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Incomplete Theorizing in the High Court

Review Essay: Cass R Sunstein, Legal Reasoning and Political Conflict

Published online by Cambridge University Press:  24 January 2025

Adrienne Stone
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Abstract

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Type
Comment and Book Review
Information
Federal Law Review , Volume 26 , Issue 1 , March 1998 , pp. 195 - 205
Copyright
Copyright © 1998 The Australian National University

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Footnotes

*

Thanks are due to Anne-Marie Allgrove for her patient and insightful review of an earlier draft.

References

1 Sunstein, C R, Legal Reasoning and Political Conflict (1996)CrossRefGoogle Scholar.

2 Ibid at 39.

3 Ibid at 35-61.

4 Ibid at 35.

5 J Rawls, Political Liberalism 133-72 (1992);See C R Sunstein above n 1 at 4.

6 CR Sunstein, above n 1 at 4.

7 Sunstein's reference here is to the controversy which occurred in 1977-78 surrounding the plans of a Nazi organisation to demonstrate in a Chicago suburb.For an account of the controversy,see Hamlin, D, The Nazi/Skokie Conflict:A Civil Liberties Battle (1981)Google Scholar.

8 Schenck v United States, 249 US 47,51 (1919).

9 C R Sunstein,above n 1 at 37.

10 Ibid at 39-40.

11 Ibid.

12 Ibid.

13 Ibid at 41.

14 Ibid at 39-40.

15 Ibid at 43.

16 Ibid at 45.

17 Ibid.

18 See Alexander, L, “Incomplete Theorizing:A Review Essay of Cass R Sunstein's Legal Reasoning and Political Conflict' (1997) 72 Notre Dame L Rev 531 at 535-538Google Scholar.

19 C R Sunstein,above n 1 at 63 (emphasis in original).

20 Ibid at 38.

21 For discussions of arguments justifying freedom of speech,see generally,F Schauer, Free Speech:A Philosophical Inquiry, 35-46 (1981); Greenawalt, K, “Free Speech Justifications”,(1989) 89 Colum L Rev 119 and 145-146CrossRefGoogle Scholar.

22 C R Sunstein,above n 1 at 51.

23 Ibid.

24 Ibid at 56.

25 Ibid at 56-57.

26 See above nn 20-21 and accompanying text.

27 See Shapiro, S J, “Fear of Theory”,(1997) 64 U Chic L Rev 389 at 396CrossRefGoogle Scholar.

28 See V Blasi, “The Pathological Perspective and the First Amendment”(1985)85 Colum L Rev 449(1985).

29 C RSunstein,above n 1,ch 8.

30 30 410 us 113 (1973).

31 C RSunstein,above n 1 at 180.

32 For a recent manifestation of this turmoil, see Schenck v Pro-choice Network of Western New York, 117 S Ct 855 (1997).

33 C R Sunstein,above n 1 at 180.

34 Ibid at 179-180.

35 Ibid at 181.

36 Ibid at 180-181.

37 E L Rubin, “Book Review:Legal Reasoning,Legal Process and the Judiciary as an Institution”,(1997) 85 Calif L Rev 265 at 276-277.

38 For a summary of such arguments,see A Kaufman, “Incompletely Theorized Agreements :A Plausible Ideal for Legal Reasoning?”(1996) 85 Geo L J 395 at 397-401.

39 C RSunstein,above n 1 at 175-76.

40 Ibid at 179.

41 J H Ely, Democracy and Distrust:A Theory ofludicial Review (1980).

42 See R A Posner, “Democracy and Distrust Revisited”,77 Va L Rev 641 (1991).

43 G N Rosenberg, The Hollaw Hope (1991).CR Sunstein,above n 1 at 45.

44 C R Sunstein above n 1 at 45-46.

45 Ibid at180-181.

46 See below nn 49-50 and accompanying text.

47 Australian Capital Television v The Commonwealth, (1992) 177 CLR 106; Nationwide News v Wills, (1992) 177 CLR 1.

48 Alexander Meiklejohn was perhaps the principal exponent of this theory of free speech.See A Meiklejohn, Free Speech and its Relation to Self Government (1948).See also, Mills v Alabama, 384 US 214, 218 (1966); Buckley v Valeo, 424 US 1,14 (1976).See generally,F Schauer,above n 21 at 35-46;K Greenawalt,above n 21 at 145-46.

49 This argument is most fully explained by F Schauer,above n 21 at 33-34.See also,V Blasi,“Reading Abrams through the Lens of Schauer”(1997) 72 Notre Dame L Rev 1343.

50 See O Fiss, “Free Speech and Social Structure”,(1986) 71 Iowa L Rev 1405; CR Sunstein, The Partial Constitution (1993) at 203-213.

51 Australian Capital Television (1992) 177 CLR 107 at 143 per Mason q; at 234-235 per McHughJ.

52 Ibid at 145 per Mason CJ, echoing the concerns of the Supreme Court in Buckley v Valeo, 424 US 1 at48-49 (1976).

53 (1994) 182 CLR 107.

54 376 us 254 (1964).

55 In summary,the High Court rejected the American decisions extending the notion of “a public figure” beyond public officials and candidates for public office. Theophanous, (1994)182 CLR 107 at 134,placed the onus of proof on the defendant and substituted the “reasonableness”test for the “actual malice” standard (1994) 182 CLR 107 at 135.

56 I have made this point in detail in A Stone, Freedom of Political Communication, the Common Law and the Constitution, forthcoming .

57 376 US 254,279 (1964).

58 (1994) 182 CLR 107 at 138.

59 See Abrams v United States, 250 US 616,630 (1919) (Holmes,J dissenting).See generally,K Greenawalt,above n 21, at 130-141; F Schauer,above n 21 at 15-34.

60 The contrary view might be that a truth requirement in the law of defamation would advance free speech values by ensuring accurate reporting in the first place.See M Chesterman, “The Money or the Truth” (1995) 18 UNSWLJ 200 at 307-308.

61 This was the basis of Justice McHugh's dissent in Theophanous v Herald and Weekly Times (1994) 182 CLR 107 at 199 and 205.See also McGinty v West Australia, (1996) 186 CLR 140 at 169 per Brennan CJ;at 232-235 per McHugh J;at 291 per Gummow J.

62 (1997) 145 ALR 96

63 (1994) 182 CLR 107.

64 (1994) 182 CLR 211.

65 (1997) 145 ALR 96 at 112.

66 Ibid at 107.

67 Ibid.

68 Ibid.

69 Ibid at 112.This is of itself an ambitious theoretical position as McHugh J acknowledged in McGinty (1996) 186 CLR 140 at 230). By the same token, Sunstein's advocacy of incomplete advocacy of incomplete theorizing requires ambitious theoretical commitment to that position. See C R Sunstein, above n 1 at 60.