No CrossRef data available.
We use cookies to distinguish you from other users and to provide you with a better experience on our websites. Close this message to accept cookies or find out how to manage your cookie settings.
We use cookies to distinguish you from other users and to provide you with a better experience on our websites. Close this message to accept cookies or find out how to manage your cookie settings.
Published online by Cambridge University Press: 01 January 2025
This article traces the manner in which the High Court’s recent legality jurisprudence has applied the ‘modern approach’ to interpretation in the context of fundamental rights. It is an approach which has exerted doctrinal pressure on the iconic and once authoritative conception of legality outlined in Coco v The Queen. Relevantly, the Court’s commitment to contextualism has extended to the interpretation of statutes which, on their ordinary meaning, implicate fundamental rights; and the important doctrinal shift which these cases seem to evidence is that the infringement of fundamental rights by necessary implication no longer has to satisfy the stringent — Coco — test. In Coco, the Court had stated that legality — the fundamental rights presumption — ‘may be displaced by an implication if it is necessary to prevent the statutory provisions from becoming inoperative or meaningless.’
My thanks are due to Jeff Goldsworthy, Matthew Groves and the anonymous referees for their valuable comments and suggestions and likewise to the participants at the Centre for Comparative Constitutional Studies Brown Bag Seminar Series at the Melbourne Law School where an earlier version of the article was presented on 30 March 2021.
1. Coco v The Queen (1994) 179 CLR 427, 437–8 (Mason CJ, Brennan, Gaudron and McHugh JJ) (‘Coco’).
2. Ibid 437.
3. Ibid 438.
4. (1990) 171 CLR 1 (‘Bropho’); Coco (n 1).
5. Ibid 17 (Mason CJ, Deane, Dawson, Toohey, Gaudron and McHugh JJ).
6. Coco (n 1) 437–8 (Mason CJ, Brennan, Gaudron and McHugh JJ).
7. (2013) 251 CLR 196 (‘Lee’).
8. (2018) 264 CLR 1 (‘Probuild’); (2019) 267 CLR 560 (‘Mann’); (2020) 385 ALR 187 (‘Roy’).
9. CIC Insurance Ltd v Bankstown Football Club Ltd (1997) 187 CLR 384, 408 (Brennan CJ, Dawson, Toohey and Gummow JJ) (‘CIC Insurance’).
10. Project Blue Sky Inc v Australian Broadcasting Authority (1998) 194 CLR 355, 384 (McHugh, Gummow, Kirby and Hayne JJ) (‘Project Blue Sky’).
11. Bropho (n 4) 19 (Mason CJ, Deane, Dawson, Toohey, Gaurdon and McHugh JJ).
12. Ibid 20.
13. Bropho (n 4) 20.
14. Ibid.
15. Ibid (citations omitted).
16. Ibid 17 (citations omitted).
17. Ibid.
18. Ibid.
19. Ibid (citations omitted, emphasis in original).
20. Ibid.
21. Ibid.
22. Ibid18–19.
23. Ibid 22.
24. Ibid 21–2.
25. Ibid 21.
26. Ibid 22.
27. Ibid 23.
28. Ibid.
29. Ibid 20.
30. Ibid 17.
31. Ibid.
32. Coco (n 1) 438 (Mason CJ, Brennan, Gaudron and McHugh JJ).
33. Ibid 436.
34. Ibid 441, 447 (Deane and Dawson JJ), 458 (Toohey J).
35. Ibid 437 (Mason CJ, Brennan, Gaudron and McHugh JJ).
36. Ibid quoting Potter v Minahan (1908) 7 CLR 277, 304 (O’Connor J) (‘Potter’).
37. Ibid 437–8.
38. R v Secretary of State for the Home Department; Ex parte Simms [2000] 2 AC 115, 131 (‘Simms’).
39. Coco (n 1) 438 (Mason CJ, Brennan, Gaudron and McHugh JJ).
40. Ibid (citations omitted).
41. Ibid 437.
42. Electrolux Home Products Pty Ltd v Australian Workers’ Union (2004) 221 CLR 309, 329 (Gleeson CJ) (‘Electrolux’).
43. See The Hon. James J Spigelman, ‘The Common Law Bill of Rights’ in Statutory Interpretation and Human Rights (University of Queensland Press, 2008) 27; J J Doyle, ‘Common Law Rights and Democratic Rights’ in P D Finn (ed) Essays on Law and Government: Volume 1 Principles and Values (Law Book Co, 1995) 144; Dan Meagher, ‘A Common Law Bill of Rights’ in Matthew Groves, Janina Boughey and Dan Meagher (eds) The Legal Protection of Rights in Australia (Hart, 2019) 373.
44. See Dan Meagher, ‘The Principle of Legality as Clear Statement Rule: Significance and Problems’ (2014) 36 Sydney Law Review 413, 429–39; Francis Cardell-Oliver, ‘Parliament, The Judiciary and Fundamental Rights: The Strength of the Principle of Legality’ (2017) 41 Melbourne University Law Review 30, 41–8.
45. Paul Rishworth, ‘Common Law Rights and Navigation Lights: Judicial Review and the New Zealand Bill of Rights’ (2004) 15 Public Law Review 103, 106.
46. Coco (n 1) 438 (Mason CJ, Brennan, Gaudron and McHugh JJ).
47. Coco (n 1) 438; see Dennis Pearce, Statutory Interpretation in Australia (LexisNexis Butterworths, 9th ed, 2019) 212.
48. Ibid 446 (Deane and Dawson JJ).
49. [2013] HCA 29 (‘X7’).
50. Ibid 437 (Mason CJ, Brennan, Gaudron and McHugh JJ) (citations omitted), endorsed at 446 (Deane and Dawson JJ), cited in X7 (n 49) 108 (French CJ and Crennan J), 132 (Hayne and Bell JJ), 153 (Kiefel J); Lee (n 7) 249 (Crennan J), 264 (Kiefel J), 309 (Gageler and Keane JJ).
51. X7: Australian Crime Commission Act 2002 (Cth) Part II, Division 2; Lee: Criminal Assets Recovery Act 1990 (NSW) s 31D(1).
52. X7 (n 49) 149.
53. Ibid.
54. Ibid 153 (Kiefel J).
55. Ibid.
56. Ibid.
57. Lee (n 7) 265 [173] (Kiefel J) (citation omitted), (Hayne J agreeing at 231 [58], Bell J agreeing at 290 [255]).
58. Ibid 218 [29]–[30] (French CJ).
59. Ibid 265 [173].
60. Coco (n 1) 438 (Mason CJ, Brennan, Gaudron and McHugh JJ).
61. (1970) 122 CLR 493 (‘Mortimer’).
62. Lee (n 7) 230–1 (French CJ).
63. Mortimer (n 61) 499 (Walsh J) quoted in Lee (n 6) 218 [30] (French CJ).
64. Ibid cited in Lee (n 7) 230 [56] (French CJ).
65. Coco (n 1) 446 (Deane and Dawson JJ) (citation omitted).
66. Ibid 438 (Mason CJ, Brennan, Gaudron and McHugh JJ).
67. Bropho (n 4) 17 (Mason CJ, Deane, Dawson, Toohey, Gaudron and McHugh JJ) quoting Province of Bombay [1947] AC 63.
68. Lee (n 7) 249–50 [126] (Crennan J).
69. Ibid 308–9 [309]–[311] (Gageler and Keane JJ).
70. See Lee (n 7) where the following legality cases Simms (n 38); K-Generation Pty Ltd v Liquor Licensing Court (2009) 237 CLR 501; Plaintiff S157/2002 v Commonwealth (2003) 211 CLR 476 (‘Plaintiff S157’); Electrolux (n 42) 329 (Gleeson CJ) are cited at 390; Saeed v Minister for Immigration and Citizenship (2010) 241 CLR 252 (‘Saeed’); Australian Education Union v General Manager of Fair Work Australia (2012) 246 CLR 117 cited at 310.
71. Lee (n 7) 310 [313] (Gageler and Keane JJ).
72. Coco (n 1) 437 (Mason CJ, Brennan, Gaudron and McHugh JJ).
73. Lee (n 7) 310 [314] (Gageler and Keane JJ).
74. Coco (n 1) 438 (Mason CJ, Brennan, Gaudron and McHugh JJ).
75. See The Hon T F Bathurst, ‘Address to NSW Legislative Drafter on the Principle of Legality’ (Speech, Sydney, 30 October 2018) [17] <http://www.supremecourt.justice.nsw.gov.au/Documents/Publications/Speeches/2018Speeches/Bathurst_20181030.pdf>.
76. Lee (n 7) 308–9 (Gageler and Keane JJ).
77. Project Blue Sky (n 10) 384 [78] (McHugh, Gummow, Kirby and Hayne JJ).
78. Lee (n 7) 311 [315] (Gageler and Keane JJ) quoting Australian Securities and Investments Commission v DB Management Pty Ltd (2000) 199 CLR 321, 340 [43] (Gleeson CJ, Gaudron, Gummow, Hayne and Callinan JJ).
79. Lee (n 7) 312–3 [317].
80. Ibid 218 [29].
81. Ibid 218 [29]–[30] (French CJ).
82. See Bruce Chen, ‘The French Court and the Principle of Legality’ (2018) 41(2) University of New South Wales Law Journal 401, 431.
83. See Bathurst (n 75) [49]–[57].
84. Coco (n 1) 446 (Deane and Dawson JJ).
85. Saeed (n 70); (2011) 242 CLR 573 (‘Lacey’).
86. See Bathurst (n 75) [14]; Chen (n 82) 411–15; Jeffrey Goldsworthy, ‘The Principle of Legality and Legislative Intention’ in Dan Meagher and Matthew Groves (eds), The Principle of Legality in Australia and New Zealand (Federation Press, 2017) 46, 50–4; Meagher, ‘The Principle of Legality as a Clear Statement Rule: Significance and Problems’ (n 44) 423–6.
87. See Bathurst (n 75) [22]–[29], [46]–[52]; Dan Meagher, ‘On the Wane? The Principle of Legality in the High Court of Australia’ (2021) 32 Public Law Review 61, 62–6 (‘On the Wane?’).
88. Coco (n 1) 437 (Mason CJ, Brennan, Gaudron and McHugh JJ) quoting Potter (n 36) 304 (O’Connor J); see Brendan Lim, The Normativity of the Principle of Legality’ (2013) 37 Melbourne University Law Review 372.
89. Australian Law Reform Commission, Traditional Rights and Freedoms — Encroachment by Commonwealth Laws (ALRC Report 129, 1 March 2016) <https://www.alrc.gov.au/publication/traditional-rights-and-freedoms-encroachments-by-commonwealth-laws-alrc-report-129/>.
90. The following important legality cases which arose in the context of State and Territory legislation: Lacey (n 85); X7 (n 49); Lee (n 7); North Australian Aboriginal Justice Agency Ltd v Northern Territory (2015) 256 CLR 569 (‘NAAJA’); Brown v Tasmania (2017) 261 CLR 328 (‘Brown’).
91. See Malika Holdings Pty Ltd v Stretton (2001) 204 CLR 290, 298–9 [28] (McHugh J).
92. Bropho (n 4) 21 (Mason CJ, Deane, Dawson, Toohey, Gaudron, McHugh JJ).
93. Ibid.
94. Commonwealth, Parliamentary Debates, House of Representatives, 30 September 2010, 271 (Robert McClelland, Attorney-General).
95. Human Rights (Parliamentary Scrutiny) Act 2011 (Cth) s 7.
96. Ibid ss 8, 9.
97. See, eg, Human Rights Act 2004 (ACT) ss 37, 38; Human Rights Act 2019 (Qld) ss 38, 39; Charter of Human Rights and Responsibilities 2006 (Vic) ss 28, 30.
98. My thanks to Scott Stephenson for drawing this perspective (and argument) to my attention.
99. See, eg, R v Independent Broad-Based Anti-Corruption Commissioner (2016) 256 CLR 459, 478–9 (Gageler J); Dan Meagher, ‘The Human Rights (Parliamentary Scrutiny) Act 2011 (Cth) and the Courts’ (2014) 42 Federal Law Review 1, 18–20.
100. (2017) 2262 CLR 362 (‘SZTAL’).
101. Ibid 368 [14] (Kiefel CJ, Nettle and Gordon JJ) (citations omitted).
102. Coco (n 1) 446 (Deane and Dawson JJ).
103. See Meagher, ‘On the Wane?’ (n 87) 72–6.
104. See Dan Meagher, ‘The “Modern Approach” to Statutory Interpretation and the Principle of Legality: An Issue of Coherence?' (2018) 46(3) Federal Law Review 397.
105. Saeed (n 70); Lacey (n 85).
106. See Meagher, ‘The “Modern Approach” to Statutory Interpretation and the Principle of Legality: An Issue of Coherence?’ (n 104) 407–10, 412–14.
107. CIC Insurance (n 9) 408 (Brennan CJ, Dawson, Toohey and Gummow JJ).
108. There are others, for example, BMW Australia Ltd v Brewster (2019) 374 ALR 627; see also Meagher, ‘On the Wane?’ (n 87) 71.
109. Probuild (n 8) 15 (Kiefel CJ, Bell, Keane, Nettle and Gordon JJ), 21 (Gageler J), 43 (Edelman J).
110. Ibid 14 (Kiefel CJ, Bell, Keane, Nettle and Gordon JJ).
111. Ibid (citations omitted).
112. Ibid 15.
113. Ibid 19 (citation omitted).
114. Bathurst (n 75) [19].
115. Probuild (n 8) 41.
116. Coco (n 1) 438 (Mason CJ, Brennan, Gaudron and McHugh JJ).
117. Probuild (n 8) 41 (Edelman J).
118. Ibid 19 (Kiefel CJ, Bell, Keane, Nettle and Gordon JJ).
119. Ibid 15 (citation omitted), quoting New South Wales, Parliamentary Debates, Legislative Assembly, 12 November 2002, 6542.
120. Mann (n 8).
121. See, eg, Plaintiff S99/2016 v Minister for Immigration and Border Protection (2016) 243 FCR 17, 129 (Bromberg J); Commissioner of State Revenue v Can Barz Pty Ltd [2017] 2 Qd R 537, [19] (Philippides JA); Minister for Lands and Forests v McPherson (1991) 22 NSWLR 687, 699–701 (Kirby P, Mahoney and Meagher JJA agreeing).
122. Mann v Paterson Constructions Pty Ltd [2018] VSCA 231, [131] (Kyrou, McLeish and Hargrave JJA).
123. Ibid [144].
124. Coco (n 1) 438 (Mason CJ, Brennan, Gaudron and McHugh JJ).
125. Probuild (n 8) 41 (Edelman J).
126. X7 (n 49) 149 (Hayne and Bell JJ).
127. Mann v Paterson Constructions Pty Ltd (n 122) [131] (Kyrou, McLeish and Hargrave JJA).
128. Mann (n 8) 591 (Gageler J).
129. Ibid 622–3 (Nettle, Gordon and Edelman JJ) (citation omitted).
130. Ibid 623.
131. Coco (n 1) 437 (Mason CJ, Brennan, Gaudron and McHugh JJ).
132. Mann (n 8) 623 (Nettle, Gordon and Edelman JJ) (citations omitted).
133. Ibid (emphasis in original).
134. Mann v Paterson Constructions Pty Ltd (n 122) [131] (Kyrou, McLeish and Hargrave JJA).
135. Coco (n 1) 438 (Mason CJ, Brennan, Gaudron and McHugh JJ).
136. Mann (n 8) 623 (Nettle, Gordon and Edelman JJ).
137. Roy (n 8) 191.
138. Ibid 194.
139. Ibid 198.
140. Ibid 204.
141. Ibid 210.
142. Ibid 211.
143. Ibid.
144. Ibid 210.
145. Ibid.
146. See Cardell-Oliver (n 44), 36–41.
147. My thanks to Kristen Walker KC (now Justice Walker of the Court of Appeal of the Supreme Court of Victoria) for this point.
148. Roy (n 8) 199.
149. Ibid.
150. Coco (n 1) 435 (Mason CJ, Brennan, Gaudron and McHugh JJ).
151. Roy (n 8) 208.
152. In this context the concept and degree of a right’s fundamentality is judicial assessed and determined — see Spigelman (n 43) 26.
153. See text accompanying n 39–48 above; Meagher, ‘The Principle of Legality as a Clear Statement Rule: Significance and Problems’ (n 44) 429–39.
154. Mann (n 8) 623.
155. See Part IIIB(1) above.
156. See BMW Australia v Brewster (2019) 374 ALR 627, 680; BVD17 v Minister v Immigration and Border Protection (2019) 268 CLR 29, 51.
157. Commissioner of Taxation v Tomaras (2018) 265 CLR 434, 467 (‘Tomaras’).
158. See Kassam v Hazzard (2021) NSWLR 520, 541 (Bell P), 554–5 (Leeming JA) (‘Kassam’); Sir Philip Sales, ‘A Comparison of the Principle of Legality and Section 3 of the Human Rights Act 1998’ (2009) 125 Law Quarterly Review 598, 607.
159. Electrolux (n 42) 328.
160. Roy (n 8) 208 (Keane and Edelman JJ).
161. Cardell-Oliver (n 44) 57.
162. See, eg, Eckart Klein, ‘Establishing a Hierarchy of Human Rights: Ideal Solution or Fallacy’ (2008) 41(3) Israel Law Review 477; Theodore Meron, ‘On a Hierarchy of International Human Rights’ (1986) 80(1) American Journal of International Law 1.
163. On the overlap between fundamental rights at common law and the Constitution and the interpretive consequences for legality cases: see Chen (n 82) 418–22; Meagher, ‘On the Wane?’ (n 87) 76–8.
164. See Australian Constitution s 75(v) (liberty), s 75(iii)–(v) (court access), s 71 (due process), ss 7, 24, 64 and 128 (political speech and association).
165. See David Hume, ‘The Rule of Law in Reading Down: Good Law for the “Bad Man”’ (2014) 37(3) Melbourne University Law Review 620; Neil Duxbury, ‘Reading Down’ (2017) 20(2) The Green Bag 155.
166. See, eg, Hogan v Hinch (2011) 243 CLR 506, 535–44 (French CJ) (‘Hogan’), 547–56 (Gummow, Hayne, Heydon, Crennan, Kiefel, and Bell JJ); Monis v The Queen (2013) 249 CLR 92, 208–11 (Crennan, Kiefel and Bell JJ); Tajjour v New South Wales (2014) 254 CLR 508, 600–5 (Keane J); NAAJA (n 90) 581, 587–93 (French CJ, Kiefel and Bell JJ), 645–52 (Nettle and Gordon JJ); see Meagher, ‘On the Wane?’ (n 87) 76–8.
167. But important doubts have been articulated as to the propriety of this approach: see Vella v Commissioner of Police (NSW) (2019) 374 ALR 1, 53 (Gordon J), NAAJA (n 90) 604–5 (Gageler J); Hume (n 165) 629–44; Scott Stephenson, ‘Against Interpretation as an Alternative to Invalidation’ (2020) 48(1) Federal Law Review 46.
168. Roy (n 8) 195 [31]–[32] (Bell and Gageler JJ).
169. Ibid (citations omitted).
170. Plenty v Dillon (1991) 171 CLR 635, 647 (Gaudron and McHugh JJ) citing Semayne’s Case (1604) 77 ER 194, 195; Entick v Carrington (1765) 95 ER 807,817; Southam v Smout [1964] 1 QB 308, 320; Eccles v Bourque [1975] 2 SCR 739; Morris v Beardmore [1981] AC 446.
171. Semanyne’s Case (1604) 77 ER 194, 195; Entick v Carrington (1765) 95 ER 807, 817.
172. R v Secretary for the Home Department; Ex parte Leech [1994] QB 198, 209 (Lord Steyn) (‘Leech’).
173. Probuild (n 8).
174. Re Bolton; Ex parte Beane (1987) 162 CLR 514, 520 (Brennan J).
175. Kassam (n 158) 554 (Leeming JA) (citations omitted).
176. Ibid 554–5.
177. Lee (n 7) (Gageler and Keane JJ); see Sales (n 158), 604–6 for a persuasive account as to how courts can identify those rights, principles and interests which are fundamental and so protected by the principle of legality.
178. Saeed (n 85).
179. Hogan (n 166).
180. X7 (n 49).
181. Plaintiff S157 (n 70).
182. On the constitutional separation of judicial power: see R v Kirby; Ex parte Boilermakers’ Society of Australia (1956) 94 CLR 254.
183. On the extension of Ch III protections to State courts: see Kirk v Industrial Court (NSW) (2010) 239 CLR 531; Debra Mortimer, ‘The Constitutionalization of Administrative Law’ in Cheryl Saunders and Adrienne Stone (eds), The Oxford Handbook of the Australian Constitution (Oxford University Press, 2018) 696.
184. Senate Standing Committee for the Scrutiny of Delegated Legislation, Parliament of Australia, Inquiry into the Exemption of Delegated Legislation from Parliamentary Oversight (Report, 16 March 2021) [3.1].
185. On the nature of this parliamentary authority and its relationship with the distinct power of disallowance: see Dan Meagher and Matthew Groves, ‘The Common Law Principle of Legality and Secondary Legislation’ (2016) 39(2) University of New South Wales Law Journal 450, 452–3.
186. See Brendan Lim, ‘Executive Power and the Principle of Legality’ in Janina Boughey and Lisa Burton Crawford (eds), Interpreting Executive Power (The Federation Press, 2020) 76, 78 for a fascinating argument that the legality is primarily concerned to regulate ‘the exercise of power by the executive branch of government in ways that affect certain individual rights’.
187. Victorian Stevedoring & General Contracting Co Pty Ltd v Dignan (1931) 46 CLR 73.
188. Anne Twomey, Submission No 18 to Senate Standing Committee for the Scrutiny of Delegated Legislation (n 184) [3.41].
189. See Dennis C Pearce and Stephen Argument, Delegated Legislation in Australia (LexisNexis Butterworths, 5th ed, 2017) ch 3; Janina Boughey, ‘Brett Cattle: New Limits on Delegated Law-Making Powers?’ (2020) 31(4) Public Law Review 347.
190. Senate Standing Committee for the Scrutiny of Delegated Legislation, Parliament of Australia, Inquiry into the Exemption of Delegated Legislation from Parliamentary Oversight (Interim Report, 2 December 2020) 3.
191. Ibid xiii.
192. Ibid xiv.
193. But see Meagher and Groves, ‘The Common Law Principle of Legality and Secondary Legislation’ (n 185) 485–6.
194. See, eg, A-G (SA) v Corporation of the City of Adelaide (2013) 249 CLR 1, 70 (Heydon J).
195. See, eg, Leech (n 172); Simms (n 38); R (Daly) v Secretary of State for the Home Department [2001] 2 AC 532; R (Unison) v Lord Chancellor [2020] AC 869 (‘Unison’).
196. See Jason Varuhas, ‘The Principle of Legality’ (2020) 79(3) Cambridge Law Journal 578, 604–6, 612–4 for an important argument that the Supreme Court’s use of legality in the context of secondary legislation is ‘effectively … a surrogate form of invasive substantive review, while freeing the courts of the ordinary constraints that apply to substantive review — and maintain its legitimacy — such as the concept of deference’: at 614.
197. In the constitutional review contexts: see, eg, Brown (n 90), 376–9 (Gageler J), 462–8 (Gordon J). In the legality context: see Goldsworthy, ‘The Principle of Legality and Legislative Intention’ in Meagher and Groves, (n 86) 69–70; Dan Meagher, ‘The Principle of Legality and Proportionality in Australian Law’ in Meagher and Groves, The Principle of Legality in Australia and New Zealand (n 86) ch 7. But see Hanna Wilberg, ‘Common Law Rights Have Justified Limits: Refining the “Principle of Legality”’ in Meagher and Groves (eds) (n 86) ch 8.
198. See Brett Cattle Company Pty Ltd v Minister for Agriculture (2020) 274 FCR 337, 407–14 [285]–[310] where Rares J used structured proportionality in the context of determining the validity of secondary legislation which implicated a fundamental right. That approach, which constituted a stricter form of legality in this context, was nevertheless problematic in my view as the empowering statute appeared to expressly authorise the relevant rights infringement. See, eg, Boughey, above n 185; Andrew Edgar, ‘Structured Proportionality, Unreasonableness and Managing the Line Between Executive and Judicial Functions’ (2021) 32 Public Law Review 204.
199. See, eg, the account offered (in the context of the implied freedom of political communication) by Adrienne Stone ‘Proportionality and Its Alternatives’ (2020) 48(1) Federal Law Review 123, 134–40.
200. Unison (n 195) 900 (Lord Reed).
201. Ibid 902–3
202. Ibid 902–5; see Jason Varuhas, ‘Conceptualising the Principle(s) of Legality (2018) 29 Public Law Review 196.
203. Leech (n 172). This proposition and interpretive approach to secondary legislation were endorsed by Lord Reed (with whom Lord Neuberger, Lord Mance, Lord Kerr, Lord Wilson and Lord Hughes agreed) in Unison (n 195) 899–902.
204. See, eg, Unison (n 195) 889–94 where Lord Reed made use of detailed statistical evidence in order to assess the extent to which the relevant secondary rule (fees order) infringed the (constitutional) right to access the courts.
205. See, eg, Clubb v Edwards (2019) 267 CLR 171, 224–41 (Gageler J), 299–310 (Gordon J) (‘Clubb’).
206. Lange v Australian Broadcasting Corporation (1997) 189 CLR 520, 567 (Brennan CJ, Dawson, Toohey, Gaudron, McHugh, Gummow and Kirby JJ).
207. Brown (n 90) 378 (Gageler J).
208. Clubb (n 205) 309 (Gordon J).
209. See John Basten, ‘Construing Statutes Conferring Powers — A Process of Implication or Applying Values’ in Boughey and Crawford (n 186) 54, 56–60; John Basten, ‘Legislative Purpose and Statutory Interpretation’ in Jeffrey Barnes (ed) The Coherence of Statutory Interpretation (The Federation Press, 2019) 134.
210. Brown (n 90).
211. Ibid 390 (Gageler J).
212. Ibid.
213. Ibid 391 (Gageler J).
214. Simms (n 38) 131 (Lord Hoffman). But see Lisa Burton Crawford, ‘An Institutional Justification for the Principle of Legality’ (2002) 45(2) Melbourne University Law Review 511, 519–26.