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Distancing From Accountability? Governments’ Use of Soft Law in the COVID-19 Pandemic

Published online by Cambridge University Press:  01 January 2025

Matthew McLeod Open the ORCID record for Matthew McLeod [Opens in a new window]
Matthew McLeod*
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BA/LLB (Hons I) (UNSW)
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Abstract

This article analyses how governments across Australia and the world have employed ‘soft law’ in their responses to the COVID-19 pandemic. Rather than simply directing the public to the text of voluminous, complex and everchanging public health orders, executive officials have utilised a variety of non-legal soft law instruments to inform the community of their rights and obligations. These instruments are beneficial — especially in a public health crisis — as they are comprehensible, adaptable and effective. However, their non-legal nature also presents significant accountability issues which challenge the Australian conception of the separation of powers. Soft law exists independent of any parliamentary authorisation or oversight. Subsequently, those affected by soft law lack almost any ability to challenge its use in court. To remedy such issues, this article recommends a greater role for administrative complaint mechanisms (such as Ombudsman recommendations and discretionary payment schemes) in combatting abuses of soft law. It further suggests that the limited adoption of two foreign doctrines — substantive legitimate expectations and epistemic deference — into Australian judicial review could aid in addressing this dilemma.

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Articles
Information
Federal Law Review , Volume 50 , Issue 1 , March 2022 , pp. 3 - 19
Copyright
Copyright © 2022 The Author(s)

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Footnotes

This article began as an undergraduate research essay, and I am extremely grateful to all those who aided in its further development. My sincerest thanks go to Dr Janina Boughey for her guidance and invaluable comments and to Kate Jackson for her constant friendship and support. All views are my own.

References

1. Greg Weeks, Soft Law and Public Authorities: Remedies and Reform (Hart Publishing, 2016) 13 (‘Soft Law and Public Authorities’).

2. Stephen Argument, ‘Quasi Legislation: Greasy Pig, Trojan Horse or Unruly Child?’ (1994) 1(3) Australian Journal of Administrative Law 144 (‘Quasi-Legislation’); Commonwealth Interdepartmental Committee on Quasi-regulation, Grey-Letter Law: Report of the Commonwealth Interdepartmental Committee on Quasi-regulation (Report, December 1997); Robert Baldwin, Rules and Government (Oxford University Press, 1995) 80.

3. Robin Creyke, ‘Soft Law and Administrative Law: A New Challenge’ (2010) 61(1) Australian Institute of Administrative Law Forum 15, 15.

4. Greg Weeks, ‘Soft Law and Public Liability: Beyond the Separation of Powers?’ (2018) 39(2) Adelaide Law Review 303, 306 (‘Beyond the Separation of Powers?’); Robin Creyke and John McMillan, ‘Soft Law v Hard Law’ in Linda Pearson, Carol Harlow and Michael Taggart (eds), Administrative Law in a Changing State (Hart Publishing, 2008) 377, 378.

5. Creyke (n 3) 15; Greg Weeks, ‘The Use and Enforcement of Soft Law by Australian Public Authorities’ (2014) 42(1) Federal Law Review 181, 183 (‘Use and Enforcement of Soft Law’).

6. Weeks, ‘Beyond the Separation of Powers?’ (n 4) 311.

7. Federal Airports Corporation v Aerolineas Argentinas (1997) 76 FCR 582, 590; Roche Products Pty Ltd v National Drugs and Poisons Schedule Committee (2007) 163 FCR 451, 458‐461.

8. Stephen Daly, ‘The Rule of (Soft) Law’ (2021) 32(1) King’s Law Journal 3, 5.

9. Weeks, ‘Beyond the Separation of Powers?’ (n 4) 306.

10. Ibid 310.

11. Ibid.

12. Janina Boughey, ‘Executive Power in Emergencies: Where is the Accountability?’ (2020) 45(3) Alternative Law Journal 168, 171-172 (‘Executive Power in Emergencies’).

13. Legislation Act 2003 (Cth) s 15K(1).

14. Creyke (n 3) 15.

15. See, eg, Motor Accidents Compensation Act 1999 (NSW) s 133(2)(b). See also Weeks, Soft Law and Public Authorities (n 1) 47–53; Weeks, ‘Use and Enforcement of Soft Law’ (n 5) 209.

16. See Lisa Burton Crawford, ‘The Rule of Law in the Age of Statutes’ (2020) 48(2) Federal Law Review 159 (‘Age of Statutes’).

17. Lisa Burton Crawford, ‘Between a Rock and a Hard Place: Executive Guidance in the Administrative State’ in Janina Boughey and Lisa Burton Crawford (eds), Interpreting Executive Power (Federation Press, 2020) 7, 9 (‘Executive Guidance in the Administrative State’).

18. Ibid.

19. See Emily K Vraga and Kathryn H Jacobsen, ‘Strategies for Effective Health Communication during the Coronavirus Pandemic and Future Emerging Infectious Disease Events’ (2020) 12(3) World Medical & Health Policy 233.

20. See, eg, Public Health Act 2010 (NSW), which provides that, in response to a public health risk, the relevant Minister ‘may take such action, and … may by order give such directions, as the Minister considers necessary to deal with the risk and its possible consequences’: at s 7. See also Biosecurity Act 2015 (Cth) s 477; Public Health and Wellbeing Act 2008 (Vic) s 200.

21. Boughey, ‘Executive Power in Emergencies’ (n 12) 172.

22. Ibid.

23. Public Health (Non-Essential Gatherings) Emergency Direction 2020 (ACT), as at 1 April 2020.

24. Email from ACT Parliamentary Counsel’s Office to the author, 27 October 2020. PCO noted that this instrument had ‘a very high viewing rate for the register website’ and ‘was viewed 3 times more than any other document on the site’ during the relevant period. Similar data was sought from the governments of the Commonwealth, the states and the Northern Territory but was not made available.

25. Australian Bureau of Statistics, National, State and Territory Population (Catalogue No 3101.0, 31 March 2020).

26. Eric Windholz, ‘Governing in a Pandemic: From Parliamentary Sovereignty to Autocratic Technocracy’ (2020) 8(1‐2) The Theory and Practice of Legislation 93, 96.

27. World Health Organization, ‘Rwanda: Drones for Community Awareness and Nation-Wide Measures in COVID-19 Response’, World Health Organization (online, 20 July 2020) <https://www.who.int/news-room/feature-stories/detail/rwanda-drones-for-community-awareness-and-nation-wide-measures-in-covid-19-response>; Zane Small, ‘Jacinda Ardern Discussed Alternatives to “Loud Honk” COVID-19 Mobile Phone Alert’, Newshub (online, 26 March 2020) <https://www.newshub.co.nz/home/politics/2020/03/jacinda-ardern-discussed-alternatives-to-loud-honk-covid-19-mobile-phone-alert.html>; Erin Handley, ‘How South-East Asia Is Using Catchy Pop Songs to Combat Coronavirus’, ABC News (online, 10 March 2020) <https://www.abc.net.au/news/2020-03-10/how-south-east-asia-is-using-pop-songs-to-combat-coronavirus/12038228>.

28. Windholz (n 26) 94.

29. See, eg, ‘What you can and can’t do under the rules’, NSW Government (Web Page, 12 June 2020) <https://www.nsw.gov.au/covid-19/what-you-can-and-cant-do-under-rules>.

30. See, eg, ‘Victoria’s COVID lockdown restrictions: From masks, gatherings and shopping, to hospitals, school and work’, ABC News (Web Page, 12 February 2021) <https://www.abc.net.au/news/2021-02-12/victorias-coronavirus-lockdown-restrictions-explained/13149206?nw=0>.

31. Weeks, ‘Beyond the Separation of Powers?’ (n 4) 310.

32. See, eg, ‘Herogram video: Magda Szubanski as Sharon Strzelecki’, Victorian Government (Web Page) <https://www.vic.gov.au/media/15774>.

33. ‘COVID-19 testing advice’, NSW Health (Web Page) <https://www.health.nsw.gov.au/Infectious/covid-19/Pages/case-definition.aspx>.

34. NSW Health, COVID-19 Ward Set Up Advice (Information Bulletin No IB2020_013, April 2020); Victorian Department of Health and Human Services, COVID-19 Daily Capacity and Occupancy Register: Guidelines for Reporting (Policy Document, 2020).

35. Boughey, ‘Executive Power in Emergencies’ (n 12) 172.

36. See Alyssa Leng and Hervé Lemahieu, ‘Covid Performance Index: Deconstructing Pandemic Responses’ Lowy Institute (Web Page, 28 January 2021) <https://interactives.lowyinstitute.org/features/covid-performance/>.

37. Boughey, ‘Executive Power in Emergencies’ (n 12) 172.

38. Deborah Rupp and Cynthia Williams, ‘The Efficacy of Regulation as a Function of Psychological Fit: Reexamining the Hard Law/Soft Law Continuum’ (2011) 12(2) Theoretical Inquiries in Law 581, 581.

39. Ibid 596.

40. Thio Li-Ann, ‘Constitutional “Soft” Law and the Management of Religious Liberty and Order: The 2003 Declaration of Religious Harmony’ [2004] (2) Singapore Journal of Legal Studies 414, 434.

41. Sarah Thomas, ‘NSW Premier Gladys Berejiklian Issues ‘Strong Recommendation’ for Masks to Fight Coronavirus’, ABC News (online, 2 August 2020) <https://www.abc.net.au/news/2020-08-02/nsw-sunday-coronavirus-update-masks-recommended/12516026>.

42. ‘Coronavirus (COVID-19) daily update’, Victoria Department of Health and Human Services (Web Page) <https://www.dhhs.vic.gov.au/coronavirus-covid-19-daily-update>.

43. Stay Safe Directions (Victoria) (No 16) 2020 (Vic) cl 7(2)(h), as at 1 March 2021.

44. Justice Connect, Submission No 54 to Public Accounts and Estimates Committee, Parliament of Victoria, Inquiry into the Victorian Government’s Response to the COVID-19 Pandemic (July 2020) 12.

45. Stephen Argument, Parliamentary Scrutiny of Quasi-Legislation (Papers on Parliament No 15, Department of the Senate, Parliament House, May 1992) 24 (‘Parliamentary Scrutiny’).

46. Weeks, Soft Law and Public Authorities (n 1) 57.

47. Ibid 30.

48. See, eg, NSW Health, ‘COVID-19 Update — 2 January 2021’ (Press Conference, 2 January 2021) <https://vimeo.com/507303044/756af387fc>.

49. Weeks, Soft Law and Public Authorities (n 1) 44.

50. Weeks, ‘Beyond the Separation of Powers?’ (n 4) 304.

51. Crawford, ‘Executive Guidance in the Administrative State’ (n 17) 8.

52. See generally Weeks, ‘Beyond the Separation of Powers?’ (n 4).

53. (2021) 95 ALJR 441, 465 [98] (Gordon and Steward JJ).

54. Janina Boughey and Greg Weeks, ‘Government Accountability as a “Constitutional Value”’ in Rosalind Dixon (ed), Australian Constitutional Values (Hart Publishing, 2018) 99, 103. See also Ellen Rock, Measuring Accountability in Public Governance Regimes (Cambridge University Press, 2020); Jerry Mashaw, ‘Accountability and Institutional Design: Some Thoughts on the Grammar of Governance’ in Michael Dowdle (ed), Public Accountability: Designs, Dilemmas and Experiences (Cambridge University Press, 2006) 115; Richard Mulgan, ‘Accountability Deficits’ in Mark Bovens, Robert E Goodin and Thomas Schillemans (eds), The Oxford Handbook of Public Accountability (Oxford University Press, 2014) 545.

55. Weeks, Soft Law and Public Authorities (n 1) 30.

56. Argument, ‘Quasi-Legislation’ (n 2) 148‐150.

57. See Brendan Gogarty and Gabrielle Appleby, ‘The Role of Tasmania’s Subordinate Legislation Committee during the COVID-19 Emergency’ (2020) 45(3) Alternative Law Journal 188, 193.

58. Boughey, ‘Executive Power in Emergencies’ (n 12) 170.

59. Argument, ‘Parliamentary Scrutiny’ (n 45) 20.

60. Weeks, ‘Beyond the Separation of Powers?’ (n 4) 309.

61. Jan Petrov, ‘The COVID-19 Emergency in the Age of Executive Aggrandizement: What Role for Legislative and Judicial Checks?’ (2020) 8(1‐2) The Theory and Practice of Legislation 71, 75.

62. Justice Connect (n 44) 11.

63. ‘What you can and can’t do under the rules’, NSW Government (Web Page, 12 June 2020) <https://www.nsw.gov.au/covid-19/what-you-can-and-cant-do-under-rules>.

64. Paul Daly, ‘Governmental Power and COVID-19: The Limits of Judicial Review’ in Colleen M Flood et al (eds), Vulnerable: The Law, Policy and Ethics of COVID-19 (University of Ottawa Press, 2020) 211, 220 (‘Governmental Power and COVID-19’).

65. Simon Halliday, Jed Meers and Joe Tomlinson, Public Attitudes on Compliance with COVID-19 Lockdown Restrictions (Interim Report No 2, 25 June 2020) 3.

66. Simon Halliday et al, Public Attitudes on Compliance with COVID-19 Restrictions (Face Coverings) (Interim Report No 3, 10 November 2020) 2.

67. [2020] NZHC 2090 (‘Borrowdale’).

68. Jacinda Ardern, ‘Prime Minister: COVID-19 Alert Level increased’ (Press Release, New Zealand Government, 23 March 2020) <https://www.beehive.govt.nz/speech/prime-minister-covid-19-alert-level-increased>.

69. Borrowdale (n 67) [29] (Thomas, Venning and Ellis JJ).

70. Ibid [184].

71. Ibid [187], [191].

72. Tom Hickman, ‘The Use and Misuse of Guidance During the UK’s Coronavirus Lockdown’ (Working Paper, June 2020) 3 <https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=3686857>.

73. [2020] IEHC 461 (‘Ryanair’)

74. Ibid [45]‐[48], [52] (Simons J)

75. Ibid [38]‐[39].

76. [2020] VSC 722 (‘Loielo’).

77. Ibid [43]‐[49] (Ginnane J).

78. Ibid [167]-[171].

79. Ibid [169].

80. Weeks, Soft Law and Public Authorities (n 1) 62.

81. Australian Constitution s 75; Transport Accident Commission (Vic) v Kaddour [2019] NSWSC 1738, [21] (Basten J).

82. Administrative Decisions (Judicial Review) Act 1977 (Cth) s 3(1).

83. Green v Daniels (1977) 13 ALR 1, 9.

84. Ryanair (n 73) [41].

85. Ibid [42].

86. Creyke (n 3) 19.

87. See Weeks, ‘Use and Enforcement of Soft Law’ (n 5) 190‐199; Weeks, Soft Law and Public Authorities (n 1) 119‐141.

88. Loielo (n 76) [43]-[49].

89. Borrowdale (n 67) [193]-[226].

90. Daly, ‘Governmental Power and COVID-19’ (n 64) 220.

91. Weeks, Soft Law and Public Authorities (n 1) 145.

92. Ibid 141.

93. Ibid 143.

94. Ibid.

95. Borrowdale (n 67) [292].

96. Claudia Geiringer and Andrew Geddis, ‘Judicial Deference and Emergency Power: A Perspective on Borrowdale v Director-General’ (2020) 31(4) Public Law Review 370, 379.

97. Though beyond the scope of this article, there exists a growing body of work on whether remedies in tort or equity may be suited to addressing soft law. See Matthew Groves and Greg Weeks, ‘Soft Law and Liability in Tort’ (2020) 27(3) Australian Journal of Administrative Law 131; Weeks, Soft Law and Public Authorities (n 1) 180‐234. See also Greg Weeks, ‘Estoppel and Public Authorities: Examining the Case for an Equitable Remedy’ [2010] (4) Journal of Equity 247.

98. Weeks, Soft Law and Public Authorities (n 1) 271.

99. See generally Argument, ‘Parliamentary Scrutiny’ (n 45).

100. Weeks, Soft Law and Public Authorities (n 1) 235‐242.

101. Michael Frahm, Australasia and Pacific Ombudsman Institutions: Mandates, Competences and Good Practice (Springer, 2013) 69‐71. See, eg, Ombudsman Act 1976 (Cth) s 15; Ombudsman Act 1974 (NSW) s 26; Ombudsman Act 1973 (Vic) s 23.

102. Weeks, Soft Law and Public Authorities (n 1) 271.

103. Ibid 248‐249.

104. ‘Complaints about financial grants for small business’, Victorian Ombudsman (Web Page) <https://www.ombudsman.vic.gov.au/our-impact/case-examples/complaints-about-financial-grants/>.

105. Ibid.

106. Commonwealth Ombudsman, ‘Statement by the Commonwealth Ombudsman Michael Manthorpe on the Management of COVID-19 risks in Immigration Detention Facilities’ (Press Statement, Commonwealth Ombudsman, 1 July 2020) 1.

107. See Human Rights Act 2019 (Qld) pt 4.

108. Queensland Human Rights Commission, Hotel Quarantine: Unresolved Complaint Report Under Sec. 88 Human Rights Act 2019 (Report, 15 October 2020) [36]‐[52].

109. Stuart Layt and Lydia Lynch, ‘CHO Defends Hotel Quarantine Amid Concerns from Human Rights Watchdog’, Brisbane Times (online, 10 December 2020) <https://www.brisbanetimes.com.au/national/queensland/cho-defends-hotel-quarantine-amid-concerns-from-human-rights-watchdog-20201210-p56mc7.html>.

110. Weeks, Soft Law and Public Authorities (n 1) 237.

111. NSW Ombudsman, Submission No 8 to Legislative Council Public Accountability Committee, Parliament of New South Wales, Budget Process for Independent Oversight Bodies and the Parliament of New South Wales (18 November 2019) 12.

112. See, eg, Ombudsman Act 1974 (NSW) s 26A.

113. Weeks, Soft Law and Public Authorities (n 1) 253.

114. See generally, ‘Scheme for Compensation for Detriment caused by Defective Administration (CDDA Scheme)’, Australian Government Department of Finance (Web Page) <https://www.finance.gov.au/individuals/act-grace-payments-waiver-debts-commonwealth-compensation-detriment-caused-defective-administration-cdda/scheme-compensation-detriment-caused-defective-administration-cdda-scheme>; Weeks, Soft Law and Public Authorities (n 1) 252-267.

115. Jason NE Varuhas, ‘In Search of a Doctrine: Mapping the Law of Legitimate Expectations’ in Matthew Groves and Greg Weeks (eds), Legitimate Expectations in the Common Law World (Hart Publishing, 2017) 17, 18.

116. Crawford, ‘Executive Guidance in the Administrative State’ (n 17) 14.

117. Matthew Groves, ‘Substantive Legitimate Expectations in Australian Administrative Law’ (2008) 32(2) Melbourne University Law Review 470, 472.

118. Ibid 471.

119. Re Minister for Immigration and Multicultural and Indigenous Affairs; Ex parte Lam (2003) 214 CLR 1.

120. Crawford, ‘Executive Guidance in the Administrative State’ (n 17) 15.

121. Ibid 16.

122. Ibid 19.

123. [2021] HCA 5, [62] (Kiefel CJ and Keane J), [217] (Edelman J). Earlier, the Federal Court of Australia also signified such a shift through its use of structured proportionality in Brett Cattle Company Pty Ltd v Minister for Agriculture (2020) 274 FCR 337, 411 [300] (Rares J).

124. Taxation Administration Act 1953 (Cth) sch 1, s 357‐1.

125. Ibid sch 1, s 357‐60.

126. Crawford, ‘Age of Statutes’ (n 16) 174.

127. Varuhas (n 115) 18.

128. Janina Boughey, ‘Proportionality and Legitimate Expectations’ in Matthew Groves and Greg Weeks (eds), Legitimate Expectations in the Common Law World (Hart Publishing, 2017) 121, 146.

129. Paul Daly, ‘A Pluralist Account of Deference and Legitimate Expectations’ in Matthew Groves and Greg Weeks (eds), Legitimate Expectations in the Common Law World (Hart Publishing, 2017) 101, 117.

130. See Corporation of the City of Enfield v Development Assessment Commission (2000) 199 CLR 135.

131. Stephen Gageler, ‘Deference’ (2015) 22(3) Australian Journal of Administrative Law 151, 152‐3.

132. Janina Boughey, ‘Re-Evaluating the Doctrine of Deference in Administrative Law’ (2017) 45(4) Federal Law Review 597, 603.

133. Paul Daly, A Theory of Deference in Administrative Law: Basis, Application and Scope (Cambridge University Press, 2012) 7–8; Skidmore v Swift & Co, 323 US 134 (1944).

134. Gageler (n 131) 152.

135. HP Lee et al, Emergency Powers in Australia (Cambridge University Press, 2018) 249.

136. Marbury v Madison 5 US (1 Cranch) 137 (1803) (Marshall CJ).

137. Crawford, ‘Executive Guidance in the Administrative State’ (n 17) 21.

138. Ibid.

139. Ibid 20‐2.

140. Janina Boughey, ‘The Case for “Deference” to (Some) Executive Interpretations of Law’ in Janina Boughey and Lisa Burton Crawford (eds), Interpreting Executive Power (Federation Press, 2020) 34, 36‐7 (‘The Case for Deference’).

141. Ibid 47.

142. Ibid 53.

143. Ibid 49.

144. Ibid 50.

145. Weeks, Soft Law and Public Authorities (n 1) 49.

146. Windholz (n 26) 95. See, eg, Public Health Act 2005 (Qld) s 362B.

147. See Boughey, ‘The Case for Deference’ (n 140) 48‐9. See also Sas Ansari and Lorne Sossin, ‘Legitimate Expectations in Canada: Soft Law and Tax Administration’ in Matthew Groves and Greg Weeks (eds), Legitimate Expectations in the Common Law World (Hart Publishing, 2017) 293; Stephen Daly, ‘Oversight of HMRC Soft Law: Lessons from the Ombudsman’ (2016) 38(3) Journal of Social Welfare and Family Law 343.