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Published online by Cambridge University Press: 24 January 2025
The Trade Practices Act 1965-1971 was repealed by the Restrictive Trade Practices Act 1971 (Act No. 138 of 1971). Part VI (ss. 66-77) of the latter Act deals with resale price maintenance. As to ss. 66B, 66M and 90AA in the former Act cf. ss. 66, 76 and 102 of the Restrictive Trade Practices Act 1971.
1 (1972) 47 A.L.J.R. 14; [1972] Argus L.R. 921. High Court of Australia; Barwick C.J., McTiernan, Menzies, Walsh, Gibbs and Stephen JJ.
2 S. 66B(2)(d)(ii).
3 (1971) 45 A.L.J.R. 485, noted (1972) 5 F.L.Rev. 133,
4 (1971) 45 A.L.J.R. 485, 494.
5 Id. 503, 506.
6 (1972) 47 A.L.J.R. 14, 16.
7 Id. 17.
8 E.g., Hospital Provident Fund Pty Ltd v. State of Victoria (1953) 87 C.L.R. 1; Samuels v. Readers' Digest Association (1969) 120 C.L.R. 1, 17. There was once a settled test for ascertaining whether a law applied directly and not merely remotely to interstate trade and commerce: O. Gilpin Ltd v. Commissioner of Road Transport and Tramways (1935) 52 C.L.R. 189, 202 and Hospital Provident Fund Pty Ltd v. State of Victoria (1953) 87 C.L.R. 1, 17-18 per Dixon J.; Samuels v. Readers' Digest Association (1969) 120 C.L.R. 1, 31 per Kitto J., 17 per Barwick C.J. In the present case it was not found necessary to revive the controversy over the question of directness of operation of laws.
9 (1972) 47 A.L.J.R. 14, 17 per Barwick C.J., 20 per McTiernan J.
10 Id. 27.
11 (1969) 120 C.L.R. 1.
12 (1972) 47 A.L.J.R. 14, 22.
13 Id. 26.
14 Id. 27, 28.
15 Id. 18.
16 Chapman v. Suttie (1963) 110 C.L.R. 321.
17 Fergusson v. Stevenson (1951) C.L.R. 421, 431.
18 (1962-1963) 36 A.L.J.R. 342, 349 per Menzies J.
19 (1969) 120 C.L.R. 1.
20 (1972) 47 A.L.J.R. 14, 18, 21, 25, 26, 27. Also Cominos v. Cominos (1971) 46 A.L.J.R. 596, 597; R. v. Trade Practices Tribunal (1971) 44 A.L.J.R. 126, 130.
21 (1954) 90 C.L.R. 353.
22 (1972) 47 A.L.J.R. 14, 22 per Menzies J., 24 per Walsh J.
23 Id. 23, 30.
24 Id. 20.
25 Id. 22-23, 24, 29.
26 Cf. the interpretation of Income Tax Assessment Act 1936-1973, s. 26(a). It is settled that the words in that provision “with the intention” require that the stipulated intention be the dominant or decisive intention. E.g. Pascoe v. Federal Commissioner of Taxation (1956) 11 A.T.D. 108.
27 (1972) 47 A.L.J.R. 14, 24, 25, 30.
28 Id. 25.
29 S. 67 of present Act; Clause 96 of Trade Practices Bill 1973.
30 (1972) 47 A.L.J.R. 14, 23, 30.
31 S. 68 of present Act; cf. Clause 97 of the Bill.
32 S. 76 of present Act; cf. Clause 99 of the Bill.
33 (1972) 47 A.L.J.R. 14, 24, 31.
34 Clause 48, Clause 95.
35 Clause 76.
36 Clause 77.
37 Clause 78.
38 Clause 80(1) (c).
39 S. 102(1); formerly s. 90AA.
40 Redfern v. Dunlop Rubber Australia Ltd (1964) 110 C.L.R. 194.
41 Clause 87(2).
42 R. v. Spicer; Ex parte Builders' Labourers' Federation (1957) 31 A.L.J.R. 670.
43 There does now exist in State courts a limited power to adjust property rights. For example, courts of Equity have limited inherent powers to vary terms of private trusts; and in addition there exists in some jurisdictions the power to modify or extinguish interests in real property; e.g. Conveyancing Act 1919, s. 89 (N.S.W.).