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Published online by Cambridge University Press: 24 January 2025
It seems generally admitted that the term ‘police power’ was first used in 1827 by Marshall C.J. in Brown v. Maryland. However the concept which underlay this term was not new. References to ‘regulations of internal police’, ‘matters of police’ etc. are found in the writings of such eminent eighteenth century authors as Montesquieu, Blackstone, and Vattel. These terms found an early use in newly independent America.
This article is part of a thesis submitted for the degree of Doctor of the Science of Law at the University of Michigan.
1 (1827) 12 Who 419, 433.
2 Cook, , ‘What is the Police Power?’ (1907) 7 Columbia Law Review 322CrossRefGoogle Scholar, 326.
3 For a full discussion of the early use of this term, Crosskey, , Politics and the Constitution in the History of the United States (1953) i 145–155Google Scholar and references there cited.
4 Webster, , American Dictionary of the English Language (1828)Google Scholar.
5 Bierly, W. R., The Police Power—State and Federal (1828)Google Scholar.
6 Plucknett, T. F. T., ‘Bonham's Case and Judicial Review’ (1926) 40 Harvard Law Review 30CrossRefGoogle Scholar, 61-68. Extra-territorial authority of Parliament, as opposed to that of the Crown was also in doubt. Kennedy, , Essays in Constitutional Law (1934) 8–15Google Scholar and vide 6 Geo. III, c. 12 (an Act declaring the American colonies subordinate to the Imperial Parliament).
7 Plucknett, op. cit. 49-61
8 Clark, Colonial Law 28.
9 Dickerson, Oliver M., American Colonial Government 1696-1765 (1912) 234–263Google Scholar.
10 Chafee, Zechariah Jnr, ‘Colonial Courts and the Common Law’ (1945), 68th Proceedings of the Massachusetts Historical Society 132Google Scholar, 134-137. How effective these limitations were is a different matter, Crosskey, op. cit. n. 3, and Schlesinger, A. M., ‘Colonial Appeals to the Privy Council’ (1913) Political Science Quarterly 279CrossRefGoogle Scholar, 433.
11 Bowman V. Middleton (1792) 1 Bay 252, (South Carolina).
12 Clark, op. cit. n. 8, 41-43.
13 Decided in 1728 on appeal from Connecticut; Smith, Appeals to the Privy Council from the American Plantations 537-582.
14 Philips v. Savage (1738); Smith, op. cit. n. 13, 562-572.
15 Clark v. Tousey (1745); Smith, op. cit. n. 13, 572-582. ‘ Overruled ’ is perhaps too strongly worded; ibid. 576.
16 Clark, op. cit. n. 8, 74.
17 Bowman v. Middleton, (1792) 1 Bay 252 (S.C.). See also Trevett v. Weeden discussed in Plucknett, op. cit . n. 6, 65-67. See also Dixon, , ‘The Law and the Constitution’ (1935) 51 Law Quarterly Review 590Google Scholar, 596.
18 Plucknett, op. cit. n. 6, 61-65 and materials there cited.
19 Commentaries i, 129-140. Corwin, , ‘The “ Higher Law ” Background of American Constitutional Law’ (1928) 42 Harvard Law Review 149CrossRefGoogle Scholar, 365
20 Blackstone, Commentaries i, 91.
21 Gibbons v. Ogden (1824) 9 Wh. 1, 211.
22 Thus Hamilton, , The Federalist (1961) No. 81CrossRefGoogle Scholar, 508 suggested that there were limitations on legislative power ‘ on general principles of law and reason’. See also Madison, in The Federalist (1961) No. 44, 319Google Scholar.
23 Calder v. Bull (1798) 3 Dallas 386, 388 per Chase J.
24 Second Treatise on Civil Government, c. II s. 135.
25 Soper v. Harvard College (1822) 1 Pick. 177, 179 (Mass); Stuyvesant v. Mayor of New York (1827) 7 Cow. 588, 605 (New York). The idea is found in manycases dealing with the police power of the States that the legislature can onlyinterfere with the rights of private property or personal liberty where the common law would have sanctioned public intervention, e.g. the right to abate nuisance. The doctrines of ‘ overruling necessity’ and ‘ sic utere tuo ut alienum non laedas ' which related to the law of property and its protection from intervention by strangers and the Crown, were transferred to the legislative field. According to this doctrine the State legislatures could not override rights sanctioned by the common law except where the common law had already qualified them. Commonwealth v. Tewksbury (1846) 11 Met. 55 (Mass.). See R. L. Roettinger, The Supreme Court and State Police Power 13; Hastings, W. G., ‘The Development of Law as Illustrated by the Decisions relating to the Police Power of the State’ (1900) 39th Proceedings of the American Philosophical Society 359, 410Google Scholar, 411.
26 Tiedeman, C. G., Limitations of Police Power (1886) 4Google Scholar.
27 Thorpe v. Rutland and Burlington B. R. Co. (1845) 27 Vermont 140; Beebe v. State (1855) 6 Indiana 501, 508, 509; Wynehammer v. People (1856) 13 N.Y. 378,390; State v. Noyes (1859) 47 Maine 189,211-214.
28 In Commonwealth v. Alger (1851) 7 Cush 53, 85 (Mass.), Shaw C.J. describes the police power as the power ‘ to make, ordain and establish all manner of wholesome and reasonable laws, statutes and ordinances, either with penalties or without, not repugnant to the Constitution, as they [i.e. the legislators] shall judge to be for the good and welfare of the Commonwealth, and of the subjects of the same’. Though Shaw C.J. was willing to leave greater discretion to the legislature than most of his brethren at the time were prepared to admit, the stipulation that such laws should be ‘ reasonable ’ anticipates the Fourteenth Amendment. See also Toledo, Wabash and Western Railway Co. v. City of Jacksonville (1873) 67 Ill. 37, 40.
29 E.g. The Federalist Nos. 32 and 33.
30 Gibbons v. Ogden (1824) 9 Wh. 1, 203 per Marshall, C.J. ‘that immense mass of legislation, which embraces everything within the territory of a State, not surrendered to the general government’; License Cases (Pierce v. New Hampshire) (1847) 5Google Scholar How. 504, 582 per Taney C.J. ‘ the powers of government inherent in every sovereignty to the extent of its dominions ’.
31 Gibbons v. Ogden, (1824) 9 Wh. 1, 203; Brown v. Maryland, (1827) 12 Who 419.
32 License Cases, supra n. 30.
33 (1837) 11 Pet. 102 sustaining a New York statute requiring the master of incoming vessels to report the name, place of birth, age, legal settlement and occupation of every passenger landing in New York. Reversed in Henderson v. Mayor of New York (1875) 92 U.S. 259.
34 Ibid. 139.
35 (1847) 5 How. 504, 588 sustaining State laws requiring licences for the sale of liquor including liquor brought in from outside the State. Virtually overruled in Leisy v. Hardin (1890) 135 U.S. 100.
36 Ibid. 592, 593.
37 Smith v. Turner, Norris v. City of Boston (1849) 7 How. 283 in which the Court, for a variety of reasons, held invalid State taxes upon alien passengers arriving in the State from foreign countries.
38 Groves v. Slaughter (1841) 15 Pet. 449, 508 per McLean J., 516 per Baldwin J. License Cases, supra n. 30, 632 per Grier J.
39 The interchangeability of the State concept and the federal concept is illustrated by the decision in Jones v. People (1852) 14 Ill. 196 where the federal decisions on the police power are cited in support of a decision that the prohibition of liquor is within the police power of the State of Illinois, i.e. under the State Constitution.
40 (1851) 12 How. 299.
41 Ibid.
42 (1862) I Black 603.
43 (1885) 114 U.S. 196.
44 Ribble, State and National Power over Commerce (1937) 87, 88.
45 E.g.: Tennessee v. Davis (1880) 100 U.S. 256, 300, 301; Robbins v. Shelby County Tax District (1887) 120 U.S. 489. See also Gavit, The Commerce Clause (1932) 21.
46 Ribble, op. cit. n. 44 in ch. XI comes to the same conclusion. See also Gavit, op. cit. n. 45, 24-26 and cases there cited.
47 (1873) 16 Wall. 36 holding that a Louisiana law conferring a monopoly of slaughtering upon a named corporation within a certain part of the State, did not contravene either the Thirteenth or the Fourteenth Amendment to the Constitution. But see later, Allgeyer v. Louisiana (1897) 165 U.S. 578.
48 Ibid. 66, 67.
49 (1877) 94 U.S. 113, upholding an Illinois statute fixing the maximum rates that could be charged for the storage of grain in elevators in the Chicagoarea. Distinguished in Wabash, St Louis and Pacific Ry Co. v. Illinois (1886) 118 U.S. 557 which restricted severely the power of the States to regulatecharges made by public utilities operating in several States.
50 An intermediate stage is seen in Cole v. La Grange (1885) 113 U.S. 1 where a restriction is federalized as a principle derived from the nature of free governments, but without reliance upon the Fourteenth Amendment. The Court shows an awareness that infringement of what the State courts had enforced as a limitation upon the police power was an infringement of the Federal Constitution, but the justices could not yet assign that protection to its proper pigeonhole.
51 (1897) 165 U.S. 578.
52 In this sense Field J. was correct in saying in Barbier v. Connolly (1885) 113 U.S. 27, 31 that the Fourteenth Amendment did not interfere with the police power of the States.
53 Brown, Ray A., ‘Due Process of Law, Police Power, and the Supreme Court’ (1927) 40 Harvard Law Review 943CrossRefGoogle Scholar, 948-952.
54 (1897) 165 U.S. 578, 589 holding that Louisiana could not prohibit defendants who were cottonbrokers in New Orleans, from insuring with a New York insurance company not registered in Louisiana.
55 Beebe v. State (1855) 6 Ind. 501, 505 per Perkins J.
56 (1905) 198 U.S. 45.
57 Pound, Roscoe, ‘ Liberty of Contract ’ (1908) 18 Yale Law Journal 454CrossRefGoogle Scholar, 470 ff.
58 Brown, op. cit. n. 53, 952.
59 Ernest Freund, The Police Power (1904) 15.
60 Ribble, op. cit. n. 44, 224, 225; Gavit, op. cit. n. 45, 23.
61 Ribble, op. cit. n. 44, 98, 99.
62 Schollenberger v. Pennsylvania (1898) 171 U.S. 1
63 E.g. Slaughter-House Cases (1873) 16 Wall. 36; Munn v. Illinois (1877) 94 U.S. 113.
64 Leisy v. Hardin (1890) 135 U.S. 100; Allgeyer v. Louisiana (1897) 165 U.S. 578; Schollenberger v. Pennsylvania (1898) 171 U.S. 1.
65 (1847) 5 How. 504, 588-593 per McLean J., 632 per Grier J. See Ribble, op. cit. n. 44, 90, 91.
66 (1849) 7 How. 283.
67 Ribble, op. cit. n. 44, 90-97.
68 Minnesota v. Barber (1890) 136 U.S. 313.
69 Railroad Co. v. Fuller (1873) 17 Wall. 560.
70 Sherlock v. Alling (1876) 93 U.S. 99, 102.
71 American Manufacturing Co. v. St Louis (1919) 250 U.S. 459.
72 Robbins v. Shelby County Taxing District (1887) 120 U.S. 489.
73 (1876) 91 U.S. 275 holding invalid a Missouri statute requiring peddlers of outof-State goods to obtain a licence as a prerequisite to carrying out their calling.
74 Such as the prevention of obvious physical danger, e.g. the importation of diseased cattle; Morgan v. Louisiana (1886) 118 U.S. 455; Smith v. St Louis and S.W. Railway (1901) 181 U.S. 248.
75 (1890) 135 U.S. 100.
76 Ibid. 159 per Gray, Harlan and Brewer JJ.
77 E.g. in Schollenberger v. Pennsylvania (1898) 171 U.S. 1; Collins v. New Hampshire (1898) 171 U.S. 30.
78 26 Stat. 313; see also Webb-Kenyon Act of 1913, 37 Stat. 699; Hawes-Cooper Act of 1929, 45 Stat. 1084; Miller-Tydings Act of 1937, 50 Stat. 693; McCarran Act of 1945, 59 Stat. 33.
79 In re Rahrer (1891) 140 U.S. 545; Clark Distilling Co. v. Western Maryland Railway Co. (1917) 242 U.S. 311; Prudential Insurance Co. v. Benjamin (1946) 328 U.S. 408.
80 (1851) 12 How. 299.
81 Buck v. Kuykendall (1925) 267 U.S. 307, 315 per Brandeis J.
82 (1927) 273 U.S. 34, 44 where the majority held invalid a State statute requiring all persons selling steamship tickets to or from foreign countries to be licensed. Overruled in California v. Thompson (1941) 313 U.S. 109.
83 (1942) 317 U.S. 341, 362.
84 Ibid.
85 (1938) 303 U.S. 177 upholding a State statute prescribing maximum width and weight for semi-trailer trucks using State highways.
86 Ibid. 191.
87 Ibid. 191. For a similar approach to a problem under the Fourteenth Amendment see Sage Stores v. Kansas (1944) 323 U.S. 32, 35 per Reed J.
88 (1945) 325 U.S. 761, 769.
89 Ibid. 775, 776.
90 Ibid. 794.
91 Ibid. 795 per Douglas J.
92 Nippert v. Richmond (1946) 327 U.S. 416; Freeman v. Hewit (1946) 329 U.S. 249,253; H. P. Hood & Sons v. Du Mond (1949) 336 U.S. 525; Dean Milk Co. v. City of Madison (1951) 340 U.S. 349.
93 (1946) 328 U.S. 373, 387, 388 declaring invalid a Virginia law requiring racial segregation in interstate transport. Distinguished in Colorado Anti-Discrimination Commission v. Continental Airlines (1963) 372 U.S. 714.
94 H. P. Hood & Sons v. Du Mond (1949) 336 U.S. 525, 563, 564; Dean Milk Co. v. City of Madison, (1951) 340 U.S. 349, 358, 359.
95 (1949) 336 U.S. 525 declaring invalid a New York scheme designed to keep milk within the State.
96 Ibid. 554, 555.
97 Ibid. 538, 539.
98 Dean Milk Co. v. City of Madison (1951) 340 U.S. 349, 354.
99 H. P. Hood & Sons v. Du Mond (1949) 336 U.S. 525, 549.
1 Bibb v. Navajo Freight Lines (1959) 359 U.S. 520, 529 per Douglas J.
2 Ibid.
3 Ibid. 530.
4 H. P. Hood & Sons v. Du Mond (1949) 336 U.S. 525, 529-532.
5 Polar Ice Cream v. Andrews (1964) 11 Law Ed. 2d. 389.
6 (1963) 373 U.S. 132.
7 Huron Portland Cement Co. v. Detroit (1960) 362 U.S. 440; Head v. Board of Examiners (1963) 374 U.S. 424; Florida Avocado Growers v. Paul (1963) 373 U.S. 132.
8 Colorado Anti-Discrimination Commission v. Continental Airlines (1963) 372 U.S. 714, 719, 720, 721.
9 Ferguson v. Skrupa (1963) 372 U.S. 726.
10 Kallenbach, J. E., Federal and State Cooperation (1942) 195Google Scholar.
11 Kennedy, Constitutional Documents of Canada (1918) 10.
12 Clark, Colonial Law 10, suggested that in a ‘ settled’colony the Crown has no legislativewer but that this is possessed by the Imperial Parliament or the local legislature when called. However, it would appear, that in the beginnings of a settled colony the Crown has of necessity a limited power oflegislation, though not ofimposing taxation, until local circumstances permit the calling of an assembly. See Evatt, H. V., ‘ The Legal Foundations of New South Wales ’ (1938) 11 Australian Law Journal 409Google Scholar, 421-423; Lumb, R. D., The Constitutions of the Australian States (1963) 6Google Scholar. But see contra: Campbell, W. B., ‘ A Note on Jeremy Bentham's “ A Plea for the Constitution of New South Wales” ’ (1951) 25 Australian Law Journal 59Google Scholar.
13 Clark, op. cit. n. 12, 41.
14 14 Geo. III c. 83.
15 The Proclamation of 1763 had indeed purported to change the law of Quebec and had promised the convening of an assembly as soon as practicable.
16 31 Geo. III c. 31.
17 31 Geo. III c. 55.
18 32 Geo. III c. 46 (1792).
19 The exception being 27 Geo. III c. 2 (1787) which authorized the King to create a Court of criminal jurisdiction in the colony.
20 See Bentham, Jeremy, A Plea for the Constitution of New South Wales, Works (1843) iv, 255–260Google Scholar.
21 4 Geo. IV, c. 96 (1823), 9 Geo. IV c. 83 (1828). These statutes made arrangements for the administration ofjustice and also conferred legislative powers on the Governor aided by a nominee Council. Finally after several interim measures Parliament authorized the convening of representative legislatures in the Australian colonies by the Australian Constitutions Act of 1850, 13 & 14 Vic. c. 59.
22 Kennedy, , Constitutional Documents of Canada (1918) 217Google Scholar.
23 See Clark, op. cit. n. 12, passim for the position as at 1834.
24 See for details: Hannan, A. J., The Life of Chief Justice Way (1960)Google Scholar ch. 4.
25 28 & 29 Vic. c. 63.
26 The Statute of Westminster of 1931 (22 Geo. V c. 4) s. 2 abolished this supremacy so far as the Commonwealth was concerned, but not in respect of the Australian States.
27 See Higinbotham, C.J. in Toy v. Musgrove (1888) 14Google Scholar V.L.R. 349, 379, 396.
28 Ibid. 407, 408 per Kerferd J.
29 (1878) 3 A.C. 889.
30 Ibid. 904-905. See also Hodge v. The Queen (1883) 9 A.C. 117, 132; Powell v. Appollo Candle Co. (1885) 10 A.C. 282, 289, 290.
31 See Records of Debate of the Federal Convention First Session, Adelaide (1897)1141 (Deakin), 1145 (O'Connor); Second Session, Sydney (1897) 1061 (Isaacs), 1062-1063 (O&Connor).
32 Per O'Connor, First Session, Adelaide (1897) 1145, supra.
33 Records of Debates of the Federal Convention Second Session, Sydney (1897)1059-1061.
34 Ibid. 1063, 1064.
35 See Isaacs, J. in Ex parte Nelson (No.1) (1928) 42Google Scholar C.L.R. 209, 226.
36 S. 112–‘ After uniform duties of customs have been imposed, a State may levy on imports or exports, or on goods passing into or out of the State, such charges as may be necessary for executing the inspection laws of the State; but the net produce of all charges so levied shall be for the use of the Commonwealth; and any such inspection laws may be annulled by the Parliament of the Commonwealth.’
37 S. 113–‘ All fermented, distilled, or other intoxicating liquids passing into any State or remaining therein for use, consumption, sale, or storage, shall be subject to the laws of the State as if such liquids had been produced in the State.’
38 (1890) 135 U.S. 100.
39 Records of Debates of the Federal Convention First Session, Adelaide (1897) 1145.
40 Records of Debates of the Federal Convention Third Session, Melbourne (1898)i, 649, 650.
41 Ibid. 650.
42 Ibid. ii, 2366 per Isaacs. Quick and Garran, Annotations on the Australian Constitution (1901) 943 suggest that the clause was designed to enable charges to be imposed,the inspection laws themselves flowing from the exercise of the police power. However, it would appear both from the debates and from the final sentence of the clause that section 112 was intended to be the sole authority for the inspection laws as well; see Dixon, J. in Tasmania v. Victoria (1935) 52Google Scholar C.L.R. 157, 186.
43 See Quick and Garran, op. cit. supra 850-853, 943. Inglis Clark, A., Australian Constitutional Law (2nd ed. 1905)Google Scholar ch. 7.
44 See Moore, Harrison, Commonwealth of Australia (2nd ed. 1910) 342Google Scholar, 344; Kerr, D., Law of the Australian Constitution (1925) 131–136Google Scholar.
45 Conlan v. Watts (1911) 7 Tas. L.R. 40, 43, 44.
46 There were some early judicial suggestions in the general context of the doctrine of State reserved powers that those powers which could be describedas of ‘ police’ were exclusively reserved to the States. D'Emden v. Pedder (1904) 1 C.L.R. 91, 104 per Griffith C.J.; Australian Boot Trades Employes Federation v. Whybrow (1910) 10 C.L.R. 266, 292 per Baron J.
47 (1912) 16 C.L.R. 99.
48 Not so much section 92, but rather an implied ‘ federal right of transit ’.
49 Cf. Railroad Co. v. Husen (1877) 95 U.S. 465, 471.
50 See New South Wales v. Commonwealth (1915) 20 C.L.R. 54, and especially 69 per Griffith C. J.
51 Duncan v. State of Queensland (1916) 22 C.L.R. 556, 633 per Higgins J.; 641 per Gavan Duffy and Rich JJ.; Roughley v. New South Wales (1928) 42 C.L.R. 162, 198 per Higgins J.
52 Russell v. The Queen (1882) 7 A.C. 829.
53 (1916) 22 C.L.R. 556.
54 Ibid. 641. See also Higgins, J. in Roughley's case (1928) 42Google Scholar C.L.R. 162, 200.
55 Ibid. 641, 642.
56 Ibid. See also Griffith C.J. 576: ‘In my judgment a law having for its object to make the stock bred in Queensland available for the food of the Imperial Forces is a law conducive to the good government of that State as part of the Empire’.
57 (1928) 42 C.L.R. 209 (Knox C.J., Gavan Duffy and Starke JJ. prevailing on the casting vote of the Chief Justice, Isaacs, Higgins and Powers JJ. dissenting).
58 Ibid. 218-219.
59 Ibid. 219.
60 See Peanut Board v. Rockhampton Harbour Board (1933) 48 C.L.R. 266, 284 per Starke J. where his Honour states that State powers exercised ‘ for the public safety, necessity, convenience or welfare do not offend against section 92. Indeed his Honour was a most consistent advocate of the ’ pith and substance' test, see R. v. Connare; Ex parte Wawn (1939) 61 C.L.R. 596, 616. See also Willard v. Rawson (1933) 48 C.L.R. 316, 337, 338 per McTiernan J.
61 (1932) 47 C.L.R. 386.
62 (1936) 55 C.L.R. 1.
63 Ibid. 54.
64 Per Latham C.J. in Hartley v. Walsh (1937) 57 C.L.R. 372, 382, 383.
65 See Hartley v. Walsh (1937) 57 C.L.R. 372 and R. v. Connare (1939) 61 C.L.R.596, 627, 628 per Evatt J.
66 Cf. Baldwin v. Seelig (1934) 294 U.S. 511 with Milk Board ofNew South Wales v. Metropolitan Cream Pty Ltd (1939) 62 C.L.R. 116, where State marketinglegislation was upheld in the absence of evidence of local protectionism.
67 Latham C.J. and Rich J.
68 See Home Benefits Pty Ltd v. Crafter (1939) 61 C.L.R. 701, 730, 731.
69 (1916) 22 C.L.R. 556, 623-625.
70 Ibid. 623.
71 Ex parte Nelson (No.1) (1928) 42 C.L.R. 209, 226, 229, 235.
72 Ibid. 235.
73 (1935) 52 C.L.R. 157, 180-183.
74 (1928) 42 C.L.R. 209.
75 (1935) 52 C.L.R. 157, 186.
76 Hartley v. Walsh (1937) 57 C.L.R. 372, 389.
77 Fergusson v. Stevenson (1951) 84 C.L.R. 421 and especially 434, 435.
78 Bierton v. Higgins (1961) 106 C.L.R. 127 virtually overruling Hartley v. Walsh (1937) 57 C.L.R. 372. But see now-Egg and Egg Pulp Marketing Board v. Rogers [1965] V.R. 723.
79 Chapman v. SUllie (1963) 110 C.L.R. 321.
80 (1935) 52 C.L.R. 189, 205.
81 Ibid. 206.
82 (1928) 42 C.L.R. 209.
83 (1955) 93 C.L.R. 126.
84 Ibid. 160. Kitto J., ibid. 218 speaks of ‘ the reasonable enjoyment by each … of his own position in … society’.
85 Ibid.162. For a fuller explanation—Lane, P. H. ‘ Present Test for Invalidity under Section 92 of the Constitution ’ (1958) 31 Australian Law Journal 715Google Scholar.
86 Mansell V. Beck (1956) 95 C.L.R. 550, 568 per Dixon C.J. and Webb J. ; Jackson v. McLeer [1964] V.R. 374; Anderson, R. ‘ Freedom of Interstate Trade: Essence,Incidence and Device under Section 92 of the Constitution ’ (1959) 33 Australian Law Journal 294Google Scholar, 298.
87 (1955) 93 C.L.R. 127, 205, 206. And see the same Justice in McCarter v. Brodie (1950) 80 C.L.R. 432,496,497.
88 (1960) 103 C.L.R. 177, 183-185.
89 (1956) 95 C.L.R. 550. It is interesting to recall that in his evidence before the Royal Commission on the Constitution in 1927 Mr Dixon K.C. (as he then was)expressed the opinion that section 92 prevented New South Wales from forbidding its citizens to send money out of the State for the purchase of a lottery ticket. Minutes of Evidence 791.
90 Ibid. 566-568 per Dixon C.J. and Webb J.; 594-596 per Taylor J. and compare the more direct approach of Williams J. 573, 574.
91 The Literature Board of Review v. Transport Publishing Co. Pty Ltd [1955] St.R.Qd 466; O'Sullivan v. Truth [1956] S.A.S.R. 58.
92 Ex parte Topco Pty Ltd,. Re Eldershaw (1960) 60 S.R. (N.S.W.) 532.
93 Chapman v. Suttie (1963) 110 C.L.R. 321, 344, 345 per Windeyer J.
94 Coombe v. Cheston [1960] S.A.S.R. 161; Greutner v. Everard (1960) 103 C.L.R.177.
95 Stock Health Service Pty Ltd v. Brebner (1964) 38 A.L.J.R. 227, 229 per Windeyer J.
96 Chapman v. Suttie (1963) 110 C.L.R. 321.
97 Hughes & Vale Pty Ltd v. New South Wales (No.2) (1955) 93 C.L.R. 127, 159. Cf. the ‘ ordered liberty ’ of Frankfurter J. in Rochin v. California (1952) 342 U.S. 165, 169
98 (1956) 95 C.L.R. 550, 594.
99 Fergusson v. Stevenson (1951) 84 C.L.R. 421.
1 Garvey v. Filippini [1961] V.R. 569.
2 Challenger v. Rae (1929) 24 Tas. L.R. 53.
3 (1961) 106 C.L.R. 127.
4 (1937) 57 C.L.R. 372.
5 Sawer, Cases on the Constitution (3rd ed.) 317.
6 Breen v. Snedden (1961) 106 C.L.R. 406.
7 Greutner v. Everard (1960) 103 C.L.R. 177, 187 per Dixon C.J. Kitto J. suggests that the only question for the Court in such a case is which type of legislation can be categorized as ‘ reasonable ’, e.g. traffic regulations, without going into the question of impact, ibid. 188, but this is going too far, see Dixon C.J. 184, 185.
8 (1928) 42 C.L.R. 209. ‘
9 Chapman v. Suttie (1963) 110 C.L.R. 321, 345 per Windeyer J.
10 Hughes & Vale Pty Ltd v. New South Wales (No.2) (1955) 93 C.L.R. 127; Chapman v. Suttie (1963) 110 C.L.R. 321, 341 per Menzies J.
11 (1963) 110 C.L.R. 321.
12 Bank of New South Wales v. Commonwealth (1949) 79 C.L.R. 497, 641 (P.C.).
13 McCarter v. Brodie (1950) 80 C.L.R. 432, 497 per Fullagar J.
14 Wynes, Legislative, Executive and Judicial Powers in Australia (3rd ed. 1962) 15, 16.
15 Minutes of Evidence 791.
16 As evidenced by his dissents in Mansell v. Beck (1956) 95 C.L.R. 550, 582 and in Armstrong v. Victoria (No.2) (1957) 99 C.L.R. 28, 84.