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Fertile Ground for Federalism? Internal Security, the States and Section 119 of the Constitution

Published online by Cambridge University Press:  01 January 2025

Peta Stephenson
Peta Stephenson*
Affiliation:
TC Beirne School of Law, University of Queensland
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Abstract

Section 119 of the Australian Constitution confers a duty on the Commonwealth to protect the states against invasion. It also directs the Commonwealth to protect the states against domestic violence when an application is made by a state government. This article contends that there are compelling reasons to construe this second limb of s 119 as a federal constraint on the power of the Commonwealth to call out the military domestically. This interpretation of s 119 is consistent with the plain meaning and constitutional context of the provision and it coheres well with the High Court's revival of interpretive federalism.

Type
Article
Information
Federal Law Review , Volume 43 , Issue 2 , June 2015 , pp. 289 - 312
Copyright
Copyright © 2015 The Australian National University

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Footnotes

I would like to thank the anonymous referees for their thoughtful and detailed comments. An earlier version of this article was presented as part of the Working Paper Series at the TC Beirne School of Law at The University of Queensland. My thanks are especially due to Jonathan Crowe and to Graeme Orr, Jim Allan, Simon Bronitt, Rebecca Ananian-Welsh and the other participants for their generous and helpful feedback. Any errors and omissions are, of course, my own.

References

1 (2012) 248 CLR 156.

2 See Hume, David, Lynch, Andrew and Williams, George, ‘Heresy in the High Court? Federalism as a Constraint on Commonwealth Power’ (2013) 41 Federal Law Review 71, 74, 83, 90.CrossRefGoogle Scholar

3 The federal character of the Commonwealth was also a relevant factor in interpreting the Commonwealth's executive power in Commonwealth v Colonial Combing, Spinning and Weaving Co (1922) 31 CLR 421, 443 (Isaacs J) ('the Wooltops Case’); R v Sharkey (1949) 79 CLR 121, 151–2 (Dixon J); Victoria v Commonwealth and Hayden (1975) 134 CLR 338, 364 (Barwick CJ), 378–9 (Gibbs J), 396–8, 400–1 (Mason J), 406 (Jacobs J) ('the AAP Case’); R v Duncan; Ex parte Australian Iron and Steel Pty Ltd (1983) 158 CLR 535, 560 (Mason J) (‘Duncan’); Davis v Commonwealth (1988) 166 CLR 79, 93 (Mason CJ, Deane and Gaudron JJ), 103–4 (Wilson and Dawson JJ) (‘Davis’); R v Hughes (2000) 202 CLR 535, 554–5 [38] (Gleeson CJ, Gaudron, McHugh, Gummow, Hayne and Callinan JJ); Pape v Commissioner of Taxation (2009) 238 CLR 1, 62 [131]–[132] (French CJ); 114 [323], 115–6 [327] (Hayne and Kiefel JJ) (‘Pape’).

4 Williams (2012) 248 CLR 156, 231 [131] (Gummow and Bell JJ), 269 [247] (Hayne J), 303 [362] (Heydon J), 347 [501], 356–7 [539] Crennan J, 371 [586] (Kiefel J) quoting with approval the AAP Case (1975) 134 CLR 338, 396 (Mason J).

5 Williams (2012) 248 CLR 156, 192–3 [37] (French CJ), 235 [146] (Gummow and Bell JJ), 347 [501], (Crennan J), 370 [581], 373 [594] (Kiefel J).

6 Hume, Lynch and Williams, above n 2, 71. See also Appleby, Gabrielle and McDonald, Stephen, ‘Looking at the Executive Power through the High Court's New Spectacles’ (2013) 35(2) Sydney Law Review 253, 272–5.Google Scholar

7 Williams may, therefore, signal a retreat from interpretive principles set out in Amalgamated Society of Engineers v Commonwealth (1920) 28 CLR 129 (‘Engineers Case’).

8 See, eg, Blackshield, A R, ‘The Siege of Bowral – The Legal Issues’ (1978) 4(9) Pacific Defence Reporter 6Google Scholar; Doogan, C M, ‘Defence powers under the Constitution’ (1981) 31 Defence Force Journal 31Google Scholar; Head, Michael, ‘The Military Call-Out Legislation – Some Legal and Constitutional Questions’ (2001) 29 Federal Law Review 273CrossRefGoogle Scholar; Head, Michael, ‘Calling Out the Troops – Disturbing Trends and Unanswered Questions’ (2005) 28(2) University of New South Wales Law Journal 479Google Scholar; Head, Michael, Calling Out the Troops: The Australian Military and Civil Unrest (Federation Press, 2009)Google Scholar; Hocking, Jenny, Terror Laws: ASIO, Counter-Terrorism and the Threat to Democracy (University of New South Wales Press, 2004)Google Scholar; Hope, R M, Protective Security Review (Australian Government Printing Service, 1979)Google Scholar; Lee, H P, Emergency Powers (Law Book, 1984)Google Scholar; White, Margaret, ‘The Executive and the Military’ (2005) 28(2) University of New South Wales Law Journal 438.Google Scholar

9 Farey v Burvett (1916) 21 CLR 433, 452 (Isaacs J); Joseph v Colonial Treasurer of New South Wales (1918) 25 CLR 32, 46–7 (Isaacs, Powers and Rich JJ); Adelaide Company of Jehovah's Witnesses Inc v Commonwealth (1943) 67 CLR 116, 162–3 (Williams J); Carter v Egg and Egg Pulp Marketing Board (Vic) (1942) 66 CLR 557, 589 (McTiernan J); R v Sharkey (1949) 79 CLR 121, 148–152 (Dixon J); Thomas v Mowbray (2007) 233 CLR 307, 394–5 [247]–[249] (Kirby J).

10 See, eg, requests for Commonwealth assistance from: the Tasmanian Government in 1916 to protect against expected disturbances from the referendum on conscription; the Queensland Government in 1912 to respond to protests associated with the Brisbane General Strike; the Western Australian Government in 1919 and 1921 to control the Fremantle Wharf Strike and the WA Railway Strike; the Victorian Government in 1923 to respond to riots resulting from the Police Strike; and from the South Australian Government in 1928 to respond to violence associated with the National Waterfront Strike in H P Lee, above n 8, 201–2.

11 H P Lee discovered that the Queensland Government applied to the Commonwealth under s 119 to address protests associated with the Brisbane General Strike of 1912 in Lee, above n 8, 202.

12 See, eg, Hocking, above n 8, 93; White above n 8, 441–2, 445, 456; Opinion of Sir Victor Windeyer, On Certain Questions Concerning the Position of Members of the Defence Force When Called Out to Aid the Civil Power, 13 November 1978 reprinted as Appendix 9 in Hope, above n 8, 282 [13].

13 Order by the Governor-General of the Commonwealth of Australia, 13 February 1978, reprinted as Annex 1 to Appendix 15 in Hope, above n 8, 321. See also Hocking, above n 8, 255.

14 Order by the Governor-General of the Commonwealth of Australia, 13 February 1978, reprinted as Annex 1 to Appendix 15 in Hope, above n 8, 321.

15 Revocation of Order by the Governor-General of the Commonwealth of Australia, 20 February 1978, reprinted as Annex 4 to Appendix 15 in Hope, above n 8, 324.

16 Head, Australian Military and Civil Unrest, above n 8, 24. See also Head, ‘Disturbing Trends and Unanswered Questions’, above n 8, 482.

17 The ADF was mobilised for the Sydney 2000 Olympic Games, the 2003 Rugby World Cup and the Melbourne 2006 Commonwealth Games. The SAS and other troops were deployed at the 2007 APEC Summit in Sydney. For a detailed examination of these events see Head, Australian Military and Civil Unrest, above n 8, 77, 82–5.

18 Ruddock v Vadarlis (2001) 110 FCR 491. See also Moore, Cameron, ‘Turning King Canute into Lord Neptune: Australia's New Offshore Protection Measures’ (2006) 3 University of New England Law Journal 57.Google Scholar

19 For a detailed discussion see Head, Australian Military and Civil Unrest, above n 8, 82–5; Bronitt, Simon and Stephens, Dale, ‘“Flying Under the Radar” – The Use of Lethal Force Against Hijacked Aircraft: Recent Australian Developments’ (2005) 7(2) Oxford University Commonwealth Law Journal 265.CrossRefGoogle Scholar

20 Head, Australian Military and Civil Unrest, above n 8, 77, 85.

21 See Head, ‘Disturbing Trends and Unanswered Questions’, above n 8; White, above n 8, 456–7.

22 (1949) 79 CLR 121.

23 (2007) 233 CLR 307.

24 See Crowe, Jonathan and Stephenson, Peta, ‘An Express Constitutional Right to Vote? The Case for Reviving Section 41’ (2014) 36 Sydney Law Review 205, 208.Google Scholar

25 Official Report of the National Australasian Convention Debates, Melbourne, 8 February 1898, 692 (‘Convention Debates’).

26 Ibid 691–2.

27 La Nauze, J A, The Making of the Australian Constitution (Melbourne University Press, 1972) 62.Google Scholar

28 See First Proof of the Constitution Bill, 24 March 1891, reprinted in Williams, John M, The Australian Constitution: A Documentary History (Melbourne University Press, 2005) 154.Google Scholar

29 Ibid.

30 La Nauze, above n 27, 62. Article IV, Section 4 of the US Constitution provides that ‘[t]he United States shall guarantee to every state in this Union a Republican Form of Government, and shall protect each of them against Invasion; and on Application of the Legislature, or of the Executive (when the Legislature cannot be convened) against domestic Violence.'

31 Revised Constitution Submitted by the Drafting Committee to the Constitutional Committee, 30 March 1891, reprinted in Williams, above n 28, 257.

32 Ibid.

33 Michael Head made a similar observation in Head, Australian Military and Civil Unrest, above n 8, 45.

34 Svensen, Stuart, The Shearers’ War – The Story of the 1891 Shearers’ Strike (University of Queensland Press, 1989) 5.Google Scholar

35 Ibid.

36 Ibid 91–6, 296.

37 Ibid 296.

38 Convention Debates, Sydney, 4 March 1891, 25. See also Farey v Burvett (1916) 21 CLR 433, 451–2 (Isaacs J). For a useful discussion of the constitutional framework in relation to defence see Doogan, above n 8, 32–4; Head, ‘The Military Call-Out Legislation’ above n 8, 286–293; Head, Australian Military and Civil Unrest, above n 8, 61–76; White, above n 8, 439–40.

39 However, the original iteration of Section 69 is found in Section 82, The Third Schedule to Andrew Inglis Clark's initial draft: Williams, above n 28, 112. Section 114 had its roots in Section 79 of Part VI, entitled ‘Provincial Constitutions’ in Andrew Inglis Clarks’ initial draft and Section II of Part XIII entitled ‘Powers of Local Parliaments’ in Charles Cameron Kingston's draft: Williams, above n 28, 109, 131. Section 114 was initially inserted as Clause 7 of a chapter entitled ‘The States’ in the First Draft: Williams, above n 28, 157–8.

40 Article I, Section 10 of the US Constitution provides that ‘[n]o state shall, without the consent of Congress, lay any duty of tonnage, keep troops, or ships of war in time of peace […]’.

41 Farey v Burvett (1916) 21 CLR 433, 451–2 (Isaacs J), 457 (Higgins J); R v Sharkey (1949) 79 CLR 121, 151 (Dixon J).

42 Convention Debates, Sydney, 4 March 1891, 31.

43 Ibid.

44 Ibid.

45 For a useful discussion of what is meant by ‘best explanation’ see Aroney, Nicholas, ‘Towards the “Best Explanation” of the Constitution: Text, Structure, History and Principle in Roach v Electoral Commissioner’ (2011) 30 University of Queensland Law Journal 145.Google Scholar

46 (1949) 79 CLR 121.

47 (2007) 233 CLR 307.

48 Hohfeld, Wesley Newcomb, ‘Some Fundamental Legal Conceptions as Applied in Judicial Reasoning’ (1913) 23 Yale Law Journal 16CrossRefGoogle Scholar; Hohfeld, Wesley Newcomb, ‘Fundamental Legal Conceptions as Applied in Judicial Reasoning’ (1917) 26 Yale Law Journal 710.CrossRefGoogle Scholar For a useful summary of Hohfeld's scheme see Ratnapala, Suri, Jurisprudence (Cambridge University Press, 2nd ed, 2013) 336–348Google Scholar; Crowe, Jonathan, Legal Theory (Thomson Reuters, 2nd ed, 2013) 141–4.Google Scholar

49 Ratnapala, above n 48, 343–5; Crowe, above n 48, 144.

50 Thomas v Mowbray (2007) 233 CLR 307, 394 [248] (Kirby J).

51 Adelaide Company of Jehovah's Witnesses Inc v Commonwealth (1943) 67 CLR 116, 162–3 (Williams J); Carter v Egg and Egg Pulp Marketing Board (Vic) (1942) 66 CLR 557, 589 (McTiernan J).

52 Joseph v Colonial Treasurer of New South Wales (1918) 25 CLR 32, 46–7 (Isaacs, Powers and Rich JJ).

53 Farey v Burvett (1916) 21 CLR 433, 452 (Isaacs J).

54 Ratnapala, above n 48, 345–6; Crowe, above n 48, 144.

55 White, above n 8, 445–6.

56 Head, Australian Military and Civil Unrest, above n 8, 16.

57 See, eg, Blackshield, above n 8, 6; Lee, above n 8, 204–5. Contra Head, Australian Military and Civil Unrest, above n 8, 17, 63; White, above n 8, 455–6.

58 Quick, John and Garran, Robert Randolph, The Annotated Constitution of the Australian Commonwealth (Angus and Robertson, 1901) 964–5Google Scholar, quoted with approval in R v Sharkey (1949) 79 CLR 121, 151 (Dixon J); Thomas v Mowbray (2007) 233 CLR 307, 394 [248] (Kirby J).

59 (1949) 79 CLR 121, 150–1.

60 Ibid 125.

61 Ibid 148.

62 Ibid 148–9.

63 Ibid. This was subsequently confirmed in Australian Communist Party v Commonwealth (1951) 83 CLR 1, 188 (Dixon J) (‘Communist Party Case’).

64 R v Sharkey (1949) 79 CLR 121, 151.

65 Ibid 148–50.

66 Ibid 150–4.

67 Ibid 151.

68 Thomas v Mowbray (2007) 233 CLR 307, 309.

69 Ibid.

70 Ibid 394 [247].

71 Ibid 394 [249].

72 Ibid.

73 Ibid.

74 Ibid 394–5 [249].

75 Cf White, above n 8, 445. See also Opinion of Sir Victor Windeyer, above n 12, 282 [13]; Hocking, above n 8, 93.

76 See especially Head, ‘Disturbing Trends and Unanswered Questions’, above n 8; Head, Australian Military and Civil Unrest, above n 8, 100–21.

77 Head, Australian Military and Civil Unrest, above n 8, 100–21. See also Head, ‘Disturbing Trends and Unanswered Questions’, above n 8, 480–1; Bronitt and Stephens, above n 19, 270–5.

78 For a detailed discussion of the background and passage of this legislation, see Head, ‘Disturbing Trends and Unanswered Questions’, above n 8, 480.

79 Defence Act 1903 (Cth) s 51(1) defines ‘authorising Ministers’ as the Prime Minister, the Minister for Defence and the Attorney-General.

80 Ibid s 51A(1)(a).

81 Ibid ss 51A(1)(b), 51A(2)–(3).

82 Ibid s 51A(3)(b).

83 Ibid s 51A(3A).

84 Ibid s 51AA(4).

85 Ibid s 51CB.

86 Ibid s 51(1) (definition of ‘infrastructure’).

87 Head, Australian Military and Civil Unrest, above n 8, 106.

88 Defence Act 1903 (Cth) ss 51AA(6)–(7).

89 Ibid ss 51CB(5)–(6).

90 Ibid s 51CA.

91 Ibid.

92 Michael Head refers to these as ‘pre-programmed callouts’: Head, Australian Military and Civil Unrest, above n 8, 108–9.

93 Blackshield, above n 8, 7. Blackshield was referring to the language of ‘national security’ but ‘Commonwealth interests’ is similarly vague.

94 White, above n 8, 456.

95 Defence Act 1903 (Cth) s 51A(1)(a).

96 See, eg, Blackshield, above n 8, 6–7; Lee, above n 8, 204–5.

97 Commentators have expressed general concerns about the ADF, rather than the police, being utilised to respond to incidents where civilians are involved. See further Head, Australian Military and Civil Unrest, above n 8, 106; White, above n 8, 456–7.

98 See also Head, Australian Military and Civil Unrest, above n 8, 105–6.

99 Defence Act 1903 (Cth) s 51Y.

100 See Ruddock v Vadarlis (2001) 110 FCR 491, 545 [201]–[202] (French J). See also Head, Australian Military and Civil Unrest, above n 8, 126–8; White, above n 8, 452.

101 Cf Ruddock v Vadarlis (2001) 110 FCR 491, 545 [201] (French J). This might include ‘a clear and unambiguous provision’ or ‘a clearly expressed intention’: Barton v Commonwealth (1974) 131 CLR 477, 488 (Barwick CJ), 501 (Mason J).

102 See AAP Case (1975) 134 CLR 338, 396–7 (Mason J).

103 Communist Party Case (1951) 83 CLR 1, 188 (Dixon J). See also Burns v Ransley (1949) 79 CLR 101, 116 (Dixon J); R v Sharkey (1949) 79 CLR 121, 148–9 (Dixon J).

104 AAP Case (1975) 134 CLR 338, 396–7 (Mason J), approved in Davis (1988) 166 CLR 79, 93–4 (Mason CJ, Deane and Gaudron JJ), 111 (Brennan J); Pape (2009) 238 CLR 1, 63–4 [133] (French CJ), 87–8 [228], 91–2 [241]–[242] (Gummow, Crennan and Bell JJ); Williams (2012) 248 CLR 156, 184–5 [22] (French CJ), 250–1 [196] (Gummow and Bell JJ), 342 [485], 346 [498], 348 [503] (Crennan J), 370 [583], 373 [594] (Kiefel J); Williams v Commonwealth [No 2] (2014) 252 CLR 416, 454 [23] (French CJ, Hayne, Kiefel, Bell and Keane JJ).

105 See, eg, Opinion of Sir Victor Windeyer, above n 12, 282 [13]; White, above n 8, 441–2.

106 See also Wooltops Case (1922) 31 CLR 421, 443 (Isaacs J); R v Sharkey (1949) 79 CLR 121, 151–2 (Dixon J); AAP Case (1975) 134 CLR 338, 364 (Barwick CJ), 378–9 (Gibbs J), 396–8 (Mason J), 406 (Jacobs J); Duncan (1983) 158 CLR 535, 560 (Mason J); Davis (1988) 166 CLR 79, 93 (Mason CJ, Deane and Gaudron JJ), 103–4 (Wilson and Dawson JJ); R v Hughes (2000) 202 CLR 535, 554–5 [38].

107 Pape (2009) 238 CLR 1, 60 [127].

108 Ibid 60 [127], 63 [133].

109 Ibid 60 [127].

110 Ibid 24 [10].

111 Ibid 88 [228].

112 Ibid 89 [233].

113 Ibid 91 [241].

114 Ibid 91–100 [242], cf 123–4 [355]–[357] (Hayne and Kiefel JJ), 178–9 [513] (Heydon J). Anne Twomey has argued that the Commonwealth could also have relied on other constitutional mechanisms that would have enabled it to respond to the economic crisis. In particular, financial assistance could have been granted to the states pursuant to s 96, or legislation could have been enacted under ss 51(ii) or 51(xxiiiA) of the Constitution. The states could have stimulated the economy through expenditure on capital projects and individual grants: Twomey, Anne, ‘Pushing the Boundaries of Executive Power — Pape, the Prerogative and Nationhood Powers’ (2010) 34 Melbourne University Law Review 313, 329.Google Scholar

115 Williams (2012) 248 CLR 156, 235 [146].

116 Ibid.

117 Ibid 346 [497]–[498] (Crennan J), 373 [594] (Kiefel J).

118 Ibid 373 [594] (Kiefel J).

119 Ibid 348 [503] (Crennan J).

120 See also Hume, Lynch and Williams, above n 2; Appleby and McDonald, above n 6.

121 White, above n 8, 457.

122 Davis (1988) 166 CLR 79, 93–4 (Mason CJ, Deane and Gaudron JJ), approved in Pape (2009) 238 CLR 1, 62–3 [131]–[133] (French CJ), 90–1 [239] (Gummow, Crennan and Bell JJ); Williams (2012) 248 CLR 156, 234–5 [144], [146] (Gummow and Bell JJ), 272 [256] (Hayne J), 372–3 [588]–[591] (Kiefel J).

123 AAP Case (1975) 134 CLR 338, 397 (Mason J).

124 Williams (2012) 248 CLR 156, 269 [247] (Hayne J).

125 Ibid 267 [243] (Hayne J), 373 [593] (Kiefel J).

126 Ibid 235–6 [146]–[148] (Gummow and Bell JJ), 347 [501] (Crennan J), 370 [581] (Kiefel J); AAP Case (1975) 134 CLR 338, 357–8 (Barwick CJ).

127 Williams (2012) 248 CLR 156, 235–6 [148] (Gummow and Bell JJ), 270 [248] (Hayne J); AAP Case (1975) 134 CLR 338, 357–8 (Barwick CJ).

128 Williams (2012) 248 CLR 156, 235–6 [146]–[148] (Gummow and Bell JJ), 270–1 [251] (Hayne J), 347 [501] (Crennan J), 373 [592] (Kiefel J), quoting with approval the AAP Case (1975) 134 CLR 338, 357–8 (Barwick CJ).

129 Ibid 270–1 [251] (Hayne J).

130 For a reconceptualisation of s 96 as a transitional provision see Crowe, Jonathan and Stephenson, Peta, ‘Reimagining Fiscal Federalism: Section 96 as a Transitional Provision’ (2014) 33(1) University of Queensland Law Journal 221.Google Scholar

131 Williams (2012) 248 CLR 156, 192–3 [37].

132 Cf ibid 270–1 [251] (Hayne J).

133 R v Sharkey (1949) 79 CLR 121, 151 (Dixon J).

134 Ibid.

135 Ruddock v Vadarlis (2001) 110 FCR 491, 542–3 [192]–[193] (French J).

136 Intergovernmental Agreement on Australia's National Counter Terrorism Arrangements, October 2002, 3 [2.2].

137 Ibid.

138 Duncan (1983) 158 CLR 535, 560 (Mason J). See also R v Hughes (2000) 202 CLR 535, 554–5 [38] (Gleeson CJ, Gaudron, McHugh, Gummow, Hayne and Callinan JJ); ICM Agriculture Pty Ltd v Commonwealth (2009) 240 CLR 140, 164–5 [29] (French CJ, Gummow and Crennan JJ); Saunders, Cheryl, ‘Intergovernmental Agreements and the Executive Power’ (2005) 16 Public Law Review 294, 301, 306Google Scholar; Twomey, above n 114, 337; Chordia, Shipra, Lynch, Andrew and Williams, George, ‘Williams v Commonwealth: Commonwealth Executive Power and Australian Federalism’ (2013) 37 Melbourne University Law Review 189, 220.Google Scholar

139 Intergovernmental Agreement on Australia's National Counter Terrorism Arrangements, October 2002, 4 [3], 5 [4].

140 Ibid 4 [2.4.e].

141 Ibid 3 [2.4.a].

142 Ibid 4 [2.4.f].

143 Ibid 3 [2.4.e].

144 Ibid.

145 Duncan (1983) 158 CLR 535, 560 (Mason J), approved in R v Hughes (2000) 202 CLR 535, 554–5 [38] (Gleeson CJ, Gaudron, McHugh, Gummow, Hayne and Callinan JJ); ICM Agriculture Pty Ltd v Commonwealth (2009) 240 CLR 140, 164–5 [29] (French CJ, Gummow and Crennan JJ). See also Saunders, above n 138, 306.

146 Cheryl Saunders has argued that ss 92 and 117 are examples of the ‘most obvious’ express textual limitations: Saunders, above n 138, 306.

147 PJ Magennis Pty Ltd v Commonwealth (1949) 80 CLR 382; Duncan (1983) 158 CLR 535, 560 (Mason J), approved in R v Hughes (2000) 202 CLR 535, 554–5 [38] (Gleeson CJ, Gaudron, McHugh, Gummow, Hayne and Callinan JJ); ICM Agriculture Pty Ltd v Commonwealth (2009) 240 CLR 140, 164–5 [29].

148 Saunders, above n 138, 306–7.