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The Privy Council, Natural Justice and Certiorari

Published online by Cambridge University Press:  24 January 2025

Garth Nettheim
Garth Nettheim*
Affiliation:
University of Sydney
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Extract

‘Natural justice’ is one of the key concepts in our legal system. The concept has been employed to ensure fair adjudication, not only by courts in the strict sense, but also by a vast range of administrative tribunals, bodies and officials that have power to affect the rights of individuals.

‘Natural justice’, to English and Australian lawyers, comprises two basic rules: the right to be heard (audi alterarn partern, the hearing rule) and the principle of fairness or impartiality (nerno debet esse judex in sua propria causa, the bias rule). These are ‘the essential characteristics of what is often called natural justice. They are the twin pillars supporting it’.

Type
Research Article
Information
Federal Law Review , Volume 2 , Issue 2 , June 1967 , pp. 215 - 243
Copyright
Copyright © 1967 The Australian National University

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References

1 Kanda v. Government of Malaya [1962] A.C. 322, 337 per Lord Denning.

2 de Smith, , Judicial Review of Administrative Action (1959) 102–103Google Scholar.

3 Ibid. 122.

4 Ibid. 136.

5 Baldwin & Francis Ltd v. Patents Appeal Tribunal [1959] A.C. 663, 697 per Lord Denning.

6 Barnard v. National Dock Labour Board [1953] 2 Q.B. 18, 41; Pyx Granite Co. Ltd v. Ministry of Housing and Local Government [1958] 1 Q.B. 554, 571; Freedom Under The Law (1949) 126.

7 [1964] A.C. 40. Sir Carleton Allen describes this decision as ‘ the Magna Carta of natural justice’: Law and Orders (3rd ed. 1965) 242.

8 [1951] A.C. 66.

9 [1967] 2 All E.R. 152; [1967] 3 W.L.R. 289.

10 (1963) 111 C.L.R. 610, 632-633.

11 (1966) 39 A.L.J.R. 480.

12 [1966] 1 W.L.R. 1234. See comment (1966) 82 Law Quarterly Review 441; (1966) 40 Australian Law Journal 109.

13 E.g. Bruce v. Waldron [1963] V.R. 3; Ex parte Brown; Re Tunstall (1966) 84 W.N. (Pt 2) (N.S.W.) 13.

14 [1942] A.C. 624.

15 [1931] A.C. 704.

16 Glasgow Corporation v. Central Land Board [1956] S.C. (H.L.) 1. The House of Lords now hasan opportunity to reconsider the Duncan decision, now thatleave to appeal has been granted from the Court of Appeal decision in Conway v. Rimmer (Times 8 June 1967).

17 [1964] A.C. 40.

18 [1951] A.C. 6.

19 Testro Bros Pty Ltd v. Tait (1963) 109 C.L.R. 353, 362-363 per McTiernan, Taylor and Owen JJ.; Mobil Oil Australia Pty Ltd v. Commissioner of Taxation (1963) 37 A.L.J.R. 182, 184, 185, 190.

20 [1967] 2 All E.R. 152. The Board consisted of Viscount Dilhorne, Lord Guest, Lord Devlin, Lord Upjohn and Lord Pearson. Lord Upjohn delivered the opinion.

21 Fatuma Binti.Mohamed Bin Salim Bakhshuwen v. Mohamed Bin Salim Bakhshuwen [1952] A.C. 1. That the scope of certiorari in Ceylonese law is to be governed by ‘ the relevant rules of English common law’ was decided by the Privy Council in Nakkuda Ali v. Jayaratne [1951] A.C. 66, 74-75.

22 E.g. Sparks v. Edward Ash Ltd [1943] 1 K.B. 223, 229-230; Ex parte Wilkes; Re Minister for Education [1962] S.R. (N.S.W.) 220; Liversidge v. Anderson [1942] A.C. 206-222, 253; Duncan v. Cammell, Laird & Co. [1942] A.C. 624; Franklin v. Minister of Town and Country Planning [1948] A.C. 87.

23 [1967] 2 All E.R. 152, 154.

24 Ibid.

25 (1958) 59 N.L.R. 457.

26 Ibid. 471. There had been many previous English cases to the effect that such a formula made the exercjse of power ‘judge-proof’, at least where the ground of challenge was excess of jurisdiction or ultra vires, i.e. where the satisfaction etc. of the minister etc. was a condition precedent to exercise of the power : Point of Ayr Collieries Ltd v. Lloyd George [1943] 2 All E.R. 546; Carltona Ltd v. Commissioner of Works [1943] 2 All E.R. 560; Robinson v. Minister of Town and Country Planning [1947] K.B. 702. But cf. per Denning L.J. (dissenting) in Earl Fitzwilliam's Wentworth Estates Co. Ltd v. Minister of Town and Country Planning [1951] 2 K.B. 284 311. And see Allen, C. K., Law and Orders (3rd ed. 1965) 254–257Google Scholar; Wade, , Administrative Law (1961) 67–73Google Scholar.

Australian courts, however, have been prepared to review an exercise of power conditioned on such satisfaction etc. on the basis of total absence of evidence on which the minister etc. could be satisfied and/or misunderstanding of the test to be applied: R. v. Connell; Ex parte The Hetton Bellbird Collieries Ltd (1944) 69 C.L.R. 407; R. v. Australian Stevedoring Industry Board; Ex parte Melbourne Stevedoring Co. Pty Ltd (1953) 88 C.L.R. 100.

The Privy Council itself has extended judicial review on a similar basis: Estate and Trust Agencies (1927) Ltd v. Singapore Improvement Trust [1937] A.C. 898; Maradana Mosque Trustees v. Mahmud [1967] A.C. 13, 25.

See generally de Smith, , Judicial Review of Adrninistrative Action (1959) 240–248Google Scholar.

27 (1863) 14 C.B.N.S. 180, 194.

28 (1723) Fortes Rep. 202.

29 (1832) 2 Cr. & J. 558. De Smith describes this decision as ‘ the most remarkable illustration of the audi alteram partem principle in any reported case’: Judicial Review of Administrative Action (1959) 105. A bishop was empowered by statute to order a vicar to appoint a curate (to be paid by the vicar) when satisfied, either of his own knowledge or by affidavit, that the vicar had neglected his duties. It was held that he was under an absolute duty to give the vicar notice and opportunity to be heard before making the order.

And see the decision of the Privy Council itself in De Verteuil v. Knaggs [1918] A.C. 557 (affirmed in University of Ceylon v. Fernando [1960] 1 W.L.R. 223) to the effect that the audi alteram partem principle applied to the exercise, by the Governor of Trinidad, of a power to transfer the indentures of immigrants from one plantation to another ‘ if at any time it appears to the Governor, on sufficient ground shown to his satisfaction ’ that this should be done.

30 [1967] 2 All E.R. 152, 155-156.

31 [1951] A.C. 66, 76-77.

32 [1942] A.C. 206. But see Lord Atkin's magnificent dissent.

33 [1951] A.C. 66, 77.

34 [1924] 1 K.B. 171, 205. (Italics supplied).

35 [1928] 1 K.B. 411, 415.

36 de Smith, , Judicial Review of Administrative Action (1959) 281–290Google Scholar; Wade, , Administrative Law (1961) 99–108Google Scholar.

37 Benjafield, and Whitmore, , Principles of Australian Administrative Law (3rd ed. 1966) 147–154Google Scholar; de Smith, , Judicial Review of Administrative Action (1959) 122–136Google Scholar; Wade, , Administrative Law (1961) 127–165Google Scholar; Ridge v. Baldwin [1964] A.C. 40, 71-79 per Lord Reid.

The development of this restrictive attitude to the rules of natural justice has also been related to the particular circumstances of cases arising under the English housing and town planning legislation, to semantic problems (the differing meanings given for differing purposes to such terms as ‘ judicial’ and ‘ jurisdiction ’) and to judicial , amnesia‘ (Wade, op. cit. 163).

The same restrictive approach has been at least implicit in some of the decisions of the High Court of Australia: R. v. Commonwealth Rent Controller; Ex parte National Mutual Life Association of Australasia Ltd (1947) 75 C.L.R. 361; R. v. Wright; Ex parte Waterside Workers’Federation of Australia (1955) 93 C.L.R. 528; Testro Bros Pty Ltd v. Tait (1963) 109 C.L.R. 353.

At the same time, the High Court has taken a broader view of the application of the hearing rule in cases where the issue has been raised other than by application for certiorari: Delta Properties Pty Ltd v. Brisbane City Council (1955) 95 C.L.R. 11; Commissioner of Police v. Tanos (1958) 98 C.L.R. 383; Hoile v. Medical Board of South Australia (1960) 104 C.L.R. 157. For an account of similarly liberal decisions in other Commonwealth jurisdictions, see de Smith, op. cit. 133-136; Wade, op. cit. 164-165.

38 [1951] A.C. 66, 78-79.

39 [1964] A.C. 40.

40 See Benjafield, and Whitmore, , ‘The House of Lords and “Natural Justice”, (1963) 37 Australian Law Journal 140Google Scholar.

41 [1924] 1 K.B. 171.

42 [1928] 1 K.B. 411.

43 (1863) 14 C.B.N.S. 180.

44 Ibid. 194.

45 Supra. 221 Perhaps the most remarkable illustration to date of the liberation achieved for English courts by Ridge v. Baldwin is the decision In re H. K. (An Infant) [1967] 2 W.L.R. 962. In that case, Lord Parker C.J., Salmon L.J. and Blain J. considered that the audi alteram partem principle wouldapply to an immigration officer in deciding whether a person was entitled to enter the country under the Commonwealth Immigrants Act, 1962 (Eng.) whether or not the officer's power be classified as ‘ judicial ’ or ‘quasi-judicial ’. See especially per Salmon L.J. 973.

46 [1964] A.C. 40.. 76.

47 [1924] 1 K.B. 171.

48 Ibid. 198.

49 Ibid. 206, 207.

50 [1964] A.C. 40, 76.

51 Ibid. 77.

52 [1967] 2 All E.R. 152, 156.

53 [1964] A.C. 40, 79.

54 The earlier decision of the Judicial Cotnlnittee in Maradana Mosque Trustees v. Mahmud [1967] A.C. 13, 23 applied the same principle, although only implicitly.

55 [1964] A.C. 40, 65, 72. See also Board of Education v. Rice [1911] A.C. 179, 182 per Lord Lorebum; R. v. Registrar of Building Societies [1960] 1 W.L.R. 669, 676 per Lord Parker C.J.

56 Benjafield, and Whitmore, , Principles of Australian Administrative Law (3rd ed. 1966) 155–156Google Scholar.

57 [1967] 2 All B.R. 152, 154.

58 [1924] 1 K.B. 171, 205.

59 Benjafield, and Whitmore, , ‘ The House of Lords and “ Natural Justice ” ’ (1963) 37 Australian Law Journal 140Google Scholar, 143. And the Privy Council itself specifically rejectedsuch a submission as too wide in Vidyodaya University Council v. Silva [1965] 1 W.L.R.77, 88.

60 [1964] A.C. 40, 65-71.

61 [1967] 2 All E.R. 152, 156.

62 Ibid.

63 [1918] A.C. 557.

64 [1948] A.C. 341.

65 [1967] 2 All E.R. 152, 156.

66 [1964] A.C. 40, 72.

67 Benjafield, and Whitmore, , ‘ The House of Lords and “ Natural Justice” ’ (1963) 37 Australian Law Journal 140Google Scholar, 144.

68 [1967] 2 All E.R. 152, 156-157.

69 Ibid. 157.

70 Ibid.

71 (1863) 14 C.B.N.S. 180. And see the similar decision of the High Court of Australia in Municipal Council of Sydney v. Harris (1912) 14 C.L.R. 1.

72 [1967] 2 All E.R. 152, 157-158.

73 Dimes v. Grand Junction Canal Co. (1852) 3 H.L.C. 759. See also de Smith, , Judicial Review of Administrative Action (1959) 162–163Google Scholar; Rubinstein, , Jurisdiction and Illegality (1965) 202–204Google Scholar; Benjafield, and Whitmore, , Principles of Australian Administrative Law (3rd ed. 1966) 163Google Scholar.

74 See for Australian examples: Clancy v. Butchers Shop Employees' Union (1904)1 C.L.R. 181; R. v. Hickman; Ex parte Fox and Clinton (1945) 70 C.L.R. 598; R. v. Central Reference Board (1948) 77 C.L.R. 123; Boulus v. Broken Hill Theatres Pty Ltd (1948) 78 C.L.R. 177; Ex parte Wurth; Re Tully (1954) 55 S.R. (N.S.W.) 47; Ex parte Herman; Re Mathieson (1961) 78 W.N. (N.S.W.) 6; Ex parte Rosier; Re Pollard (1961) 78 W.N. (N.S.W.) 20; R. v. Chairman of General Sessions at Hamilton; Ex parte Atterby [1959] V.R. 800; R. v. Justices of the Peace of Yarram; Ex parte Arnold [1964] V.R. 21.

75 Colonial Bank of Australasia v. Willan (1874) L.R. 5 P.C. 417. And see the views of Dixon J. in R. v. Hickman; Ex parte Fox and Clinton (1945) 70 C.L.R. 598, 614-617; R. v. Murray; Ex parte Proctor (1949) 77 C.L.R. 387, 398-399; R. v. Metal Trades Employers' Association (1951) 82 C.L.R. 208, 247-250.

76 New Zealand Waterside Workers Federation v. Frazer [1924] N.Z.L.R. 689, 702; R. v. Foster; Ex parte Isaacs [1941] V.L.R. 77; R. v. Blakeley; Ex parteAustralian Theatrical and Amuselnent Employees Association (1949) 80 C.L.R. 82; Re Industrial Appeals Court [1955] A.L.R. 675; R. v. Tennant; Ex parte Woods [1962] Qd. R. 241. But cf R. v. Mahony [1910] 2 I.R. 695.

77 R. v. Medical Appeal Tribunal; Ex parte Gilmore [1957] 1 Q.B. 574. See generally as to privative clauses, de Smith, Judicial Review of Administrative Action (1959) 225-230; Rubinstein, Jurisdiction and Illegality (1965) 85-88.

78 The conflicting views are noted in Benjafield, and Whitmore, , ‘ The House of Lords and “ Natural Justice” ’ (1963) 37 Australian Law Journal 140Google Scholar, 146; Benjafield, and Whitmore, , Principles of Australian Administrative Law (3rd ed. 1966) 163–165Google Scholar. See also de Smith, , Judicial Review of Administrative Action (1959) 77–78Google Scholar, 98-100, 294.

79 [1964] A.C. 40, 80-81 (Lord Reid), 86-94 (Lord Evershed), 125-126 (Lord Morris), 135-136 (Lord Hodson), 141-142 (Lord Devlin).

80 E.g. R. v. War Pensions Entitlement Appeal Tribunal; Ex parte Bott (1933) 50 C.L.R. 228, 243; Parisienne Basket Shoes Pty Ltd v. Whyte (1938) 59 C.L.R. 369, 389; Posner v. Collector for Inter-State Destitute Persons (1947) 74 C.L.R. 461.

81 That their Lordships should do so is perhaps surprising in view of the suggestion the Judicial Committee had made in Runyowa v. The Queen [1967] A.C.26 that an appellant before the Board could raise a point not raised in the lower court only if the precise point had been raised before the lower courtin some other case. Here the new point was raised, not by one of the parties, but by their Lordships, without any reference to any views thereon of the Supreme Court of Ceylon. A distinguishing factor, however, might be that the particular point, locus standi, went to the ‘ jurisdiction ’ of the court.

82 [1967] 2 All E.R. 152, 158.

83 [1964] A.C. 40, 92.

84 Pollock on Contract (13th ed. 1929) 48.

85 [1962] A.C. 152.

86 [1967] 2 All E.R. 34.

87 [1964] A.C. 40, 80.

88 [1967] 2 All E.R. 152, 159.

89 Ibid. 160.

90 [1964] A.C. 40, 125-126.

91 Benjafield, and Whitmore, , Principles of Australian Administrative Law (3rd ed. 1966) 165Google Scholar, n. 124; Disher v. Disher [1965] P. 31.

92 R. v. Paddington Valuation Officer; Ex parte Peachey Property Corporation Ltd [1965] 3 W.L.R. 426, 435 per Lord Denning; D.P.P. v. Head [1959] A.C. 83, 111-113 per Lord Denning.

93 In fact, the courts have defied logic in issuing mandamus in respect of defects which do not go to jurisdiction and are thus voidable only. See Rubinstein, , Jurisdiction and Illegality (1959) 101–105Google Scholar; Municipal Council ofSydney v. Harris (1912) 14 C.L.R. 1.

94 de Smith, , Judicial Review of Administrative Action (1959) 407–409Google Scholar.

95 [1960] A.C. 260.

96 [1958] 1 Q.B. 554, 571. But see Lord Denning's earlier views on this matter in Healey v. Minister of Health [1955] 1 Q.B. 221, 228, also per Morris L.J. 230. However he repeated that a declaration would be available as an alternative to certiorari in delivering the opinion of the Privy Council in Kanda v. Government of Malaya [1962] A.C. 322, 338.

97 [1960] A.C. 260, 290.

98 Gordon, , ‘ Certiorari and an Action for a Declaration of Invalidity as Alternative Remedies ’ (1959) 75 Law Quarterly Review 455Google Scholar, 456.

99 [1964] 1 W.L.R. 226; [1964] 1 All E.R. 448. Also Healey v. Minister of Health [1955] 1 Q.B. 221. But a similarly analytical approach would exclude certiorari to quash in respect of a decision made in excess of jurisdiction—such a decision being a nullity, there is nothing to quash: R. v. Bristol & Exeter Railway Co. (1838) 11 Ad. & E. 202; Re Daws (1838) 8 Ad. & E. 936; Ex parte Lord Gifford (1845) L.T.O.S. 341. Also Barnard v. National Dock Labour Board [1953] 2 Q.B. 18,38-39 per Singleton L.J.In Parisienne Basket Shoes Pty Ltd v. Whyte (1938) 59 C.L.R. 369, 392 Dixon J. concluded that ‘ certiorari is a proceeding for quashing orders that are voidable only’.

Yet the courts have consistently issued certiorari on the ground of jurisdictional error, as well as on the basisof defects which would render a decision voidable only. See generally, on this conflict between logic and practice, Rubinstein, , Jurisdiction and Illegality (1965) 81–94Google Scholar.

It appears, then, that certiorari on the ground of excess of jurisdiction serves a merely declaratory function. It has been regarded as serving a quashing function only in respect of non-jurisdictional defects. But the Privy Council's new analysis of the meaning of ‘ voidable’ may affect this.

1 (1863) 14 C.B.N.S. 180.

2 [1964] A.C. 40.

3 See also Cooper v. Wilson [1937] 2 K.B. 309; Hoggard v. Worsborough U.D.C. [1962] 2 Q.B. 93; Kanda v. Government of Malaya [1962] A.C. 322. And, as to domestic tribunals, Annamunthodo v. Oilfield Workers' Trade Union [1961] A.C. 945; Taylor v. National Union ofSeamen [1967] 1 All E.R. 767. See generally,on the‘ void-voidable’question in relation to declaration, Rubinstein, , Jurisdiction and Illegality (1965) 116–120Google Scholar.

4 R. v. Chairman of General Sessions at Hamilton; Ex parte Atterby [1959] V.R. 800; R. v. Will and Toon; Ex parte Visona [1960] Qd. R. 123; Ex parte Northern Rivers Rutile Pty Ltd; Re Claye (1965) 82 W.N. (Pt 1) (N.S.W.) 514; R. v. Justices of Rankine River; Ex parte Sydney (1963) 3 F.L.R. 215.

5 [1967] 2 All E.R. 152, 160.

6 Benjafield, and Whitmore, , Principles of Australian Administrative Law (3rd ed. 1966) 209–210Google Scholar, n. 64; de Smith, , Judicial Review of Administrative Action (1959) 310–313Google Scholar.

7 [1967] 2 All E.R. 152, 159.

8 Yardley, , ‘ Certiorari and the Problem of Locus Standi ’ (1955) 71 Law Quarterly Review 388Google Scholar, 396.

9 Ibid. 401.

10 [1933] 2 K.B. 696.

11 But see the strange decision in Gregory v. London Borough of Camden [1966] 1 W.L.R.899; [1966] 2 All E.R. 196; 64 L.G.R. 215. Adjoining landowners wished to challenge a planning permission on the ground that it was ultra vires, i.e. a nullity. Paull J. held that they lacked locus standi for a declaration, as their legal rights were not affected. He suggested that they might have had standing had they proceeded by way of certiorari.

12 [1961] 1 Q.B. 278, 286.

13 (1870) L.R. 5 Q.B. 466.

14 (1957) 55 L.G.R. 129.

15 [1961] Cambridge Law Journal 5, 7-8.

16 (1957) 55 L.G.R. 129.

17 Gordon, , ‘ Certiorari and the Problem of Locus Standi ’ (1955) 71 Law Quarterly Review 483Google Scholar, 485. And see Dr Yardley's reply, ‘ Certiorari and the Problem of Locus Standi ’ (1956) 72 Law Quarterly Review 36; also the same author's ‘ Prohibition and Mandamus and the Problem of Locus Standi ’(1957) 73 Law Quarterly Review 534, 539.

See also, to similar effect, the views of Lord Denning in two cases where the ground of challenge was error of law on the face of the record which would make a decision voidable only: Baldwin & Francis Ltd v. Patents Appeal Tribunal [1959] A.C. 663, 695-696; R. v. Paddington Valuation Officer; Ex parte Peachey Property Corporation Ltd [1965] 3 W.L.R. 426, 434.

18 Thio, , ‘ Locus Standi in Relation to Prohibition ’ [1965] Public Law 88Google Scholar.

19 Such a situation did arise in Maradana Mosque Trustees v. Mahmud [1967] A.C.13. A further ground for the application was error of law on the face of the record.The applicant, however, was the party aggrieved by the original decision.

20 The artificiality and injustice of such a technical approach to the problem of locus standi is well illustrated by the denial of standing to appeal, as ‘ persons aggrieved ’ under the Town and Country Planning Act, 1959 (Eng.), to neighbours in respect of the grant of planning permission in the famous Chalk Pit Case: Buxton v. Minister of Housing and Local Government [1961] 1 Q.B. 278. But cf. per Lord Denning in A-G of the Gambia v. N’ Jie [1961] A.C. 617, 634; Maurice v. L.C.C. [1964] 2 Q.B. 362, 378.

21 Supra n. 57.

22 [1967] 2 All E.R. 152, 154.

23 Randall v. Northcote Corporation (1910) 11 C.L.R. 100, 117-119; Metropolitan Meat Industry Board v. Finlayson (1916) 22 C.L.R. 340; Ex parte McCarthy; Re Milk Board (1934) 35 S.R. (N.S.W.) 47; Nakkuda Ali v. Jayaratne [1951] A.C. 66; R. v. Metropolitan Police Commissioner; Ex parte Parker [1953] 1 W.L.R. 1150.

24 de Smith, , Judicial Review of Administrative Action (1959) 131–132Google Scholar, 279-280; Benjafield, and Whitmore, , Principles of Australian Administrative Law (3rd ed. 1966) 154–155Google Scholar, 203-205; New Zealand United Licensed Victuallers' Association of Employers v. Price Tribunal [1957] N.Z.L.R. 167; Television Corporation Ltd v. The Commonwealth (1963) 109 C.L.R. 59; Ridge v. Baldwin [1964] A.C. 40, 94-95 per Lord Evershed.

25 [1967] 2 All E.R. 152, 159.

26 [1966] 1 All E.R. 689.

27 de Smith, , Judicial Review of Administrative Action (1959) 276–278Google Scholar; Benjafield, and Whitmore, , Principles of Australian Administrative Law (3rd ed. 1966) 202–203Google Scholar. The cases are difficult to reconcile. For a recent High Court application of the notion, see Testro Bros Pty Ltd v. Tait (1963) 109 C.L.R. 353, and the dissenting opinions of Kitto and Menzies JJ.

28 [1967] 2 All E.R. 986.

29 Ibid. 1006.

30 [1967] A.C. 13.

31 [1967] 2 All E.R. 986, 994.

32 Ibid. 1007, 1008.