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The Efficacy of Australia Adopting a Debarment Regime in Public Procurement

Published online by Cambridge University Press:  01 January 2025

Olivia Dixon Open the ORCID record for Olivia Dixon [Opens in a new window]
Olivia Dixon*
Affiliation:
The University of Sydney Law School
*
The author may be contacted at olivia.dixon@sydney.edu.au
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Abstract

While transparent and efficient public sector procurement systems facilitate innumerable opportunities for stakeholders, the scale and scope of the global procurement market has rendered it increasingly vulnerable to corruption. The Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development estimates that annually US$2 trillion of public funds is lost to corruption, yet governments have failed to respond with robust measures to deter such practice. Through comparing the debarment frameworks and policy goals across five jurisdictions, this article argues that Australia should consider adopting a discretionary debarment regime. By excluding bidders who have engaged in ‘corporate integrity offences’ from procurement contracts, debarment policies offer a potentially important mechanism in the fight against corruption. Debarment would not only protect the government from current threats, but it may also deter potential wrongdoers, encourage contractors to rehabilitate themselves, incapacitate actual offenders and facilitate development of a culture of compliance through the competitive advantage gains enjoyed by law-abiding firms.

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Articles
Information
Federal Law Review , Volume 49 , Issue 1 , March 2021 , pp. 122 - 148
Copyright
Copyright © 2020 The Author(s)

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References

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16. PwC, ‘Fighting Fraud in the Public Sector III’ (2015) <https://www.pwc.com.au/pdf/fighting-fraud-feb151.pdf>.

17. Transparency International, ‘Corruption Perceptions Index 2018’ <https://www.transparency.org/cpi2018>.

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20. OECD, ‘Australia: Follow-Up to the Phase 3 Report & Recommendations’ (online), April 2015, 35 <http://www.oecd.org/daf/anti-bribery/Australia-Phase-3-Follow-up-Report-ENG.pdf>.

21. See, eg, European Commission, ‘Evaluation of Directive 2009/81/EC on Public Procurement in the Fields of Defence and Security’ (2016) 20 <https://eur-lex.europa.eu/legalcontent/EN/TXT/PDF/?uri=CELEX:52016SC0407&from=EN>.

22. This article does not purport to solve endemic corruption, rather it analyses whether, on balance, there is merit in Australia adopting a discretionary debarment regime to protect government resources. For the issues impeding successful regulation of corruption and proposals for reform, see, eg, Indira Carr, ‘Corruption, Legal Solutions and Limits of the Law’ (2007) 3(3) International Journal of Law in Context 227; David Hess and Cristie L Ford, ‘Corporate Corruption and Reform Undertakings: A New Approach to an Old Problem’ (2008) 41(2) Cornell International Law Journal 307; A J Brown et al, Governing for Integrity: A Blueprint for Reform, Draft Report of Australia’s Second National Integrity System Assessment. Griffith University & Transparency International Australia (2019).

23. This article will focus on public-sector corruption, the corruption that occurs between private individuals and public sector agents.

24. Joseph S Nye, ‘Corruption and Political Development: A Cost-Benefit Analysis’ (1967) 61 American Political Science Review 417, 419.

25. Elizabeth Anderson, Municipal Best Practices: Preventing Fraud, Bribery and Corruption (International Centre for Criminal Law Reform and Criminal Justice Policy, 2013) 2 <https://icclr.law.ubc.ca/wp-content/uploads/2017/06/Municipal-Best-Practices-Preventing-Fraud-Bribery-and-Corruption-FINAL.pdf>.

26. See Joel S Hellman et al, ‘Measuring Governance, Corruption, and State Capture — How Firms and Bureaucrats Shape the Business Environment in Transition Economies’, Policy, Research Working Paper; No WPS 2312 (World Bank, 2000) <http://documents.worldbank.org/curated/en/241911468765617541/Measuring-governance-corruption-and-State-capture-how-firms-and-bureaucrats-shape-the-business-environment-in-transition-economies>.

27. See Michael Johnston, ‘Corruption, Administrative’ in Bertrand Badie, Dirk Berg-Schlosser and Leonardo Morlino (eds), International Encyclopaedia of Political Science (Sage Publishers, 2011) 481-483.

28. Burger and Holland, above n 4, 45, 45 n.1, citing Hooker, above n 4, 89, 204, 317.

29. OECD, ‘Preventing Corruption in Public Procurement’ (2016) 6 <https://www.oecd.org/gov/public-procurement/publications/Corruption-Public-Procurement-Brochure.pdf>.

30. See generally Tina Søreide, Corruption in Public Procurement: Causes, Consequences, Cures (CMI, 2002) ch 2.

31. Rose-Ackerman, above n 7, 64.

32. Vito Tanzi, ‘Corruption Around the World: Causes, Consequences, Scope and Cures’ (1998) 45(4) IMF Staff Papers 559.

33. See, eg, W Michael Kramer, The Most Common Procurement Fraud Schemes and their Primary Red Flags (International Anti-Corruption Resource Centre, 2012) <https://iacrc.org/procurement-fraud/the-most-common-procurement-fraud-schemes-and-their-primary-red-flags/>.

34. Black’s Law Dictionary, ‘What is Collusion?’ <https://thelawdictionary.org/collusion/>.

35. Transparency International, above n 2, 7.

36. Transparency International, The Anti-Corruption Plain Language Guide (2009) 19 <www.transparency.org/whatwedo/pub/the_anti_corrup-tion_plain_language_guide>.

37. Black’s Law Dictionary, ‘What is Coercion?’ <https://thelawdictionary.org/coercion/>.

38. See, eg, Drury D Stevenson and Nicholas J Wagoner, ‘FCPA Sanctions: Too Big to Debar?’ (2011) 80(2) Fordham Law Review 775.

39. See Jessica Tillipman, ‘A House of Cards Falls: Why “Too Big to Debar” Is All Slogan and Little Substance’ (2012) 80 Fordham Law Review Res Gestae 49; Jessica Tillipman, ‘The Congressional War on Contractors’ (2013) 45 George Washington International Law Review 235.

40. See 49 CFR § 9.402(b).

41. See Article 57(4)(d), EU Procurement Directive 2014/24/EU.

42. Pascale Hélène Dubois, ‘Domestic and International Administrative Tools to Combat Fraud and Corruption: A Comparison of US Suspension and Debarment with the World Bank’s Sanctioning System’ (2010) University of Chicago Legal Forum 195; Frank A Fariello, Jr and Anne-Marie Leroy, The World Bank Group Sanctions Process and Its Recent Reforms (World Bank Publications, 2012). See also World Bank Sanctions Procedures and World Bank Sanctioning Guidelines, s 1.01(b).

43. Gary S Becker, ‘Crime and Punishment: An Economic Approach’ (1968) 76 Journal of Political Economy 169.

44. Ibid 2.

45. See generally W Robert Thomas, ‘The Ability and Responsibility of Corporate Law to Improve Criminal Fines’ (2017) 78 Ohio State Law Journal 601. See also, eg, Treasury Laws Amendment (Strengthening Corporate and Financial Sector Penalties) Act 2019 (Cth).

46. John C Coffee Jr, ‘“No Soul to Damn: No Body to Kick”: An Unscandalized Inquiry into the Problem of Corporate Punishment’ (1981) 79 Michigan Law Review 389, 390.

47. Cindy R Alexander and Mark A Cohen, ‘The Causes of Corporate Crime: An Economic Perspective’ in Anthony S Barkow and Rachel E Barkow (eds), Prosecutors in the Boardroom: Using Criminal Law to Regulate Corporate Conduct (NYU Press, 2011) 11, 24.

48. Thomas, above n 45, 601, 611 (citing Coffee, above n 46, 386, 390).

49. Ibid (alteration in original) (quoting Lawrence Summers, ‘Companies on Trial: Are They “Too Big to Jail”?’, Financial Times (online), 21 November 2014 <http://www.ft.com/cms/s/0/e3bf99547009-11e4-90af-00144feabdc0.html>.

50. Thomas, above n 45, 601, 617.

51. Ibid 616–17.

52. Ibid 614.

53. Hazel Croall, Understanding White Collar Crime (Open University Press, 2001) 8.

54. See, eg, Jennifer Arlen, ‘The Potentially Perverse Effects of Corporate Criminal Liability’ (1994) 23 Journal of Legal Studies 833; Jennifer Arlen and Reinier Kraakman, ‘Controlling Corporate Misconduct: An Analysis of Corporate Liability Regimes’ (1997) 72 New York University Law Review 687.

55. Arlen, above n 54, 833.

56. Arlen and Kraakman, above n 54, 687. Note, this is how the US Sentencing Guidelines for Organizations are structured. See US Sentencing Guidelines Manual, ch 8 (1999).

57. See, eg, Ian Ayres and John Braithwaite, Responsive Regulation: Transcending the Deregulation Debate (Oxford University Press, 1992).

58. Emmanuelle Auriol and Tina Søreide, ‘An Economic Analysis of Debarment’ (2017) 50 International Review of Law and Economics 36.

59. Claudia Cerrone, Yoan Hermstrüwer and Pedro Robalo, ‘Debarment and Collusion in Procurement Auctions’, Discussion Papers of the Max Planck Institute for Research on Collective Goods, No 2018/5 (Max Planck Institute for Research on Collective Goods).

60. Ibid 3.

61. Like many areas of corporate misconduct, there are few published empirical studies on the deterrent effects of debarment. To analyse the effects of debarment on a deeper scale, a long-term empirical study in collaboration with various industry regulators would be both beneficial and desirable.

62. No country currently operates cross-debarment. Only the World Bank operates a cross-debarment regime.

63. The MDBs comprise the African Development Bank Group, Asian Development Bank, European Bank for Reconstruction and Development, Inter-American Development Bank and the World Bank Group.

64. The African Development Bank Group, Asian Development Bank, European Bank for Reconstruction and Development, Inter-American Development Bank and the World Bank Group, Agreement on Mutual Enforcement of Debarment Decisions (9 April 2010).

65. OECD Recommendation of the Council on Bribery in International Business Transactions, 33 ILM 1389 (1994); OECD Recommendation of the Council on the Tax Deductibility of Bribes to Foreign Public Officials, 35 ILM 1311 (1996); OECD Revised Recommendation of the Council on Combatting Bribery in International Business Transactions, 36 ILM 1016 (1997); OECD Recommendation of the Council on Guidelines for Managing Conflict of Interest in Public Service (June 2003); OECD Recommendation of the Council on Enhancing Integrity in Public Procurement [C (2008) 105].

66. UN General Assembly Resolution 51/59, Action Against Corruption and the International Code of Conduct for Public Officials, A/RES/51/59; UN Declaration Against Corruption and Bribery in International Commercial Transactions, A/RES/51/191; General Assembly Resolution 55/61, An Effective International Legal Instrument Against Corruption, A/RES/55/61.

67. Transparency International, Corruption Perception Index 2018 <https://www.transparency.org/cpi2018>.

68. Transparency International, Global Corruption Barometer 2017 <https://www.transparency.org/whatwedo/publication/people_and_corruption_citizens_voices_from_around_the_world>.

69. 43 ILM 37 (2004) <http://www.unodc.org/documents/treaties/UNCAC/Publications/Convention/08-50026_E.pdf>.

70. Ibid, ch II.

71. Ibid, ch III.

72. Ibid, ch IV.

73. Ibid, ch V.

74. 37 ILM 1 (1998).

75. Organization for Economic Co-operation and Development, ‘Commentaries on the Convention on Combatting Bribery of Foreign Public Officials in International Business Transactions’, DAFFE/IME/BR(97)17/REV1 (25 Nobember 1997) <http://www.unodc.org/documents/treaties/UNCAC/Publications/Convention/08-50026_E.pdf>.

76. Ibid 2.

77. Padideh Ala’i, ‘The Legacy of Geographical Morality and Colonialism: A Historical Assessment of the Current Crusade Against Corruption’ (2000) 33 Vanderbilt Journal of Transnational Law 877, 923–4.

78. OECD, ‘Recommendation of the Council for Further Combating Bribery of Foreign Public Officials in International Business Transactions’ (26 November 2009) <https://www.oecd.org/daf/anti-bribery/44176910.pdf>.

79. See OECD, above n 20.

80. See OECD Working Group of Bribery, above n 19.

81. See Australian Government, Department of Finance, Policy and Legislation, ‘Matters Dealt with by the Department’ <http://www.finance.gov.au/policy-legislation.html>.

82. The appointment of a board member may also be terminated under s 30 of the Public Governance, Performance and Accountability Act 2013 (which deals with terminating the appointment of an accountable authority, or a member of an accountable authority, for contravening general duties of officials).

83. See Australian Government Department of Finance, ‘Guide to the PGPA for Accountable Authorities’, Resource Management Guide No 200 (December 2016) <https://www.finance.gov.au/resource-management/accountability/accountable-authorities/>.

84. See, eg, Public Works and Procurement Act 1912 (NSW); Financial Management Act 1994 (Vic); Procurement Act 2004 (SA); Government Procurement Act 2001 (ACT).

85. Crimes (Serious Crime Prevention Orders) Act 2016 (NSW), s 6(1).

86. See New South Wales Parliament, Legislative Council, Hansard (4 May 2016) 45–6. See Serious Crime Act 2007 (UK), ss 1(1), 2(1) and 5.

87. Crimes (Serious Crime Prevention Orders) Bill 2016 (NSW) — Explanatory Note, 1 <https://www.parliament.nsw.gov.au/bill/files/3284/XN%20Crimes%20Serious.pdf>.

88. Corporations are included within the definition of a ‘person’ under the Interpretation Act 1987 (NSW), s 21(1).

89. Crimes (Serious Crime Prevention Orders) Act 2016 (NSW), ss 4 and 5(1)(b).

90. Ibid, s 5(1)(c).

91. Ibid, s 3.

92. Criminal Assets Recovery Act 1990 (NSW), s 6(2).

93. See, eg, NSW Council for Civil Liberties, ‘NSWCCL Statement in Opposition to The Crimes (Serious Crime Prevention Orders) Bill 2016 and The Criminal Legislation Amendment (Organised Crime and Public Safety) Bill 2016’ (3 May 2016) 2 <https://d3n8a8pro7vhmx.cloudfront.net/nswccl/pages/2158/attachments/original/1462254803/NSWCCL__statement__Serious_Crimes_and_PSO_Bills_010516.pdf?1462254803>.

94. Law Society of NSW, ‘The Crimes (Serious Crime Prevention Orders) Bill 2016 and The Criminal Legislation Amendment (Organised Crime and Public Safety) Bill 2016’ (29 April 2016) <http://d3n8a8pro7vhmx.cloudfront.net/nswccl/mailings/70/attachments/original/Law_Society_NSW_Crimes_Sub.pdf?1462168308>.

95. See, eg, NSW Council for Civil Liberties, above n 93.

96. Ibid.

97. Vella & Ors v Commissioner of Police (NSW) & Anor, Case Number S30/2019 <http://www.hcourt.gov.au/cases/case_s30-2019>.

98. Vella & Ors v Commissioner of Police (NSW) & Anor, ‘Plaintiff’s Submissions’, Case Number S30/2019 (24 June 2019) <http://www.hcourt.gov.au/assets/cases/08-Sydney/s30-2019/Vella-Commissioner_of_Police_NSW_Pltf.pdf>.

99. See, eg, World Bank, Press Release, ‘New World Bank Procurement Framework Promotes Strengthened National Procurement Systems’ (30 June 2016) <https://www.worldbank.org/en/news/press-release/2016/06/30/new-world-bank-procurement-framework-promotes-strengthened-national-procurement-systems>.

100. James Wolfensohn, ‘Corruption Impedes Development and Hurts the Poor’ (1998) 25 International Journal of Government Auditing 1.

101. See, eg, Moisés Naím, ‘The Corruption Eruption’ (1995) 2 Brown Journal of World Affairs 245.

102. Dubois, above n 42, 217.

103. International Bank for Reconstruction and Development, ‘Articles of Agreement’ (as amended effective 27 June 2012), art III, s 5 <https://www.worldbank.org/en/about/articles-of-agreement/ibrd-articles-of-agreement>.

104. World Bank, ‘Bank Policy: Procurement in IPF and Other Operational Procurement Matters’ (7 November 2017) 3 <https://policies.worldbank.org/sites/ppf3/PPFDocuments/a3656cb78847417b886f11fa0235216e.pdf>.

105. Defined as fraud, corruption, coercion, collusion and obstruction: See World Bank, ‘The World Bank Group Sanctions System’, 3 <https://www.worldbank.org/content/dam/documents/sanctions/other-documents/sanctions-board/Two-Tier-Sanctions-brochure-Final.pdf>.

106. See generally, World Bank, ‘The World Bank Group Sanctions System’, <https://www.worldbank.org/content/dam/documents/sanctions/other-documents/sanctions-board/Two-Tier-Sanctions-brochure-Final.pdf>.

107. Ibid.

108. Dick Thornburgh, Ronald L Gainer and Cuyler H Walker, Report Concerning the Debarment Process of the World Bank (World Bank, 2002) 33, 61 <https://www.worldbank.org/content/dam/documents/sanctions/other-documents/osd/ThornburghReport.pdf>.

109. Ibid.

110. Ibid 71.

111. For example, debarment with conditional release, debarment, conditional non-debarment, letter of reprimand, permanent debarment and restitution.

112. World Bank, ‘World Bank Sanctioning Guidelines’, 1 <http://siteresources.worldbank.org/EXTOFFEVASUS/Resources/WorldBankSanctioningGuidelines.pdf>.

113. Ibid.

114. World Bank Group, Summary of World Bank Group Integrity Compliance Guidelines <https://siteresources.worldbank.org/INTDOII/Resources/Integrity_Compliance_Guidelines.pdf>.

115. Ibid.

116. Ibid.

117. World Bank, ‘World Bank Group Debarred 78 Firms and Individuals During Fiscal Year 2018’ (Press Release, 3 October 2018) <https://www.worldbank.org/en/news/press-release/2018/10/03/world-bank-group-debarred-78-firms-and-individuals-during-fiscal-year-2018>.

118. Ibid.

119. Some strategic federal agencies have agency-specific procurement regulations, but they are modelled on the FAR.

120. 48 CFR § 9.402(b).

121. See, eg, Roemer v Hoffman, 419 F Supp 130 (DDC 1976).

122. 48 CFR § 9.402; Rachel E Kramer, ‘Awarding Contracts to Suspended and Debarred Firms: Are Stricter Rules Necessary?’ (2005) 34 Public Contract Law Journal 539.

123. 48 CFR § 9.406-2.

124. 48 CFR § 9.406-2(a)(1).

125. 48 CFR § 9.406-2(a)(2).

126. 48 CFR § 9.406-2(a)(3).

127. 48 CFR § 9.406-2(c).

128. Christopher R Yukins, ‘Suspension and Debarment: Re-examining the Process’ (2004) 13 Public Procurement Law Review 255, 256, citing John C Cibinic Jr and Ralph Nash Jr, Formation of Government Contracts (CCH Incorporated, 3rd ed, 1998) 454–503. See also Todd J Canni, ‘Shoot First, Ask Questions Later: An Examination and Critique of Suspension and Debarment Practice Under the FAR, Including a Discussion of the Mandatory Disclosure Rule, the IBM Suspension, and Other Noteworthy Developments’ (2009) 38 Public Contract Law Journal 547, 580–1.

129. Sue Arrowsmith, ‘A Taxonomy of Horizontal Policies in Public Procurement’, in Sue Arrowsmith and Peter Kunzlik (eds), Social and Environmental Policies in EC Procurement Law: New Directives and New Directions (Cambridge University Press, 2009) 113.

130. 48 CFR § 9.403.

131. See Warren Bianchi, ‘Equality in Exclusion: Empowering Individuals in the Suspension and Debarment System’ (2015) 45 Public Contract Law Journal 79, 82.

132. 48 CFR § 9.406-2(b)(1)(i)(A)–(B).

133. 48 CFR § 9.406-2(b)(v)(A)(1)–(2).

134. 48 CFR § 9.406-2(b)(vi)(C).

135. 48 CFR § 9.406-2.

136. Steven A Shaw, ‘Access to Information: The Key Challenge to a Credible Suspension and Debarment Programme’ (2004) 5 Public Procurement Law Review 230, 232.

137. 48 CFR § 9.406-1(a).

138. Ibid.

139. 48 CFR § 9.406-1(a)(1)–(10).

140. 48 CFR § 9.103(b).

141. 48 CFR § 9.104-1(d).

142. Impresa Construzioni Geom. Domenico Garufi v United States, 238 F 3d 1324, 1335 (Fed Cir 2001).

143. Arthur S Miller, ‘Administrative Discretion in the Award of Federal Contracts’ (1955) 53 Michigan Law Review 781, 788, quoting O’Brien v Carney, 6 F Supp 761, 762 (D Mass (1934)).

144. 48 CFR § 9.406-3(a)–(e).

145. 48 CFR § 9.406-3.

146. 48 CFR § 9.402(a).

147. See, eg, Steven L Schooner, ‘Fear of Oversight: The Fundamental Failure of Businesslike Government’ (2001) 50 American University Law Review 627, 663–4; John Bryan Warnock, ‘Principled or Practical Responsibility: Sixty Years of Discussion’ (2012) 41(4) Public Contract Law Journal 881.

148. 48 CFR § 9.406-2(a), 9.407-1(a).

149. 48 CFR § 9.406-1(a).

150. Ibid.

151. 48 CFR § 9.406-1.

152. Warnock, above n 147, 881, 882.

153. Richard J Bednar, ‘Emerging Issues in Suspension and Debarment: Some Observations from an Experienced Head’ (2004) 5 Public Procurement Law Review 223, 228. See, eg, US Government Accountability Office, GAO-10-1033, Assessments and Citations of Federal Labor Law Violations by Selected Federal Contractors 9–16 (2010) 9–16.

154. See Jennifer S Zucker, ‘The Boeing Suspension: Has Consolidation Tied the Defense Department’s Hands?’ (2004) 5 Public Procurement Law Review 260, 273.

154. See Jennifer S Zucker, ‘The Boeing Suspension: Has Consolidation Tied the Defense Department's Hands?’

156. Steven L Schooner, ‘The Paper Tiger Stirs: Rethinking Suspension and Debarment’ (2004) 14 Public Procurement Law Review 211, 214.

157. Stevenson and Wagoner, above n 38, 775.

158. Schooner, above n 156, 211, 216. See also Warnock, above n 147, 881, 908.

159. Supplemental Appropriations Act of 2008, Pub L No 110-252, §6102, 122 Stat 2323, 2386 (2008); FAR 3.1003(a)(1) and (2).

160. See, eg, Office of the Under Secretary of Defense for Acquisition and Sustainment, ‘Report to Congress Section 889 of the FY 2018 NDAA Report on Defense Contracting Fraud’ (December 2018) <https://fas.org/man/eprint/contract-fraud.pdf>.

161. Sope Williams-Elegbe, Fighting Corruption in Public Procurement: A Comparative Analysis of Disqualification or Debarment Measures (Bloomsbury Publishing, 2012) 20.

162. [1995] OJ C316/48.

163. [1997] OJ C195/1.

164. 38 ILM 505 (1999).

165. Ibid, ch II.

166. ETS No 174.

167. Ibid, arts 1 and 3.

168. Ibid, arts 3 and 4.

169. Ibid, art 5.

170. Mariusz Maciejewski, Christina Ratcliff and Andreea Dobrita, ‘European Parliament Fact Sheets on the European Union: Public Procurement Contracts’ (April 2019) <http://www.europarl.europa.eu/factsheets/en/sheet/34/public-procurement-contracts>.

171. European Union, Consolidated version of the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union, 13 December 2007, 2008/C 115/01.

172. Directive 2014/23/EU on the award of concession contracts (the Concessions Directive); Directive 2014/24/EU on public procurement (the Public Sector Directive); and Directive 2014/25/EU on procurement by entities operating in the water, energy, transport and postal sectors (the Utilities Directive). See also Directive 2009/81/EC, which regulates the awarding of certain contracts in the fields of defence and security (the Defence Directive).

173. Directive 2014/24/EU, art 57(1).

174. Ibid, art 57(2).

175. See Ibid, art 57(4).

176. See Ibid, art 57(4).

177. Ibid.

178. Arrowsmith, above n 129, 112–13.

179. See, eg, OECD Working Group on Bribery in International Business Transactions, Typologies on the Role of Intermediaries in International Business Transactions (9 October 2009) 6–12 <https://www.oecd.org/daf/anti-bribery/43879503.pdf>.

180. Schooner, above n 156, 211, 214.

181. Interagency Suspension and Debarment Committee, FY16 Report by the Interagency Suspension and Debarment Committee on Federal Agency Suspension and Debarment Activities (12 January 2017) 2 <https://s3.amazonaws.com/sitesusa/wp-content/uploads/sites/272/2017/03/873-Report-FY-2016.pdf>.

182. See generally Brandon Garrett, Too Big to Jail: How Prosecutors Compromise with Corporations (Harvard University Press, 2016).

183. See, eg, Andrew Weissmann and David Newman, ‘Rethinking Corporate Criminal Liability’ (2007) 82 Indiana Law Journal 411, 426; Erik Paulsen, ‘Imposing Limits on Prosecutorial Discretion in Corporate Prosecution Agreements’ (2007) 82 New York University Law Review 1434, 1436; James Kelly, ‘The Power of an Indictment and the Demise of Arthur Andersen’ (2006) 48 South Texas Law Review 509, 511.

184. See Gabriel Markoff, ‘Arthur Andersen and the Myth of the Corporate Death Penalty: Corporate Criminal Convictions in the Twenty-First Century’ (2013) 15 University of Pennsylvania Journal of Business Law 797, 805; Tillipman, above n 39, 49.

185. Serious Fraud Office v Rolls-Royce Plc and Rolls-Royce Energy Systems Inc, Case No U20170036 (17 January 2017) §61 <https://www.judiciary.uk/wp-content/uploads/2017/01/sfo-v-rolls-royce.pdf>.

186. Ibid § 53.

187. Ibid § 55.

188. Ibid § 53.

189. Australian Government Attorney Generals Department ‘Improving Enforcement Options for Serious Corporate Crime: A Proposed Model for a Deferred Prosecution Agreement scheme in Australia’ (March 2017) <https://www.ag.gov.au/Consultations/Documents/Deferred-prosecution-agreement-scheme/A-proposed-model-for-a-deferred-prosecution-agreement-scheme-in-australia.pdf>.

190. See, eg, Danielle Brian, ‘Contractor Debarment and Suspension: A Broken System’ (2004) 13(5) Public Procurement Law Review 235, 253; Schooner, above n 156, 211, 215; Nolan A Kulbiski, ‘Another Perspective on Too Big to Debar: BP, The Environmental Protection Agency, and the World Bank’ (2012) 41 Public Contract Law Journal 967, 975.

191. See 48 CFR 9.406-1(c); Susan M Collins, ‘What the MCI Case Teaches About the Current State of Suspension and Debarment’ (2004) 5 Public Procurement Law Review 218, 222; Marcia G Madsen, ‘The Government’s Debarment Process: Out-of-Step with Current Ethical Standards’ (2004) 13 Public Procurement Law Review 252, 253.

192. Warnock, above n 147, 881, 882.

193. See Paul D’Aloisio, ‘Accusations of Criminal Conduct by Government Contractors: The Remedies, Problems and Solutions’ (1987) 17 Public Contract Law Journal 265, 292–93, 299–303.

194. Ibid.

195. See generally Jean Tirole, The Theory of Industrial Organization (MIT Press, 1989); Margaret C Levenstein and Valerie Y Suslow, ‘What Determines Cartel Success?’ (2006) 44 Journal of Economic Literature 43; Miguel A Fonseca and Hans-Theo Normann, ‘Explicit vs. Tacit Collusion — The Impact of Communication in Oligopoly Experiments’ (2012) 56(8) European Economic Review 1759.

196. Madsen, above n 191, 252, 252–53. See also Schooner, above n 156, 211, 215.

197. Leroy and Fariello, above n 42, 8.

198. 48 CFR § 9.402(b).

199. Ibid.

200. Steven L Schooner, ‘Desiderata: Objectives for a System of Government Contract Law’ (2002) 11 Public Procurement Law Review 103, 103.

201. Sue Arrowsmith, Hans-Joachim Priess and Pascal Friton, ‘Self-Cleansing as a Defence to Exclusions for Misconduct: An Emerging concept in EC Public Procurement Law?’ (2009) 18 Public Procurement Law Review 257, 274.

202. Warnock, above n 147, 881, 881–82. See also United States v Glymph, 96 F 3d 722, 725 (4th Cir, 1996).

203. United States v Glymph, 96 F 3d 722, 725 (4th Cir, 1996).

204. 518 US 267, 267 (1996).

205. See, eg, Ewing v United States, 538 US 11, 25 (2003); Kennedy v Mendoza-Martinez, 372 US 144, 168 (1963).

206. Stevenson and Wagoner, above n 38, 775, 776.

207. The UK Anti-Corruption Forum is an alliance of UK business associations, professional institutions, civil society organisations and companies. The purpose is to promote industry-led actions, which can help to eliminate corruption <https://www.giacentre.org/documents/FORUM.DEBARMENT.DISCUSSIONPAPER.pdf>.

208. 48 CFR § 9.406-2.

209. See Directive 2014/24/EU, art 57(4).

210. See ‘iv. The Bounds of Discretion’, below.

211. See 2 CFR § 180.850.

212. See, eg, 2 CFR § 180.990.

213. See, eg, 2 CFR § 180.855(a).

214. See 2 CFR § 180.850.

215. See World Bank, World Bank Sanctions Procedures (April 2012) <https://www.worldbank.org/content/dam/documents/sanctions/otherdocuments/osd/WBGSanctions_Procedures_April2012_Final.pdf>.

216. Ibid.

217. See Australian National Audit Office, ‘Australian Government Procurement Contract Reporting Update’, Auditor-General Report No 27 of 2019–2020 (11 March 2020) §§ 5.5–5.8 <https://www.anao.gov.au/work/information/australian-government-procurement-contract-reporting-update-2019>.

218. Silverman v US Department of Defense, 817 F. Supp. 846, 849 (S.D. Cal. 2001).

219. See, eg, Emily N Seymour, ‘Refining the Source of the Risk: Suspension and Debarment in the Post-Andersen Era’ (2005) 34 Public Contract Law Journal 357, 377.

220. Steven Kelman, ‘Remaking Federal Procurement’, John F Kennedy School of Government, Visions of Government in the 21st Century, Working Paper No 3, 44.

221. Schooner, above n 147, 627, 663.

222. See ‘vii. Basic Rights’, below.

223. See US Department of Defense, General Services Administration and National Aeronautics and Space Administration, Federal Acquisition Regulation; FAR Case 2008-027, Federal Awardee Performance and Integrity Information System, 75 Fed Reg 14,059 (23 March 2010).

224. Mike Schaengold and Rebecca Soll, ‘Statutes and Regulations — Part 1: Statutes Update’, in West Government Contracts Year in Review Conference, Conference Briefs, 1-1, 1-1 (2011).

225. Office of Management and Budget, Suspension and Debarment, Administrative Agreements, and Compelling Reason Determinations, 31 August 2006.

226. See, eg, United States Department of State, Bureau of Political Military Affairs, In the Matter of General Motors Corporation & General Dynamics Corporation, 22 October 2004.

227. 48 CFR §1.601(a).

228. Mike Koehler, ‘Measuring the Impact of Non-Prosecution and Deferred Prosecution Agreements on Foreign Corrupt Practices Act Enforcement’ (2015) 49 UC Davis Law Review 497.

229. Ibid 521.

230. OECD, ‘OECD Foreign Bribery Report: An Analysis of the Crime of Bribery of Foreign Public Officials’ (December 2014) <https://read.oecd-ilibrary.org/governance/oecd-foreign-bribery-report_9789264226616-en#page3>.

231. Letter from the Committee on Oversight and Government Reform to Attorney General Eric Holder, quoted in OECD Phase 3 Report on US Implementation of Anti-Bribery Convention, October 2010, para 142.

232. See Crimes Legislation Amendment (Combatting Corporate Crime) Bill 2019 (Cth).