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Forge V Australian Securities and Investments Commission: The KABLE Principle and the Constitutional Validity of Acting Judges

Published online by Cambridge University Press:  24 January 2025

Anna Dziedzic*
Affiliation:
Associate to the Hon Justice KE Lindgren, Federal Court of Australia

Extract

In Forge v Australian Securities and Investments Commission the High Court considered whether the appointment of acting judges to a state Supreme Court was constitutionally permissible. By a majority of six to one, the Court found that such appointments were constitutionally valid. The decision is an important illustration of the way that the ‘Kable principle', which works to maintain the institutional integrity of Australia's integrated system of courts, continues to evolve in Australian constitutional law. This casenote examines how the judgments in Forge v ASIC extend the Kable principle to cover the composition and structure of state courts, and seek to link the Kable principle with the text of the Constitution.

Type
Research Article
Copyright
Copyright © 2007 The Australian National University

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Footnotes

The author would like to thank Adrienne Stone for her assistance with this casenote.

References

1 (2006) 229 ALR 223 ('Forge v ASIC’).

2 Kable v Director of Public Prosecutions (NSW) (1996) 189 CLR 51 ('Kable v DPP’).

3 Supreme Court Act 1970 (NSW) s 37(4A).

4 [2002] NSWSC 760.

5 Forge v ASIC (2006) 229 ALR 223, 224 [1]–[2] (Gleeson CJ); 235 [49] (Gummow, Hayne and Crennan JJ).

6 Forge v Australian Securities and Investments Commission (2004) 213 ALR 574.

7 Section 72 states that ‘the appointment of a Justice of the High Court shall be for a term expiring upon his attaining the age of seventy years', while the appointments of judges to other federal courts shall be for a term ‘expiring on his attaining the age that is, at the time of his appointment, the maximum age for Justices of that court'. If an act is silent as to the maximum age (as the Federal Court of Australia Act 1976 (Cth) is) the Constitution provides that the default maximum age is 70 years.

8 R v Murray; Ex parte Commonwealth (1916) 22 CLR 437, 452; Le Mesurier v Connor (1929) 42 CLR 481, 495–6.

9 (1996) 189 CLR 51.

10 This and related arguments have also been put in academic and political contexts. See further, Ronald Sackville, ‘Acting Judges and Judicial “Independence“', The Age (Melbourne), 28 February 2005; Kirby, Michael, ‘Acting Judges — A Non-theoretical Danger’ (1998) 8 Journal of Judicial Administration 69, 74–5Google Scholar; Ruddock, Philip, ‘Selection and Appointment of Judges’ (Speech delivered at the Sydney University, Sydney, 2 May 2005)Google Scholar; Young, PW, ‘Current Issues: Acting Judges’ (1998) 72 The Australian Law Journal 653, 653–4Google Scholar; Drummond, Douglas, ‘Towards a More Compliant Judiciary? — Part I’ (2001) 75 The Australian Law Journal 304, 313.Google Scholar

11 Justice Kirby presents these figures in tables and graphs in Forge v ASIC (2006) 229 ALR 223, 258–64 [135]–[144].

12 Forge v ASIC (2006) 229 ALR 223, 239 [57]. This rule is also discussed in Kable v DPP (1996) 189 CLR 51, 103 (Gaudron J); 110–11 (McHugh J); and 139–42 (Gummow J).

13 Forge v ASIC (2006) 229 ALR 223, 240 [61].

14 Ibid 240 [63].

15 Ibid 242 [70].

16 See further the comments of Gummow and Hayne JJ during argument: Transcript of Proceedings, Forge v Australian Securities and Investments Commission [2006] HCATrans 22.

17 Forge v ASIC (2006) 229 ALR 223, 243 [72] (emphasis in original).

18 Ibid 243 [73].

19 Ibid 244 [78].

20 Ibid 248 [90].

21 Ibid.

22 Ibid 249 [93].

23 Ibid 250 [98].

24 Ibid 251 [101].

25 Ibid 250 [99].

26 bid 234 [41].

27 Ibid 235 [46].

28 Ibid 228 [19]–[20].

29 Ibid 232 [36]–[37].

30 Ibid 228 [19], 235 [45].

31 Ibid 234 [43].

32 Ibid 234–5 [44].

33 Ibid 291 [239]–[240].

34 Ibid 292 [241].

35 Ibid 292–3 [245]–[246].

36 Ibid 295 [256], quoting Barwick CJ in King v Jones (1972) 128 CLR 221, 229.

37 Ibid.

38 Ibid 295–9 [256]–[267].

39 Ibid 302 [277].

40 Ibid 299–300 [269].

41 Ibid 300 [270].

42 Ibid 301–2 [276].

43 Ibid 256 [124].

44 Ibid 278 [192].

45 Ibid 280 [198].

46 Ibid 275 [185].

47 Ibid 282–5 [204]–[214]. Justice Kirby cites the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, opened for signature 16 December 1966, 999 UNTS 171, Art 14(1) (entered into force 23 March 1996) which provides that ‘all persons shall be equal before the courts and tribunals [and] everyone shall be entitled to a fair and public hearing by a competent, independent and impartial tribunal established by law’ (at 283 [208]).

48 Ibid 262 [141].

49 Ibid 263 [143].

50 Ibid 266 [150].

51 Ibid 267 [153].

52 Ibid 287–8 [222].

53 Ibid.

54 Ibid 266 [149].

55 Ibid 288 [224].

56 Ibid 289–90 [230]–[231].

57 Ibid 250 [97], [99].

58 Ibid 241–2 [66]–[68].

59 Ibid 251 [101].

60 Ibid 250 [98].

61 Ibid 248 [89].

62 Ibid 228 [20].

63 Ibid 229 [26].

64 Kable v DPP (1996) 189 CLR 51, 97–8 (Toohey J), 107 (Gaudron J), 117 (McHugh J).

65 (2004) 223 CLR 575.

66 (2004) 223 CLR 513.

67 See Meagher, Dan, ‘The Status of the Kable Principle in Australian Constitutional Law’ (2005) 16 Public Law Review 182.Google Scholar

68 (2004) 218 CLR 146 ('Bradley’).

69 Ibid 164 [32]. See also Fardon v Attorney-General (Qld) (2004) 223 CLR 575, 618 [104] (Gummow J).

70 Wheeler, Fiona, ‘The Kable Doctrine and State Legislative Power over State Courts’ (2005) 20 Australasian Parliamentary Review 15, 19.Google Scholar

71 Forge v ASIC (2006) 229 ALR 223, 234 [41].

72 Ibid 240–1 [63].

73 Ibid 278 [192].

74 See, eg, Kable v DPP (1996) 189 CLR 51, 107 (Gaudron J): ‘The integrity of the courts depends on their acting in accordance with the judicial process and, in no small measure, on the maintenance of public confidence in that process.’ See also 98 (Toohey J), and 124 (McHugh J).

75 Forge v ASIC (2006) 229 ALR 223, 279 [194].

76 Fardon v Attorney-General (Qld) (2004) 223 CLR 575, 618 [102] (Gummow J).

77 See generally, Meagher, above n 67, Wheeler, above n 70.

78 Forge v ASIC (2006) 229 ALR 223, 234 [41] (Gleeson CJ), 241 [64] (Gummow, Hayne and Crennan JJ), 275–6 [181] (Kirby J).

79 Ibid 276 [185].

80 Ibid 230 [28].

81 Ibid 245 [80].

82 Ibid 282–5 [204]–[214].

83 Ibid 277–8 [187]–[191].

84 Ibid 293–4 [250].

85 Ibid 234 [42].

86 Ibid 246 [84].

87 Ibid 247 [85].

88 This point was made by Fiona Wheeler, during a Centre for International and Public Law Discussion Group on Forge v Australian Securities and Investments Commission, 5 October 2006, ANU College of Law, Australian National University.

89 Forge v ASIC (2006) 229 ALR 223, 257–8 [127]–[130].

90 Forge v ASIC (2006) 229 ALR 223, 241 [64].