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Political Constitutionalism: Individual Responsibility and Collective Restraint

Published online by Cambridge University Press:  01 January 2025

Yee-Fui Ng Open the ORCID record for Yee-Fui Ng [Opens in a new window]
Yee-Fui Ng*
Affiliation:
Monash University
*
The author may be contacted at yeefui.ng@monash.edu.
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Abstract

Australia’s Constitution has been shaped by a blend of legal and political constitutionalism; yet there is limited attention given to political mechanisms of control in Australia. With the recent developments in the United Kingdom and the turmoil of Brexit that shifted the balance between legal and political constitutionalism, it is timely to examine how political constitutionalism has evolved in Australia. This article argues that Australian political constitutionalism is distinct from the United Kingdom as it is shaped not by internal conflict about the nature of the constitution but rather by the significant evolutionary development of fundamental institutions. In particular, it is argued that there are three critical junctures for political constitutionalism in Australia: the foundations of the Commonwealth, the formation of disciplined political parties and the rise of oversight bodies. It is contended that Australia may be reaching a new critical juncture due to the fragmentation of responsible government from privatisation and outsourcing and the rise of ministerial advisers.

Type
Articles
Information
Federal Law Review , Volume 48 , Issue 4 , December 2020 , pp. 455 - 468
Copyright
Copyright © 2020 The Author(s)

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Footnotes

The author would like to thank the guest editors, participants of a UNSW workshop, Patrick Emerton and the two anonymous reviewers for their helpful comments on drafts of this article.

References

1. See J A G Griffith, ‘The Political Constitution’ (1979) 42(1) Modern Law Review 1.

2. Graham Gee and Grégoire C N Webber, ‘What is a Political Constitution?’ (2010) 30(2) Oxford Journal of Legal Studies 273, 273.

3. Ibid.

4. Griffith (n 1) 16.

5. Richard Bellamy, Political Constitutionalism: A Republican Defence of the Constitutionality of Democracy (Cambridge University Press, 2007) 5 (emphasis in original).

6. Ibid 16.

7. See, eg, Gee and Webber (n 2) 273; Bellamy (n 5); Adam Tomkins, Our Republican Constitution (Hart Publishing, 2005). American literature includes Jeremy Waldron, Law and Disagreement (Oxford University Press, 1999); Mark Tushnet, Taking the Constitution Away from the Courts (Princeton University Press, 1999).

8. See, eg, Tom R Hickman, ‘In Defence of the Legal Constitution’ (2005) 55(4) University of Toronto Law Journal 981; T R S Allan, Constitutional Justice: A Liberal Theory of the Rule of Law (Oxford University Press, 2001); David Dyzenhaus, ‘The Incoherence of Constitutional Positivism’ in Grant Huscroft (ed), Expounding the Constitution: Essays in Constitutional Theory (Cambridge University Press, 2008) 138.

9. Tomkins (n 7) 64–5; Bellamy (n 5) 5, 210. On republicanism, see Philip Pettit, Republicanism: A Theory of Freedom and Government (Clarendon Press, 1997).

10. Bellamy (n 5) 5.

11. See <https://judicialpowerproject.org.uk/>.

12. Aileen Kavanagh, ‘Recasting the Political Constitution: From Rivals to Relationships’ (2019) 30(1) King’s Law Journal 43, 64; Martin Loughlin, ‘Towards a Republican Revival?’ (2006) 26(2) Oxford Journal of Legal Studies 425, 431, 435–6.

13. [2020] AC 373.

14. Ibid 407 [50].

15. Jeffrey Goldsworthy, Parliamentary Sovereignty: Contemporary Debates (Cambridge University Press, 2010) 293–304.

16. R v Secretary of State for Transport; Ex parte Factortame Ltd (No 2) [1991] 1 AC 603; Thoburn v Sunderland City Council [2002] EWHC 195 (Admin), [2003] QB 151; R (HS2 Action Alliance Ltd) v Secretary of State for Transport [2014] 1 WLR 324. See Farrah Ahmed and Adam Perry, ‘Constitutional Statutes’ (2017) 37(2) Oxford Journal of Legal Studies 461.

17. See, eg, Bradley Selway, ‘The Principle behind Common Law Judicial Review of Administrative Action: The Search Continues’ (2002) 30(2) Federal Law Review 217; Lisa Burton Crawford, The Rule of Law and the Australian Constitution (Federation Press, 2017).

18. The most recent Australian election study found that only 59 per cent of Australians are satisfied with democracy, and trust has reached its lowest level on record, with only 25 per cent believing people in government can be trusted. See Sarah Cameron and Ian McAllister, The 2019 Federal Election: Results from the Australian Election Study (Report, December 2019) <https://australianelectionstudy.org/wp-content/uploads/The-2019-Australian-Federal-Election-Results-from-the-Australian-Election-Study.pdf>.

19. Amalgamated Society of Engineers v Adelaide Steamship Co Ltd (1920) 28 CLR 129, 147 (Knox CJ, Isaacs, Rich and Starke JJ); R v Kirby; Ex parte Boilermakers’ Society of Australia (1956) 94 CLR 254, 275 (Dixon CJ, McTiernan, Fullagar and Kitto JJ).

20. See Terence Daintith and Yee-Fui Ng, ‘Executives’ in Cheryl Saunders and Adrienne Stone (eds), Oxford Handbook of the Australian Constitution (Oxford University Press, 2018) 587.

21. George Winterton, Parliament, the Executive and the Governor-General: A Constitutional Analysis (Melbourne University Press, 1983) 71–85.

22. Re Patterson; Ex parte Taylor (2001) 207 CLR 391, 403 [17] (Gleeson CJ); Williams v Commonwealth (2012) 248 CLR 156, 351–2 [516] (Crennan J); Egan v Willis (1998) 195 CLR 424, 451 [41] (Gaudon, Gummow and Hayne JJ).

23. Jack M Balkin, Living Originalism (Harvard University Press, 2011) 26, 349.

24. Lange v Australian Broadcasting Corporation (1997) 189 CLR 520, 557.

25. Roach v Electoral Commissioner (2007) 233 CLR 162; Rowe v Electoral Commissioner (2010) 243 CLR 1.

26. See, eg, Jeffrey Goldsworthy, ‘The High Court, Implied Rights and Constitutional Change’ (1995) 39(3) Quadrant 46.

27. See, eg, Stephen Gageler, ‘Beyond the Text: A Vision of the Structure and Function of the Constitution’ [2009] (Winter) Bar News 30, 38–9.

28. See, eg, John Finnis, ‘The Unconstitutionality of the Supreme Court’s Prorogation Judgment’ (Paper, Policy Exchange, 28 September 2019) < https://policyexchange.org.uk/wp-content/uploads/2019/10/The-unconstitutionality-of-the-Supreme-Courts-prorogation-judgment.pdf >. There are UK antagonists to this position, eg Mark Elliott, ‘Brexit, the Executive and Parliament: A Response to John Finnis’, Public Law for Everyone (Blog Post, 2 April 2019) <https://publiclawforeveryone.com/2019/04/02/brexit-the-executive-and-parliament-a-response-to-john-finnis/>.

29. Alan J Ward, Parliamentary Government in Australia (Anthem Press, 2014) 289.

30. Egan v Willis (1998) 195 CLR 424, 453–6 (Gaudron, Gummow, Hayne JJ), 458–9, 478–9 (McHugh J), 504–5 (Kirby J), 514 (Callinan J).

31. Bruce Stone, ‘Bicameralism and Democracy: The Transformation of Australian State Upper Houses’ (2002) 37(2) Australian Journal of Political Science 267, 269–70.

32. Gareth Evans, ‘Scrutiny of the Executive by Parliamentary Committees’ in J R Nethercote (ed), Parliament and Bureaucracy (Hale & Iremonger, 1982) 78–9.

33. John Halligan, John Power and Robin Miller, ‘The Three Committee Systems of the Australian Parliament: A Developmental Overview?’ (Paper presented at the Australasian Study of Parliament Group National Conference, 16 July 2000) 111 <http://www.parliament.qld.gov.au/aspg/documents/aspg_11.pdf>.

34. Ibid 113.

35. Commonwealth, Journals of the Senate, 11 June 1970, 187–90.

36. Harry Evans, ‘Accountability versus Government Control: The Effect of Proportional Representation’ (Papers on Parliament No 34, Parliament of Australia, 1999).

37. Ibid.

38. Stephen Argument, ‘Legislative Scrutiny in Australia: Wisdom to Export?’ (2011) 32(2) Statute Law Review 116, 125.

39. See Adam Fletcher, Australia’s Human Rights Scrutiny Regime: Democratic Masterstroke or Mere Window Dressing? (Melbourne University Press, 2018).

40. Laura Grenfell and Sarah Moulds, ‘The Role of Committees in Rights Protection in Federal and State Parliaments in Australia’ (2018) 41(1) UNSW Law Journal 40, 78.

41. Williams v Commonwealth (2012) 248 CLR 156.

42. See Yee-Fui Ng, ‘In the Moonlight? The Control and Accountability of Government Corporations in Australia’ (2019) 43(1) Melbourne University Law Review 303.

43. Public Governance, Performance and Accountability Act 2013 (Cth) ss 38–9 (‘PGPA Act’); Public Governance, Performance and Accountability Rule 2014 (Cth) s 16F.

44. PGPA Act (n 43) s 46.

45. Ibid s 97.

46. Elizabeth Alexander and David Thodey, Independent Review into the Operation of the Public Governance, Performance and Accountability Act 2013 and Rule (Final Report, September 2018) 12.

47. Ibid 42.

48. The New Zealand public sector has a performance budgeting framework that includes reporting publicly against a clear set of national outcome goals: ibid 12.

49. Official Report of the National Australasian Convention Debates, Adelaide, 23 March 1897, 24; Official Report of the National Australasian Convention Debates, Sydney, 12 March 1891, 280; Official Report of the National Australasian Convention Debates, Adelaide, 23 March 1897, 28.

50. Daryl J Levison and Richard H Pildes, ‘Separation of Parties, Not Powers’ (2006) 119(8) Harvard Law Review 2311, 2312.

51. See John M Carey, ‘Competing Principals, Political Institutions, and Party Unity in Legislative Voting’ (2007) 51(1) American Journal of Political Science 92.

52. Jean-François Godbout and Monika Smaz, ‘Party Development in the Early Decades of the Australian Parliament: A New Perspective’ (2016) 51(3) Australian Journal of Political Science 478, 478.

53. See Paul Strangio and Nick Dyrenfurth (eds), Confusion: The Making of the Australian Two-Party System (Melbourne University Press, 2009).

54. Dean Jaensch, The Australian Party System (Allen & Unwin, 1983) 115–20.

55. Rodney Smith, ‘Disciplined Parties and Australian Parliamentary Politics’ in Anika Gauja, Rodney Smith and Narelle Miragliotta (eds), Contemporary Australian Political Party Organisations (Monash University Publishing, 2015) 169, 170.

56. Godbout and Smaz (n 52) 480–3, 492.

57. Christopher J Kam, Party Discipline and Parliamentary Politics (Cambridge University Press, 2009) 48.

58. Carey (n 51) 93.

59. See Dean Jaensch, ‘Parties in Executive Government’ in Anika Gauja, Rodney Smith and Narelle Miragliotta (eds), Contemporary Australian Political Party Organisations (Monash University Publishing, 2015) 185.

60. Mark Tushnet, ‘The Political Constitution of Emergency Powers: Some Lessons from Hamdan’ (2007) 91(5) Minnesota Law Review 1451, 1466.

61. Electoral Act 1918 (Cth) s 239.

62. Yee-Fui Ng, Ministerial Advisers in Australia: The Modern Legal Context (Federation Press, 2016) 100.

63. Patrick Weller, Cabinet Government in Australia, 1901–2006: Practice, Principles, Performance (UNSW Press, 2007) 203.

64. See Zareh Ghazarian, The Making of a Party System: Minor Parties in the Australian Senate (Monash University Publishing, 2015).

65. Balkin (n 23) 299.

66. Arend Lijphart, Patterns of Democracy: Government Forms and Performance in Thirty-Six Countries (Yale University Press, 2nd ed, 1999) 187–94.

67. Weller (n 63) 192.

68. John Uhr, ‘Reforming the Parliament’ in Clement Macintyre and John Williams (eds), Peace Order and Good Government: State Constitutional and Parliamentary Reform (Wakefield Press, 2003) 228, 231.

69. Keith Dowding, Chris Lewis and Adam Packer, ‘The Pattern of Forced Exits from the Ministry’ in Keith Dowding and Chris Lewis (eds), Ministerial Careers and Accountability in the Australian Commonwealth Government (ANU E Press) 115, 118.

70. Ibid 122.

71. Diana Woodhouse, Ministers and Parliament: Accountability in Theory and Practice (Clarendon Press, 1994) 28–38.

72. See Yee-Fui Ng, ‘Dispelling Myths about Conventions: Ministerial Advisers and Parliamentary Committees’ (2016) 51(3) Australian Journal of Political Science 512.

73. Yee-Fui Ng, The Rise of Political Advisors in the Westminster System (Routledge, 2018) 163–5.

74. Legal constitutionalism was also strengthened in this period by the introduction of the Administrative Decisions (Judicial Review) Act 1977 (Cth) (‘ADJR Act’).

75. Edward L Rubin, ‘Law and Legislation in the Administrative State’ (1989) 89(3) Columbia Law Review 369, 392–4.

76. See Gabrielle Appleby, ‘Horizontal Accountability: The Rights-Protective Promise and Fragility of Executive Integrity Institutions’ (2017) 23(2) Australian Human Rights Journal 168.

77. Jeffrey Bell, ‘Agents of Parliament: A New Branch of Government?’ (2006) 29(1) Canadian Parliamentary Review 13, 15.

78. See, eg, the Commonwealth Auditor-General is an ‘officer of Parliament’: Auditor-General Act 1997 (Cth) s 8(1). However, it is unclear what this status denotes beyond a closer relationship to Parliament.

79. About half of contemporary Commonwealth laws consists of delegated legislation rather than Acts of Parliament: Harry Evans, Odgers’ Australian Senate Practice (Department of the Senate, 14th ed, 2016) 432.

80. Terence Daintith and Alan Page, The Executive in the Constitution: Structure, Autonomy, and Internal Control (Oxford University Press, 1999) 29.

81. Paul Finn, Law and Government in Colonial Australia (Oxford University Press, 1987) 58–61, 95–102, 128–32.

82. Ng, ‘In the Moonlight?’ (n 42) 315–16.

83. Peter Cane, Controlling Administrative Power: An Historical Comparison (Cambridge University Press, 2016) 458.

84. Ng, ‘In the Moonlight?’ (n 42) 317.

85. As of February 2020, there are 81 Commonwealth agencies and statutory authorities, 71 statutory corporations and 18 Commonwealth companies: ‘Flipchart of PGPA Act Commonwealth Entities and Companies’, Australian Government: Department of Finance (Flipchart, 2020) <https://www.finance.gov.au/sites/default/files/2020-02/Flipchart%20February%202020%20-%20Update%2020%20Feb.pdf>.

86. Ng, Ministerial Advisers in Australia (n 62).

87. Ng, ‘Dispelling Myths about Conventions’ (n 72).

88. A High Court majority held that a decision made by a non-statutory company was not judicially reviewable under the ADJR Act, as it was not made ‘under an enactment’: NEAT Domestic Trading Pty Ltd v AWB Ltd (2003) 216 CLR 277. Corporate entities are not susceptible to judicial review under s 75(v) of the Constitution, as they have been held not to be ‘officers of the Commonwealth’. Courts have read in a requirement of a formal appointment of a natural person, and an exclusion of artificial persons: R v Murray; Ex parte Commonwealth (1916) 22 CLR 437, 452 (Isaacs J).

89. R v Panel on Takeovers and Mergers; Ex parte Datafin Plc [1987] QB 815. See Terence Daintith and Yee-Fui Ng, ‘Legal Form and Function in the Public Sector: The Government-Owned Company in the United Kingdom and Australia’ (2020) 136(April) Law Quarterly Review 292.

90. See Lisa Burton Crawford and Jeffrey Goldsworthy, ‘Constitutionalism’ in Cheryl Saunders and Adrienne Stone (eds), The Oxford Handbook of the Australian Constitution (Oxford University Press, 2018) 357.