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Heresy in the High Court? Federalism as a Constraint on Commonwealth Power

Published online by Cambridge University Press:  24 January 2025

David Hume ,
Andrew Lynch  and
George Williams
David Hume
Affiliation:
Gilbert + Tobin Centre of Public Law, Faculty of Law, University of New South Wales
Andrew Lynch
Affiliation:
Gilbert + Tobin Centre of Public Law, Faculty of Law, University of New South Wales
George Williams
Affiliation:
Gilbert + Tobin Centre of Public Law, Faculty of Law, University of New South Wales; Barrister, New South Wales Bar
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Abstract

Williams v Commonwealth of Australia is a landmark decision of the High Court on the scope of federal executive power in s 61 of the Constitution. The decision is also important for the interpretive methodology adopted by the Court. Notably, each judge based their understanding of s 61 upon federal readings of the Constitution. This methodology raises fresh questions about how the Constitution is to be interpreted, and whether Williams marks a break from orthodox understandings of that task. This article assesses the significance of Williams for constitutional interpretation in Australia, and whether it lays the foundation for a more robust protection of state interests by the High Court.

Type
Research Article
Information
Federal Law Review , Volume 41 , Issue 1 , March 2013 , pp. 71 - 93
Copyright
Copyright © 2013 The Australian National University

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Footnotes

We thank Lisa Burton for her research assistance.

References

1 Official Report of the National Australasian Convention Debates, (Sydney), 12 March 1891, 436 (JW Hackett).

2 [2012] HCA 23 (20 June 2012).

3 See Williams [2012] HCA 23, [404] (Heydon J). As to the nature of the ‘common assumption', see Geoffrey Lindell, ‘Williams v Commonwealth — How the School Chaplains and Mr Pape Destroyed the ‘Common Assumption’ Regarding Executive Power’ (Paper Delivered at the AACL Seminar, Sydney, 13 August 2012) 9. See also Lynch, Andrew, ‘Commonwealth Financial Powers — Taxation, Direct Spending and Grants — Scope and Limitations’ (2011) 6 Public Policy 23Google Scholar; Winterton, George, ‘The Relationship Between Commonwealth Legislative and Executive Power’ (2004) 25 Adelaide Law Review 21.Google Scholar

4 In Pape v Federal Commissioner of Taxation (‘Pape’) (2009) 238 CLR 1, the High Court held that the enactment of an Appropriation Act did not in itself confer power to spend: 36 [53], 55–6 [111]–[113] (French CJ), 72 [176], 72 [178], 74 [180], 74–5 [183]–[184] (Gummow, Crennan and Bell JJ), 100-1 [283], 105 [296], 113 [320] (Hayne and Kiefel JJ), 210 [600], 213 [607] (Heydon J).

5 These may include contracting and expenditure with respect to the administration of Departments of State pursuant to s 64 of the Constitution; contracting and expenditure in the execution and maintenance of the laws of the Commonwealth; contracting and expenditure in the exercise of prerogative powers attributable to the Commonwealth; or contracting and expenditure in the exercise of inherent authority derived from the character and status of the Commonwealth as the national government: Williams [2012] HCA 23, [4] (French CJ), [146] (Gummow and Bell JJ). See also Pape (2009) 238 CLR 1, 63–4 [133] (French CJ), 90 [236] (Gummow, Crennan and Bell JJ). See further Saunders, Cheryl, ‘The Sources and Scope of Commonwealth Power to Spend’ (2009) 20 Public Law Review 256.Google Scholar

6 Williams [2012] HCA 23, [252], [288] (Hayne J). While agreeing with that conclusion, Kiefel J appeared more willing to accept, albeit without conclusively deciding, that the power to contract and spend extended to ‘subject matters of express grants of legislative power in ss 51, 52 and 122': Williams [2012] HCA 23, [594].

7 Ibid [403].

8 Ibid [60]–[61] (French CJ), [136], [145] (Gummow and Bell JJ), [252] (Hayne J), [487], [515]–[517], [527]–[530], [532], [544] (Crennan J). The general theme was that the exercise of extra-statutory power undermines the legislative predominance which is essential for responsible government.

9 Ibid [27], [36], [38] (French CJ), [288] (Hayne J).

10 Ibid [38] (French CJ), [151] (Gummow and Bell JJ), [204], [206], [215]–[217] (Hayne J), [518]–[521] (Crennan J), [577] (Kiefel J). For an earlier discussion of this concept, see Anne Twomey, ‘Pushing the Boundaries of Executive Power – Pape, the Prerogative and Nationhood Powers’ (2010) Melbourne University Law Review 313, 322–4; Zines, Leslie, The High Court and the Constitution (Federation Press, 5th ed, 2008) 349–58.Google Scholar

11 (1920) 28 CLR 129. See generally Booker, Keven and Glass, Arthur, ‘The Engineers Case’ in Lee, HP and Winterton, George (eds), Australian Constitutional Landmarks (Cambridge University Press, 2003) 34CrossRefGoogle Scholar; Coper, Michael and Williams, George (eds), How Many Cheers for Engineers? (Federation Press, 1997).Google Scholar

12 See, eg, R v Barger; Commonwealth v McKay (1908) 6 CLR 41.

13 This is not to say that these interpretive principles have not come under challenge, such as in regard to the High Court's development of an implied freedom of political communication: see Williams, George, ‘Engineers is Dead, Long Live the Engineers!’ (1995) 17 Sydney Law Review 62.Google Scholar See also De Q Walker, Geoffrey, ‘The Seven Pillars of Centralism: Engineers’ Case and Federalism’ (2002) 76 Australian Law Journal 678.Google Scholar

14 (1971) 122 CLR 353, 394, 396.

15 (2006) 229 CLR 1. See further Allan, James and Aroney, Nicholas, ‘An Uncommon Court: How the High Court of Australia Has Undermined Australian Federalism’ (2008) 30 Sydney Law Review 245.Google Scholar

16 The Tertiary Education Quality and Standards Agency Act 2011 (Cth) is an example of the use of the corporations power in the higher education sector based upon the Work Choices Case precedent. See Williams, George and Pillai, Sangeetha, ‘Commonwealth Power over Higher Education’ (2011) 30 University of Queensland Law Journal 287.Google Scholar

17 Work Choices Case (2006) 229 CLR 1, 119–121 [192]–[193] (Gleeson CJ, Gummow, Hayne, Heydon and Crennan JJ).

18 Ibid 332 [794].

19 (1929) 42 CLR 481.

20 Ibid 514. Section 61 provides: ‘The executive power of the Commonwealth is vested in the Queen and is exercisable by the Governor-General as the Queen's representative, and extends to the execution and maintenance of this Constitution, and of the laws of the Commonwealth'.

21 (2009) 238 CLR 1.

22 (2010) 242 CLR 195.

23 [2012] HCA 23, [61]. See also [2012] HCA 23, [83] (French CJ).

24 (2010) 242 CLR 195, 210 [30]. See also Pape (2009) 238 CLR 1, 60 [127] (French CJ).

25 [2012] HCA 23, [89]. See also [2012] HCA 23, [143], referring to ‘considerations of federalism'.

26 Ibid [192], [199].

27 Pape (2009) 238 CLR 1, 118 [335].

28 (1947) 74 CLR 31.

29 [2012] HCA 23, [495].

30 See (2009) 238 CLR 1, 180–1 [519], 190 [541], 193 [551].

31 French CJ, curially (ibid 58 [123]) and extra-curially (French, Robert, ‘The Executive Power’ (2010) 12(1) Constitutional Law and Policy Review 5, 10Google Scholar) has spoken of how it is a common feature of written constitutions that executive power is conferred in bare, unconfined terms.

32 See the Preamble and cl 3 of the Commonwealth of Australia Constitution Act 1900 (Imp) 63 & 64 Vict.

33 See further Lynch, Andrew and Williams, George, ‘Beyond a Federal Structure: Is a Constitutional Commitment to a Federal Relationship Possible?’ (2008) 31 University of New South Wales Law Journal 395.Google Scholar

34 See, eg, Miller v Miller (2011) 242 CLR 446, 454 [13], 468–469 [59]–[60] (French CJ, Gummow, Hayne, Crennan, Kiefel and Bell JJ); Equuscorp Pty Ltd v Haxton (2012) 86 ALJR 296, 320 [94], 325 [114] (Gummow and Bell JJ).

35 Williams [2012] HCA 23, [37].

36 Ibid [1]. See also ibid [352] (Heydon J).

37 Ibid [37], [83].

38 See Aroney, Nicholas, ‘Constitutional Choices in the Work Choices Case, or What Exactly is Wrong with the Reserved Powers Doctrine?’ (2008) 32 Melbourne University Law Review 1, 9–10.Google Scholar

39 Work Choices Case (2006) 229 CLR 1, 120 [195] (Gleeson CJ, Gummow, Hayne, Heydon and Crennan JJ). See also Gummow J's reliance on this dictum in Momcilovic v The Queen (2011) (2011) 245 CLR 1, 104 [221] to explain why s 109 can operate without undermining the Melbourne Corporation doctrine. See further Zines, above n 10, 440–1.

40 Melbourne Corporation (1947) 74 CLR 31, 82.

41 See also Williams, [2012] HCA 23, [83]. The language of ‘competence’ reflects that of Mason CJ, Deane and Gaudron JJ in Davis v The Commonwealth (1988) 166 CLR 79, 93–4.

42 See Pape (2009) 238 CLR 1, 63 [133] (French CJ), 91–2 [241]–[242] (Gummow, Crennan and Bell JJ).

43 Williams [2012] HCA 23, [146].

44 Ibid [196]. See also: ibid [497]–[499] (Crennan J).

45 Ibid [594].

46 Ibid [503].

47 See Twomey, above n 10.

48 (1975) 134 CLR 338.

49 Ibid 396. See also Pape (2009) 238 CLR 1, 83 [214] (Gummow, Crennan and Bell JJ).

50 (1988) 166 CLR 79, 93–94.

51 (2009) 238 CLR 1, 91 [239], quoting ibid 389 (Brennan J).

52 AAP Case (1975) 134 CLR 338, 357. In Pape Heydon J similarly remarked that ‘[t]he making of s 96 grants depends on consultation with, and the cooperation of, the States': (2009) 238 CLR 1, 208 [597].

53 [2012] HCA 23, [148] (Gummow and Bell JJ), [501] (Crennan J).

54 Ibid [248].

55 Ibid.

56 (1957) 99 CLR 575, 609-10.

57 Williams [2012] HCA 23, [248].

58 Ibid [60].

59 Ibid [61].

60 Ibid.

61 Ibid [60]. Gummow and Bell JJ also referred to the weakness of the Senate in the appropriation process, though, for them, this was an issue of representative government, not federalism: ibid [136], [145].

62 Ibid [396].

63 Ibid. Crennan J also referred to the role of Select Committees of both Houses of Parliament: ibid [515].

64 Ibid [396].

65 (2009) 240 CLR 272, 307 [66] (Gummow, Heydon, Kiefel and Bell JJ).

66 (2010) 241 CLR 491, 503–504 [19], 505 [25].

67 (2011) 245 CLR 1, 124 [284], 133 [313].

68 See further Williams, George, Human Rights Under the Australian Constitution (Oxford University Press, first published 1999, 2002 ed) 48–50Google Scholar; Stellios, James, ‘State/Territory Human Rights Legislation in a Federal Judicial System’ (2008) 19 Public Law Review 52.Google Scholar

69 Engineers Case (1920) 28 CLR 129, 135.

70 567 US __ (2012) (Slip Op).

71 Ibid 31–2 (Scalia, Kennedy, Thomas and Alito JJ).

72 Ibid 48 (Roberts CJ), 34–5 (Scalia, Kennedy, Thomas and Alito JJ).

73 Williams [2012] HCA 23, [89].

74 Ibid [37].

75 Ibid.

76 Ibid [242].

77 Ibid [248].

78 Ibid [192]. See also ibid [248].

79 Ibid [495] ('The Commonwealth defendants’ wider submission … must be assessed in light of … the distribution of executive powers between the Commonwealth and the States as polities [Melbourne Corporation (1947) 74 CLR 31, 82–3 (Dixon J)]’).

80 (2009) 238 CLR 1, 118–119 [335].

81 Williams [2012] HCA 23, [500], quoting ibid 85 [220].

82 Melbourne Corporation (1947) 74 CLR 31, 82 (Dixon J).

83 Williams [2012] HCA 23, [495].

84 (2009) 238 CLR 1, 119 [337]. See also (2009) 238 CLR 1, 117–118 [333], 118–119 [335], 120 [339], 124 [357].

85 Williams [2012] HCA 23, [157].

86 Ibid [247]–[248], [251]. [284] (Hayne J). [592]–[593] (Kiefel J).

87 Ibid [251].

88 Pape (2009) 238 CLR 1, 199 [569].

89 Williams [2012] HCA 23, [143], [147].

90 Ibid [503].

91 Ibid [495].

92 (2006) 229 CLR 1, 319–320 [772], 333–4 [798]–[799].

93 (2009) 238 CLR 1, 160–1 [470].

94 [2012] HCA 23, [247] (Hayne J), [501] (Crennan J).

95 AAP Case (1975) 134 CLR 338, 398.

96 Williams [2012] HCA 23, [522].

97 Ibid [590].

98 The Commonwealth accepted that the executive's power to contract could not displace the ordinary operation of state and territory laws: ibid [37] (French CJ).

99 Geoffrey Lindell has made this argument: Lindell, above n 3, 23.

100 The language of Isaacs J in The Commonwealth v Kreglinger & Fernau Ltd and Bardsley (1926) 37 CLR 393, 411–412 in relation to responsible government.

101 See also Allan and Aroney, above n 15.

102 Work Choices Case (2006) 229 CLR 1, 103–4 [142], 117 [185] (Gleeson CJ, Gummow, Hayne, Heydon and Crennan JJ), quoting R v Public Vehicles Licensing Appeal Tribunal (Tas); Ex parte Australian National Airways Pty Ltd (1964) 113 CLR 207, 225–6.

103 (1908) 6 CLR 309, 368.

104 This was implicit in the majority's rejection of the argument that s 51(xx) should be read down in light of s 51(xxxv). See Work Choices Case (2006) 229 CLR 1, 71–2 [51], 123 [204], 124 [206], 128 [223].

105 Ibid 117–118 [188] (Gleeson CJ, Gummow, Hayne, Heydon and Crennan JJ) (emphasis in original). This closely tracks the principle enunciated in the Engineers Case (1920) 28 CLR 129, 151 (Knox CJ, Isaacs, Rich and Starke JJ).

106 (2006) 229 CLR 1, 122–3 [202] (Gleeson CJ, Gummow, Hayne, Heydon and Crennan JJ). The majority adopted this expression from the majority judgment in R v Kirby; ex parte Boilermakers’ Society of Australia (1956) 94 CLR 254, 270 [5] (Dixon CJ, McTiernan, Fullagar and Kitto JJ).

107 Ibid 73–4 [54], quoting Payroll Tax Case (1971) 122 CLR 353, 395–6 (Windeyer J).

108 Engineers Case (1920) 28 CLR 129, 151 (Knox CJ, Isaacs, Rich and Starke JJ).

109 Work Choices Case (2006) 229 CLR 1, 119–120 [194] (Gleeson CJ, Gummow, Hayne, Heydon and Crennan JJ).

110 Ibid 101 [134] (Gleeson CJ, Gummow, Hayne, Heydon and Crennan JJ).

111 Ibid 72 [52] (Gleeson CJ, Gummow, Hayne, Heydon and Crennan JJ).

112 Ibid 72 [52], 119–120 [194], 120–1 [196] (Gleeson CJ, Gummow, Hayne, Heydon and Crennan JJ).

113 Ibid 89 [94], 120–1 [194] (Gleeson CJ, Gummow, Hayne, Heydon and Crennan JJ). Hayne J made the same point in APLA Limited v Legal Services Commissioner (NSW) (2005) 224 CLR 322, 453 [387] ('the conclusion to be derived from structural considerations is reached only having first started by considering the relevant text’).

114 Work Choices Case (2006) 229 CLR 1, 71–2 [51] (Gleeson CJ, Gummow, Hayne, Heydon and Crennan JJ). This approach may be likened to the insistence from McHugh J in McGinty v Western Australia (1996) 186 CLR 140, 231, that the implied freedom of political communication could not be derived solely from a free-standing conception of representative and responsible government but must find a secure a basis in the constitutional text which gave rise to it. That view was endorsed unanimously by the Court in Lange v Australian Broadcasting Corporation (1997) 189 CLR 520, 566–7.

115 Work Choices Case (2006) 229 CLR 1, 89 [94] (Gleeson CJ, Gummow, Hayne, Heydon and Crennan JJ).

116 (2009) 238 CLR 1, 117–118, [333].

117 See Engineers Case (1920) 28 CLR 129, 148–151 (Knox CJ, Isaacs, Rich and Starke JJ), which sees constitutional construction as starting with the text of a power, construing the affirmative words, discarding considerations of the possible abuse of power, and then places the onus on a person wishing to restrict the power to identify its source in the Constitution. See also (1920) 28 CLR 129, 154 (Knox CJ, Isaacs, Rich and Starke JJ).

118 See also Walker, above n 13.

119 Engineers Case (1920) 28 CLR 129, 154 (Knox CJ, Isaacs, Rich and Starke JJ).

120 For example, s 109 refers generically to ‘law of a State'.

121 A number of legislative powers expressly conferred by the Constitution on state parliaments are now redundant (see, eg, ss 7, 9). Section 108 confers a power of alteration or repeal of state laws existing at Federation and ‘relating to any matter within the powers of the Parliament of the Commonwealth'. A number of provisions assume that the states have some kind of legislative power (see, eg, s 113, which assumes that states may have laws regulating ‘fermented, distilled, or other intoxicating liquids’ in the state; ss 112 and 114, which assume that the states have a power to levy taxes). Section 15 gives State Parliaments power to choose replacement Senators following casual vacancies.

122 Commonwealth of Australia Constitution Act 1900 (Imp) 63 & 64 Vict cl 3.

123 Engineers Case (1920) 28 CLR 129, 134–5.

124 (2006) 229 CLR 1, 316–317 [766], 336–7 [809].

125 (2009) 238 CLR 1, 140–3 [412]–[419].

126 See, eg, Williams [2012] HCA 23, [192], [197]–[198] (Hayne J), [581] (Kiefel J). See also Pape (2009) 238 CLR 1, 60 [127] (French CJ), 115–16 [327]–[328] (Hayne and Kiefel JJ); Victoria v The Commonwealth (1975) 134 CLR 338, 396–7 (Mason CJ); R v Hughes (2000) 202 CLR 535, 554–5 [38] (Gleeson CJ, Gaudron, McHugh, Gummow, Hayne and Callinan JJ), quoting R v Duncan; Ex parte Australian Iron and Steel Pty Ltd (1983) 158 CLR 535, 560 (Mason J).

127 (2006) 229 CLR 1, 207–8 [490]-[493] (Kirby J), 307 [743] (Callinan J).

128 See, eg, (2009) 238 CLR 1, 199 [569].

129 Bourke v State Bank of New South Wales (1990) 170 CLR 276, 285.

130 (1961) 105 CLR 361, 371–2, adopted in ibid 285–286.

131 (1990) 170 CLR 276.

132 (2006) 229 CLR 1, 123–8 [205]–[222]; cf (2006) 229 CLR 1, 214–16 [510]–[517] (Kirby J).

133 Williams [2012] HCA 23, [341]-[343] (Heydon J).

134 (1929) 42 CLR 481, 514.

135 Australian Communist Party v The Commonwealth (1951) 83 CLR 1, 187.

136 (2009) 238 CLR 1, 24 [10].

137 French, above n 31, 9. See also the factors identified by Jackson J of the United States Supreme Court in Youngstown Sheet & Tube Co v Sawyer 343 US 579, 654 (1952), in particular the rise of the party system which gives the executive significant, often overbearing, power in the legislature. See also Twomey, above n 10.

138 See, eg, Miller v Miller (2011) 242 CLR 446, 454 [15] (French CJ, Gummow, Hayne, Crennan, Kiefel and Bell JJ); Aid/Watch Incorporated v Commissioner of Taxation for the Commonwealth of Australia (2010) 241 CLR 539, 555–6 [43]–[44] (French CJ, Gummow, Hayne, Crennan and Bell JJ).

139 Work Choices Case (2006) 229 CLR 1, 72 [52] (Gleeson CJ, Gummow, Hayne, Heydon and Crennan JJ).

140 See, eg, ACTV v Commonwealth (1992) 177 CLR 106, 135 (Mason CJ); APLA Limited v Legal Services Commissioner (NSW) (2005) 224 CLR 322, 409 [241] (Gummow J).

141 Williams [2012] HCA 23, [241]–[242].

142 Ibid [242].

143 Ibid.