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‘Each for Themselves’ or ‘One for All’? the Changing Emphasis of the Commonwealth Ombudsman

Published online by Cambridge University Press:  24 January 2025

Anita Stuhmcke
Anita Stuhmcke*
Affiliation:
Faculty of Law, University of Technology Sydney
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Extract

In the Australian liberal democratic tradition, the expectation that government be accountable to the people is a product of the electorate’s grant of power to government. As government becomes more complex due to the expansion of human activity it regulates there is increased reliance upon official means of facilitating democratic accountability. Indicative of this development is the 20th century supplementation of traditional Westminster mechanisms of accountability with administrative law institutions such as the Commonwealth Ombudsman. These supplementary review processes and institutions of ‘new administrative law’ aim to render the application of discretionary decision-making by government administrators transparent and fair to the individual citizen. This was the primary vision of the Kerr and Bland Committees which framed the need for administrative review agencies against the background of the protection and promotion of individual citizen rights.

Type
Research Article
Information
Federal Law Review , Volume 38 , Issue 1 , March 2010 , pp. 143 - 167
Copyright
Copyright © 2010 The Australian National University

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Footnotes

I would like to thank the referees involved in this process for their helpful insights. I would also like to thank Professor Dennis Pearce for the inspiration for this piece.

References

1 It has been suggested that the Westminster system is now without ‘clarity or credence': Elizabeth, Harman, ‘The Impact of Public Sector Reforms on Australian Government’ in Patrick, Weller, John, Forster and Glyn, Davis (eds), Reforming the Public Service (1993) 16, 33Google Scholar. Indeed as Mason J states, ‘the doctrine of ministerial responsibility is not in itself an adequate safeguard for the citizen whose rights are affected. This is now generally accepted and its acceptance underlies the comprehensive system of judicial review of administrative action which now prevails in Australia': The Queen v Toohey; Ex parte Northern Land Council (1980–81) 151 CLR 170, 222.

2 Commonwealth, Commonwealth Administrative Review Committee Report, Parl Paper No 144 (1971); Commonwealth, Interim Report of the Committee on Administrative Discretions, Parl Paper No 53 (1973); Commonwealth, Final Report of the Committee on Administrative Discretions, Parl Paper No 316 (1973) (see for specific examples the Commonwealth Administrative Review Committee Report, Parl Paper No 144 (1971) [11], [354], [363]).

3 See Hot Holdings v Creasy (2002) 210 CLR 438, 467 (Kirby J), citing Paul Finn's three forms of accountability as follows:

One form is accountability to official superiors and peers. This is the preferred, but most diluted, method of accountability favoured in Westminster systems. Another is accountability to agencies such as the Auditor-General, the Ombudsman and to Parliament. These agencies act, or should act, for and on behalf of the public. The final form of accountability is to members of the public directly, either as individuals (as through administrative law mechanisms) or as a community (as through elections).

4 Commonwealth Ombudsman, Annual Report (2008–09) 2Google Scholar.

5 This general movement has been noted by peak bodies such as the Administrative Review Council. See Administrative Review Council, Commonwealth Parliament, Better Decisions: Review of Commonwealth Merits Review Tribunals Report No 39 (1995)Google Scholar.

6 Evidentiary proof that any such improvement occurs is rare: See Australian Law Reform Commission, Managing Justice: A Review of the Federal Justice System, Report No 89 (1999) [1.43].

7 Commonwealth, Commonwealth Administrative Review Committee Report, above n 2, [354], [364].

8 Stating that the reinforcement of avenues for individual review rights would minimise administrative error and ‘stimulate administrative efficiency', see Commonwealth, Commonwealth Administrative Review Committee Report, above n 2, [12], [364].

9 For further discussion see Gabriel, Fleming, ‘Administrative Review and the “Normative” Goal — Is Anybody Out There?’ (2000) 28 Federal Law Review 61Google Scholar.

10 Commonwealth, Commonwealth Administrative Review Committee Report, above n 2.

11 Commonwealth, Interim Report of the Committee on Administrative Discretions, above n 2; Commonwealth, Final Report of the Committee on Administrative Discretions, above n 2 (Bland Committee Final Report).

12 Commonwealth, Report of the Committee of Review of Prerogative Writ Procedure, Parl Paper No 56 (1973) (Ellicott Committee Report).

13 Cited in Shergold v Tanner (2002) 209 CLR 26, 130 (Gleeson CJ, McHugh, Gummow, Kirby and Hayne JJ).

14 Although there was some comment that acknowledged that it may have broader application, see for example the terms of reference of the Commonwealth, Commonwealth Administrative Review Committee Report, above n 2, [1].

15 Indeed commentary on the improvement of the system was confined to the need to balance ‘the desirability of achieving justice to the individual and the preservation of the efficiency of the administrative process': ibid [12].

16 Administrative Review Council, above n 5.

17 See, eg, Charles, Sampford, ‘Law, Institutions and the Public/Private Divide’ (1991) 20 Federal Law Review 185, 185Google Scholar; referring to the 1980s. This may be broadened into a discussion of classical versus new liberalism: see Martin, Loughlin, ‘The Functionalist Style in Public Law’ (2005) 55 University of Toronto Law Journal 361Google Scholar.

18 Archival parliamentary material records confidential files on the concept of the Ombudsman from 1961: See Archive file: ECOSOC — Proposal for an “Ombudsman” in Australia File No 929/1/4. See also Archive files: No 68/3880; No 929/1/4; see also Commonwealth, Parliamentary Debates, House of Representatives, 16 April 1970, 1 314; 15 March 1967, 724; 26 April 1966 1 195; 27 April 1965, 921; 13 October 1964 1875; 10 September 1963 807.

19 A Harris, First Assistant Secretary, Ref No BA 66/36 Commonwealth Treasury Canberra ACT to The Secretary Prime Ministers Department contained in National Archives.

20 Ibid. The other reasons being that the population is too large in relation to Commonwealth functions with the special difficulty of vast geographical spread; and difficulties associated with the federal system.

21 Commonwealth, Commonwealth Administrative Review Committee Report, above n 2, [313].

22 For example, the Office was envisaged as an advocate with an incidental system fixing role which ‘would act mainly on complaint being made to him': Ibid [313]. Even so, Chapter 15 of the report discussing the proposed Ombudsman makes no mention of improvement to the system of administrative review.

23 Senate Standing Committee on Finance and Public Administration, Parliament of Australia, Review of the Office of the Commonwealth Ombudsman (1991) 8Google Scholar.

24 Commonwealth Ombudsman, Annual Report (1977–78) 2Google Scholar.

25 Senate Standing Committee on Finance and Public Administration, above n 23, 14.

26 The role of the Office was described in parliamentary debate as one ‘of investigating, conciliating and cajoling’ see Commonwealth, Parliamentary Debates, House of Representatives, 4 June 1975, 3366 (John Howard).

27 Commonwealth, Parliamentary Debates, House of Representatives, 24 August 1976, 474 (Lionel Bowen).

28 Commonwealth, Parliamentary Debates, House of Representatives, 4 June 1976, 3068 (Robert Ellicott, Attorney-General).

29 Commonwealth, Parliamentary Debates, House of Representatives, 24 August 1976, 476 (Neil Brown).

30 Commonwealth Ombudsman, Annual Report (1977–78) 3Google Scholar. See also Commonwealth, above n 28.

31 Commonwealth Ombudsman, Annual Report (2007–08) 2Google Scholar.

32 See, eg, Roy Morgan Research Centre, Public Awareness Survey (June 1992); AGB, McNair, Complainant Satisfaction Survey (May 1994)Google Scholar.

33 Robin, Creyke, ‘The Performance of Administrative Law in Protecting Rights’ in Tom, Campbell, Jeffrey, Goldsworthy and Adrienne, Stone (eds), Protecting Rights Without a Bill of Rights (2006) 101, 120Google Scholar.

34 The detailed data finishes at 2005. On 29 November 2005 the Commonwealth Ombudsman issued a ‘Public Statement: Changes to Ombudsman's Work Practices', which notes that ‘upcoming work practice and systems changes will affect our statistical recording…it may mean that our complaint statistics for 2005–06 are not representative or comparable with those for previous years.’ Commonwealth Ombudsman, ‘Public Statement: Changes to Ombudsman's Work Practices’ (Press Release, 29 November 2005) <www.ombudsman.gov.au/commonwealth/publish.nsf/Content/mediarelease_20> at 2 March 2009.

35 Commonwealth Ombudsman, Annual Report (2008–09) 13, 17Google Scholar.

36 In one of the only recent studies, the Northern Territory Ombudsman provided data to track out of jurisdiction complaints. In 2008–09 it was determined that within the Northern Territory 53 per cent or 818 complaints were out of jurisdiction, the Annual Report notes that ‘[s]tatistics were kept for the first time regarding the inquiries that were out of jurisdiction. The results show that 24% were about employment issues and 14% related to consumer affairs issues.’ Northern Territory Ombudsman, Annual Report (2008–09) 21.

37 For example in the 2008–09 Annual Report of the Queensland Ombudsman it was noted that ‘[r]eferrals have increased 136% since 2005–2006’ and that ‘[w]ith the increasing number of complaint resolution bodies being established, both in government and in the private sector, people are becoming confused about the correct agency to contact for assistance.': Queensland Ombudsman, Annual Report (2008–09) 16Google Scholar.

38 Commonwealth Ombudsman, Annual Report (2008–09) 13Google Scholar.

39 The grounds upon which the Ombudsman can exercise this discretion are contained in s 6 of the Ombudsman Act 1976 (Cth), eg, the Ombudsman can decline to investigate if a matter is more than 12 months old; if the complainant does not have a sufficient interest in the subject matter of the complaint; if a complainant has not first raised the complaint with the agency; or if there is a more appropriate alternative avenue of review available to the complainant. Practically, the most important of these powers is the discretion not to investigate until the complainant has raised the complaint at first instance with the agency concerned: Commonwealth Ombudsman, Annual Report (2003–04) 14–25Google Scholar.

40 Such as the Privacy Commissioner; the Public Service Commissioner; an industry ombudsman; the Australian Broadcasting Authority; the Australian Communications authority and the Employment Services Regulatory Authority: Ombudsman Act 1976 (Cth) s 6.

41 Ombudsman Act 1976 (Cth) s 6A.

42 This article uses standardised statistics and itemises them into portfolio, year and individual Ombudsman to allow meaningful analysis and comparisons of the longitudinal operation of the Office. For an overview as to the methodology use to create this data: See Anita, Stuhmcke, ‘Changing Relations between Government and Citizen: Administrative Law and the Work of the Australian Commonwealth Ombudsman’ (2008) 67(3) The Australian Journal of Public Administration 321–39Google Scholar.

43 Commonwealth Ombudsman, Annual Report (2005–06) 23Google Scholar.

44 Commonwealth Ombudsman, Annual Report (2006–07) 2Google Scholar.

45 Commonwealth Ombudsman, Annual Report (2007–08) 19Google Scholar. As noted above the data for the years from 2006 onwards is not included in tabular form due to changes in Office work practices.

46 Commonwealth Ombudsman, Annual Report (2008–09) 15Google Scholar.

47 Removal or aggregation of the data to take into account the four year difference between the time periods being compared does not significantly impact upon this finding.

48 Commonwealth Ombudsman, Annual Report (2000–01) 12Google Scholar. Any additional reasons stated in Annual Reports are both general and rare for example, ‘A smaller number of complaints are not investigated due to insufficient information, or where the client requests that their complaint be withdrawn.’ Commonwealth Ombudsman, Annual Report (1997–98) 41Google Scholar.

49 See, eg, Commonwealth Ombudsman, Annual Report (2000–01) 12 — 68 per cent; Commonwealth Ombudsman, Annual Report (2001–02) 16 — 67 per cent; Commonwealth Ombudsman, Annual Report (2002–03) 13 — 69 per cent; Commonwealth Ombudsman, Annual Report (2003–04) 23 — 43 per cent; Commonwealth Ombudsman, Annual Report (2004–05) 20 — 40 per cent; Commonwealth Ombudsman, Annual Report (2008–09) 17 — 58 per cent.

50 Commonwealth Ombudsman, Annual Report (2008–09) 17Google Scholar.

51 Indeed, the reference to the Office as an agent of last resort — pushing complaints back to agencies — is used for the first time in the Annual Report (1996–97): Commonwealth Ombudsman, Annual Report (1996–97) 3Google Scholar.

52 Commonwealth Ombudsman, Annual Report (2002–03) 14Google Scholar.

53 Commonwealth Ombudsman, Oral Advice: Some Questions and Issues (1996)Google Scholar; Commonwealth Ombudsman, Issue Relating to Oral Advice Clients Beware: Report Under Section 35A the Ombudsman Act 1976 (1997); Commonwealth Ombudsman A Good Practice Guide for Effective Complaint Handling (1999), Commonwealth Ombudsman, Balancing the Risks Own Motion Investigation Into the Role of Agencies in Providing Adequate Information to Customers in a Complex Income Support System : Report Under Section 35A of the Ombudsman Act 1976 (1999) and To Compensate or not to Compensate Own Motion Investigation of Commonwealth Arrangements for Providing Financial Redress for Maladministration: Report Under Section 35A of the Ombudsman Act 1976 (1999). See also: Commonwealth Ombudsman, Better Practice Guides <http://www.ombudsman.gov.au/pages/publications-and-media/better-practice-guides/> at 14 April 2010 and Professor John McMillan, ‘Future Directions for Australian Administrative Law – The Ombudsman’ (Speech delivered at the Australian Institute of Administrative Law, National Administrative Law Forum, Canberra 3-4 July 2003, <http://www.ombudsman.gov.au/docs/speeches/futuredirections-AIAL-4july03.pdf> at 14 April 2010).

54 John Howard, ‘Message; 20th Anniversary of the Office of the Commonwealth Ombudsman July 1997', Twenty years of the Commonwealth Ombudsman 1977–1997 (1997) cited in Administrative Review Council, The Contracting Out of Government Services, Report No 42 (1998) [4.71].

55 For further commentary on the standing arrangements with agencies see the Commonwealth Ombudsman, Annual Report (2004–05) 67–73Google Scholar; as to the introduction of the Public Contact Team see the Commonwealth Ombudsman, Annual Report (2005–06) 40–45Google Scholar. In Professor John McMillan's second term (2008–current) an internal working party has recommended further changes to the way that complaints are managed see the Commonwealth Ombudsman, Annual Report (2007–08) 42Google Scholar.

56 This term has been used by Australian ombudsmen to refer to complainants who ‘give up’ on the pursuit of their complaint. See Commonwealth Ombudsman, Annual Report (2005–06) 40-45Google Scholar.

57 Commonwealth Ombudsman, Annual Report (2005–06) 43Google Scholar.

58 Commonwealth Ombudsman, Annual Report (2003–04) 23Google Scholar.

59 Commonwealth Ombudsman, Annual Report (2008–09) 17Google Scholar.

60 Similar research carried out by the Queensland Ombudsman in 2004 notes a failure of 33.4 per cent of complainants to pursue their complaint: Queensland Ombudsman, Annual Report (2004–05) 14. One of the principal findings was that ‘46.8% of complainants did not follow our advice to contact the agency’ see David Bevan, ‘Survey of complainants referred to agencies’ (Presentation to 22nd APOR Conference, Wellington, New Zealand, 2004).

61 David Bevan, ‘Survey of complainants referred to agencies’ (Presentation to 22nd APOR Conference, Wellington, New Zealand, 2004) 2.

62 Ron, McLeod, Commonwealth Ombudsman, Review of the Child Support Agency's Complaint Service (2001) 1Google Scholar.

63 Ibid 2. On a side note, the issue as to whether the outcomes and impact of own motion investigations are evaluated sufficiently by the Office also requires empirical attention.

64 Senate Standing Committee on Finance and Public Administration, above n 23, 64. Apart from this review, the jurisdiction of the Ombudsman was the subject of a working party report which was implemented in part by the Ombudsman Amendment Act 1983 (Cth): Administrative Review Council, Jurisdiction of Ombudsman: Working Party Report to Council (1980).

65 Commonwealth, Interim Report of the Committee on Administrative Discretions, above n 2, [65].

66 Ibid [64].

67 See, eg, commentators on the United Kingdom Ombudsman, see Mary, Seneviratne, Ombudsmen: Public Services and Administrative Justice (2002)Google Scholar; North American and Canadian Ombudsman, see Office of the Ombudsman Province of New Brunswick, Annual Report (2003–04); See also Larry, Hill, ‘The Ombudsman Revisited: Thirty Years of Hawaiian Experience’ (2002) 62(1) Public Administration Review 24, 41Google Scholar; Latin American Ombudsman, see Fredrick, Uggla, ‘The Ombudsman in Latin America’ (2004) 36(3) Journal of Latin American Studies 423, 441Google Scholar; European Ombudsmen, including specialist ombudsmen, see Gary, Melton, ‘Lessons from Norway: The Children's Ombudsman as a Voice for Children’ (1991) 23(2) Case Western Reserve Journal of International Law 197Google Scholar; African Ombudsman, see Charles, Fombad, ‘The Enhancement of Good Governance in Botswana: a Critical Assessment of the Ombudsman Act, 1995’ (2001) 27(1) Journal of Southern African Studies 57Google Scholar; Eastern European Ombudsmen, see Milan, Ambroz, ‘The Mediating Role of the Ombudsman in the Protection of Human Rights’ (2005) 14(2) International Journal of Social Welfare 145Google Scholar; Asian Ombudsmen, see Carlos, Lo and Robert, Wickins, ‘Towards an Accountable and Quality Public Administration in Hong Kong: Redressing Administrative Grievances Through the Ombudsman’ (2002) 25(6) International Journal of Public Administration 737Google Scholar.

68 Evaluations range from ‘the most informal intuitive sense of goodness or badness to more formalised scientific analysis': Steven, Aufrecht and Marc, Hertogh, ‘Evaluating Ombudsman Systems’ in Roy, Gregory and Philip, Giddings (eds), Righting Wrongs: The Ombudsman in Six Continents (2000) 389, 393Google Scholar.

69 Commonwealth Ombudsman, Annual Report (2003–04) 102Google Scholar.

70 Such independent investigation has largely been non-existent, see comments by Rick, Snell, ‘Towards an Understanding of a Constitutional Misfit: Four Snapshots of the Ombudsman Enigma’ in Chris, Finn (ed), Sunrise or Sunset? Administrative Law in the New Millennium (2000) 188Google Scholar, 188 who uses the phrase the ‘ombudsman enigma’ in arguing that the ‘office for too long has been neglected by Parliament, academics, lawyers and others'; Dennis, Pearce, ‘The Jurisdiction of Australian Government Ombudsmen’ in Matthew, Groves (ed), Law and Government in Australia (2005) 110, 111Google Scholar ‘the office of the ombudsman has attracted limited academic attention.'; Hugh, Selby, ‘Ombudsman Inc: A Bullish Stock with a Bare Performance’ (1989) 58 Canberra Bulletin of Public Administration 174Google Scholar, who notes that most commentary is supplied by ombudsman or ex-ombudsman staff, calling for independent critical examination of its operation.

71 Dennis Pearce, ‘The Anniversary Lecture', (Speech delivered at the 25th Anniversary Proceedings Administrative Review Council, Canberra, 6 December 2001), 13 <www.ag.gov.au> at 12 April 2007.

72 Joint Standing Committee on Foreign Affairs, Defence and Trade, Parliament of Australia, The Human Rights and Equal Opportunity Commissioner and the Commonwealth Ombudsman report on Public Seminars 20 and 25 September 1996 (1997) 9.

73 Australian Law Reform Commission, above n 6, [1.90].

74 Administrative Review Council, Access to Administrative Review by Members of Australia's Ethnic Communities Report No 34 (1991), 5 see also 67.

75 Senate Standing Committee on Finance and Public Administration, above n 23, 66, 69.

76 Jens Olsen, Soren Knudson, Ermir Dobjani and Christian Moller, Some Experiences in the Field of Assistance and Cooperation between Ombudsman, Parliamentary Commissioner for Civil and Military Administration in Denmark <http://www.ombudsmen.dk/publikationer/cooperation/> 23 March 2010, 9.

77 Commonwealth Ombudsman, Annual Report (1992–93) xiGoogle Scholar. This point is reiterated in the next Commonwealth Ombudsman, Annual Report (1993–94) 1–2Google Scholar.

78 Commonwealth Ombudsman, Annual Report (1994–95) 7Google Scholar.

79 Commonwealth Ombudsman, Annual Report (2007–08) viiiGoogle Scholar.

80 The dual role of Ombudsmen is found in originating legislation and echoed in judicial dicta: see Re Alberta Ombudsman Act (1970) 10 DLR (3d) 47, 61 (Milvain CJTD) and Botany Council v The Ombudsman (1995) 37 NSWLR 357, 363 (Kirby P).

81 Only in South Australia and in New Zealand are there legislative guidelines on the use of the title Ombudsman. In South Australia the internal use of the title by a government agency is prohibited: Ombudsman Act 1972 (SA) s 32; Ombudsman Act 1975 (NZ) s 28A(1). Since 1991 in New Zealand it has been necessary to have a statutory appointment or permission of the Chief Ombudsman before the title is used; this has been given to two industry Ombudsmen in New Zealand: Ombudsmen Act 1975 (NZ) s 28A, the two other Ombudsman are the New Zealand Insurance and Savings Ombudsman and the Office of the Banking Ombudsman.

82 The word ‘ombuds’ is a Swedish word meaning representative or agent of the people or a group of people, it has been asserted that the word itself derives from Germanic tribes ‘where the term was applied to a third party whose task was to collect fines from remorseful culprit families and give them to aggrieved families of victims': H H, Kirchheiner, ‘The Ideological Foundation of the Ombudsman Institution’ in Gerald, E Caiden (ed), International Handbook of the Ombudsman: Evolution and Present Function (1983) 23Google Scholar.

83 Commonwealth Ombudsman, Annual Report (1977–78) 7Google Scholar.

84 Arthur, Maloney, ‘The Ombudsman Idea’ (1979) 13 University of British Columbia Law Review 380Google Scholar.

85 Commonwealth Ombudsman, Annual Report (1977–78) 214Google Scholar citing ‘The Concept of Ombudsman’ in The Ombudsman through the Looking Glass, Proceedings of a Seminar at the Law School The Australia National University (1985).

86 Arthur, Maloney, ‘The Ombudsman as Mediator, Reformer, and Fighter?’ in Gerald, E Caiden (ed), International Handbook of the Ombudsman: Evolution and Present Function (1983) 71Google Scholar.

87 For a good overview of developments see K, Del Villar, ‘Who Guards the Guardians? Recent Developments Concerning the Jurisdiction and Accountability of Ombudsman’ (2003) 36 Australian Institute of Administrative Law Forum 25Google Scholar.

88 Commonwealth, Interim Report of the Committee on Administrative Discretions, above n 2, [22]-[23].

89 Robin Creyke, above n 33; see also Robin, Creyke, ‘Administrative Justice: Beyond the Courtroom Door (2006) Acta Juridica 257Google Scholar.

90 Dennis, Pearce, ‘The Jurisdiction of Australian Government Ombudsmen’ in Matthew, Groves (ed), Law and Government in Australia (2005) 110, 138Google Scholar.

91 See, eg, in Allan v Transurban City Link Ltd (2001) 208 CLR 167,188-9 (Kirby J) referring to the Kerr Committee report to justify the ‘general trend of Australian federal legislation in recent years to enlarge the scope of rights to initiate administrative review. This was certainly the intention of those who planned the creation of the AAT.’ See also Public Service Board of NSW v Osmond (1986) 159 CLR 656, 673 (Wilson J): ‘Furthermore, some significance must attach to the time when these statutes were enacted, coming at the end of a decade of extraordinary executive and legislative activity in Australia directed to the improvement of efficiency and procedural fairness in public administration: see, e.g , the 1971 Report of the Commonwealth Administrative Review Committee (the Kerr Committee).'

92 Roger, Cramton, ‘A Federal Ombudsman’ (1972) 1 Duke Law Journal 1, 2Google Scholar.

93 See British Development Corporation v Friedman [1984] 14 DLR 129, 139 (Dickson J).

94 Commonwealth, Commonwealth Administrative Review Committee Report, above n 2, [12].

95 Senate Standing Committee on Finance and Public Administration, above n 23, 386–7.

96 Commonwealth Ombudsman, Annual Report (2006–07) 2Google Scholar.

97 George Laking, ‘Address at the Official Opening’ (Speech delivered at the Sixth Conference of Australasian and Pacific Ombudsman 1982) in Commonwealth Ombudsman, Annual Report (1982–83) 145Google Scholar (Appendix C).

98 Mark, Bovens, ‘Analysing and Assessing Public Accountability: A Conceptual Framework’ (2007) 13(4) European Law Journal 447, 454Google Scholar.

99 Administrative Review Council, First Annual Report (1977) Foreword.

100 Commonwealth Ombudsman, Annual Report (2006–07)Google Scholar at 2.

101 Dennis Pearce, above n 90, 138 stating ‘[T]he ombudsman is now a well established part of the Australian government scene…no government would now act to abolish the office.'

102 Professor John McMillan in the Annual Report celebrating three decades of operation observes that over its thirty years of operation the Office ‘has dealt with more than 600 000 complaints’ see Commonwealth Ombudsman, Annual Report (2006–07) 6Google Scholar.

103 Senate Standing Committee on Finance and Public Administration, above n 23, 111.

104 SirAnthony, Mason, ‘The 30th Anniversary: A judicial Perspective’ (2007) 58 Admin Review: Thirtieth Anniversary Issue 13, 15Google Scholar, stating that:

Of the major reforms, the Ombudsman has been perhaps the most successful; indeed more successful than I expected Ombudsman have succeeded in dealing expeditiously and effectively with a very large number of complaints at very low cost.

105 The Commonwealth Ombudsman now has seven roles: Commonwealth Ombudsman, ACT Ombudsman, Defence Force Ombudsman, Taxation Ombudsman, Immigration Ombudsman, Postal Industry Ombudsman, and Law Enforcement Ombudsman: Commonwealth Ombudsman, Annual Report (2005–06) 1Google Scholar.

106 Sian, Ellias, ‘Administrative Law For “Living People“’ (2009) 68(1) Cambridge Law Journal 47Google Scholar, 47.