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Freedom of Movement in an Era of Shared Parenting: The Differences in Judicial Approaches to Relocation

Published online by Cambridge University Press:  24 January 2025

Patrick Parkinson
Patrick Parkinson*
Affiliation:
University of Sydney; Watts McCray Lawyers
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Extract

In 2006, Parliament made major amendments to the Family Law Act 1975 (Cth) (‘Family Law Act’) to encourage a greater level of shared parenting, and to give greater emphasis to the importance of children maintaining a relationship with both parents in the absence of violence or abuse. There are major differences between trial judges in how to apply the new laws to the problem of parental relocation — where the primary caregiver wants to move a long way from the other. The central problem is determining how much importance should be given to a parent's freedom of movement given this greater emphasis on the involvement of both parents. There are stark differences in the policy and approach of different trial judges, which have yet to be resolved by an authoritative and carefully reasoned decision of an appellate court.

This article examines these substantial differences in view between judges on this issue since the 2006 amendments, and proposes a way forward based upon revisiting the leading judgment of Kirby J in the High Court in AMS v AIF.

Type
Research Article
Information
Federal Law Review , Volume 36 , Issue 2 , June 2008 , pp. 145 - 171
Copyright
Copyright © 2008 The Australian National University

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Footnotes

This research was supported under Australian Research Council's Discovery Projects funding scheme (project number DP0665676). Thanks to Professor Richard Chisholm and to the reviewer for comments on an earlier draft of this article.

References

1 (1999) 199 CLR 160.

2 Duggan, W Dennis, ‘Rock-paper-scissors: Playing the Odds with the Law of Child Relocation’ (2007) 45 Family Court Review 193CrossRefGoogle Scholar; Tim, Carmody, ‘Child Relocation: an Intractable International Family Law Problem’ (2007) 45 Family Court Review 214Google Scholar; John Croker, ‘Relocation — Can I Go or Must I Stay?’, Handbook of the 13th National Family Law Conference, Adelaide, 2008, 13.

3 Tropea v Tropea, 87 NY 2d 727, 736 (NY, 1996). See also the comments of the present Chief Justice of the Family Court of Australia, the Hon Diana Bryant, quoting the observation that relocation cases ‘pose a dilemma rather than a problem: a problem can be solved: a dilemma is insoluble’: House of Representatives Standing Committee on Legal and Constitutional Affairs, Parliament of Australia, Report on the Exposure Draft of the Family Law Amendment (Shared Parental Responsibility) Bill 2005, (2005) 22Google Scholar.

4 (1999) 199 CLR 160.

5 Family Law Act s 68F(2) as it was prior to the Family Law Amendment (Shared Parental Responsibility) Act 2006 (Cth).

6 AMS v AIF (1999) 199 CLR 160; U v U (2002) 211 CLR 238. A succinct summary of the law was given by the Full Court of the Family Court in Bolitho v Cohen (2005) 33 Fam LR 471, 472 explaining the effect of the High Court’s decision in U v U: ‘The proper approach to be adopted in a relocation case is a weighing of competing proposals, having regard to relevant factors in s 68F(2) of the Act, and consideration of other relevant factors, including the right of freedom of movement of the parent who wishes to relocate, bearing in mind that ultimately the decision must be one that is in the best interests of the child.’ There was neither a presumption for nor against relocation. The parent who wished to move did not bear any onus of proving that the relocation was bona fide or reasonable: AMS v AIF (1999) 199 CLR 160.

7 AMS v AIF (1999) 199 CLR 160, 206.

8 Family Law Act s 60CC(2).

9 Goode v Goode (2006) 36 Fam LR 422. As Murphy J has written (in Pitken and Hendry [2008] FamCA 186, [22]), the Act ‘prescribes but one method for determining best interests and that is the making of findings in respect of the matters specified in s 60CC.’

10 [2006] FMCAfam 607, [35]-[36].

11 Family Law Act s 65DAA.

12 See, eg, Eddington and Eddington (No 2) [2007] FamCA 1299, [52], in which Finn, Coleman and Collier JJ, allowing an appeal from a discretionary decision concerning the allocation of time between parents, said: ‘Were this appeal to be determined by reference to the statutory framework of Part VII of the Act as it existed prior to 1 July 2006, the prospects of success would be remote.’ See also Bryans and Franks-Bryans [2007] FamCA 377, [70] (Strickland J); M v S (2006) 37 Fam LR 32 (Dessau J) (relocation cases).

13 Bale and Jenkins [2007] FamCA 809; Taylor v Barker (2007) 37 Fam LR 461; Lamereaux and Noirot [2008] FamCAFC 22. See also Goldrick and Goldrick [2007] FamCA 1260.

14 See, eg, Sampson v Hartnett (No 10) (2007) 38 Fam LR 315.

15 Taylor v Barker (2007) 37 Fam LR 461.

16 Sampson v Hartnett (No 10) (2007) 38 Fam LR 315.

17 See, eg, Morgan v Miles (2007) 38 Fam LR 275 (Boland J); Godfrey and Sanders [2007] FamCA 102 (Kay J). See also McAdam and McAdam [2008] FamCAFC 91.

18 See, eg, Taylor v Barker (2007) 37 Fam LR 461; Goldrick and Goldrick [2007] FamCA 1260.

19 For the author’s analysis, see Patrick, Parkinson, ‘Decision-Making about the Best Interests of the Child: The Impact of the Two Tiers’ (2006) 20 Australian Journal of Family Law 179Google Scholar.

20 The issues concerning the impact of the primary and additional considerations were very helpfully presented to a full bench of the Full Court by Peter Murphy SC as he then was, in Goldrick and Goldrick [2007] FamCA 1260. However, the Full Court chose not to deal with them as it considered it did not need to do so on the facts of that case. Murphy SC argued, in the context of a case where the mother had already relocated with the child, that the trial judge had erred in law in concluding that the Orders made by him provided for the father to have a ‘meaningful relationship’ with the children within the meaning of s 60CC of the Family Law Act. In spite of this, the Full Court said that ‘no argument based on principle was raised which required us to examine the meaning or parameters of the term “meaningful relationship“’: Goldrick and Goldrick [2007] FamCA 1260, [21].

21 For an analysis of the 58 reported decisions (determined on a final basis) between 1 July 2006 and early April 2008 in the Federal Magistrates Court, the Family Court of Australia and the Family Court of Western Australia, see Patrick, Parkinson, ‘The Realities of Relocation: Messages from Judicial Decisions’ (2008) 22 Australian Journal of Family Law 35Google Scholar.

22 See, eg, D and D [2006] FMCAfam 458; W and P [2007] FMCAfam 105; Gordon and Gordon [2007] FamCA 361.

23 Kenneth and Kenneth [2007] FamCA 535.

24 See, eg, MAS and SLC [2007] FMCAfam 28; Glover and Taylor [2007] FMCAfam 926.

25 See Parkinson, ‘The Realities of Relocation: Messages from Judicial Decisions’, above n 21. Differences in outcome between cities have also been observed in previous research: Patricia, Easteal, Juliet, Behrens and Lisa, Young, ‘Relocation Decisions in Canberra and Perth: A Blurry Snapshot’ (2000) 14 Australian Journal of Family Law 234Google Scholar.

26 [2007] FamCA 809, [62].

27 (2000) 26 Fam LR 382, 408.

28 (2005) 33 Fam LR 471.

29 Ibid 484. The Court also did not consider whether any of the legal principles expounded in A v A or in the High Court authorities needed to be reconsidered in the light of the changes to the Act. Finn J observed that since the parties were both self-represented, the appeal was not a suitable vehicle for any significant statement of principle from the Court: Bale and Jenkins [2007] FamCA 809, [3].

30 (2007) 37 Fam LR 461.

31 The facts and decision in Taylor v Barker and the guidance for deciding relocation cases that may be discerned from the Full Court judgment, are considered further on in this article.

32 (2006) 37 Fam LR 32.

33 [2007] FamCA 102.

34 M v S (2006) 37 Fam LR 32, 38.

35 (2007) 38 Fam LR 275.

36 Ibid 276.

37 Ibid 290.

38 [2006] FMCA 518, [25]. See also C and C [2007] FMCAfam 1, [25], [28] (Brown FM).

39 M and K [2007] FMCAfam 26, [56].

40 (1999) 199 CLR 160.

41 Citing Levy v Victoria (1997) 189 CLR 579, 607 (Dawson J).

42 (1999) 199 CLR 160, 248.

43 See also A v A (Relocation Approach) (2000) 26 Fam LR 382, 383. The Full Court said as follows: ‘the ultimate issue is the best interests of the children and to the extent that the freedom of a parent to move impinges upon those interests then it must give way.’

44 Gleeson CJ, McHugh and Gummow JJ agreed with Kirby J’s reasons for allowing the appeal: AMS v AIF (1999) 199 CLR 160, 179.

45 Ibid 216.

46 Opened for signature, 20 November 1989, 1577 UNTS 3 (entered into force 2 September 1990).

47 AMS v AIF (1999) 199 CLR 160, 217–18. Kirby J also observed that international conventions do little more than restate the problem of relocation, AMS v AIF (1999) 199 CLR 160, 218:

In a sense, the international conventions relevant to this subject merely express the sometimes conflicting principles which are already reflected in Australian law and court decisions: a general recognition of the importance of freedom of movement; an appreciation of the tendency of orders restraining the movement of custodial parents to fall unequally on women; and an acknowledgment that the right of access to the non-custodial parent is not only valuable to that parent but is an important right of the child concerned, to be upheld for that reason in all but exceptional circumstances… International law merely reflects, and repeats, the considerations which give rise to those problems. In this case, it does not throw much light on how they should be resolved.

48 Ibid 208.

49 (2007) 37 Fam LR 461.

50 (2002) 211 CLR 238.

51 Ibid 262.

52 See, eg, A v A (Relocation Approach) (2000) 26 Fam LR 382, 384 (‘The importance of a party’s right to freedom of movement’). The language of a ‘right’ of freedom of movement is surprisingly absent from the leading High Court judgment on s 92 of the Constitution and family law, AMS v AIF (1999) 199 CLR 160. That language is only used in describing the mother’s submissions. Gummow and Callinan JJ did refer to a ‘right’ of freedom of mobility in U v U (2002) 211 CLR 238, 262 in the passage quoted above, but in context they were not referring to any legal right under the Constitution (for this was an international case) or a right in international law.

53 [2006] FamCA 1207. In this case, for some years following separation, the parents had lived in close proximity to one another in Rockhampton. The three children lived with the mother and had contact with the father from after school until early to mid-evening, on Monday, Tuesday, Wednesday and Thursday in each alternate week of each fortnight and for each alternate weekend and half school holidays. The mother formed an attachment to a man in South-East Queensland and wanted to move there. The Federal Magistrate, applying the law prior to 1 July 2006, allowed the relocation and Warnick J, despite his misgivings about the result, did not interfere with the decision.

54 Ibid [37], [40].

55 Ibid [43].

56 [2007] FamCA 102.

57 Ibid [33], [36]. Altobelli FM has written of this passage in Glover and Taylor [2007] FMCAfam 926, [22]:

In Godfrey and Sanders (2007) FamCA 102 Kay J obviously found that any post-relocation diminution of relationship was not, on those facts, significant. I very much doubt if His Honour meant his comments to apply generally. The children in that case were 11 and 7. But if the children were much younger, for example, relocation might have caused a greater diminution in the quality of the relationship between them and the non-relocating parent. It is also unfortunate that His Honour did not have the benefit of contrary submissions as to what constituted a meaningful relationship on the facts of that case.

58 B and B [2006] FamCA 1207, [46] (Warnick J) (emphasis in original).

59 Kirby J wrote in AMS v AIF (1999) 199 CLR 160, 207: ‘Preconceived notions as to the weight which must be given to particular factors are incompatible with the exercise of an individualised judicial discretion such as is mandated by Australian legislation’. See also McLachlin J in the Supreme Court of Canada in Goertz v Gordon (formerly Goertz): Women’s Legal Education and Action Fund (LEAF) et al (1996) 134 DLR (4th) 321, 340: ‘[A] presumption in favour of the custodial parent has the potential to impair the inquiry into the best interests of the child. This inquiry should not be undertaken with a mind-set that defaults in favour of a pre-ordained outcome absent persuasion to the contrary’.

60 (1976) 1 Fam LR 11, 276 (‘Craven’).

61 D v SV (2003) 30 Fam LR 91 (Nicholson CJ, and Kay and Monteith JJ).

62 Craven (1976) 1 Fam LR 11, 276, 11, 278-9.

63 Family Law Act s 60B(1)(a).

64 Goode v Goode (2006) 36 Fam LR 422, 424.

65 See, eg, M v S (2006) 37 Fam LR 32; Taylor v Barker (2007) 37 Fam LR 461; Shelton and Bloomfield [2007] FamCA 311; Mazorski v Albright (2007) 37 Fam LR 518; R and M [2007] FCWA 76.

66 Taylor v Barker (2007) 37 Fam LR 461.

67 Ibid 471.

68 [2006] FMCAfam 469.

69 Ibid [23].

70 See, eg, Kenneth and Kenneth [2007] FamCA 535; MAS and SLC [2007] FMCAfam 28; M and K [2007] FMCAfam 26; Bryans and Franks-Bryans [2007] FamCA 377; Glover and Taylor [2007] FMCAfam 926; Ryan and Ryan [2008] FMCAfam 92; White and White [2008] FMCAfam 62; Corrochio and Corrochio [2008] FamCA 220.

71 AMS v AIF (1999) 199 CLR 160, 193, quoting from Deane J in Cunliffe v The Commonwealth (1994) 182 CLR 272, 346.

72 AMS v AIF (1999) 199 CLR 160, 194.

73 Ibid 226.

74 Ibid 207–8, 216.

75 Ibid 216.

76 D v SV (2003) 30 Fam LR 91.

77 Eleanor, Maccoby, Christy, Buchanan, Robert, Mnookin and Sanford, Dornbusch, ‘Postdivorce Roles of Mothers and Fathers in the Lives of their Children’ (1993) 7 Journal of Family Psychology 24Google Scholar; Christy, Buchanan, Eleanor, Maccoby and Sanford, Dornbusch, Adolescents after divorce (1996) 85Google Scholar.

78 In evaluating a relocating parent’s proposals for the children to spend time with the non-resident parent, it is important to determine how realistic those proposals are. Is the travel affordable in the long-term (particularly given the costs already associated with the court case)? Who will accompany the children if the distances are extensive? How will those travel arrangements be manageable given the likely work commitments of each parent? What burden will the travel impose upon the children? See Parkinson, ‘The Realities of Relocation: Messages from Judicial Decisions’, above n 21.

79 The effect of relocation on a child’s relationship with the non-resident parent needs to be considered also in the context of the large body of evidence which suggests that frequency of contact, in itself, is not associated with better outcomes for children. What matters most is the quality of the parenting that is made possible by that regular contact. In a meta-analysis of 63 prior studies on parent-child visitation, Amato and Gilbreth concluded that ‘how often fathers see children is less important than what fathers do when they are with their children’: Paul, Amato and Joan, Gilbreth, ‘Nonresident Fathers and Children’s Well-Being: a Meta-Analysis’ (1999) 61 Journal of Marriage and Family 557, 569Google Scholar. The authors found that emotional closeness, and in particular, authoritative parenting, is highly beneficial to children. On authoritative parenting, see Diana, Baumrind, ‘Authoritarian v Authoritative Control’ (1968) 3 Adolescence 255Google Scholar.

80 AMS v AIF (1999) 199 CLR 160, 208.

81 For an exploration of this, with particular reference to relocation cases, see Richard, Chisholm, ‘The Paramount Consideration: Children’s Interests in Family Law’ (2002) 16 Australian Journal of Family Law 87Google Scholar.

82 AMS v AIF (1999) 199 CLR 160, 224.

83 For an astute analysis of the conceptual difficulties in the interpretation of s 65DAA, see Pitken and Hendry [2008] FamCA 186, [25]–[32] (Murphy J).

84 (2007) 37 Fam LR 461.

85 Ibid 479.

86 Ibid 480.

87 [2007] FCWA 47.

88 Ibid [28], [30].

89 [2007] FMCAfam 26.

90 Ibid [35].

91 Ibid [36]. See also BJZ and KEM [2007] FMCAfam 86, [47], [48], Lindsay FM agreeing with Altobelli FM. Consistently with that approach, in H and H [2007] FMCAfam 27, his Honour permitted a relocation from Brisbane to Cairns when the presumption of equal shared responsibility was rebutted on the facts of that case as being not in the best interests of the child. There was a very high level of conflict between the parents and his Honour considered that the proposed relocation would reduce the children’s exposure to that conflict.

92 [2008] FamCA 220.

93 Ibid [82].

94 See, eg, the decision of Howard FM in Duggan and Starr [2008] FMCAfam 187. Having determined that the child’s best interests would be served by the child spending substantial and significant time with the father, the Federal Magistrate then analysed whether it would be possible if the mother relocated to New Zealand. Unsurprisingly, the answer was no. Relocation was refused. See also Blair and Blair [2007] FamCA 253; Eltham and Eltham [2007] FamCA 657; Ryan and Ryan [2008] FMCAfam 92; Ruston and Byford [2007] FamCA 406.

95 AMS v AIF (1999) 199 CLR 160, 207–8.

96 Ibid 208.

97 [2007] FamCA 432.

98 See also Chatwin and Eales [2007] FamCA 816, [113]–[114]; Glover and Taylor [2007] FMCAfam 926.

99 See, eg, Kirby J in AMS v AIF (1999) 199 CLR 160, 206: ‘overwhelmingly, women constitute the residence parent to whom, in the old nomenclature, “custody” is granted. Of single parent families, the mother is reportedly the residence parent in approximately 84 per cent of cases. Accordingly, in practical terms, court orders restraining movement of a custodial (or residence) parent ordinarily exert inhibitions on the freedom of movement of women, not men’; Gaudron J in U v U (2002) 211 CLR 238, 248: ‘it is noteworthy that in this case there was no consideration of the possibility that the father could return to India permanently to avail himself of frequent and regular contact with his daughter. The failure to explore that possibility, particularly given the father’s origins, his professional qualifications and family contacts in India, seems to me to be explicable only on the basis of an assumption, inherently sexist, that a father’s choice as to where he lives is beyond challenge in a way that a mother’s is not.’ See also Juliet, Behrens, ‘A Feminist Perspective on B and B (The Family Court and Mobility)’ (1997) 2 Sister in Law 65Google Scholar; Family Law Council, Relocation (2006) 25–8Google Scholar; Chris, Ford, ‘Untying the Relocation Knot: Recent Developments and a Model for Change’ (1997) 7 Columbia Journal of Gender and Law 1Google Scholar.

100 An order with respect to restraining a relocation does not prohibit a parent moving. Rather, it restrains moving the residence of the child. This may be a distinction without a difference where the parent has what used to be called sole custody (see, eg, AMS v AIF (1999) 199 CLR 160, 175 (Gleeson CJ, McHugh and Gummow JJ)), however the position may be otherwise in an era of shared parenting when both parents are involved in caring for the child and if either parent could well meet the needs of the child as primary caregiver.

101 This was a factor, for example, in the decision of Brown FM to allow a relocation from Darwin to Adelaide in P and P [2006] FMCAfam 518. The cities were not actually named, but ‘D’ was in the Northern Territory and ‘A’ was in South Australia. In that case, the parents had moved to Darwin from NSW in order for the father to take up a lucrative employment opportunity. After the breakdown of the marriage, the mother found herself in a situation where she had no reason, independent of the father, to remain in Darwin and had little support. She wanted to move to Adelaide to be close to her family. The father did not think he could get such a good job in Adelaide and didn’t want to move. However, there was no real impediment to him doing so and if he chose to do so then he could maintain and develop his relationship with his child. See also T and O [2006] FMCAfam 709.

102 This option ought to be considered by the court. See U v U (2002) 211 CLR 238, 248 (Gaudron J), 285 (Hayne J, with Gleeson CJ (at 240) and McHugh J (at 249) agreeing). For commentary on this case, see Juliet, Behrens, ‘U v U: The High Court on Relocation’ (2003) 27 Melbourne University Law Review 572Google Scholar. For an argument that the non-resident parent’s mobility should always be considered in the American jurisprudence, see Merle, Weiner, ‘Inertia and Inequality: Reconceptualizing Disputes over Parental Relocation’ (2007) 40 UC Davis Law Review 1747Google Scholar.

103 Patrick, Parkinson, ‘Family Law and the Indissolubility of Parenthood’ (2006) 40 Family Law Quarterly 237Google Scholar.

104 Peteke, Feijten and Maarten, Van Ham, ‘Residential Mobility and Migration of the Divorced and Separated’ (2007) 17 Demographic Research 623CrossRefGoogle Scholar.

105 (1999) 199 CLR 160, 208.

106 [2007] FCWA 11.

107 Ibid [92].

108 Shirley, J Asher and Bernard, L Bloom, ‘Geographic Mobility as a Factor in Adjustment to Divorce’ (1983) 6 Journal of Divorce 69, 73Google Scholar.

109 In G and A [2007] FCWA 11, [61], Thackray J took account of the fact that if he were to decide the case concerning a young child on the basis that the father could follow the mother, it might be the first of a number of moves he would have to make because the mother’s previous lifestyle indicated that she was unlikely to settle for a long time in the next location.

110 Family Law Act s 60B(1)(a).

111 Parkinson, ‘Decision-Making about the Best Interests of the Child: The Impact of the Two Tiers’, above n 19, 185.

112 Sampson v Hartnett (No 10) (2007) 38 Fam LR 315, 328-9. On the application of the injunctive power to ex-nuptial children, see Mills v Watson (2008) 39 Fam LR 52.

113 See, eg, Noirot and Lamereaux [2007] FamCA 422, [177], Trench J observed: ‘Were it not for the mother’s current state of depression and more importantly the prospect of her progressing into severe depression, I would have concluded that the best interests of the son dictated that the mother not remove him from Australia at this time.’ This decision has been overturned on appeal and a re-trial ordered, inter alia, because of issues concerning the assessment of the psychologist’s evidence: Lamereaux and Noirot [2008] FamCAFC 22.

114 See, eg, D and D [2006] FMCAfam 458; Taylor v Barker (2007) 37 Fam LR 461.

115 [2006] FamCA 1207, [47].

116 In AMS v AIF (1999) 199 CLR 160, 208, Kirby J stated:

Courts recognise that unwarranted interference in the life of a custodial parent may itself occasion bitterness towards the former spouse or partner which may be transmitted to the child or otherwise impinge on the happiness of the custodial (or residence) parent in a way likely to affect the welfare or best interests of the child.

117 See, eg, Taylor v Barker (2007) 37 Fam LR 461, 484-5.

118 The likelihood that both parents would be able and willing to cope with an adverse decision was specifically taken into account by Thackray CJ in M and M [2007] FCWA 47, [76]. Thackray CJ said:

I also consider it important to say that I consider [Mrs M] would do a good job in endeavouring to conceal her unhappiness and frustration in the event she was forced to remain in Perth. In this regard, it should also be kept in mind that if [Mr M] did decide to move to [the Eastern states] to follow [Mrs M] and the children, there is a possibility he would be unhappy, having been forced to leave his home town and his family. Nevertheless, I am satisfied that he too would do a good job in ensuring that this did not unduly interfere with his capacity to care for the children during the times that they would spend with him.

119 Patrick, Parkinson, Judy, Cashmore and Judi, Single, ‘Adolescents’ Views on the Fairness of Parenting and Financial Arrangements After Separation’ (2005) 43 Family Court Review 429Google Scholar; Anne, Smith and Megan, Gollop, ‘Children’s Perspectives on Access Visits’ [2001] Butterworths Family Law Journal 259Google Scholar; R, Neugebauer, ‘Divorce, Custody and Visitation: The Child’s Point of View’ (1989) 12 Journal of Divorce 153Google Scholar; Yvette, Walczak and Sheila, Burns, Divorce: The Child’s Point of View (1984)Google Scholar.

120 Lisa, Laumann-Billings and Robert, Emery, ‘Distress Among Young Adults From Divorced Families’ (2000) 14 Journal of Family Psychology 671Google Scholar. See also William, Fabricius and Jeffrey, Hall, ‘Young Adults’ Perspectives on Divorce: Living Arrangements’ (2000) 38 Family and Conciliation Courts Review 446Google Scholar.

121 Residential mobility is a risk factor for children after separation. For a review, see William, Austin, ‘Relocation, Research and Forensic Evaluation, Part 1: Effects of Residential Mobility on Children of Divorce’ (2008) 46 Family Court Review 137Google Scholar. McLanahan and Sandfur reported that residential mobility explained two thirds of the difference between children in single-parent families and two-parent families in high school drop-out rates, and all of the difference between step-families and two parent families. The researchers also found that residential mobility accounts for 30 per cent of the increase in the risk of a teen birth compared with two parent families: Sara, McLanahan and Garry, Sandefur, Growing Up with a Single Parent: What Hurts, What Helps (1994) 129–31Google Scholar. See also Nan, Marie Astone and Sara, McLanahan, ‘Family Structure, Residential Mobility and School Dropout: A Research Note’ (1994) 31 Demography 575Google Scholar.

122 [2006] FamCA 1207, [48].

123 Family Law Council, Relocation (2006)Google Scholar.

124 Goode v Goode (2006) 36 Fam LR 422.

125 The author was chair of the Council at the time of this Report, but was not a member of the subcommittee of the Council that had responsibility for the report’s preparation.

126 See, eg, Missouri Annotated Statutes § 452.375 (West, 2004): ‘The general assembly finds and declares that it is the public policy of this state that frequent, continuing and meaningful contact with both parents after the parents have separated or dissolved their marriage is in the best interest of the child, except for cases where the court specifically finds that such contact is not in the best interest of the child…’; see also California Family Code §3020; Florida Statutes Annotated §61.13(3)(a) (West, 2004); Maine Revised Statutes Annotated §1653(1)(C) (West, 2004); Oklahoma Statutes §43–110.1 (West, 2004).

127 D v SV (2003) 30 Fam LR 91.