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Contracts and the Implied Freedom of Political Communication

Published online by Cambridge University Press:  01 January 2025

Patrick McCabe
Patrick McCabe*
Affiliation:
Lieschke & Weatherill Lawyers, Adelaide
*
The author may be contacted at pmccabe@student.unimelb.edu.au.
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Abstract

This article considers the phenomenon of contractually-imposed restraints on political communication. Such restraints often incidentally arise from broad limits on out-of-hours conduct imposed by employment contracts or from confidentiality or non-disparagement clauses in deeds of settlement. It is argued that the implied freedom of political communication has work to do in relation to at least some categories of such restraints. The various objections to that view are examined and it is argued those objections are not compelling. The article analyses the question of how the implied freedom would operate in respect of contracts that impermissibly burden freedom of political communication, and suggests that this may be achieved by developing the common law of contract to accomodate a doctrine similar to the doctrine governing unreasonable restraints of trade.

Type
In Focus: The Implied Freedom of Political Communication
Information
Federal Law Review , Volume 49 , Issue 1 , March 2021 , pp. 40 - 72
Copyright
Copyright © 2020 The Author(s)

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Footnotes

An earlier version of this article was submitted for the Constitutional Rights and Freedoms class offered as part of the Melbourne Law Masters programme. Thank you to Professor Adrienne Stone for her comments on that earlier version, provided in her capacity as course co-ordinator. All errors are mine.

References

1. (1997) 189 CLR 520 (‘Lange’).

2. In this article, when a law is said to ‘infringe’ the freedom, what will consistently be meant is that the relevant law burdens the freedom in a way that cannot be justified by recourse to the McCloy v New South Wales (2015) 257 CLR 178 (‘McCloy’) test and is therefore unconstitutional. The terminology of ‘infringement’ to describe this concept seems to be favoured by the current High Court, but its use is not universal. It is important to keep in mind that some laws that burden the freedom will not infringe it, because the burden will be justified under the McCloy test.

3. Comcare v Banerji (2019) 93 ALJR 900, 912 [29] (Kiefel CJ, Bell, Keane and Nettle JJ) (‘Banerji’); APLA Ltd v Legal Services Commissioner (NSW) (2005) 224 CLR 322, 351 [28] (Gleeson CJ and Heydon J); Wotton v Queensland (2012) 246 CLR 1, 24 [54] (Heydon J); Monis v The Queen (2013) 249 CLR 92, 142–6 [108]–[122] (Hayne J); Unions NSW v New South Wales (2013) 252 CLR 530, 555 [40] (French CJ, Hayne, Crennan, Kiefel and Bell JJ); Tajjour v New South Wales (2014) 254 CLR 508, 578–9 [145]–[146], 582 [155]–[156] (Gageler J).

4. See Tom Brennan, ‘Undertakings of Confidence by the Commonwealth: Are There Limits?’ (1998) 18 Australian Institute of Administrative Law Forum 8, 15; Nicholas Seddon, Government Contracts: Federal, State and Local (Federation Press, 6th ed, 2018) 505 [8.39].

5. See generally on this topic, Graeme Orr and Alexandra Wells, ‘Horizontal Censorship? Restriction of Socio-Political Expression by Employers’ (2020) 32 Australian Journal of Labour Law 290.

6. Australian Human Rights Commission, Submission to the Senate Legal And Constitutional Affairs References Committee, Inquiry into the Incident at the Manus Island Detention Centre from 16 February to 18 February 2014 (16 May 2014) 25 [2.29]–[2.30].

7. Mark Irving, The Contract of Employment (LexisNexis Butterworths, 2nd ed, 2019) 393–9 [7.22]–[7.24]. However, depending on the precise wording of the employment contract in question, it is arguable that often policies thought to be incorporated into the contract of employment in fact simply constitute directions of the employer to the employee, and thus must be obeyed only if lawful and reasonable: Westpac Banking Corporation v Wittenberg (2016) 242 FCR 505, 518–30 (Buchanan J).

8. See Asma El Ouirdi et al, ‘Institutional Predictors of the Adoption of Employee Social Media Policies’ (2015) 35(5–6) Bulletin of Science, Technology & Society 134.

9. Ben Doherty, ‘Transfield Immigration Staff Told They Can Be Fired for Using Facebook’, The Guardian (online), 7 April 2015 <https://www.theguardian.com/australia-news/2015/apr/07/transfield-immigration-staff-told-they-can-be-fired-for-using-facebook>; Michael Bradley, ‘Depths of Detention Centre Secrecy Revealed’, ABC News (online), 10 April 2015 <https://www.abc.net.au/news/2015-04-10/bradley-depths-of-detention-centre-secrecy-revealed/6380698>.

10. Irving (n 7) 518–21 [9.18].

11. Ibid 601–4 [9.102]–[9.105].

12. Equivalent duties also arise in equity. A consideration of the freedom’s application to equity is beyond the scope of this article. See G J McCarry, ‘The Contract of Employment and Freedom of Speech’ (1981) 9(2) Sydney Law Review 333, for an enlightening discussion concerning ways that terms implied by law into contracts of employment may constrict employees’ freedom of speech.

13. Irving (n 7) 800–7 [13.6]–[13.11].

14. That is not to say these employees may be dismissed at will—many such employees will have a statutory right under the Fair Work Act 2009 (Cth) not to be dismissed unfairly (and potentially other statutory rights too). But that right involves no question of contract law, so is irrelevant for present purposes.

15. Michaela Whitbourn, ‘SBS Presenter Sacked over “Inappropriate” Anzac Day Tweets’, Sydney Morning Herald (Sydney), 27 April 2015, 3; Michael Bodey, ‘Sacked SBS Reporter Scott McIntyre Sues over Anzac Day Tweets’, The Australian (online), 18 May 2015 <https://www.theaustralian.com.au/news/sacked-sbs-reporter-scott-mcintyre-sues-over-anzac-day-tweets/news-story/a0908e95e17bb0c0e7d9a98187aac15f>.

16. Whitbourn (n 15); Bodey (n 15).

17. Lisa Visentin, ‘Sacked Reporter Scott McIntyre and SBS Resolve Dispute over ANZAC Day Tweets’, Sydney Morning Herald (Sydney), 11 April 2016. See also McIntyre v Special Broadcasting Services Corporation [2015] FWC 6768.

18. National Tertiary Education Industry Union v University of Sydney [2020] FCA 1709.

19. (2020) 294 IR 337 (‘Rumble’).

20. Banerji (n 3).

21. Banerji and Comcare (Compensation) [2018] AATA 892 [12].

22. Phillipa Weeks, ‘The Reshaping of Australian Public Service Employment Law’ in Marilyn Pittard and Phillipa Weeks (eds), Public Sector Employment in the Twenty-First Century (Australian National University Press, 2007) 11, 23–33. See also Anthony Gray, ‘Public Sector Employees and the Freedom of Political Communication’ (2018) 43(1) Alternative Law Journal 10.

23. [2020] FCAFC 123.

24. See Adrienne Stone, ‘Rights, Personal Rights and Freedoms: The Nature of the Freedom of Political Communication’ (2001) 25(2) Melbourne University Law Review 374, 385–6 (‘Rights, Personal Rights and Freedoms’); Dan Meagher, ‘What Is “Political Communication”? The Rationale and Scope of the Implied Freedom of Political Communication’ (2004) 28(2) Melbourne University Law Review 438, 459–71; Adrienne Stone, ‘The Limits of Constitutional Text and Structure Revisited’ (2005) 28(3) University of New South Wales Law Journal 842, 848; Mitchell Landrigan, ‘Can the Implied Freedom of Political Discourse Apply to Speech By or About Religious Leaders?’ (2014) 34(2) Adelaide Law Review 427, 430; Shireen Morris and Adrienne Stone, ‘Abortion Protests and the Limits of Freedom of Political Communication: Clubb v Edwards; Preston v Avery’ (2018) 40(3) Sydney Law Review 395, 400–2. Morris and Stone suggest that the communication in issue in the cases mentioned in the title was political communication. See Clubb v Edwards (2019) 93 ALJR 448 (‘Clubb’), 483 [154], where Gageler J agrees. But see Nettle J at 502 [249], 503 [253], 515 [305], 516–17 [310]–[311] (Nettle J), and Gordon J at 525–6 [363], where the judges’ comments arguably indicate a narrower conception of the definition of political communication.

25. The media have reported settlement of one such claim, where it seems some aspects of the settlement were not confidential, but others were. It is not clear whether there was a non-disparagement clause: Michael Koziol and Benjamin Preiss, ‘Manus Island Class Action: Government to Compensate Former Detainees in Huge Settlement’, Sydney Morning Herald (online), 14 June 2017 <http://www.smh.com.au/federal-politics/political-news/manus-island-class-action-government-to-compensate-former-detainees-in-huge-settlement-20170613-gwqlu3.html>.

26. Non-disparagement clauses are commonplace in daily legal practice, but rarely considered by courts. Some exceptions where non-disparagement clauses have received curial consideration are Orleans Investments Pty Ltd v MindShare Communications Ltd (2009) 254 ALR 81, Fermiscan Pty Ltd v James (2009) 261 ALR 408, Phontos v Tresedar Pty Ltd [2013] NSWSC 1606, Flegg v Hallett [2015] QSC 315 and Adnyamathanha Traditional Lands Association v Topez [2016] SADC 69.

27. Women Lawyers Association of New South Wales, Submission No 340.1 to the Australian Human Rights Commission, National Inquiry into Sexual Harassment in Australian Workplaces (July 2019) 23–4 <https://www.humanrights.gov.au/sites/default/files/2019-07/submission_340.1_-_women_lawyers_association_of_nsw.pdf>; Unions New South Wales, ‘Reforms to Sexual Harassment Laws’ (Discussion Paper, 13 August 2018) 14–15 <http://www.asmofnsw.org.au/DISCUSSION_PAPER_Reforms_to_sexual_harassment_laws_Final_13_August_2018.pdf>.

28. Commonwealth Attorney-General’s Department, ‘Improving Protections of Employees’ Wages and Entitlements: Strengthening Penalties for Non-Compliance’ (Discussion Paper, September 2019) <https://www.ag.gov.au/Consultations/Documents/industrial-relations/strengthening-penalties-for-non-compliance-discussion-paper.pdf>; see also, eg, Ben Schneiders, ‘Union Leader Says Libs Might Criminalise Wage Theft for “Marketing Reasons”’, Sydney Morning Herald (online), 6 September 2019 <https://www.smh.com.au/politics/federal/union-leader-says-libs-might-criminalise-wage-theft-for-marketing-reasons-20190906-p52opg.html>.

29. Lange (n 1) 560, 566.

30. Clubb (n 24) 524 [356] (Gordon J); Brown v Tasmania (2017) 261 CLR 328, 359 [88], 407 [258], 430 [313]; Lange (n 1) 560; Hogan v Hinch (2011) 243 CLR 506, 554 [92]; Unions NSW v New South Wales (n 3) 554 [36]; Tajjour v New South Wales (n 3) 558 [59], 577 [140].

31. Lange (n 1) 566; Roberts v Bass (2002) 212 CLR 1, 26–7 [65].

32. J W Carter, Contract Law in Australia (LexisNexis Butterworths, 7th ed, 2018) 545–625 [25-01]–[27-39].

33. Ibid 109–50 [6-01]–[6-64].

34. Ibid 373–541 [18-01]–[24-31].

35. Ibid 313–38 [15-01]–[15-63].

36. Ibid 175–85 [8-01]–[8-12].

37. Nicholas Seddon, Seddon on Deeds (Federation Press, 2015) 63–4 [2.10]; Carter (n 32) 331–4 [15.46]–[15.52].

38. See also Corporations Act 2001 (Cth) ss 112, 125, 126, 127.

39. In the context of employment contracts, see also Special Broadcasting Service Act 1991 (Cth) s 54.

40. Mark Leeming, ‘Theories and Principles Underlying the Development of the Common Law: The Statutory Elephant in the Room’ (2013) 36(3) University of New South Wales Law Journal 1002, 1004 (emphasis omitted) (citations omitted), quoting Gammage v The Queen (1969) 122 CLR 444, 462. See also Sir Anthony Mason, ‘The Interaction of Statute Law and Common Law’ (2016) 90(5) Australian Law Journal 324, 331–2; Esso Resources Ltd v Federal Commissioner of Taxation (1999) 201 CLR 49, 60 [19] (Gleeson CJ, Gummow and Gaudron JJ).

41. Grofam Pty Ltd v Federal Commissioner of Taxation (1997) 36 ATR 493, 503.

42. Carter (n 32) 337 [15-60].

43. (2012) 248 CLR 156.

44. Williams v Commonwealth (2012) 248 CLR 156, 233 [139] (Gummow and Bell JJ), citing New South Wales v Bardolph (1934) 52 CLR 455.

45. Williams v Commonwealth (2012) 248 CLR 156, 191 [34] (French CJ).

46. Anne Twomey, ‘Post-Williams Expenditure: When Can the Commonwealth and States Spend Public Money Without Parliamentary Authorisation?’ (2014) 33(1) University of Queensland Law Journal 9, 27–8.

47. K M Hayne, ‘Non-Statutory Executive Power’ (2017) 28(4) Public Law Review 333, 333–4, 344.

48. Twomey (n 46) 14–16; Gerard Carney, ‘A Comment on How the Implied Freedom of Political Communications Restricts Non-Statutory Executive Power’ (2018) 43(2) University of Western Australia Law Review 255, 273; George Winterton, Parliament, the Executive and the Governor-General (Melbourne University Press, 1983) 137; Seddon (n 4) 64–5 [2.4].

49. Anne Twomey (n 46) 19–23; Nicholas Condylis, ‘Debating the Nature and Ambit of the Commonwealth’s Non-Statutory Executive Power’ (2015) 39(2) Melbourne University Law Review 385, 397–404; Carney (n 48) 264–5; Seddon (n 4) 78–80 [2.8].

50. Twomey (n 46) 16–19, 23–5; Condylis (n 49) 391–7; Carney (n 48) 269; Seddon (n 4) 72–8 [2.7], 80–2 [2.9]–[2.10], 86–8 [2.13].

51. Condylis (n 49) 416–31.

52. See above n 24.

53. (2005) 221 CLR 99, 120–1 [56], 129 [82] (Gummow, Callinan and Heydon JJ, in the majority). See also Australian National University v Burns (1982) 43 ALR 25, 31–2 (Bowen CJ and Lockhart J).

54. (1993) 45 FCR 164.

55. Ibid 173.

56. (2004) 240 CLR 1.

57. McCloy (n 2).

58. Brown v Tasmania (n 30).

59. Clubb (n 24) 462 [5] (Kiefel CJ, Bell and Keane JJ).

60. Ibid; Lange (n 1) 568.

61. Lange (n 1) 567–8.

62. Ibid 568.

63. Ibid 568–9.

64. See, eg, Anthony Kronman and Richard Posner, The Economics of Contract Law (Little, Brown and Company, 1979); Richard Posner, ‘The Law and Economics of Contract Interpretation’ (2005) 83(6) Texas Law Review 1581; Douglas Baird, ‘Economics of Contract Law’ in Francesco Parisi (ed), The Oxford Handbook of Law and Economics: Volume 2: Private and Commercial Law (Oxford University Press, 2017) 3; Steven Shavell, Foundations of Economic Analysis of Law (Harvard University Press, 2004) chs 13–16.

65. Russell Korobkin, ‘Behavioral Economics, Contract Formation, and Contract Law’ in Cass Sunstein (ed), Behavioral Law and Economics (Cambridge University Press, 2000) 116; Peter Alces, A Theory of Contract Law: Empirical Insights and Moral Psychology (Oxford University Press, 2011); Melvin A Eisenberg, ‘Behavioral Economics and Contract Law’ in Eyal Zamir and Doron Teichman (eds), The Oxford Handbook of Behavioral Economics and the Law (Oxford University Press, 2014) 438.

66. Sir Anthony Mason and SJ Gageler, ‘The Contract’ in P D Finn (ed), Essays on Contract (Law Book Company, 1987) 1.

67. Stephen A Smith, Atiyah’s Introduction to the Law of Contract (Clarendon Press, 2005) 3.

68. Ibid 3–5.

69. This argument is further advanced in, for example, James Gordley, ‘Contract Law in the Aristotelian Tradition’ in Peter Benson (ed), The Theory of Contract Law: New Essays (Cambridge University Press, 2001) 265.

70. This argument is expanded upon at length in Charles Fried, Contract as Promise: A Theory of Contractual Obligation (Harvard University Press, 1981).

71. Lange (n 1) 568.

72. Ibid.

73. Ibid 568–9.

74. Clubb (n 24) 467 [43], 471 [75] (Kiefel CJ, Bell and Keane JJ).

75. Sarah Joseph, ‘Public Servants and Free Speech’ The Conversation (online), 14 August 2013 <https://theconversation.com/public-servants-and-free-speech-17054>.

76. Ibid.

77. See Stone, ‘Rights, Personal Rights and Freedoms’ (n 24) 391; Kent Greenawalt, ‘Free Speech Justifications’ (1989) 89(1) Columbia Law Review 119, 143–5, 151–2; Bivens v Six Unknown Named Agents 403 US 388 (1971).

78. See, eg, Lange (n 1) 560; Levy v Victoria (1997) 189 CLR 579, 622, 625–6 (McHugh J) (‘Levy’); Mulholland v Australian Electoral Commission (2004) 220 CLR 181, 223–4 (McHugh J), 246 (Gummow and Hayne JJ); Attorney-General (SA) v City of Adelaide Corporation (2013) 249 CLR 1, 89 (Crennan and Kiefel JJ) (‘City of Adelaide’); Monis v The Queen (n 3) 129 (French CJ); Wotton v Queensland (n 3) 31 (Kiefel J).

79. Unions NSW v New South Wales (n 3).

80. Ibid 554 [36] (French CJ, Hayne, Crennan, Kiefel and Bell JJ).

81. James Stellios, Zines’s The High Court and the Constitution (Federation Press, 6th ed, 2015) 584.

82. Levy (n 78) 624 (McHugh J).

83. Stone argues there may not be such a sharp distinction between this and the ‘autonomy’ rationale as commonly thought, but this is not an argument acknowledged in the High Court jurisprudence: Stone, ‘Rights, Personal Rights and Freedoms’ (n 24) 398–400.

84. Brown v The Queen (1986) 160 CLR 171; Brownlee v The Queen (2001) 207 CLR 278.

85. James Stellios, ‘The Constitutional Jury: “A Bulwark of Liberty”?’ (2005) 27(1) Sydney Law Review 113, 119–21, 137, 141.

86. Banerji (n 3) 912 [29] (Kiefel CJ, Bell, Keane and Nettle JJ), 924 [89]–[95] (Gageler J), 932 [137]–[141] (Gordon J). See also Chief of Defence Force v Gaynor (2017) 246 FCR 298, 322–3 [104]–[105].

87. Banerji (n 3) 936 [166], 942 [195] (Edelman J).

88. Clubb (n 24) 487–8 [178]–[182], 489–90 [192]–[194] (Gageler J); Australian Capital Television Pty Ltd v Commonwealth (1992) 177 CLR 106, 234–5 (McHugh J); Levy (n 78) 639 (Kirby J); Brown v Tasmania (n 30) 462 [420], 464 [426] (Gordon J).

89. See Clubb (n 24) 487 [181] (Gageler J), and the cases cited therein.

90. Lange (n 1) 569–71.

91. Carter (n 32) 556–7 [25-19].

92. Ibid.

93. Re Morris (1943) 43 SR (NSW) 352, 356.

94. Ibid 355–6, quoting Naylor, Benzon & Co Ltd v Krainische Industrie Gesellschaft [1918] 1 KB 331, 342.

95. McCloy (n 2) 193–5 [2]–[3] (French CJ, Kiefel, Bell and Keane JJ); Brown v Tasmania (n 30) 363–4 [104], 375–6 [155]–[156], 398 [236], 413 [271], 416–17 [277]–[278], 478 [481]; Clubb (n 24) 462 [4]–[6] (Kiefel CJ, Bell and Keane JJ).

96 McCloy (n 2) 193–5 [2]–[3] (French CJ, Kiefel, Bell and Keane JJ); Clubb (n 24) 462 [6] (Kiefel CJ, Bell and Keane JJ).

97. Ibid.

98 Lange (n 1) 565.

99. Ibid 571–4.

100. Ibid 566.

101. Ibid 560.

102. See, eg, Australian Broadcasting Corporation v Lenah Game Meats Pty Ltd (2001) 208 CLR 199, 220 [20] (Gleeson CJ) (‘Lenah’); APLA Ltd v Legal Services Commissioner (NSW) (n 3) 360 [62] (McHugh J); Monis v The Queen (n 3) 132 [68] (French CJ).

103. Lange (n 1) 560.

104. Stellios, Zines’s The High Court and the Constitution (n 81) 564.

105. Stone, ‘Rights, Personal Rights and Freedoms’ (n 24) 414.

106. Mason (n 40) 326.

107. Graeme Hill and Adrienne Stone, ‘The Constitutionalisation of the Common Law’ (2004) 25 Adelaide Law Review 67, 84.

108. Ibid 82–92.

109. (1994) 182 CLR 104 (‘Theophanous’). See especially Brennan J at 148.

110. Ibid 234 (Mason CJ, Toohey and Gaudron JJ), 236 (Brennan J).

111. See, eg, Stellios, Zines’s The High Court and the Constitution (n 81) 564, 586, 612; George Williams and David Hume, Human Rights Under the Australian Constitution (Oxford University Press, 2nd ed, 2013), 48–9; Leslie Zines, ‘The Common Law in Australia: Its Nature and Constitutional Significance’ (2004) 32 Federal Law Review 337; William Gummow, ‘Common Law’ in Cheryl Saunders and Adrienne Stone (eds), The Oxford Handbook of the Australian Constitution (Oxford University Press, 2018); Kathleen Foley, ‘The Australian Constitution’s Influence on the Common Law’ (2003) 31(1) Federal Law Review 131; Pamela Tate, ‘Some Observations on the Common Law and the Constitution’ (2008) 30(1) Sydney Law Review 119; Hill and Stone (n 107) 71; Jeffrey Goldsworthy, ‘The Constitution and Its Common Law Background’ (2014) 25(4) Public Law Review 265, 269–70; Adrienne Stone, ‘The Common Law and the Constitution: A Reply’ (2002) 26(3) Melbourne University Law Review 646; William Buss, ‘Alexander Meiklejohn, American Constitutional Law, and Australia’s Implied Freedom of Political Communication’ (2006) 34(3) Federal Law Review 421. Condylis (n 49) argues (at 419–24) that the High Court’s decision in Bodruddaza v Minister for Immigration and Multicultural Affairs (2007) 228 CLR 651 is consistent with the requirement from Lange that the common law must conform with the Constitution. Similarly, Fiona Wheeler, ‘Due Process, Judicial Power and Chapter III in the New High Court’ (2004) 32(2) Federal Law Review 205 cites (at 217) Gaudron J’s judgment in Ebner v Official Trustee in Bankruptcy (2000) 205 CLR 337 as another example of the common law being required to conform with the Constitution.

112. Stone (n 111) 647; Goldsworthy (n 111) 269–70.

113. Greg Taylor, ‘Why the Common Law Should Be Only Indirectly Affected by Constitutional Guarantees: A Comment on Stone’ (2002) 26(3) Melbourne University Law Review 623, 626; Greg Taylor, ‘The Effect of the Constitution on the Common Law as Revealed by John Pfeiffer v Rogerson’ (2002) 30(1) Federal Law Review 69, 79; Greg Taylor, ‘Public Law, Private Rights: A Comparative View of the Theory Behind Recent Changes in Defamation Law to Make It Reflect Constitutional Values’ (2000) 11 Public Law Review 274.

114. (2000) 203 CLR 503 (‘Pfeiffer’).

115. Taylor, ‘The Effect of the Constitution’ (n 113) 82–90.

116. Foley (n 111) 131, 132.

117. Hill and Stone (n 107) 71.

118. Goldsworthy (n 111) 269–70.

119. Bradley Selway, ‘The Principle Behind Common Law Judicial Review of Administrative Action: The Search Continues’ (2002) 30(2) Federal Law Review 217, 232.

120. Greg Taylor, ‘The Constitution and the Common Law Again’ (2019) 40(2) Adelaide Law Review 573, 579–83.

121. (2002) 212 CLR 1.

122. Roberts v Bass (n 31) [65]–[67] (emphasis added). See also [102] (Gaudron, McHugh, Gummow JJ); see also [130], [144], [162] (Kirby J). The other judgments, though less explicit, are consistent with these views. See also Lenah (n 102) [194] (Kirby J).

123. Outside the High Court, very few cases have considered the interaction of the common law and the freedom. Some exceptions include Gunns Ltd v Alishah (2009) 19 Tas R 38, 44–8 [14]–[28]; Highway v Thomas (Northern Territory Magistrates Court, 21 May 2004); Meyerhoff v Darwin City Council (2005) 16 NTLR 222, 226–7 [18]–[23]; Windridge Farm Pty Ltd v Grassi [2010] NSWSC 335, [46]–[56].

124. (2010) 241 CLR 539 (‘Aid/Watch’).

125. See generally Joyce Chia, Matthew Harding and Ann O’Connell, ‘Navigating the Politics of Charity: Reflections on Aid/Watch Inc v Federal Commissioner of Taxation’ (2011) 35(2) Melbourne University Law Review 353.

126. Aid/Watch (n 124) 556 [44] (French CJ, Gummow, Hayne, Crennan, Bell JJ).

127. Joseph (n 75). See also Richard Jolly, ‘The Implied Freedom of Political Communication and Disclosure of Government Information’ (2000) 28(1) Federal Law Review 41, 48.

128. (2003) 134 FCR 334 (‘Bennett’).

129. Irving (n 7) 518–21 [9.18].

130. Bennett (n 128) 362–4.

131. (1997) 76 FCR 151 (‘Hughes’).

132. Ibid 245–46.

133. Brennan (n 4) 15. See also, Seddon (n 4) 505 [8.39].

134. [2013] FCCA 1052.

135. Ibid [101]–[102].

136. [2014] FCA 1134.

137. Ibid [95].

138. (2014) 323 ALR 248.

139. Ibid 266 [65].

140. Ibid 266 [67].

141. Gillian Triggs, ‘Right to Freedom of Speech Cannot Breach Employment Contract’, Sydney Morning Herald (online), 1 May 2015 <https://www.smh.com.au/opinion/right-to-freedom-of-speech-cannot-breach-employment-contract-20150430-1mwn9f.html>.

142. Anthony Forsyth, ‘High Court Decision Impacts Free Speech of All Employees’, Sydney Morning Herald (online), 8 August 2019 <https://www.smh.com.au/national/high-court-decision-impacts-free-speech-of-all-employees-20190808-p52f47.html>. Similarly, see also Orr and Wells (n 5) 294.

143. As in the famous ‘rights as trumps’ analysis offered by Ronald Dworkin: Ronald Dworkin, ‘Rights as Trumps’ in Jeremy Waldron (ed), Theories of Rights (Oxford University Press, 1984) 153–67.

144. Lange (n 1) 560.

145. Wesley Newcomb Hohfeld, ‘Some Fundamental Legal Conceptions as Applied in Judicial Reasoning’ (1913) 23 Yale Law Journal 16, 30–2, 55–8.

146. (1994) 182 CLR 272.

147. Ibid 327.

148. In contrast with the United States, where contraventions of one’s First Amendment free speech rights may be sued upon: Bivens v Six Unknown Named Agents, 403 US 388 (1971).

149. Theophanous (n 109) 148. While Theophanous was decided prior to Lange, the passage quoted was cited in a footnote in Lange at 560 in the Court’s discussion of the nature of the freedom.

150. Stone, ‘Rights, Personal Rights and Freedoms’ (n 24) 377–8.

151. Joseph (n 75).

152. Stone, ‘Rights, Personal Rights and Freedoms’ (n 24) 414–17.

153. It is true, of course, that the respondent to Lange (n 1)—the Australian Broadcasting Corporation—was a statutory corporation with public funding, but nothing turned on this—the Lange doctrine applies in exactly the same way to, say, a private newspaper as it does the ABC.

154. William J Rich, Modern Constitutional Law: Volume 2: Liberty and Equality (Thomson Reuters, 3rd ed, 2011) 121–4.

155. Cass Sunstein, The Partial Constitution (Harvard University Press, 1993) 72–4.

156. 376 US 254 (1964).

157. Ibid 265.

158. 334 US 1 (1948) (‘Shelley’).

159. Ibid 19.

160. See, eg, Herbert Wechsler, ‘Toward Neutral Principles of Constitutional Law’ (1959) 73 Harvard Law Review 1, 29; Thomas Lewis, ‘The Meaning of State Action’ (1960) 60 Columbia Law Review 1083, 1115; Louis Henkin, ‘Shelley v. Kraemer: Notes for a Revised Opinion’ (1962) 110(4) University of Pennsylvania Law Review 473; Robert J Glennon and John E Nowak, ‘A Functional Analysis of the Fourteenth Amendment “State Action” Requirement’ (1976) Supreme Court Review 221, 246; Mark Rosen, ‘Was Shelley v. Kraemer Incorrectly Decided? Some New Answers’ (2007) 95 California Law Review 451.

161. Rosen (n 160) 469–70; Evans v Abney, (1970) 396 US 435; United Egg Producers v Standard Brands Inc, 44 F 3d 940 (11th Cir. 1995); State v Noah, 9 P 3d 858 (Wash App Ct 2000); Golden Gateway Centre v Golden Gateway Tenants Association, 29 P 3d 797 (Cal 2001); Linn Valley Lakes Prop Owners Association v Brockway, 824 P 2d 948, 951 (Kan 1992).

162. Sunstein (n 155) 72–4; Rich (n 154) 132 4:6.

163. Kathleen Sullivan and Gerald Gunther, Constitutional Law (Foundation Press, 13th ed, 1997).

164. Ibid 938, cited in Stone, ‘Rights, Personal Rights and Freedoms’ (n 24) 415.

165. Stone, ‘Rights, Personal Rights and Freedoms’ (n 24) 415–16.

166. Ibid 415.

167. Ibid 415–16.

168. Ibid 416.

169. Ibid 416 (emphasis added).

170. Ibid (emphasis added). A similar argument is also discussed in Hill and Stone (n 107) 85–7.

171. Taylor, ‘Why the Common Law’ (n 113) 641.

172. Banerji (n 3) 932 [138] (Gordon J).

173. Taylor, ‘Why the Common Law’ (n 113) 627; See also, eg, Defamation Act 2005 (SA) (and like statutes in all jurisdictions).

174. Attorney-General’s Department (Cth), Improving Australia’s Law and Justice Framework: A Discussion Paper Exploring the Scope for Reforming Australian Contract Law (Discussion Paper, 2012). See also John Eldridge, ‘Contract Codification and “Certainty”’ (2018) 35 Journal of Contract Law 146; Warren Swain, ‘Codification of Contract Law: Some Lessons from History’ (2012) 31 University of Queensland Law Journal 39.

175. Clubb (n 24), 487–8 [178]–[182] (Gageler J), 528 [377], 529 [386] (Gordon J).

176. See Williams and Hume (n 111) 198, where a similar analysis is undertaken and conclusion reached in relation to aspects of the common law of property.

177. Jason N E Varuhas, ‘The Concept of “Vindication” in the Law of Torts’ (2014) 34(2) Oxford Journal of Legal Studies 253, 266.

178. See, eg, R P Balkin and J L R Davis, The Law of Torts (LexisNexis Butterworths, 5th ed, 2013) 131–87.

179. Brown v Tasmania (n 30) 364 [107] (Kiefel CJ, Bell and Keane JJ), 451 [380], 453 [387], 454 [391], 463 [424] (Gordon J), 485 [502], 506 [563] (Edelman J).

180. See Lenah (n 102), where the appellant did not attempt to suggest that there was any defence that the third party trespassers who had obtained the relevant video footage could rely upon.

181. See, eg, Balkin and Davis (n 178) 131–87.

182. John Eldridge and Tim Matthews, ‘The Right to Protest After Brown v Tasmania’, AUSPUBLAW (Blog Post, 2 November 2017) <https://auspublaw.org/2017/11/the-right-to-protest-after-brown-v-tasmania/>. See Tabernacle v Secretary of State for Defence [2009] EWCA Civ 23 and Pruneyard Shopping Center v Robins 447 US 74 (1980).

183. Sullivan and Gunther (n 163) 938.

184. Clubb (n 24) 532 [402]. This was in the context of considering the merits of importing a proportionality test into Australian law.

185. Sir John Dyson, ‘Are the Judges Too Powerful?’ (Bentham Association Presidential Address, University College London, 12 March 2014) 11 <https://www.ucl.ac.uk/laws/sites/laws/files/dyson_2014.pdf>.

186. See, eg, Printing and Numerical Registering Co v Sampson (1875) LR 19 Eq 462, 465 (Jessel MR).

187. Patrick Atiyah, The Rise and Fall of Freedom of Contract (Clarendon Press, 1979) 681–715, 726–63. See especially 731–42.

188. Holman v Johnson (1775) 1 Cowp 341; 98 ER 1120 (Lord Mansfield); Sir David Hughes Parry, The Sanctity of Contracts in English Law (Stevens & Sons, 1959) 51–6.

189. W S W Knight, ‘Public Policy in English Law’ (1922) 38 Law Quarterly Review 207, 207.

190. [2012] NSWSC 3, cited in Angus Macauley, ‘Contracts Against Public Policy: Contracts For Meretricious Sexual Services’ (2018) 40(4) Sydney Law Review 527, 528.

191. J D Heydon, The Restraint of Trade Doctrine (LexisNexis Butterworths, 4th ed, 2018) 1–2.

192. [1915] 3 KB 556 (‘Neville’). See Heydon (n 191) 286.

193. Neville (n 192) 556. It has been suggested there is a UK decision, Initial Services Ltd v Putterill [1968] 1 QB 396, to similar effect: Hugh Beale (ed), Chitty on Contracts: Volume I: General Principles (Sweet and Maxwell, 31st ed, 2012) 1227. However, it would appear all this decision suggested was that where there is an implied contractual term of confidentiality, it would not extend to require matters of legitimate public interest be kept confidential—a similar result to that suggested by Finn J in Bennett, though obviously not justified by the same constitutional considerations: Justice Toulson and Charles Phipps, Confidentiality (Sweet & Maxwell, 3rd ed, 2012), 135–7.

194. Heydon (n 191) 23–33.

195. Ibid 55; Amoco Australia Pty Ltd v Rocca Bros Motor Engineering Co Pty Ltd (1973) 133 CLR 288, 313–14 (Gibbs J).

196. Heydon (n 191) 101–2, 287–90.

197. Ibid 158–99.

198. Ibid 34–40; Mason v Provident Clothing and Supply Co Ltd [1913] AC 724, 733, 741; Herbert Morris Ltd v Saxelby [1916] 1 AC 688, 700, 706–7, 715; Bacchus Marsh Concentrated Milk Co Ltd (in liq) v Joseph Nathan & Co (1919) 26 CLR 410, 440–1; Esso Petroleum Co Ltd v Harper’s Garage (Stourport) Ltd [1968] AC 269, 319; McHugh v Australian Jockey Club Ltd (2014) 314 ALR 20, [5]–[23], [49]–[63], [65].

199. Heydon (n 191) 199–202.

200. Ibid 34–5; Mason v Provident Clothing and Supply Co Ltd (n 198) 733, 741; Herbert Morris Ltd v Saxelby (n 198) 700, 706–7, 715; Bacchus Marsh Concentrated Milk Co Ltd (in liq) v Joseph Nathan & Co (n 198) 440–1; Esso Petroleum Co Ltd v Harper’s Garage (Stourport) Ltd (n 198) 319; McHugh v Australian Jockey Club Ltd (n 198) [5]–[23], [49]–[63], [65].

201. Carter (n 32) 268 [12-15].

202. Heydon (n 191) ch 5. See also Office Angels Ltd v Rainer-Thomas [1991] IRLR 214, 219.

203. Heydon (n 191) 303.

204. Clubb (n 24) 536 [420].

205. Ibid 535–6 [419].

206. Heydon (n 191) 310.

207. Ibid.

208. Ibid 309.

209. See Louise Thornthwaite, ‘Chilling Times: Social Media Policies, Labour Law and Employment Relations’ (2016) 54(3) Asia Pacific Journal of Human Resources 332; Louise Thornthwaite, ‘Social Media and Dismissal: Towards a Reasonable Expectation of Privacy?’ (2018) 60(1) Journal of Industrial Relations 119, 122.

210. Clubb (n 24) 534 [415], 536–7 [420]–[425] (Edelman J).

211. Heydon (n 191) 315.

212. Ibid 314–15, cited by Clubb (n 24) [420] (Edelman J), referring to Nicholls v Stretton (1847) 10 QB 346; Baines v Geary (1887) 35 Ch D 154; Perls v Saalfeld [1892] 2 Ch 149; Dubowski & Sons v Goldstein [1896] 1 QB 478; Lewis v Durnford (1907) 24 TLR 64.

213. Foltz v Struxness, 215 P 2d 133, 137 (Kan Sup Ct, 1950).

214. Kemp, Sacs & Nell Real Estate (Edms) Bpk v Soll [1986] 1 SA 673, 688–9.

215. ACS Public Sector Solutions Inc v Arntsen (2005) 262 DLR (4th) 512 (BCCA).

216. Heydon (n 191) 308–9.

217. James Stellios, ‘Marbury v Madison: Constitutional limitations and discretions’ (2016) 42 Australian Bar Review 324, 344–5.

218. Lange (n 1) 561.

219. City of Adelaide (n 78).

220. Ibid 44 [68] (French CJ), 63 [137], 64 [141] (Hayne J), 88–9 [217], 89–90 [220]–[221] (Crennan and Kiefel JJ), 90–1 [224] (Bell J).

221. Clubb (n 24) 546 [469] (Edelman J).

222. Lindner v Murdock’s Garage (1950) 83 CLR 628, 633–4; Heydon (n 191) 130.

223. Portal Software International Pty Ltd v Bodsworth [2005] NSWSC 1179 [83]; Heydon (n 191) 124.

224. Printers and Finishers Ltd v Holloway [1964] 3 All ER 731, 736 (Cross J); Commercial Plastics Ltd v Vincent [1965] 1 QB 623, 642 (Pearson LJ); Heydon (n 191) 125.

225. McEllistrim v Ballymacelligot Co-operative Agricultural and Dairy Society [1919] AC 548, 582 (Lord Atkinson).

226. Cream v Bushcolt [2004] ATPR 42-004; Neville Rochow, ‘Toward a Modern Reasoned Approach to the Doctrine of Restraint of Trade’ (2014) 5 The Western Australian Jurist 25, 51.

227. As to the issue of whistleblowing legislation’s interaction with the freedom, see Danielle Ireland-Piper and Jonathan Crowe, ‘Whistleblowing, National Security, and the Constitutional Freedom of Political Communication’ (2018) 46(3) Federal Law Review 341; Danielle Ireland-Piper, ‘Public-Sector Whistleblowing and the Implied Freedom of Political Communication’, AUSPUBLAW (Blog Post, 13 April 2016) <https://auspublaw.org/2016/04/public-sector-whistleblowing/>; Public Interest Disclosure Act 2013 (Cth), s 10. For a discussion of whether whistleblowing may constitute an exception to the employee’s implied contractual duty of fidelity, see McCarry (n 12) 333.

228. Banerji (n 3) [31], [34] (Kiefel CJ, Bell, Keane, Nettle JJ), [71]–[75], [100]–[105] (Gageler J), [111], [142]–[161] (Gordon J), [179], [202]–[206] (Edelman J).

229. Banerji (n 3) 906 [2].

230. Ibid.

231. Banerji and Comcare (Compensation) [2018] AATA 892, 12–13 [14].

232. Rumble (n 19).

233. Scott Moss, ‘Illuminating Secrecy: A New Economic Analysis of Confidential Settlements’ (2007) 105 Michigan Law Review 867, 878, 902; Richard Posner, Economic Analysis of Law (Aspen Publishers, 6th ed, 2003) 570; Richard Epstein, ‘The Disclosure Dilemma: Why a Ban on Secret Legal Settlements Does More Harm than Good’, Boston Globe, 3 November 2002; Alison Lothes, ‘Quality, Not Quantity: An Analysis of Confidential Settlements and Litigants’ Economic Incentives’ (2005) 54 University of Pennsylvania Law Review 433, 456–7.

234. Andrew Daughety and Jennifer Reinganum, ‘Informational Externalities in Settlement Bargaining: Confidentiality and Correlated Culpability’ (2002) 33 RAND Journal of Economics 587, 592. See also Moss (n 233) 902; Lothes (n 233) 457.

235. Moss (n 233) 878, 880–1; but see Owen Fiss, ‘Against Settlement’ (1984) 93 Yale Law Journal 1073.

236. Women Lawyers Association of New South Wales (n 27) 23–4; Seven Network (Operations) Limited v Harrison [2017] NSWSC 129, [60]; Unions New South Wales (n 27) 14–15.

237. Moss (n 233) 878–81; John Coffee Jr, ‘Beyond the Shut-Eyed Sentry: Toward a Theoretical View of Corporate Misconduct and an Effective Legal Response’ (1977) 63 Virginia Law Review 1099, 1251, 1255–6.

238. See, eg, Patrick George, Defamation Law in Australia (LexisNexis Butterworths, 3rd ed, 2017) 417–19.