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The Constitutional Role of Electoral Management Bodies: The Case of the Australian Electoral Commission

Published online by Cambridge University Press:  01 January 2025

Paul Kildea Open the ORCID record for Paul Kildea [Opens in a new window]
Paul Kildea*
Affiliation:
University of New South Wales, Sydney, New South Wales 2052, Australia
*
The author may be contacted at p.kildea@unsw.edu.au.
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Abstract

Electoral management bodies are increasingly being recognised as ‘fourth branch’ institutions that have a role to play in safeguarding electoral democracy against government attempts to undermine the fairness of the electoral process. This article explores the extent to which the Australian Electoral Commission (‘AEC’) fulfils that constitutional function by facilitating and protecting electoral democracy. It demonstrates that independence, impartiality and a supportive legislative framework help the AEC to be effective in performing these roles, but that inadequate powers, lack of budgetary autonomy and answerability to political actors operate as constraints. More generally, the analysis presented shows the value of expanding our understanding of the role of fourth branch institutions so that we take account of their activities in both fostering and safeguarding key democratic values.

Type
Articles
Information
Federal Law Review , Volume 48 , Issue 4 , December 2020 , pp. 469 - 482
Copyright
Copyright © 2020 The Author(s)

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References

1. Mark Tushnet, Advanced Introduction to Comparative Constitutional Law (Edward Elgar, 2nd ed, 2018) ch 5; Michael Pal, ‘Electoral Management Bodies as a Fourth Branch of Government’ (2016) 21(1) Review of Constitutional Studies 85.

2. Commonwealth Constitution ss 7, 24.

3. Bruce Ackerman, ‘The New Separation of Powers’ (2000) 113(3) Harvard Law Review 633; Tushnet (n 1); James Spigelman, ‘The Integrity Branch of Government’ (2004) 78(11) Australian Law Journal 724.

4. Pal (n 1); John McMillan, ‘Re-Thinking the Separation of Powers’ (2010) 38(3) Federal Law Review 423, 440.

5. See, eg, Pal’s notion of a ‘fourth branch’ model: Pal (n 1).

6. Heinz Klug, ‘Accountability and the Role of Independent Constitutional Institutions in South Africa’s Post-Apartheid Constitutions’ (2015–16) 60(1) New York Law School Law Review 153. Globally, constitutional recognition of electoral commissions is becoming more common: Svitlana Chernykh et al, ‘Constitutions and Election Management’ in Pippa Norris, Richard W Frank and Ferran Martínez i Coma (eds), Advancing Electoral Integrity (Oxford University Press, 2014) 94, 102.

7. McMillan (n 4).

8. Spigelman (n 3).

9. Tushnet (n 1); Ackerman (n 3).

10. Tushnet (n 1) 109; Mark Tushnet, ‘Institutions Protecting Democracy: A Preliminary Inquiry’ (2018) 12(2) Law & Ethics of Human Rights 181, 183.

11. Tushnet (n 1) 109; Tushnet, ‘Institutions Protecting Democracy’ (n 10) 183.

12. Ackerman (n 3) 716.

13. Dennis F Thompson, Just Elections: Creating a Fair Electoral Process in the United States (University of Chicago Press, 2002) 175.

14. Tushnet (n 1) 112.

15. Ibid 115–17; Ackerman (n 3) 718.

16. Graeme Orr, The Law of Politics: Elections, Parties and Money in Australia (Federation Press, 2nd ed, 2019) 13; Nic Cheeseman and Brian Klaas, How to Rig an Election (Yale University Press, 2018).

17. Gabrielle Appleby, ‘Horizontal Accountability: The Rights-Protective Promise and Fragility of Executive Integrity Institutions’ (2017) 23(2) Australian Journal of Human Rights 168, 175 (‘Horizontal Accountability’).

18. Gabrielle Appleby, The Role of the Solicitor-General: Negotiating Law, Politics and the Public Interest (Hart Publishing, 2016) 6.

19. Joo-Cheong Tham, ‘Deliberative Democracy and Electoral Management Bodies: The Case of Australian Electoral Commissions’ (2013) 12(4) Election Law Journal 386, 398; Pal (n 1) 96.

20. A J Brown, ‘The Integrity Branch: A “System,” an “Industry,” or a Sensible Emerging Fourth Arm of Government?’ in Matthew Groves (ed), Modern Administrative Law in Australia: Concepts and Context (Cambridge University Press, 2014) 301, 303.

21. Helena Catt et al, Electoral Management Design (International IDEA, rev ed, 2014) 21.

22. Appleby, ‘Horizontal Accountability’ (n 17) 171–2.

23. Ibid 172.

24. Tushnet (n 1) 111; Ackerman (n 3) 694.

25. Appleby, ‘Horizontal Accountability’ (n 17) 172.

26. Ibid 182; Tushnet (n 1) 122.

27. Appleby, ‘Horizontal Accountability’ (n 17) 175–9; Tushnet (n 1) 122–3; Pal (n 1) 107.

28. Appleby, ‘Horizontal Accountability’ (n 17) 182; Tushnet (n 1).

29. Ackerman (n 3) 694.

30. Klug (n 6) 161–8; Pal (n 1) 106–7.

31. Tushnet (n 1) 117; Appleby, ‘Horizontal Accountability’ (n 17) 175–9.

32. Tushnet (n 1) 117, 119.

33. Klug (n 6) 161–2.

34. Barry Hindess, Corruption and Democracy in Australia (Democratic Audit of Australia, Report No 3, 2004) 17.

35. Marian Sawer, ‘Pacemakers for the World?’ in Marian Sawer (ed), Elections: Full, Free and Fair (Federation Press, 2001) 1, 15–16.

36. Colin Hughes, ‘Institutionalising Electoral Integrity’ in Marian Sawer (ed), Elections: Full, Free and Fair (Federation Press, 2001) 142, 156.

37. Tham (n 19); Graeme Orr, Bryan Mercurio and George Williams, ‘Australian Electoral Law: A Stocktake’ (2003) 2(3) Election Law Journal 383, 399.

38. Commonwealth Electoral Act 1918 (Cth) ss 6(1)–(2) (‘Electoral Act’).

39. Ibid ss 6(3), 8(1), 21, 25.

40. Norm Kelly, Directions in Australian Electoral Reform: Professionalism and Partisanship in Electoral Management (ANU E Press, 2011) 36–7 (‘Directions’). Notably, the ACT makes appointment of the Electoral Commissioner subject to disallowance: Electoral Act 1992 (ACT) s 12(5).

41. Electoral Act (n 38) ss 7(1)(fa), 38(1).

42. The same applies for state and territory electoral commissions. See Kelly, Directions (n 40) 45.

43. Electoral Act (n 38) s 7.

44. Ibid s 17.

45. AEC, Submission No 120 to the Joint Standing Committee on Electoral Matters, Parliament of Australia, Inquiry into and Report on All Aspects of the Conduct of the 2019 Federal Election and Matters Related Thereto (2019) 38 (‘Submission No 120’).

46. Electoral Act (n 38) s 7(1)(c)–(d).

47. Muldowney v Australian Electoral Commission (1993) 178 CLR 34, 39 (Brennan ACJ).

48. AEC, Submission No 120 (n 45) 37.

49. AEC, Nomination Guide for Candidates (Version 05, 26 May 2020); AEC, Candidates Handbook (Version 07, 26 May 2020).

50. ‘Electoral Backgrounder: Constitutional Disqualification and Intending Candidates’, AEC (Web Page), 4 April 2019 <https://www.aec.gov.au/About_AEC/Publications/Backgrounders/constitutional-disqual-intending-candidates.htm>.

51. Electoral Act (n 38) s 170B.

52. For a critique of the Court’s jurisprudence on s 44, see Orr (n 16) 110–11.

53. AEC, Submission No 120 (n 45) 4.

54. See, eg, Electoral Act (n 38) s 219.

55. Michael Maley and Graeme Orr, ‘Developing a Legislative Framework for a Complex and Dynamic Electoral Environment’ (Joint Working Paper No 64, Electoral Regulation Research Network/Democratic Audit of Australia, November 2019).

56. AEC, Submission No 120 (n 45).

57. Norm Kelly, ‘The Independence of Electoral Management Bodies: The Australian Experience’ (2007) 59(2) Political Science 17, 18.

58. Thompson (n 13) 177.

59. Colin Hughes, ‘The Importance of Boundaries’ (Research Paper No 1, Democratic Audit of Australia, 2007) 3–5.

60. Orr (n 16) 31–2; Jenni Newton-Farrelly, ‘Fairness and Equality in Electoral Redistributions in Australia’ (PhD Thesis, Swinburne University of Technology, January 2013) 28.

61. Electoral Act (n 38) pt IV.

62. Ibid s 77.

63. Ibid pt XVIII.

64. Ibid s 267.

65. Ibid ss 268, 268A, 269; AEC, Ballot Paper Formality Guidelines: Federal Elections, By-Elections, Referendums (Version 1.1, 16 May 2019) <https://www.aec.gov.au/Elections/candidates/files/ballot-paper-formality-guidelines.pdf> (‘Formality Guidelines’).

66. AEC, Formality Guidelines (n 65) 1.

67. See, eg, Mitchell v Bailey (No 2) (2008) 169 FCR 529.

68. Orr (n 16) 201–2.

69. Paul Pirani, ‘Elections and Administrative Law’ (2012) 68 Australian Institute of Administrative Law Forum 19, 22.

70. Michael Maley, ‘The Australian Electoral Commission: Balancing Independence and Accountability’ (2001) 38(1) Representation 25, 27.

71. Ibid 28.

72. Ackerman (n 3).

73. Kelly, Directions (n 40) 156.

74. Electoral Act (n 38) pt XX.

75. Ibid pt XXA.

76. Ibid s 329.

77. Evans v Crichton-Browne (1981) 147 CLR 169, 204–8.

78. Keith Ewing, The Cost of Democracy: Party Funding in Modern British Politics (Hart Publishing, 2007) 44.

79. Joo-Cheong Tham, Money and Politics: The Democracy We Can’t Afford (UNSW Press, 2010) 44.

80. Ibid; Orr (n 16) ch 11.

81. Tham, Money and Politics (n 79).

82. Pat McGrath, ‘Facebook Probed by Australian Electoral Commission over Mysterious Political Ads’, ABC News (online), 26 February 2019 <https://www.abc.net.au/news/2019-02-26/facebook-electoral-commission-emails-reveal-political-ad-concern/10834736>.

83. Orr (n 16) ch 11.

84. Electoral Funding Act 2018 (NSW) ss 78, 96.

85. Electoral Act 1985 (SA) s 113.

86. Evidence to JSCEM, Parliament of Australia, Canberra, 6 December 2019, 3 (Tom Rogers).

87. AEC, Submission No 120 (n 45) 33–4.

88. Garbett v Liu [2019] FCAFC 241, [3].

89. Ibid [132]–[135].

90. Kelly, Directions (n 40) 107–8.

91. See Ackerman (n 3) 694.

92. Appleby, ‘Horizontal Accountability’ (n 17) 183.

93. Christopher Knaus and Paul Karp, ‘Australian Electoral Commission Finds 87 Cases of Election Ads Breaching Law’, The Guardian (online) 22 May 2019 <https://www.theguardian.com/australia-news/2019/may/22/australian-electoral-commission-finds-87-cases-of-election-ads-breaching-law>.

94. Pirani (n 69) 38–9.

95. Ibid.

96. Ibid.

97. JSCEM, The 2004 Federal Election: Report of the Inquiry into the Conduct of the 2004 Federal Election and Matters Thereto (Report, 2005) 29–37 <https://www.aph.gov.au/Parliamentary_Business/Committees/House_of_Representatives_Committees?url=em/elect04/report.htm>.

98. Rowe v Electoral Commissioner (2010) 243 CLR 1.

99. AEC, Submission No 66.11 to JSCEM, Parliament of Australia, Inquiry into and Report on All Aspects of the Conduct of the 2016 Federal Election and Matters Related Thereto (February 2017) 6.

100. Tham, ‘Deliberative Democracy’ (n 19) 398.