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Determination of the Validity of the Rules of Organisations under Section 140 of the Conciliation and Arbitration Act

Published online by Cambridge University Press:  24 January 2025

R. R. S. Tracey
R. R. S. Tracey*
Affiliation:
University of Melbourne
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Federal Law Review , Volume 8 , Issue 1 , March 1977 , pp. 57 - 76
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Copyright © 1977 The Australian National University

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References

1 Conciliation and Arbitration Act 1904, s. 132(2); Conciliation and Arbitration Regulations, reg. 115(1)(d) and (2).

2 Reg. 115(1).

3 Reg. 115(2).

4 S. 133. For other requirements as to rules see ss. 137 and 139.

5 The first six sub-sections of s. 140, as it currently stands, with the exception of some constitutionally insignificant amendments to sub-sections (1), (2) and (5), were approvei by tlte High Court in R. v. Commonwealth Industrial Court: Exparte The Amalgamated Engineering Union, Australian Section (1960) 103

6 Section 140 (2) and (3). To have standing to challenge a rule under s. 140 a person must have been a member of the organisation concerned at a time during which the challenged rule operated and at the time of commencing proceedings: Lynch v. McLachlan (1962) 3 F.L.R. 59. A member may receive financial assistance from the Commonwealth Government to pursue his challenge: Section 141A.

[Editor's note: Since this article was written, the Industrial Court has been abolished and its jurisdiction and powers transferred to the Federal Court of Australia, see Conciliation and Arbitration Amendment Act (No. 3) 1976.]

7 s.104.

8 s.140(4).

9 The definition of “office” in s. 4(1) of the Act is:

“'Office', in relation to an organization or branch of an organization, means

(a) the office of a member of the committee of management of the organization or branch;

(aa) the office of president, vice-president, secretary, assistant-secretary or other executive officer, by whatever name called, of the organization or branch;

(b) the office of a person holding, whether as trustee or otherwise, property of the organization or branch, or property in which the organization or branch has any beneficial interest;

(c) the office of a member of any conference, council, committee, panel or other body within the organization or branch which, under the rules of the organization or of the branch, is empowered to make, alter or rescind rules or to enforce, or perform functions in relation to the enforcement of, rules or to exercise any of the functions of management;

(d) every office within the organization or branch for the filling of which an election is required to be conducted within the organization or branch”.

See Mackenzie v. A.C.O.A. (1962) 5 F.L.R. 342 for a case in which a rule which permitted the contractual appointment of a branch secretary was held to contravene s. 140(1)(a) because the secretaryship was an “office”.

10 Reg. 115(1)(d)(v).

11 Reg. 115(1)(d)(iv).

12 S. 133(1) (a).

13 Act No. 117 of 1976. This Act comes into force on 12 November 1976.

14 S. 133(1)(a).

15 Ibid.

16 Grove v. Federated Miscellaneous Workers Union of Australia (1972) 21 F.L.R. 72, 80 (Spicer C.J., Joske and Smithers JJ.).

17 s.133(3).

18 S.133(1)(db). Organisations have until 8 July 1977 to bring their rules into conformity with this provision: s. 133(4C).

19 (1959) 2 F.L.R. 45.

20 Spicer C.J. and Dunphy J., Morgan J. dissenting.

21 (1959) 2 F.L.R. 45, 72.

22 Id. 56.

23 Id. 88-89.

24 (1967) 10 F.L.R. 347 (Dunphy, Joske and Kerr JI.).

25 (1959) 2 F.L.R. 45.

26 (1967) 10 F.L.R. 347, 351-354.

27 Id. 367.

28 (1959) 2 F.L.R. 45.

29 (1967) 10 F.L.R. 347, 366 and 367.

30 Id. 366.

31 Id. 367.

32 (1959) 2 F.L.R. 45.

33 (1967) 10 F.L.R. 347, 368.

34 Id. 360-361.

35 (1965) 7 F.L.R. 148 (Spicer C.J., Dunphy and Smithers JJ.). See also Higgins v. Nicol (1971) 18 F.L.R. 343.

36 (1967) 10 F.L.R. 347.

37 Reg.115(1}(d}(v).

38 s.133(1)(db).

39 Wright v. Australian Workers' Union (1965) 7 F.L.R. 148, discussed supra at 61. See also Mackenzie v. A.C.O.A., Commonwealth Public Service (1962) 5 F.L.R. 342.

40 (1957) 3 F.L.R. 309 (Spicer C.J., Dunphy and Morgan JJ.).

41 For a recent application of these considerations in another union see Gordon v. Hospital Employees Federation of Australia (1975) 6 A.L.R., 579, 612-619.

42 Crealy v. Commonwealth Bank Officers' Association (1957) 1 F.L.R. 153 (Spicer C.J., Dunphy and Morgan JJ.).

43 Mackenzie v. A.C.O.A. (1962) 5 F.L.R. 342.

44 Id. 348-349 (per Spicer C.J.) and pp. 364-365 (per Joske J.). Numerically smaller sections within branches can also have disproportionate representation at Branch and Federal levels: Grove v. Federated Miscellaneous Workers Union of Australia (1972) 21 F.L.R. 72. In this case the counterbalance was provided by a Union rule which allowed any three branches or six per cent of the total membership to direct the federal executive and council to act in a specified way pending consultation of the total membership.

45 (1958) 4 F.L.R. 188 (Spicer C.J,, Dunphy and Morgan JJ.).

46 (1957) 3 F.L.R. 309. Supra at 62.47

47 (1958) 4 F.L.R. 188.

48 (1958) 4 F.L.R. 188, 191 (per Morgan J.).

49 (1958) 4 F.L.R. 188, 191 (per Morgan J. with whom Dunphy J. agreed). However, Spicer C.J. based his decision on a now omitted portion of s. 140(1)(a), holding that the amendment provision was void in that it caused the rules of the organisation to fail to comply with regulation 115(1)(d)(xiv): see n. 52.

50 (1959) 2 F.L.R. 45.

51 Id. 73.

52 Id. 90. Prior to 1972 s. 140(1)(d) read:

“(1) A rule of an organization-

(a) shall not be contrary to a provision of this Act, the regulations or an award or otherwise be contrary to law or be such as to cause the rules of the organization to fail to comply with such a provision; ... “ (Italics added.)

In Cameron v. Australian Workers' Union (1959) 2 F.L.R. 45 it was held that this paragraph did not cover the situation where a set of rules, which did not individually offend against the Act, or cause the rules to fail to comply with the Act, omitted some provision which the Act required to be incorporated. In other words, the complaint against the rules had to be “one of commission rather than of omission”. The position was remedied in 1972 by the omission of the italicised portion of the old paragraph and the inclusion of the phrase “or fail to make provision required by” the Act, etc.

53 (1959) 2 F.L.R. 45, 54-55.

54 (1962) 5 F.L.R. 342.

55 Id. 354.

56 Id. 369.

57 (1959) 2 F.L.R. 45.

58 Id. 73.

59 (1959) 2 F.L.R. 45.

60 Id. 55.

61 A.C.O.A. v. Lester (1967) 11 F.L.R. 107.

62 Wishart v. Australian Builders Labourers' Federation (1960) 2 F.L.R. 298.

63 MacKenzie v. A.C.O.A. (1962) 5 F.L.R. 342.

64 (1959) 2 F.L.R. 45.

65 Id. 50 (Spicer C.J.), 68 (Dunphy J.) and 82 (Morgan J.).

66 Id. 50-51 (Spicer C.J.) and 69 (Dunphy J.).

67 Id. 68.

68 Id. 51 (per Spicer C.J.).

69 Cameron v. Australian Workers' Union (1959) 2 F.L.R. 45, 47; Shearer v. Amalgamated Engineering Union (1960) 1 F.L.R. 436, 441.

70 Cameron v. Australian Workers' Union (1959) 2 F.L.R. 45, 60 (Spicer C.J.), 76 (Dunphy J.) and 96 (Morgan J.).

71 (1959) 2 F.L.R. 45.

72 Id. 59 per Spicer C.J. But note Joske J.'s subsequent assertion that five years membership prerequisite “must rarely ... be regarded as reasonable”, MacDonald v. A.E.U. (1962) 3 F.L.R. 446, 449.

73 In Watson v. Australian Workers' Union (1967) 10 F.L.R. 347.

74 Id. 349-350 (Dunphy J.) and 365 (Kerr J.).

75 (1962) 3 F.L.R. 446 (Spicer C.J., Joske and Eggleston JJ.).

76 (1959) 2 F.L.R. 45.

77 (1967) 10 F.L.R. 347.

78 (1959) 2 F.L.R. 45.

79 Id. 58 (Spicer C.J.) and 93 (Morgan J.).

80 Id. 58 (Spicer C.J.), 74 (Dunphy J.) and 93 (Morgan J.).

81 (1968) 12 F.L.R. 182 (Spicer C.J., Smithers and Kerr JJ.).

82 Id. 186.

83 Ibid.

84 Assuming, of course, that some or all of the current executive were seeking re-election in the ballot concerned.

85 Mawbey v. Thone (1969) 15 F.L.R. 161 (Spicer C.J., Dunphy and Kerr JJ.).

86 Ibid.

87 Cameron v. Australian Workers' Union (1959) 2 F.L.R. 45.

88 Id. 59-60 (Spicer C.J.), 75-76 (Dunphy J.) and 95 (Morgan J.).

89 Id. 60 (Spicer C.J.). Cf. Marantelli v. Amalgamated Engineering Union (1963) 4 F.L.R. 335 where a restriction to personal canvassing was held not to be unreasonable where the electorate involved was between 300-500.

90 Seen. 87.

91 (1960) 1 F.L.R. 436 (Spicer C.J., Joske and Eggleston JJ.).

92 Spicer C.J. and Eggleston J., Joske J. dissenting.

93 (1960) 1 F.L.R. 436, 439-441.

94 Id. 446.

95 (1963) 4 F.L.R. 335 (Spicer C.J., Joske and Eggleston JJ.).

96 (1960) 1 F.L.R. 436.

97 (1963) 4 F.L.R. 335, 338-339.

98 (1960) 1 F.L.R. 436.

99 (1963) 4 F.L.R. 335, 338.

1 (1960) 1 F.L.R. 436.

2 Id. 439.

3 Supra at 60-62.

4 And vice versa. See for example Watson v. Australian Workers' Union (1967) 10 F.L.R. 347 where Dunphy J. (at pp. 351-353) found for validity under both paragraphs (a) and (c) and Kerr J. (at p. 367) found for invalidity under both.

5 See for example Joske J.'s judgment in Watson v. Australian Workers' Union (1967) 10 F.L.R. 347.

6 A week's notice would normally be regarded as reasonable: Sykes and Glasbeek, Labour Law in Australia (1972) 35.

7 Williams v. Victorian Railway Commissioners (1903) 29 V.L.R. 566, 583 F.C.

8 Cameron v. Australian Workers' Union (1959) 2 F.L.R. 45.

9 Wishart v. Australian Builders Labourers' Federation (1960) 2 F.L.R. 298. (Joske and Eggleston JJ.)

10 (1960) 2 F.L.R. 298.

11 Id. 301.

12 Id. 302.

13 Mackenzie v. A.C.O.A. (1962) 5 F.L.R. 342 and Maxwell v. Boilermakers Society of Australia (1965) 7 F.L.R. 155. See also Cassidy v. Amalgamated Postal Workers' Union of Australia (1967) 11 F.L.R. 124; Egan v. Harradine (1975) 6 A.LR. 507, 514-515.

14 (1965) 6 F.L.R. 488 (Spicer C.J., Joske and Smithers JJ.).

15 McKay v. Australian Workers' Union (1968) 12 F.L.R. 182.

16 Mackenzie v. A.C.O.A. (1962) 5 F.L.R. 342.

17 Gordon v. Hospital Employees Federation of Australia (1975) 6 A.LR. 579.

18 Id. 613.

19 Id. 614. See also Mackenzie v. A.C.O.A. (1962) 5 F.L.R. 342. A denial of natural justice would be remediable by an action under s. 141.

20 Id. 614.

21 O'Neill v. Printing Industry Employees Union of Australia (1965) 6 F.L.R. 488 and Wishart v. Australian Builders Labourers' Federation (1960) 2 F.L.R. 298.

22 Mackenzie v. A.C.O.A. (1962) 5 F.L.R. 342.

23 Ibid.

24 Cameron v. Australian Workers' Union (1959) 2 F.L.R. 45.

25 (1959) 2 F.L.R. 45, 76 (Dunphy J.) and 96 (Morgan J.).

26 Byrnes v. Federated lronworkers Association of Australia (1951) 3 F.L.R. 309. See also Gordon v. Hospital Employees Federation of Australia (1915) 6 A.L.R. 579.

27 Ibid.

28 Wishart v. Australian Builders Labourers' Federation (1960) 2 F.L.R. 298.

29 (1960) 2 F.L.R, 298.

30 Id. 302.

31 R. v. Commonwealth Industrial Court; Ex parte The Amalgamated Engineering Union, Australian Section (1960) 103 C.L.R. 368; Cameron v. Duncan (1965) 8 F.L.R. 148 and Morris v. Wood (1975) 8 A.L.R. 342.

32 Unless, of course, the other court is the Privy Council or the High Court.

33 See n. 31.

34 Wishart v. Australian Builders Labourers' Federation (1960) 2 F.L.R. 298.

35 R. v. Commonwealth Court of Conciliation and Arbitration; Ex parte Whybrow and Co. (1910) 11 C.L.R. 1.

36 Wishart v. Australian Builders Labourers' Federation (1960) 2 F.L.R. 298, 303. For a summary of the severance tests used by the court see Cassidy v. Amalgamated Postal Workers' Union of Australia (1967) 11 F.L.R. 124.

37 (1962) 3 F.L.R. 446 (Spicer C.J., Joske and Eggleston JJ.).

38 This decision has been strongly criticised: Mills and Sorrell, Federal Industrial Laws (5th ed., 1975) 341-343. It was also productive of further litigation: MacDonald v. The Amalgamated Engineering Union, Australian Section (1963) 18 1.1.B. 374.

39 Acts No. 30 of 1958 and No. 37 of 1972.