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The Pervasive Constitution: The Constitution Outside of the Courts

Published online by Cambridge University Press:  01 January 2025

Gabrielle Appleby Open the ORCID record for Gabrielle Appleby [Opens in a new window] ,
Vanessa MacDonnell  and
Eddie Synot
Gabrielle Appleby*
Affiliation:
UNSW Law
Vanessa MacDonnell*
Affiliation:
University of Ottawa, Faculty of Law (Common Law Section), and University of Ottawa, Public Law Centre
Eddie Synot*
Affiliation:
Griffith University, and UNSW Law
*
The author may be contacted at g.appleby@unsw.edu.au.
The author may be contacted at vanessa.macdonnell@uottawa.ca.
The author may be contacted at e.synot@unsw.edu.au.
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Abstract

The constitution pervades the governance practices of a state, far beyond its application and interpretation in the courts. This Special Issue draws together a field of scholarship that considers these extrajudicial dimensions of constitutional practice to reveal a very different constitution to the juridified version. It is a more complex, dynamic and pervasive vision of the constitution, focused on the ongoing relationships of a broader set of constitutional institutions and actors. These relationships are mediated by the legal and political dimensions of the constitution and by the narratives and symbolism that grow up around it. In this introduction, we explore three themes of the pervasive constitution: the importance of constitutional narratives and symbols, the multiplicity of constitutional actors and the relational nature of constitutionalism. This recalibrated understanding of the constitution reveals constitutional actors and power dynamics that are often invisible in more traditional accounts of constitutionalism. This recalibration is particularly important in addressing contemporary constitutional challenges. In settler systems hoping to decolonise, courts have proven important but insufficient sites of constitutional change, and it is in political spaces that new constitutional stories can be told, stories which acknowledge the full sovereignty of Indigenous peoples and their claim to territory. In countries experiencing democratic backsliding, extrajudicial actors have been championed as the backstops to democracy and human rights. We argue that only by understanding the space outside the courts will we appreciate the breadth of new constitutional possibilities.

Type
Articles
Information
Federal Law Review , Volume 48 , Issue 4 , December 2020 , pp. 437 - 454
Copyright
Copyright © 2020 The Author(s)

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References

1. See Ran Hirschl, Towards Juristocracy: The Origins and Consequences of the New Constitutionalism (Harvard University Press, 2004).

2. Mark Tushnet, Taking the Constitution Away from the Courts (Princeton University Press, 1999).

3. See, eg, Keith E Whittington, ‘Extrajudicial Constitutional Interpretation: Three Objections and Responses’ (2002) 80(3) North Carolina Law Review 773.

4. See further explanation of different positions in Cornelia T L Pillard, ‘The Unfulfilled Promise of the Constitution in Executive Hands’ (2005) 103(4) Michigan Law Review 676, 678–9.

5. See Richard Albert and Joel I Colón-Ríos (eds), Quasi-Constitutionality and Constitutional Statutes: Forms, Functions, Applications (Routledge, 2019); Vanessa MacDonnell, ‘A Theory of Quasi-Constitutional Legislation’ (2016) 53(2) Osgoode Hall Law Journal 508; Farrah Ahmed and Adam Perry, ‘The Quasi-Entrenchment of Constitutional Statutes’ (2014) 73(3) Cambridge Law Journal 514.

6. See Gabrielle Appleby and Anna Olijnyk, ‘Executive Policy Development and Constitutional Norms: Practice and Perceptions’ (2020) International Journal of Constitutional Law (forthcoming); Janet L Hiebert, Charter Conflicts: What is Parliament’s Role? (McGill-Queen’s University Press, 2002); Mary Dawson, ‘The Impact of the Charter on the Public Policy Process and the Department of Justice’ (1992) 30(3) Osgoode Hall Law Journal 595.

7. Peter W Hogg and Allison A Bushell, ‘The Charter Dialogue Between the Courts and the Legislatures (Or Perhaps the Charter of Rights Isn’t Such a Bad Thing After All)’ (1997) 35(1) Osgoode Hall Law Journal 75, 84–7.

8. Ann Chaplin, ‘Officers of Parliament: Accountability, Virtue and the Constitution’ (LLM Thesis, University of Ottawa, 2009).

9. See also Gabrielle Appleby, ‘Horizontal Accountability: The Rights-Protective Promise and Fragility of Executive Integrity Institutions’ (2017) 23(2) Australian Journal of Human Rights 168; Michael Pal, ‘Electoral Management Bodies as a Fourth Branch of Government’ (2016) 21(1) Review of Constitutional Studies 85.

10. See, eg, Jamal Greene, ‘Trump as Constitutional Failure’ (2018) 93(1) Indiana Law Journal 93.

11. See, eg, Aradhya Sethia, ‘Where’s the Party? Towards a Constitutional Biography of Political Parties’ (2019) 3(1) Indian Law Review 1; Tarun Khaitan, ‘Political Parties in Constitutional Theory’ (24 November 2019) <https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=3492467>.

12. Grégoire Webber, ‘Loyal Opposition and the Political Constitution’ (2017) 37(2) Oxford Journal of Legal Studies 357.

13. On knowledge institutions, see Vicki C Jackson, ‘Knowledge Institutions in Constitutional Democracies: Of Objectivity and Decentralization’, Harvard Law Review Blog (Blog Post, 29 August 2019) <https://blog.harvardlawreview.org/knowledge- institutions-in-constitutional-democracies-of-objectivity-and-decentralization>.

14. Paulus Blokker, ‘Constitutional Resistance in Populist Times’ (2020) 48(4) Federal Law Review 511–528.

15. See, eg, Delgamuukw v British Columbia [1997] 3 SCR 1010.

16. On rendering the invisible visible, see Patricia J Williams, The Alchemy of Race and Rights (Harvard University Press, 1991). See also Halla Ahmed, ‘“No Well-Bred Person Will Endeavour to Force Himself into a Place Where He is Not Wanted”: The Stories We Don’t Tell in Canadian Law and Society, and the Transformative Power in Storytelling’ (2020) (unpublished, copy on file with authors).

17. In the federalism realm, see also Herbert Wechsler, ‘The Political Safeguards of Federalism: The Role of the States in the Composition and Selection of the National Government’ (1954) 54(4) Columbia Law Review 543, cited in Wade Wright, ‘The Political Safeguards of Canadian Federalism’ (2016) 36(1) National Journal of Constitutional Law 1, 7–8. Regarding fourth branch institutions, see Bruce Ackerman, ‘The New Separation of Powers’ (2000) 113(3) Harvard Law Review 633.

18. See, eg, Larry D Kramer, The People Themselves: Popular Constitutionalism and Judicial Review (Oxford University Press, 2005); Mark Tushnet, ‘Popular Constitutionalism as Political Law’ (2006) 81(3) Chicago-Kent Law Review 991; Robert C Post and Reva B Siegel, ‘Roe Rage: Democratic Constitutionalism and Backlash’ (2007) 42(2) Harvard Civil Rights-Civil Liberties Law Review 373; Robert C Post and Reva B Siegel, ‘Legislative Constitutionalism and Section Five Power: Policentric Interpretation of the Family and Medical Leave Act’ (2003) 112(8) Yale Law Journal 1943.

19. Kramer (n 18); Post and Siegel, ‘Roe Rage: Democratic Constitutionalism and Backlash’ (2007) (n 18).

20. Dawn E Johnsen, ‘Functional Departmentalism and Nonjudicial Interpretation: Who Determines Constitutional Meaning?’ (2004) 67(3) Law and Contemporary Problems 105.

21. John Hart Ely, Democracy and Distrust: A Theory of Judicial Review (Harvard University Press, 1980) 76.

22. Post and Siegel, ‘Roe Rage: Democratic Constitutionalism and Backlash’ (2007) (n 18). See also Tushnet (n 18).

23. Whittington (n 3).

24. Letter from Thomas Jefferson to Abigail Smith Adams, 11 September 1804 (Founders Online, National Archive) <https://founders.archives.gov/documents/Jefferson/99-01-02-0348>.

25. Andrew Jackson, ‘Veto Message’ in James D Richardson (ed), A Compilation of the Messages and Papers of the Presidents 1789–1897 (Bureau of National Literature Inc, 1897) vol 2, 602.

26. Dred Scott v Sandford 60 US 393 (1856).

27. Abraham Lincoln, ‘First Inaugural Address’ in James D Richardson (ed), A Compilation of the Messages and Papers of the Presidents 1789–1897 (Bureau of National Literature Inc, 1897) vol 6, 5, 9.

28. Edwin Meese III, ‘The Law of the Constitution’ (1987) 61 Tulane Law Review 979.

29. See further discussion in Johnsen (n 20).

30. See Eskridge and Frickey’s discussion in their Introduction to Henry M Hart and Albert M Sacks, The Legal Process: Basic Problems in the Making and Application of Law (Foundation Press, 1994) 148; see also Henry M Hart and Albert M Sacks ‘The Legal Process: Basic Problems in the Making and Application of Law’ in David M Kennedy and William W Fisher III (eds), The Canon of American Legal Thought (Princeton University Press, 2006) 241.

31. J A G Griffith, ‘The Political Constitution’ (1979) 42(1) Modern Law Review 1.

32. Aileen Kavanagh, ‘Recasting the Political Constitution: From Rivals to Relationships’ (2019) 30(1) King’s Law Journal 43.

33. Ibid. See, eg, Adam Tomkins, Our Republican Constitution (Hart, 2005); G D S Gee, ‘The Political Constitutionalism of JAG Griffith’ (2008) 28(1) Legal Studies 20; Thomas Poole, ‘Tilting at Windmills? Truth and Illusion in “The Political Constitution”’ (2007) 70(2) Modern Law Review 250; Richard Bellamy, Political Constitutionalism: A Republican Defence of the Constitutionality of Democracy (Cambridge University Press, 2009).

34. Tomkins (n 33) 3.

35. J A G Griffith, ‘The Common Law and the Political Constitution’ (2001) 117(1) Law Quarterly Review 42, 49; Kavanagh (n 32).

36. Ibid.

37. R (Miller) v Secretary of State for Exiting the EU [2018] AC 61; R (on the application of Miller) v The Prime Minister; Cherry v Advocate General for Scotland [2019] All ER 299. See further overview of the legal and political constitutionalists division over the R (Miller) v Secretary of State for Exiting the EU [2018] AC 61 judgment in Gavin Philipson, ‘Brexit, Prerogative and the Courts: Why Did Political Constitutionalists Support the Government Side in Miller?’ (2017) 36(2) University of Queensland Law Journal 311.

38. See, for instance, the Australian High Court’s decisions in Egan v Willis (1998) 195 CLR 424 and Williams v Commonwealth (No 1) (2012) 248 CLR 156.

39. Graham Gee and Grégoire Webber, ‘What is a Political Constitution?’ (2010) 30(2) Oxford Journal of Legal Studies 273, 273.

40. Matthew S R Palmer, ‘Using Constitutional Realism to Identify the Complete Constitution: Lessons from an Unwritten Constitution’ (2006) 54(3) American Journal of Comparative Law 587.

41. See, eg, Enid Campbell, Parliamentary Privilege (Federation Press, 2003).

42. Yee-Fui Ng, ‘Political Constitutionalism: Individual Responsibility and Collective Restraint’ (2020) 48(4) Federal Law Review 455.

43. Ibid 467.

44. See, for instance, in South Africa, Heinz Klug, ‘Accountability and the Role of Independent Constitutional Institutions in South Africa’s Post-Apartheid Constitutions’ (2015–2016) 60(1) New York Law School Law Review 153. See also Ackerman (n 17).

45. See, eg, in Australia, James Spigelman, ‘The Integrity Branch of Government’ (2004) 78(11) Australian Law Journal 724; John McMillan, ‘Re-thinking the Separation of Powers’ (2010) 38(3) Federal Law Review 423; Appleby (n 9); Stephen Gageler, ‘Three is Plenty’ in Greg Weeks and Matthew Groves (eds), Administrative Redress In and Out of the Courts: Essays in Honour of Robin Creyke and John McMillan (Federation Press, 2019) 12.

46. Paul Kildea, ‘The Constitutional Role of Electoral Management Bodies: The Case of the Australian Electoral Commission’ (2020) 48(4) Federal Law Review 470.

47. A V Dicey, Introduction to the Study of the Law of the Constitution (Macmillan, 1st ed, 1885; 10th ed, 1959) 175.

48. See further Wright (n 17) 26–7; Robert French, ‘The Incredible Shrinking Federation: Voyage to a Singular State?’ in Gabrielle Appleby, Nicholas Aroney and Thomas John (eds), The Future of Australian Federalism: Comparative and Interdisciplinary Perspectives (Cambridge University Press, 2012) 39.

49. For a taste of the extensive legal and interdisciplinary scholarship in this field, see the Australian and comparative contributions in, for example, Appleby, Aroney and John (eds) (n 48); Paul Kildea, Andrew Lynch and George Williams (eds), Tomorrow’s Federation: Reforming Australian Government (Federation Press, 2012); Mark Bruerton et al (eds), A People’s Federation (Federation Press, 2017).

50. See, eg, Detlef Nolte and Almut Schilling-Vacaflor (eds), New Constitutionalism in Latin America: Promises and Practices (Ashgate, 2012); John Mukum Mbaku, Protecting Minority Rights in African Countries: A Constitutional Political Economy Approach (Edward Elgar, 2018).

51. See further discussion of the different eras and scholarships in legal pluralism in Margaret Davies, ‘Legal Pluralism’ in Peter Cane and Herbert M Kritzer (eds), The Oxford Handbook of Empirical Legal Research (Oxford University Press, 2010) 805; Brian Z Tamanaha, ‘Understanding Legal Pluralism: Past to Present, Local to Global’ (2008) 30(3) Sydney Law Review 375.

52. John Griffiths, ‘What is Legal Pluralism’ (1986) 24 Journal of Legal Pluralism 1, 7.

53. See, eg, M B Hooker, Legal Pluralism: An Introduction to Colonial and Neo-Colonial Laws (Clarendon Press, 1975).

54. See, eg, Anne Griffiths, ‘Reconfiguring Law: An Ethnographic Perspective from Botswana’ (1998) 23(3) Law and Social Inquiry 587.

55. This includes nations such as Australia, New Zealand, Canada, the United States, Norway and Sweden, among others. Settler colonial studies have developed as a critique of state governance of Indigenous peoples in these situations and the limitations of decolonisation. See, eg, Lorenzo Veracini, Settler Colonialism: A Theoretical Overview (Palgrave, 2010); Tracey Banivanua Mar, Decolonisation and the Pacific: Indigenous Globalisation and the Ends of Empire (Cambridge University Press, 2016).

56. See, eg, John Borrows, Freedom and Indigenous Constitutionalism (University of Toronto Press, 2016); Simon Young, Jennifer Nielsen and Jeremy Patrick (eds), Constitutional Recognition of First Peoples in Australia: Theories and Comparative Perspectives (Federation Press, 2016); Patrick Macklem and Douglas Sanderson (eds), From Recognition to Reconciliation: Essays on the Constitutional Entrenchment of Aboriginal and Treaty Rights (University of Toronto Press, 2016).

57. Dylan Lino, Constitutional Recognition: First Peoples and the Australian Settler State (Federation Press, 2018) 69–90.

58. Specific Claims Tribunal Canada (Web Page) <https://www.sct-trp.ca/hom/index_e.htm>.

59. Haida Nation v British Columbia (Minister of Forests) [2004] 3 SCR 511; Mikisew Cree First Nation v Canada (Governor General in Council) [2018] 2 SCR 765.

60. Rio Tinto Alcan Inc v Carrier Sekani Tribal Council [2010] 2 SCR 650 [34]; Delgamuukw v British Columbia [1997] 3 SCR 1010 [186].

61. See, eg, Jacinta Ruru and Nicola Wheen, ‘Providing for rāhui in the Law of Aotearoa New Zealand’ in Tamatoa Bambridge (ed), The rahui: Legal Pluralism in Polynesian Traditional Management of Resources and Territories (ANU Press, 2016) 195.

62. Jacinta Ruru and Jacobi Kohu-Morris, ‘“Maranga Ake Ai” The Heroics of Constitutionalising Te Tiriti O Waitangi/The Treaty of Waitangi in Aotearoa New Zealand’ (2020) 48(4) Federal Law Review 561.

63. Mabo v Queensland (No 2) (1992) 175 CLR 1; Love v Commonwealth of Australia [2020] HCA 3 (‘Love and Thoms’).

64. See Love and Thoms (n 63) [132]–[140] (Gageler J).

65. Gabrielle Appleby and Eddie Synot, ‘A First Nations Voice: Institutionalising Political Listening’ (2020) 48(4) Federal Law Review 529, 532.

66. Borrows (n 56); Lino (n 57).

67. Lino (n 57) 174–244.

68. Borrows (n 56) 103–28.

69. See generally Kavanagh (n 32); Scott Stephenson, From Dialogue to Disagreement in Comparative Rights Constitutionalism (Federation Press, 2016). For an even broader account of disagreement, which includes social movements, see Post and Siegel, ‘Roe Rage: Democratic Constitutionalism and Backlash’ (2007) (n 18).

70. Hogg and Bushell (n 7); Kent Roach, The Supreme Court on Trial: Judicial Activism or Democratic Dialogue? (Irwin Law, 2016).

71. Hogg and Bushell (n 7); Stephen Gardbaum, The New Commonwealth Model of Constitutionalism (Cambridge University Press, 2013); Scott Stephenson, ‘Review of Stephen Gardbaum, The New Commonwealth Model of Constitutionalism: Theory and Practice’ (2013) 76(6) Modern Law Review 1156–62.

72. See, eg, Borrows (n 56).

73. Karen Drake, ‘Indigenous Constitutionalism and Dispute Resolution Outside the Courts: An Invitation’ (2020) 48(4) Federal Law Review 579.

74. See, eg, C F Black, The Land is the Source of the Law: A Dialogic Encounter with Indigenous Jurisprudence (Routledge, 2011).

75. Liberal theorists still struggle with how to ‘fit’ or ‘accommodate’ Indigenous peoples within their normative and constitutional spaces, often relying on practices that have been at the centre of exclusion. Rather than address the required structural reform of the normative structure of liberal constitutionalism, these attempts instead continue to look at minor or surface accommodations that perpetuate structural issues and refuse a more meaningful engagement with Indigenous peoples. See, eg, Duncan Ivison, Can Liberal States Accommodate Indigenous Peoples? (Polity Press, 2019).

76. Drake (n 73).

77. Appleby (n 9); Kildea (n 46); Ng (n 42).

78. Asha Kaushal, ‘Constituent Power: Political Unity and Constitutional Plurality’ (2017) 37(2) National Journal of Constitutional Law 91; Asha Kaushal, ‘Collective Diversity and Jurisdictional Accommodations in Constitutional Perspective’ in Richard Albert, Paul Daly and Vanessa MacDonnell (eds), The Canadian Constitution in Transition (University of Toronto Press, 2018), 193.

79. Appleby and Synot (n 65) 538–542; Drake (n 73); Dylan Lino, ‘The Australian Constitution as Symbol’ (2020) 48(4) Federal Law Review 554.

80. For consideration of the public servant’s particular constitutional obligations, see Vanessa MacDonnell, ‘The Civil Servant’s Role in the Implementation of Constitutional Rights’ (2015) 13(2) International Journal of Constitutional Law 383.

81. Eoin Carolan, ‘Constitutional Change Outside the Courts: Citizen Deliberation and Constitutional Narrative(s) in Ireland’s Abortion Referendum’ (2020) 48(4) Federal Law Review 497–499; Blokker (n 14).

82. Lino (n 79).

83. Drake (n 73); Kavanagh (n 32).

84. Liora Lazarus, ‘Constitutional Scholars as Constitutional Actors’ (2020) 48(4) Federal Law Review 487–488.

85. Jackson (n 25) cited in ibid.

86. Carolan (n 81).

87. Blokker (n 14).

88. Drake (n 73).

89. Lino (n 79).

90. Ruru and Kohu-Morris (n 62).

91. Waitangi Tribunal, Ko Aotearoa Tēnei: Report on the Wai 262 Claim Released (Web Page) <https://waitangitribunal.govt.nz/news/ko-aotearoa-tenei-report-on-the-wai-262-claim-released>.

92. Drake (n 73).

93. On ‘the stories we tell’, see Kate Glover Berger, ‘The Supreme Court in Canada’s Constitutional Order’ (2016) 20(2) Review of Constitutional Studies 143. See also Arundhati Roy, ‘The Pandemic is a Portal’, Financial Times (online), 3 April 2020, <https://www.ft.com/content/10d8f5e8-74eb-11ea-95fe-fcd274e920ca>.

94. Blokker (n 14); Carolan (n 81).