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Overcoming the Institutional and Constitutional Constraints of Australian Federalism: Developing a New Social Democratic Approach to the Federal Framework

Published online by Cambridge University Press:  24 January 2025

Scott Guy
Scott Guy*
Affiliation:
University of Queensland
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Extract

This article investigates the possibilities for promoting and implementing a more progressive or essentially social democratic political and constitutional agenda within the existing institutional and constitutional constraints of federalism. Although this question has been a long debated and much discussed one in social democratic political and constitutional theory, this article seeks, indeed, to bring new light to this (traditional social democratic) perspective by emphasising the potential advantages of federal theory and the federal structure for a developing and contemporary social democratic agenda. Particular attention is devoted to the progressive possibilities which inhere in the States and their accompanying (State) constitutions and the consequent potential which State constitutionalism has to support a renewed and more distinctively progressive political (and constitutional) practice.

Type
Research Article
Information
Federal Law Review , Volume 34 , Issue 2 , June 2006 , pp. 319 - 354
Copyright
Copyright © 2006 The Australian National University

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Footnotes

Special thanks to Dr Nicholas Aroney for his valuable comments and suggestions on this article. This article is based on a chapter of the writer's PhD dissertation titled Resisting Liberalism: Social Democracy and the Australian Constitution.

References

1 This model is based on the writings of Brian Galligan: see Brian, Galligan, A Federal Republic (1995)Google Scholar; Brian, Galligan, ‘Australian Federalism: The Challenge of Governing in the 1990s’, in Ian, Marsh (ed), Governing in the 1990s (1993)Google Scholar. See also Brian, Galligan, The Politics of the High Court (1987)Google Scholar; Brian, Galligan, ‘The Australian High Court’s Role in Institutional Maintenance and Development’ in Charles, Sampford and Kim, Preston (eds), Interpreting Constitutions: Theories, Principles and Institutions (1996) 184Google Scholar. The model is also based on the works of several American theorists: see Cass, Sunstein, ‘Federalism in South Africa? Notes from the American Experience’ (1993) 8 American University Journal of International Law and Policy 421Google Scholar; John, Kincaid, ‘Foreword: The New Federalism Context of the New Judicial Federalism’ (1995) 26 Rutgers Law Journal 913Google Scholar; Helen, Hershkoff, ‘Positive Rights and State Constitutions: The Limits of Federal Rationality Review’ (1999a) 112 Harvard Law Review 1131Google Scholar; Helen, Hershkoff, ‘Welfare Devolution and State Constitutions’ (1999b) 67 Fordham Law Review 1403Google Scholar; Helen, Hershkoff, ‘Foreword: Positive Rights and the Evolution of State Constitutions’ (2002) 33 Rutgers Law Journal 799Google Scholar.

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3 See the ‘Commonwealth-State Housing Agreement’ in the Housing Assistance Act 1996 (Cth) and the ‘Commonwealth-State Medicare Agreement’ in the Medicare Agreements Act 1992 (Cth).

4 Australian Constitution s 51(xxxvii).

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13 Ibid, 156.

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15 Ibid 367.

16 See Greenwood, above n 2, especially the title to Chapter 4.

17 Ibid 117–74.

18 Laski, above n 2, 366.

19 Greenwood, above n 2, 3. Such an approach significantly influenced later (Australian) political accounts of federalism: see, eg, A F, Davies, Australian Democracy: an Introduction to the Political System (2nd ed, 1964)Google Scholar.

20 Greenwood, above n 2, 11.

21 Laski, above n 2, 368.

22 Greenwood, above n 2, ch 4.

23 Greenwood, above n 2, 9.

24 See, eg, Sunstein ‘Beyond the Republican Revival’ (1988) 97 Yale Law Journal, 1539CrossRefGoogle Scholar.

25 See Kincaid, above n 1; Brennan, above n 10; Neuborne, above n 10.

26 Galligan, A Federal Republic, above n 1; Galligan, ‘The Australian High Court’s Role in Institutional Maintenance and Development’, above n 1.

27 Galligan, A Federal Republic, above n 1.

28 See Sunstein, above n 1; Kincaid, above n 1; Brennan, above n 10.

29 Galligan, ‘The Australian High Court’s Role in Institutional Maintenance and Development’, above n 1, 184. See also Brian, Galligan and Cliff, Walsh, ‘Australian Federalism — Yes or No?’ in Greg, Craven (ed), Australian Federation: Towards the Second Century (1992) 193, 197Google Scholar.

30 See Kincaid, above n 1.

31 Galligan, A Federal Republic, above n 1, 42–4; Sunstein, above n 1, 437.

32 Sunstein, above n 1, 421.

33 See the Federal-State Relations Committee, Parliament of Victoria, Report on Federalism and the Role of the States: Comparisons and Recommendations (1999) ch 7, especially 183.

34 Galligan, ‘The Australian High Court’s Role in Institutional Maintenance and Development’, above n 1.

35 Galligan, A Federal Republic, above n 1, 52.

36 Elazar, above n 10, 185–6.

37 Galligan, A Federal Republic, above n 1, 52.

38 See, eg, Greenwood, above n 2, 9.

39 Sunstein, above n 1, 436.

40 Ibid 437.

41 Ibid.

42 Rodden and Rose-Ackerman, above n 10.

43 See, eg, Laski, above n 2, 368.

44 See Sunstein, above n 1, 421.

45 Cf Bratton and McCahery, above n 6, 213.

46 See Wayne, Goss and David, Plumridge, ‘Does Australia Still Need State Governments?’ (1996) 55 Australian Journal of Public Administration 88Google Scholar.

47 Brennan, above n 10; Kincaid, above n 1.

48 For example, members of the Australian Labor Party have long been critical of the restrictions imposed by federalism: see Bob Hawke, ‘The Resolution of Conflict’ (Address delivered in The Boyer Lectures, 1979) 18; Edward, Gough Whitlam, ‘The Labor Government and the Constitution’ in Gareth, Evans (ed), Labor and the Constitution, 1972–75 (1977) 305Google Scholar.

49 Glyn, Davis et al, Public Policy in Australia (1988) 48Google Scholar.

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51 See Henry, Bournes Higgins, A New Province for Law and Order (1922) 115Google Scholar; SirIsaac, Isaacs Australian Democracy and Our Constitutional System (1939) 40–4Google Scholar. See also John, Rickard, H B Higgins: The Rebel as Judge (1984) 106Google Scholar; SirZelman, Cowan, Isaac Isaacs (1993) 55Google Scholar. See also L F, Crisp, Federation Fathers (1990) 191Google Scholar, 203, 121–86 on the approaches of Isaacs, Higgins and George Dibbs to the federal constitutional framework.

52 See Crisp, above n 51, 170-72.

53 Ibid 202.

54 Isaacs, above n 51, 33–4.

55 See Robert, Howse, ‘Federalism, Democracy and Regulatory Reform: A Sceptical View of the Case for Decentralization’, in Karen, Knop et al (eds), Rethinking Federalism: Citizens, Markets and Governments in a Changing World (1995) 272Google Scholar.

56 James, Gillespie, ‘New Federalisms’ in Judith, Brett, James, Gillespie and Murray, Goot (eds), Developments in Australian Politics (1994) 60, 71Google Scholar.

57 Ibid 70–1.

58 See, eg, Galligan, A Federal Republic, above n 1, 42; Sunstein, above n 1, 437.

59 Howse, above n 55, 271.

60 See John, Wiseman ‘Broadening and Deepening Democracy: Learning From Recent Experiments in Citizen and Community Engagement’ in Glenn, Patmore and Gary, Jungwirth (eds) Labor Essays (2004) 54Google Scholar.

61 Susan, Rose-Ackerman, Rethinking the Progressive Agenda: The Reform of the American Regulatory State (1992) 166Google Scholar.

62 Sunstein, above n 24, 1541. Cf Verity, Burgmann, ‘Active Citizenship Against Marketisation: Community Resistance to Neo-Liberalism’, in Glenn, Patmore and Gary, Jungwirth (eds), Labor Essays (2004) 116Google Scholar.

63 Such a point has been made by several traditional social democratic theorists: see, eg, Crisp, above n 11, 178; Geoffrey, Sawer, Australian Federalism in the Courts (1967)Google Scholar.

64 See, eg, Rodden and Rose-Ackerman, above n 42.

65 See, eg, Michael, Greve, ‘Against Cooperative Federalism’ (2000) 70 Mississippi Law Journal 557Google Scholar; Wolfgang, Kasper ‘High on the Reform Agenda: Competitive Federalism’ (1994) 10 Policy 10, 13Google Scholar.

66 Kasper, above n 65, 13. This has been a common theme in the writings of (liberal) academics from the Centre for Independent Studies: see, eg, Geoffrey, de Q Walker, ‘The Seven Pillars of Centralism: Engineers’ Case and Federalism’ (2002) 76 Australian Law Journal 678Google Scholar.

67 John, Gardner, ‘The Failed Discourse of State Constitutionalism’ (1992) 90 Michigan Law Review 761, 826Google Scholar.

68 Ibid 827.

69 Sheryll, Cashin ‘Federalism, Welfare Reform and the Minority Poor: Accounting for the Tyranny of State Majorities’ (1999) 99 Columbia Law Review 552Google Scholar.

70 Felix, Frankfurter and James, Landis, ‘The Compact Clause of the Constitution — A Study in Interstate Adjustments’ (1925) 34 Yale Law Journal 685, 688Google Scholar.

71 S R, Davis ‘Cooperative Federalism in Retrospect’ (1952) 5 Historical Studies: Australia and New Zealand 212, 215Google Scholar.

72 Martin, Painter, ‘Multi-Level Governance and the Emergence of Collaborative Federal Institutions in Australia’ (2001) 29 Policy and Politics 137Google Scholar; Martin, Painter, Collaborative Federalism: Economic Reform in Australia in the 1990s (1998) 32–61Google Scholar; Martin, Painter, Steering the Modern State: Changes in Central Coordination in Three Australian State Governments (1987)Google Scholar.

73 Included in these (Agreements) were the National Road Transport Commission Agreement (1991); the Non-Bank Financial Institutions Agreement (1991); the National Rail Corporation Agreement (1991); the Uniform Credit Laws Agreement (1993); and the National Competition Laws Agreement (1995). For a commentary on the several joint ‘Commonwealth-State’ agreements that were formed between 1990 and 1997 ─ as well as the activities undertaken by the Special Premiers’ Conference and the Council of Australian Governments ─ see Painter, Collaborative Federalism, above n 72, ch 3.

74 See Painter, Collaborative Federalism, above n 72, ch 2. See also Cheryl, Saunders ‘Collaborative Federalism’ (2002) 61 Australian Journal of Public Administration 69Google Scholar.

75 Painter distinguishes between two different models of federalism: an ‘arm’s length’ or ‘coordinate’ model and a ‘collaborative’ framework whereby governments enter into a range of binding agreements to pursue coordinated action: Painter, Collaborative Federalism, above n 72, 186–9.

76 Painter, Collaborative Federalism, above n 72, 100–3.

77 Painter, ‘Multi-Level Governance and the Emergence of Collaborative Federal Institutions in Australia’, above n 72, 140–1.

78 Ibid 140.

79 Ibid.

80 Ibid 145.

81 Painter, Collaborative Federalism, above n 72, 68.

82 See, eg, Painter, Steering the Modern State, above n 72, ch 1.

83 In this context, see Whitlam, above n 48, 307.

84 See the Housing Assistance Act 1996 (Cth) sch 1.

85 Clause 1, Guiding principle 1.

86 Clause 1, Guiding principle 4.

87 Clause 1, Guiding principle 3.

88 Clause 1, Guiding principles 2, 11.

89 Clause 1, Guiding principle 10.

90 (1999) 198 CLR 511 (‘Wakim’).

91 Alastair Nicholson, ‘Justice for Families and Young Offenders — A Unified Court System as a 21st Century Reform’ (Speech delivered at the,2003 JV Barry Memorial Lecture, University of Melbourne, 14 October 2003); George, Williams, ‘Cooperative Federalism and the Revival of the Corporations Law: Wakim and Beyond’, (2002) 20 Company and Securities Law Journal 160Google Scholar.

92 See eg, Williams, above n 91, 166–7, who provides examples in relation to corporations law where jurisdictional cross-vesting may produce a more efficient and effective legal and regulatory structure.

93 See eg, H G, Fryberg ‘Cross-Vesting of Jurisdiction’ (1987) 17 Queensland Law Society Journal 113Google Scholar.

94 (1998) 198 CLR 511 (Gleeson CJ, McHugh, Gummow, Hayne, Gaudron and Callinan JJ; Kirby J dissenting).

95 Section 71 provides that judicial power shall be vested in the High Court.

96 Section 75 declares that the Court shall have original jurisdiction in certain kinds of matters; s 76 empowers Federal Parliament to legislate to confer jurisdiction on the Court on certain kinds of matters; and s 77(iii) empowers Parliament to vest any State court with federal jurisdiction.

97 (1998) 198 CLR 511, 544 (Gleeson CJ), 546–7 (Gaudron J), 556–7 (McHugh J), 577–81 (Gummow and Hayne JJ), 625 (Callinan J).

98 Ibid 544 (Gleeson CJ), 555 (McHugh J), 578–9 (Gummow and Hayne JJ), 621 (Callinan J).

99 Ibid 535 (‘Duncan’).

100 Ibid 544 (Gleeson CJ), 557 (McHugh J), 580–81 (Gummow and Hayne JJ).

101 Ibid 545–6 (Gleeson CJ).

102 See Graeme, Hill, ‘The Demise of Cross-Vesting’ (1999) 27 Federal Law Review 547Google Scholar. See also Nicholas, Aroney, ‘The Constitutional Demise of the Cross-Vesting Scheme’ (1999) 7 Insolvency Law Journal 116, 130Google Scholar.

103 (1999) 198 CLR 511, 556 (McHugh J).

104 Ibid 577 (Gummow and Hayne JJ).

105 Ibid 599 (Kirby J).

106 See Aroney, above n 102, 130; Graeme, Hill, ‘R v Hughes and the Future of Co-operative Legislative Schemes’ (2000) 24 Melbourne University Law Review 478, 498–500Google Scholar.

107 (1999) 198 CLR 511, 557 (McHugh J).

108 Ibid 574 (Gummow and Hayne JJ).

109 Ibid 599 (Kirby J).

110 Ibid 601 (Kirby J).

111 Ibid (Kirby J).

112 Hill, above n 106, 498. See also Aroney, above n 102, 130.

113 Brian, Opeskin, ‘Cross-Vesting of Jurisdiction and the Federal Judicial system’ in Brian, Opeskin and Fiona, Wheeler (eds), The Australian Federal Judicial System (2000) 320Google Scholar.

114 Williams, above n 91, 163.

115 (2000) 202 CLR 535 (‘Hughes’), 554–5.

116 Williams describes Hughes as a ‘Pyrrhic victory for the Commonwealth’: Williams, above n 91, 165. See also Hill, above n 106, 493.

117 For example, in Hughes (2000) 202 CLR 535 the conferral of State (corporations) powers on the Commonwealth was, in any case, founded on the express constitutional provision of s 51(i) since the case involved Australian investment in American securities.

118 Hill, above n 106, 494.

119 Hughes (2000) 202 CLR 535, 560–1 (Kirby J).

120 Ibid.

121 Ibid. Kirby J, therefore, believed that the Commonwealth could permit the Australian Securities and Investment Commission to incorporate companies under State law: Hughes (2000) 202 CLR 535, 574–85.

122 Australian Constitution s 51(xxxvii).

123 Williams, above n 91, 166–7.

124 Ibid.

125 Ibid 168.

126 See Parliamentary Joint Committee on Corporations and Securities, Parliament of Australia, Report into the Provisions of (a) the Corporations (Commonwealth Powers) Act 2001 (NSW); and (b) the Corporations Bill 2001 and the Australian Securities and Investments Commission Bill 2001 (2001), 15.

127 Williams, above n 91, 168.

128 Ibid.

129 Jonathan, Feldman, ‘Separation of Powers and Judicial Review of Positive Rights Claims: the Role of State Courts in an Era of Positive Government’ (1993) 24 Rutgers Law Journal, 1057Google Scholar; Neuborne, above n 10; Hershkoff, ‘Positive Rights and State Constitutions: The Limits of Federal Rationality Review’, above n 1, 1156; Hershkoff, ‘Welfare Devolution and State Constitutions’, above n 1, 1403; Helen, Hershkoff, ‘State Courts and the ‘Passive Virtues’: Rethinking the Judicial Function’ (2001) 114 Harvard Law Review 1833Google Scholar; Brennan, above n 10, 535; Kincaid, above n 1, 913.

130 See, eg, Christine, Fletcher, Does Federalism Safeguard Indigenous Rights? (1999)Google Scholar.

131 See McCawley v The King (1918) 26 CLR 9. The one and only constitutional limitation on State constitutional power being that legislative enactments need to be for the ‘peace, welfare and good government’ of the State. The States (and colonies) have a history of realising interventionist legislative measures and several writers have documented their legislative programmes: see William, Pember Reeves, State Experiments in Australia and New Zealand (1969)Google Scholar; Michael, Quinlan, ‘Pre-Arbitral Labour Legislation in Australia’ in Stuart, MacIntyre and Richard, Mitchell (eds), Foundations of Arbitration: the Origins and Effects of State Compulsory Arbitration, 1890–1914 (1989)Google Scholar; Paul, Finn, Law and Government in Colonial Australia (1987), 34–67Google Scholar; David, Neal, The Rule of Law in a Penal Colony (1991)Google Scholar.

132 See McCawley v The King (1918) 26 CLR 9; Trethowan v Peden (1930) 31 SR (NSW) 183.

133 See Greg, Carney, ‘Centenary of State Constitutions’ in Glenn, Patmore and Gary, Jungwirth (eds), The Big Makeover: a New Australian Constitution (2002) 115Google Scholar. In an American context, see Hershkoff, ‘Positive Rights and State Constitutions: The Limits of Federal Rationality Review’, above n 1, 1131.

134 See the various commentaries on the ‘new judicial federalism’: Feldman, above n 129, 1057; Neuborne, above n 10, 883; Hershkoff, ‘Positive Rights and State Constitutions: The Limits of Federal Rationality Review’, above n 1, 1156; Hershkoff, ‘Welfare Devolution and State Constitutions’, above n 1, 1403; Hershkoff, ‘State Courts and the ‘Passive Virtues’: Rethinking the Judicial Function’, above n 129, 1833; Brennan, above n 10, 535; Kincaid, above n 1, 913; cf Gardner, above n 67, 761.

135 Brennan, above n 10, 535.

136 Hershkoff, ‘Forword: Positive Rights and the Evolution of State Constitutions’, above n 1, 803-4. See also G, Alan Tarr ‘Models and Fashions in State Constitutionalism’ (1998) Wisconsin Law Review 729, 739Google Scholar.

137 Hershkoff, ‘Positive Rights and State Constitutions: The Limits of Federal Rationality Review’, above n 1, 1135.

138 Hershkoff “Welfare Devolution and State Constitutions”, above n 1, 1408- 1416; Lynn, A. Baker and Ernest, A. Young “Federalism and the Double Standards of Judicial Review” (2001) 51 Duke Law Journal, 75Google Scholar at 159. .

139 The American State constitutions have flexible amendment procedures. For example, Article 18 of the California State Constitution simply requires a two-thirds majority of the Legislative Assembly to amend the Constitution. Similarly, Article 16 of the Ohio State Constitution requires a three-fifths majority of the Legislative Assembly to effect amendment.

140 Hershkoff, ‘Foreword: Positive Rights and the Evolution of State Constitutions’, above n 1, 805–6.

141 Ibid.

142 Ibid 817.

143 Hershkoff, ‘State Courts and the ‘Passive Virtues’: Rethinking the Judicial Function’, above n 129, 1839.

144 Ibid 1840.

145 Ibid 1900.

146 Feldman, above n 129, 1057.

147 Jeffrey, Dyess, ‘A Mandate to the Legislature or Serious Judicial Intervention? A Remedy in the Alabama Public School Equity Funding Case’ (1994) 25 Cumberland Law Review 133Google Scholar.

148 Brennan, above n 10, 548.

149 Ibid.

150 Neuborne, above n 10, 885.

151 Ibid.

152 Ibid.

153 Ibid 887.

154 See Dyess, above n 147, 135 who provides a commentary on Lujan v Colorado State Board of Education, 649 P 2d 1005 (Col, 1982) and Jiggetts v Grinker, 553 NE 2d 570 (NY, 1990) where State courts refused to intervene in issues of educational policy.

155 Neuborne, above n 10, 885.

156 Hershkoff, ‘State Courts and the ‘Passive Virtues’: Rethinking the Judicial Function’, above n 129, 1920.

157 Neuborne, above n 10, 885.

158 See Galligan, above n 5, 1.

159 For commentaries on how this inequality in revenue collection is inhibiting the States from undertaking significant (progressive) policy responsibilities see Webb, above n 5, 1; Galligan, above n 5, 1; Denis, James, ‘Federalism Up in Smoke? The High Court Decision on State Tobacco Tax’ (1997) 1 Current Issues Brief 2Google Scholar.

160 Webb, above n 5, 2. For example, in the 1996–97 financial year, the Commonwealth raised $115 billion ─ representing over 79 percent of total Commonwealth and State taxation.

161 The latter sources of income may have also been removed from State control with the recent widening by the High Court of s 90 of the Constitution: see Ha v New South Wales (1997) 189 CLR 465; see also John, Williams, ‘Come in Spinner: Section 90 of the Constitution and the Future of State Government Finances’ (1999) 21 Sydney Law Review 627Google Scholar.

162 For proposals seeking to decentralise federal revenue collection: see the Federal-State Relations Committee, Parliament of Victoria, Report on Federalism and the Role of the States: Comparisons and Recommendations (1999) ch 11.

163 James, above n 159.

164 John, Harrison, ‘Total Tax Revenue: Major Reform Issues’ (1996) 2 Current Issues Brief 1Google Scholar.

165 See the Federal-State Relations Committee, above n 162, Ch 11, especially 225.

166 See eg, Raoul, Blindenbacher and Arnold, Koller (eds), Federalism in a Changing World: Learning From Each Other. Scientific Background, Proceedings and Plenary Speeches of the International Conference on Federalism (2003)Google Scholar.

167 See Clifford, Larsen, ‘States Federal, Financial, Sovereign and Social: A Critical Inquiry into an Alternative to American Financial Federalism’ (1999) 47 American Journal of Comparative Law 429Google Scholar, 469.

168 Bratton and McCahery, above n 6, 217. In this context, see Bratton and McCahery’s consideration of the ‘race to the bottom’ thesis which it has been suggested that ‘competitive federalism’ may potentially produce.

169 Charles, Tiebout, ‘A Pure Theory of Local Expenditures’ (1956) 64 Journal of Political Economy 416Google Scholar.

170 Bratton and McCahery, above n 6, 230.

171 Ibid.

172 See Scott, Allard, ‘Revisiting Schapiro: Welfare Magnets and State Residency Requirements in the 1990s’ (1998) 28(3) Publius 45Google Scholar; Richard, Nathan and Thomas, Gais, ‘Early Findings About the Newest Federalism for Welfare’ (1998) 28(3) Publius 95Google Scholar; Sanford, Schram ‘Introduction ─ Welfare Reform: A Race to the Bottom?’ (1998) 28(3) Publius 1Google Scholar.

173 Allard, above n 172, 45.

174 Nicholas Aroney, ‘Fiscal Competition’ in Blindenbacher and Koller (eds), above n 166, 497.

175 Richard, Revesz, ‘Rehabilitating Interstate Competition: Rethinking the Race-to-the-Bottom Rationale for Federal Environmental Regulation’ (1992) 67 New York University Law Review 1210Google Scholar, 1242; Richard, Revesz, ‘The Race to the Bottom and Federal Environmental Regulation: A Response to the Critics’ (1997) 82 Minnesota Law Review 535Google Scholar.

176 Wallace, Oates and Robert, Schwab, ‘Economic Competition Among Jurisdictions: Efficiency Enhancing or Distortion Inducing’ (1988) 35 Journal of Public Economy 333Google Scholar; W A, Fischel, ‘Fiscal and Environmental Considerations in the Location of Firms in Suburban Communities’ in Edwin, Mills and Wallace, Oates (eds), Fiscal Zoning and Land Use Controls: the Economic Issues (1975)Google Scholar; Daniel, Farber, ‘Environmental Federalism in a Global Economy’ (1997) 83 Virginia Law Review 1283Google Scholar.

177 Aroney, above n 174, 498.

178 Ibid.

179 See Larsen, above n 167.

180 Lujan v Colorado State Board of Education, 649 P 2d 1005 (Col, 1982); Jiggetts v Grinker, 553 NE 2d 570 (NY, 1990).

181 See especially, Lujan v Colorado State Board of Education, 649 P 2d 1005 (Col, 1982).

182 Dyess, above n 147, 135. See, eg, Edgewood Independent School District v Kirby, 777 SW 2d 391 (Tex, 1989).

183 Dyess, above n 147, 137.

184 See Greenwood, above n 2.

185 Cf Michael, Coper, Encounters with the Australian Constitution (1987) 396Google Scholar; Colin, Howard, Australian Federal Constitutional Law (1985) 585Google Scholar; William, Wynes, Legislative, Executive and Judicial Powers in Australia (1976) 541Google Scholar; William, Harrison Moore, The Constitution of the Commonwealth of Australia (1910) 603Google Scholar.

186 Greenwood, above n 2, ch 4; Craven, above n 8, 89.

187 See Greenwood, above n 2; Laski, above n 2

188 Greenwood, above n 2, 117–74.

189 See the Federal-State Relations Committee, above n 162, ch 8.

190 See Craven, above n 8, 85; cf Wynes, above n 185, 542; Howard, above n 185, 585; Coper, above n 185, 395–7.

191 Craven, above n 8, 89.

192 Another consequence of this would be that s 52 would be redundant: ibid.

193 Ibid 90.

194 [1981] WAR 179 at 183 (Burt CJ). See also China Ocean Shipping v South Australia (1979) 145 CLR 172.

195 Craven, above n 8, 91.

196 Ibid.

197 Ibid.

198 Ibid.

199 Cf Moore, above n 185, 321; Wynes, above n 185, 542; Coper, above n 185, 395–7.

200 Craven, above n 8, 103.

201 Wynes, above n 185, 542.

202 Ibid 541.

203 Coper, above n 185, 397. See also Moore, above n 185, 603.

204 Coper, above n 185, 397.

205 Howard, above n 185, 585.

206 Ibid.

207 See Craven, above n 8, 108–9.

208 See Australian Constitution, ch I, pt III.

209 See Australian Constitution, ch III.

210 Craven, above n 8, 108.

211 In this respect, see Nicholas, Aroney, ‘A Public Choice? Federalism and the Prospects of a Republican Preamble’ (1999) 20 University of Queensland Law Journal 262Google Scholar.

212 Mark, Moshinsky, ‘Re-Enacting the Constitution in an Australian Act’ (1989) 18 Federal Law Review 134, 146Google Scholar.

213 Ibid 135.

214 Ibid.

215 Ibid.

216 Rodden and Rose-Ackerman, above n 10, 1523.

217 See, eg, Painter, Collaborative Federalism, above n 72, 1.