A Sociology of Constitutions’ (2012) 39(3) Journal of Law and Society 441; Jiří Přibáň, ‘Constitutional Imaginaries and Legitimation: On Potentia, Potestas, and Auctoritas in Societal Constitutionalism’ (2018) 45 (Supplement 1) Journal of Law and Society S30; Gunther Teubner, Constitutional Fragments: Societal Constitutionalism and Globalization (Oxford University Press, 2012); Chris Thornhill, A Sociology of Constitutions: Constitutions and State Legitimacy in Historical-Sociological Perspective (Cambridge University Press, 2011).

15. See n 8.

16. See, eg, Dia Anagnostou, Rights and Courts in Pursuit of Social Change: Legal Mobilisation in the Multi-level European System (Hart Publishing, 2014).

17. Donatella Della Porta and Manuela Caiani, Social Movements and Europeanization (Oxford University Press, 2009).

18. Irving, ‘More than Rights’ (n 4); Irving, Constitutions and Gender (n 4); Beverley Baines and Ruth Rubio-Marín, The Gender of Constitutional Jurisprudence (Cambridge University Press, 2005); Beverley Baines, Daphne Barak-Erez, and Tsvi Kahana, Feminist Constitutionalism: Global Perspectives (Cambridge University Press, 2011); Susan H Williams, Constituting Equality: Gender Equality and Comparative Constitutional Law (Cambridge University Press, 2009).

19. Cf Paul Blokker, ‘Constitutions and Democracy in Post-National Times: A Political-Sociological Approach’ (2012) 20(2) Irish Journal of Sociology 68; Chris Thornhill, ‘The Sociology of Constitutions’ (2017) 13(1) Annual Review of Law and Social Science 493; Paul Blokker and Chris Thornhill, Sociological Constitutionalism (Cambridge University Press, 2017); Thornhill (n 14).

20. Blokker (n 19); Heinz Klug, ‘Towards a Sociology of Constitutional Transformation: Understanding South Africa’s Post-Apartheid Constitutional Order’ in Paul Blokker and Chris Thornhill (eds), Sociological Constitutionalism (Cambridge University Press, 2017) 67.

21. Chris Thornhill and Emilios Christodoulidis, ‘New Bearings in the Sociology of Law’ (2014) 23(4) Social & Legal Studies 487.

22. Cf NeJaime (n 8); Post and Siegel (n 8); Guinier (n 8).

23. Sanford Levinson, Constitutional Faith (Princeton University Press, 1988).

24. Cf Gavin Anderson, ‘Constitutionalism as Critical Project: The Epistemological Challenge to Politics’ in Stephen Gill and A Claire Cutler (eds), New Constitutionalism and World Order (Cambridge University Press, 2014) 281-294; Michael Blecher, ‘Mind the Gap’ (2008) 19(3) Law and Critique 297-306.

25. Rachel Cichowski, The European Court and Civil Society: Litigation, Mobilization and Governance (Cambridge University Press, 2007).

26. For partial exceptions, see Idit Kostiner, ‘Evaluating Legality: Toward a Cultural Approach to the Study of Law and Social Change’ (2003) 37(2) Law & Society Review 323; Kate Nash, ‘Human Rights, Movements and Law: On Not Researching Legitimacy’ (2012) 46(5) Sociology 797; Kate Nash, The Cultural Politics of Human Rights: Comparing the US and UK (Cambridge University Press, 2009).

27. Baines and Rubio-Marín (n 18); Baines, Barak-Erez and Kahana (n 18); Irving, ‘More than Rights’ (n 4); Irving, Constitutions and Gender (n 4); Williams (n 18).

28. Baines, Barak-Erez and Kahana (n 18) 1.

29. Dia Anagnostou, ‘Gender Equality and Parity in European National Constitutions’ in Helen Irving (ed), Constitutions and Gender (Edward Elgar Publishing, 2017) 268.

30. Ibid 271.

31. See the excellent contribution by Dylan Lino in this issue: Dylan Lino, ‘The Australian Constitution as Symbol’ (2020) 48(4) Federal Law Review 543.

32. Anagnostou (n 29) 285.

33. Bui (n 1) 137–64.

34. Paul Blokker, New Democracies in Crisis? A Comparative Constitutional Study of the Czech Republic, Hungary, Poland, Romania and Slovakia (Routledge, 2014). Of course, it should be equally acknowledged that civil society mobilisation might involve support for, and the strengthening of, authoritarian tendencies or actually existing authoritarian regimes. At the same time, it should be underlined that in established democracies, important, even if mostly marginal, forms of radical mobilisation against the existing constitutional order might take place, such as with the citizens’ militias in the US, see Angela P Harris, ‘Vultures in Eagles’ Clothing: Conspiracy and Racial Fantasy in Populist Legal Thought’ (2005) 10(2) Michigan Journal of Race and Law 269. For the comparable phenomenon of the Reichsbürger in Germany, see Trystan Stahl and Heiko Homburg, ‘“Souveräne Bürger” in den USA und deutsche “Reichsbürger”—ein Vergleich hinsichtlich Ideologie und Gefahrenpotenzial’ in Dirk Wilking (ed), “Reichsbürger”: Ein Handbuch (Demos—Brandenburgisches Institut für Gemeinwesenberatung, 2015) 203. I thank my student Eva Zimmermann for drawing my attention to this phenomenon.

35. Kim Lane Scheppele, ‘The Opportunism of Populists and the Defense of Constitutional Liberalism’ (2019) 20(3) German Law Journal 314; Wojciech Sadurski, Poland’s Constitutional Breakdown (Oxford University Press, 2019).

36. Paul Blokker, ‘Constitutional Paradigms: The Italian 1948 Constitution between Conservation and Reform’ in Paul Blokker (ed), Constitutional Acceleration within the European Union and Beyond (Routledge, 2018) 119, 131.

37. Donatella della Porta and Andrea Felicetti, ‘Innovating Democracy Against Democratic Stress in Europe: Social Movements and Democratic Experiments’ (2019) Representation 1, <https://doi.org/10.1080/00344893.2019.1624600>; Jón Ólafsson, ‘So Strong, Yet So Weak: The Emergence of Protest Publics in Iceland in the Wake of the Financial Crisis’ in Nina Belyaeva, Victor Albert and Dmitry G Zaytsev (eds), Protest Publics: Toward a New Concept of Mass Civic Action (Springer, 2019) 117.

38. Anderson (n 24) 281; Paul Blokker, ‘Constitutional Mobilization and Contestation in the Transnational Sphere’ (2018) 45(S1) Journal of Law and Society S52; Gunther Teubner, ‘Quod Omnes Tangit: Transnational Constitutions Without Democracy?’ (2018) 45(S1) Journal of Law and Society S5.

39. Blokker (n 38).

40. Teubner (n 38) S18.

41. Bui (n 1) 116.

42. Ibid 119–20.

43. Ibid 120.

44. Juliano Zaiden Benvindo, ‘The Seeds of Change: Popular Protest as Constitutional Moments’ (2015) 99(2) Marquette Law Review 363, 365.

45. Cf Anagnostou (n 16); Anagnostou (n 29).

46. Bui (n 1).

47. Blokker (n 38).

48. Konstantinos Pilpilidis, ‘When Rock Trumps Paper: A Theory of Constitutional Resistance’ [2015] SSRN Online 2624459:1–30, 4.

49. Ibid.

50. Ermanno Vitale, Difendersi dal potere: per una resistenza costituzionale (Laterza, 2010) IX.

51. As in the case of so-called backsliding countries, where protests focus on the authoritarian and unconstitutional tendencies in ongoing constitutional and legal reform: cf Sadurski (n 35); Tomasz Tadeusz Koncewicz, ‘22 Years of Polish Constitution: Of Lessons not Learnt, Opportunities Missed, and Challenges Still to Be Met’, Verfassungsblog, (Blog Post, 19 April 2019) <https://verfassungsblog.de/22-years-of-polish-constitution-of-lessons-not-learnt-opportunities-missed-and-challenges-still-to-be-met>, archived at <https://doi.org/10.17176/20190517-144203-0>.

52. Vitale (n 50) X. Resistance stems from the Latin verb sto, stare, ‘to stay’, indicating a static dimension: cf Paul Blokker and Andrea Brighenti, ‘Politics between Justification and Defiance’ (2011) 14(3) European Journal of Social Theory 283.

53. Roberto Gargarella, ‘The Last Resort: The Right of Resistance in Situations of Legal Alienation’ (Conference Paper, Seminario en Latinoamérica de Teoría Constitucional y Política, 2003) 1 <https://digitalcommons.law.yale.edu/yls_sela/23/>.

54. Ibid 4.

55. An impressive example is the ‘March of 1,000 robes’ of judges from all over Europe, in Warsaw, in January 2020.

56. Vitale (n 50) X.

57. Paul Blokker, ‘Populism as a Constitutional Project’ (2019) 17(2) International Journal of Constitutional Law 535.

58. Paul Blokker, ‘Populism and Constitutional Reform. The Case of Italy’ in Giacomo Delledonne et al (eds), Italian Populism and Constitutional Law (Palgrave Macmillan, 2020) 11.

59. Sadurski (n 35).

60. Blokker, ‘Populism and Constitutional Reform’ (n 58) 11.

61. Ibid.

62. The reform of the government of PM Matteo Renzi (2014–16) was heavily, and ultimately successfully, opposed by various forces: political parties within parliament (significant opposition was present even within Renzi’s own Partito Democratico), various (constitutional) experts, journalists and other public figures, and organised groups in civil society.

63. LeG endorses public knowledge of the 1948 Constitution (inter alia by organizing constitutional events at schools) and endorses the implementation or ‘actualization’ of existing norms of the 1948 Constitution.

64. The resistance of the 5SM became very ‘visible’ in September 2013, when 12 MPs of the Movement occupied the roof of the Italian parliament, in order to defend the Constitution. See Paul Blokker, ‘The Grande Riforma of the Italian Constitution: Majoritarian versus Participatory Democracy?’ (2017) 9(2) Contemporary Italian Politics 124.

65. Martin J Bull, ‘The Constitutional Referendum of June 2006: End of the “Great Reform” but Not of Reform Itself’ (2006) 22 Italian Politics 99; Luigi Ceccarini and Fabio Bordignon, ‘Referendum on Renzi: The 2016 Vote on the Italian Constitutional Revision’ (2017) 22(3) South European Society and Politics 281.

66. In the run-up to the referendum in 2016, both resisting and promoting forces organised in bottom-up fashion. ‘[N]umerous Yes and No committees sprang up all over the country, each of which mobilised thousands of activists and several celebrities from the world of entertainment and elsewhere…The various committees structured the campaign at the grassroots level, organising meetings and debates in many towns, fostering door-to-door activism and engaging thousands of activists. Both fronts gathered signatures from public personalities and intellectuals in support of manifestos and appeals on referendum issues’, Ceccarini and Bordignon (n 65) 290.

67. Giuseppe Dossetti, ‘I valori della Costituzione ’(Report, Quaderni del trentennale 1975–2005, Istituto Italiano per gli Studi Filosofici, 2005) 27 <http://eprints.bice.rm.cnr.it/3252/1/Trentennale_5.pdf>.

68. It is striking that in journalistic parlance, from the early 1990s onwards, the Republic has been frequently referred to as the ‘Second Republic’.

69. Indeed, with regard to the recent constitutional amendment to reduce the number of parliamentarians, strongly endorsed by the 5SM, the Coordinamento per la Democrazia Costituzionale has mobilised to oppose the reform.

70. Paul Blokker, ‘Building democracy by legal means? The contestation of human rights and constitutionalism in East-Central Europe’ (2020) 18(3) Journal of Modern European History 335.

71. The 1997 constitutional document formed a compromise between secularised, civic-liberal forces and socialist forces, but excluded conservative, rightwing forces. While it was adopted by means of a national referendum, the Constitution was only favourably endorsed by 53.5 per cent of popular votes, while the overall voter turnout was just 42.9 per cent. This meant de facto that only 22.58 per cent of the citizens with the right to vote voted in favour.

72. Sadurski (n 35).

73. Some of my account draws on the careful documentation of the events by Michał Kłusek, reported in his draft paper ‘Constitutional Resistance’ (on file with the author).

74. Małgorzata Szuleka, Marcin Wolny and Marcin Szwed, The Constitutional Crisis in Poland 2015–16 (Helsinki Foundation for Human Rights Report, 2016) 47.

75. A widely used and powerful symbol of constitutional resistance is the logo ‘KonsTYtucJA’, which means constitution, and where TY stands for you and JA stands for me. The logo is used on posters and t-shirts (Lech Wałęsa, for instance, frequently wears the t-shirt).

76. Ireneusz Karolewski, ‘Protest and Participation in Post-transformation Poland: The Case of the Committee for the Defense of Democracy (KOD)’ (2016) 49(3) Communist and Post-Communist Studies 255, 256.

77. Cited in Karolewski (n 76) 260.

78. Ibid 259.

79. In the most recent 2019 elections, Razem, in a coalition with the Democratic Left Alliance and Wiosna known as The Left, won 6 seats in Parliament.

80. Judgment K 47/19, Constitutional Tribunal of Poland 9 March 2016.

81. On 17 October 2017, Piotr Szczęsny, a 54-year old man, a former activist and NGO worker, set himself on fire in Warsaw, in front of the Palace of Culture and Science. He died 10 days later. Around his burned body, numerous political leaflets were found, while he also sent two open letters to the press, the second of which stated:

  • I am ashamed to explain that Poland is not the same as the Polish government. I am ashamed to have a President, who is the president of his party and its supporters only, and who breaks the constitution (the vetoing of two unconstitutional bills, only in order to propose two other, still unconstitutional bills, is no redemption). I am ashamed to have a Prime Minister who follows party orders.

P Szczęsny and B Konior, ‘Letters to the Media of October 20, 2017’ (2018) 15(1–2) Identities: Journal for Politics, Gender and Culture 164, 164.

82. For instance, the Committee for Defense of Democracy (KOD) organized the dressing of statues with t-shirts stating ‘Konstytucja’, in defiance of the government’s judicial reforms and of criminal law rules regarding public monuments. KOD argued the action was ‘an attempt to draw the attention of broad public opinion to the fact that the president, despite many protests, signed a bill which changes the Supreme Court into a mock-up’. See Malgorzata Wojtunik, ‘Neptune Statue Gets T-shirt in Polish Protests Campaign’, Reuters (Web Page, 11 August 2018) <https://www.reuters.com/article/us-eu-poland-t-shirt-protest/neptune-statue-gets-t-shirt-in-polish-protest-campaign-idUSKBN1KV1N0>.

83. Act of 20 December 2016 Amending the Act—the Law on the System of Common Courts, the Act on the Supreme Court and Certain Other Acts (Poland).

84. Sadurski (n 35) 144.

85. See ‘Poland: Women’s Rights Activists Targeted’ Human Rights Watch (Web Page, February 6, 2019) <https://www.hrw.org/news/2019/02/06/poland-womens-rights-activists-targeted>.

86. Helsinki Foundations for Human Rights, The Situation of the Civil Society Organisations in Poland (Report, 2016), cited in ‘POLAND: Report on the Situation of the Civil Society Organisations’ Civic Space Watch (Web Page, 24 May 2019) <http://civicspacewatch.eu/poland-report-on-the-situation-of-the-civil-society-organisations/>.

87. See Mariusz Jałoszewski, ‘Ziobro’s Prosecution Service Wants to Charge Judge Tuleya for a Judgment Critical of PiS Party’ Rule of Law (Web Page, 27 February, 2020) <https://ruleoflaw.pl/ziobros-prosecution-service-wants-to-charge-judge-tuleya-for-a-judgment-critical-of-pis-party/>.

88. See Magdalena Nowicka-Franczak, ‘Committee for the Defense of Democracy in Poland: Rebellion of the “Beneficiaries of the Transformation”?’ Institute for Human Sciences (IWM) (Web Page, 7 April 2016) <https://www.iwm.at/transit-online/committee-for-the-defense-of-democracy-in-poland-rebellion-of-the-beneficiaries-of-the-transformation/>.

89. Bui (n 1).

90. This does not, however, mean that the whole of civil society is against the constitutional changes. A rather well-organised conservative civil society supports government action.

91. Veronika Felder and Michael Álvarez Kalverkamp, ‘We Want the Government to Act According to the Constitutional Law’ Heinrich Böll Stiftung (Web Page, 26 May 2016) <https://www.boell.de/en/2016/05/26/we-want-government-act-according-constitutional-law>.

92. Ibid.

93. Karolewski (n 76) 255.

94. Grzegorz Ekiert, Civil Society as a Threat to Democracy: Organizational Bases of the Populist Counterrevolution in Poland (CES Open Forum Series 2019–2020, Center for European Studies Harvard, March 2020).

95. Bui (n 1) 113.

96. Ekiert (n 94); See, for the Hungarian case, Bela Greskovits, ‘Rebuilding the Hungarian Right Through Conquering Civil Society: The Civic Circles Movement’ (2020) 36(2) East European Politics 247.