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The Race Power — Its Replacement and Interpretation

Published online by Cambridge University Press:  24 January 2025

Anne Twomey
Anne Twomey*
Affiliation:
University of Sydney
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Abstract

The Expert Panel on the Constitutional Recognition of Indigenous Australians has recommended the repeal of the ‘race power’ in the Constitution and its replacement with a power to make laws with respect to Aboriginal and Torres Strait Islander peoples. This article analyses that recommendation, the assumptions that underlie it and the way the new provision might be interpreted by the High Court. In doing so, it uses archival material to shed new light on the 1967 referendum and whether it was intended only to permit ‘beneficial’ laws. The article concludes that there is a disjunction between the intention of the Expert Panel and the likely effect of its proposed amendment.

Type
Research Article
Information
Federal Law Review , Volume 40 , Issue 3 , September 2012 , pp. 413 - 443
Copyright
Copyright © 2012 The Australian National University

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References

1 Expert Panel on Constitutional Recognition of Indigenous Australians, Recognising Aboriginal and Torres Strait Islander Peoples in the Constitution (Blue Star Print Canberra, 2012) 153Google Scholar.

2 Ibid 173.

3 For a brief discussion of this issue see: Anne Twomey, ‘Indigenous Constitutional Recognition Explained — The Issues, Risks and Options’ (Constitutional Reform Commentary, Sydney Law School Constitutional Reform Unit, January 2012) 8.

4 Note the more detailed analysis by Heydon J which draws distinctions between different types of originalist and non-originalist theories: JusticeJ D, Heydon, ‘Theories of constitutional interpretation: a taxonomy’ Bar News: The Journal of the NSW Bar Association (Winter 2007) 12Google Scholar.

5 Cole v Whitfield (1988) 165 CLR 360, 385; Pape v Commissioner of Taxation (2009) 238 CLR 1, 106 [298] (Hayne and Kiefel JJ) and 148–9 [430]–[431] (Heydon J); NSW v Commonwealth (2006) 229 CLR 1, 272–3 [683] (Callinan J); Singh v Commonwealth (2004) 222 CLR 322, 337–8 [21]–[22] (Gleeson CJ); 349–50 [54] (McHugh J); and 385 [159] (Gummow, Hayne and Heydon JJ). For two different originalist approaches to the race power, see M J, Detmold, ‘Original intentions and the race power’ (1997) 8 Public Law Review 244Google Scholar; Robert, Dubler, ‘Race and the Constitution’ (2002) 76 Australian Law Journal 456Google Scholar.

6 Amalgamated Society of Engineers v Adelaide Steamship Co Ltd (1920) 28 CLR 129; Eastman v Queen (2000) 203 CLR 1, 47 [149] (McHugh J). Note, however, that textualism still involves reading the text and structure in its historic context.

7 See, eg, Theophanous v Herald & Weekly Times Ltd (1994) 182 CLR 104, 171–2 (Deane J); Eastman v The Queen (2000) 203 CLR 1, 79–80 [242] (Kirby J).

8 Kartinyeri v Commonwealth (1998) 195 CLR 337, 413 [157] (Kirby J) ('Kartinyeri’).

9 See also McHugh J's question during the hearing of Kartinyeri: ‘[W]ho is the relevant body that we look at? Is it the people in Cabinet? Is it the people who pass the Act or is it the people that voted on it?': Transcript of Proceedings, Kartinyeri v Commonwealth [1998] HCATrans 12 (5 February 1998) 31.

10 See Alex, Reilly, ‘Reading the Race Power: A Hermeneutic analysis’ (1999) 23 Melbourne University Law Review 476, 489–91Google Scholar.

11 See, eg, J, Quick and R, Garran, The Annotated Constitution of the Australian Commonwealth (Legal Books, Sydney (1901)Google Scholar; W, Harrison Moore, The Constitution of the Commonwealth of Australia (John Murray, London, 1902)Google Scholar; A, Inglis Clark, Studies in Australian Constitutional Law (Charles F Maxwell, Melbourne, 1901)Google Scholar. See also historical works including: J A, La Nauze, The Making of the Australian Constitution (Melbourne University Press, 1972)Google Scholar; John M, Williams, The Australian Constitution — A Documentary History (Melbourne University Press, 2005)Google Scholar.

12 See, eg, Constitutional Commission, Final Report of the Constitutional Commission (Australian Government Publishing Service, 1988)Google Scholar.

13 See, eg, Expert Panel on Constitutional Recognition of Indigenous Australians, above n 1.

14 The traditional rule was that they were kept secret for 30 years, although this is gradually being reduced to 20 years: Archives Act 1983 (Cth) s 7(3).

15 House of Representatives Standing Committee on Legal and Constitutional Affairs, Commonwealth, Reforming our Constitution: A Roundtable Discussion (June 2008) 11–12.

16 Kartinyeri (1998) 195 CLR 337, 363 [32] (Gaudron J). See also Eastick who draws an analogy with the deletion of an exception in s 105 of the Constitution, which resulted in the expansion of Commonwealth legislative power: Jennifer, Eastick, ‘The Australian Aborigine: Full Commonwealth Responsibility under the Constitution’ (1980) 12 Melbourne University Law Review 516, 522–3Google Scholar.

17 Note Dubler's argument that ‘discrimination’ is treating people differently when that difference in treatment is not objectively justifiable by reference to relevant differences. He argued that at the time of federation, the framers would have believed that there were relevant differences between races and that the types of laws supported by s 51(xxvi) would be able to be objectively justified by reference to those differences. Hence, the provision would not have been intended to be ‘discriminatory’ in that sense; Dubler, above n 5, 458–61;. cf Detmold, above n 5.

18 Koowarta v Bjelke-Petersen (1982) 153 CLR 168, 186 (Gibbs CJ), 244 (Wilson J); Kartinyeri (1998) 195 CLR 337, 361–2 [29]–[30] (Gaudron J); 382–3 [91]–[94] (Gummow and Hayne JJ); Western Australia v Ward (2002) 213 CLR 1, 27980 [653] (Callinan J). Compare Murphy J's argument about the meaning of ‘for': Koowarta v Bjelke-Petersen (1982) 153 CLR 168, 242 (Murphy J); Commonwealth v Tasmania (1983) 158 CLR 1, 180 (Murphy J). Note the rejection of this argument: Commonwealth v Tasmania (1983) 158 CLR 1, 110 (Gibbs CJ); Kartinyeri (1998) 195 CLR 337, 364 [36] (Gaudron J), resiling from her earlier comments in Chu Kheng Lim v Minister for Immigration (1992) 176 CLR 1, 56. See also Robert Sadler, ‘The Federal Parliament's Power to Make Laws “With Respect to…. The People of any Race….“’ (1985) 10 Sydney Law Review 591, 606.

19 Transcript of Proceedings, Kartinyeri v Commonwealth [1998] HCATrans 13 (5 February 1998) 27.

20 Kartinyeri (1998) 195 CLR 337, 407 [145], 413 [157] (Kirby J); see also Brennan J's observation in Commonwealth v Tasmania (1983) 158 CLR 1, 242 that the primary object of s 51(xxvi) is beneficial; see also John, Williams and John, Bradsen, ‘The Perils of Inclusion: The Constitution and the Race Power’ in (1997) 19(1) Adelaide Law Review 95Google Scholar, 119–27.

21 Dubler, above n 5, 457.

22 Geoffrey, Sawer, ‘The Australian Constitution and the Australian Aborigine’ (1966) 2 Federal Law Review 17, 35Google Scholar.

23 Kartinyeri (1998) 195 CLR 337, 362–3 [31] (Gaudron J).

24 Geoffrey, Lindell, ‘The Races Power Problem: Other Observations’ (1998) 9 Public Law Review 272, 274Google Scholar. See also Kartinyeri (1998) 195 CLR 337, 382 [91] (Gummow and Hayne JJ) where they noted that an aspiration to ‘provide federal legislative power to advance the situation of persons of the Aboriginal race’ does not of itself amount to a limitation on constitutional power.

25 Transcript of Proceedings, Kartinyeri v Commonwealth [1998] HCATrans 14 (6 February 1998) 31 (Mr Griffith).

26 See, eg, advertisements such as ‘Vote Yes for Aboriginal Rights’ at National Museum of Australia, Changing the Constitution—what were the roles of people, groups and ideas in the referendum campaign? <http://indigenousrights.net.au/pdfs/67Ref_Act5.pdf>.

27 Bain, Attwood and Andrew, Markus, The 1967 Referendum: Race, Power and the Australian Constitution (Aboriginal Studies Press, 2nd ed, 2007) 50Google Scholar.

28 Ibid 44–5.

29 See also Brian, Galligan and John, Chesterman, ‘Aborigines, Citizenship and the Australian Constitution: Did the Constitution Exclude Aboriginal People from Citizenship?’ (1997) 8(1) Public Law Review 45Google Scholar.

30 Attwood and Markus, above n 27, 46.

31 Note, for example, the argument that courts focus on the second reading speech when attempting to discern the intent of Parliament, because ‘the government maintains the initiative for introducing legislation and its intent is the dominant intent'; Transcript of Proceedings, Kartinyeri v Commonwealth [1998] HCATrans 13 (5 February 1998) 35 (Mr Spigelman).

32 (2009) 236 CLR 573, 582 [21] (French CJ and Gummow J).

33 Kartinyeri (1998) 195 CLR 337, 391–3 [117], 401–2 [132] (Kirby J). Note Gummow and Hayne JJ's reference to these materials at 382 [91] with the rider ‘assuming regard may properly be had to them'. Note the more extensive use of parliamentary materials concerning a referendum bill in Wong v Commonwealth (2009) 236 CLR 573.

34 The main relevant Cabinet Minute was determined to be ‘open’ for access by the National Archives of Australia from 31 December 1997, which was before Kartinyeri was heard on 5–6 February 1998.

35 See the brief discussion of this Bill in Kartinyeri v Commonwealth (1998) 195 CLR 337, 405–6 [141] (Kirby J).

36 Constitution Alteration (Aborigines) Bill 1964 (Cth). See Commonwealth, Parliamentary Debates, House of Representatives, 14 May 1964, 1902 (Arthur Calwell). The Bill proposed the deletion of the exclusion of Aboriginal people from s 51(xxiv) and the deletion of s 127 of the Constitution.

37 Commonwealth, Parliamentary Debates, House of Representatives, 10 March 1966, 123 (Bill Wentworth).

38 Note the observation by Williams and Bradsen that the Wentworth Bill was not put to referendum ‘primarily to counter the vagaries of constitutional amendment in Australia’ but that ‘the sentiments that it contained were transferred to the decision to omit the words “other than the Aboriginal race in any State” from s 51(xxvi)'; Williams and Bradsen, above n 20, 123.

39 Commonwealth, Constitutional Amendment—Aborigines—DECISION 79, Cabinet Submission NAA: A5842 (January 1967) 4–5 [12].

40 Ibid.

41 Compare the argument made by Counsel for the Plaintiffs in Kartinyeri that the failure of the Wentworth Bill can be attributed to the anti-discrimination provision, instead of concern about the meaning of ‘advancement’ Transcript of Proceedings, Kartinyeri v Commonwealth [1998] HCATrans 13 (5 February 1998) 34.

42 Commonwealth, above n 39, 5–6 [13].

43 Commonwealth, above n 37, 124.

44 Commonwealth, above n 39, 5–6 [13].

45 Commonwealth, Cabinet Decision No 79, 22 February 1967: NAA: A5842 46.

46 Kartinyeri (1998) 195 CLR 337, 409 [148] (Kirby J).

47 Kartinyeri (1998) 195 CLR 337, 383 [94] (Gummow and Hayne JJ).

48 Kartinyeri (1998) 195 CLR 337, 381–2 [90] (Gummow and Hayne JJ). See also Singh v Commonwealth (2004) 222 CLR 322, [20] (McHugh J) 336–7 [51]; Bradley Selway, ‘Methodologies of Constitutional Interpretation in the High Court of Australia’ (2003) 14(4) Public Law Review 234, 239–40; Dubler, above n 5, 461. Cf Malbon's criticism that the majority in Kartinyeri made a ‘worrying retreat into textualism, leaving the jurisprudence of the race power in a dangerously vulnerable state': Justin, Malbon, ‘Avoiding the Hindmarsh Island Bridge Disaster: Interpreting the Race Power’ (2003) 6 Flinders Journal of Law Reform 41, 44Google Scholar; see also Reilly, above n 10, 492–6.

49 Kartinyeri (1998) 195 CLR 337, 399 [132] (Kirby J).

50 State v Zuma [1995] 2 SARL 642, 652–3 (Kentridge AJ) quotedin Kartinyeri v Commonwealth (1998) 195 CLR 337, 399 [132] (Kirby J).

51 Kartinyeri (1998) 195 CLR 337, 381-3 [90]-[94] (Gummow and Hayne JJ)

52 Kartinyeri (1998) 195 CLR 337, 361 [29] (Gaudron J).

53 Kartinyeri (1998) 195 CLR 337, 363 [34] (Gaudron J) (citations omitted). See also Kirby J at 411 [153] and Gummow and Hayne JJ at 378 [81].

54 Note that in Wong v Commonwealth (2009) 236 CLR 573, French CJ and Gummow J observed at 583 [23] that while the history of a provision and the extrinsic materials concerning its development cannot be determinative of its construction and interpretation, they become more important where the clear meaning of a provision is not apparent on the face of the text. Note also Kirby J's comment at 605 [99] that while historical materials are helpful in providing context, it is a serious mistake to think of them as resolving meaning or controlling the interpretation of a provision.

55 Expert Panel on Constitutional Recognition of Indigenous Australians, above n 1, 150.

56 Ibid 150-1 (citations omitted).

57 Stowel v Lord Zouch (1816) 1 Plowden 352, 369; 75 ER 536, 560. See also J, Quick and R, Garran, The Annotated Constitution of the Australian Commonwealth (Legal Books, Sydney first published 1901, 1995 reprint) 284Google Scholar.

58 Powell v Kempton Park Racecourse Co Ltd [1897] 2 QB 242, 299 (Chitty LJ).

59 The Sussex Peerage Case (1844) 11 Cl & Fin 85, 143; 8 ER 1034, 1057 (Lord Tindal CJ). See also Tasmania v Commonwealth and Victoria (1904) 1 CLR 329, 339 (Griffith CJ).

60 Gregory, Craven, Secession: The Ultimate States Right (Melbourne University Press, 1986) 85–8Google Scholar. See also Bowtell v Goldsbrough, Mort & Co Ltd (1905) 3 CLR 444, 451; S G G, Edgar, Craies on Statute Law (Sweet & Maxwell, London, 7th ed, 1971) 201–2Google Scholar: ‘if the meaning of the enactment is clear and unequivocal without the preamble, the preamble can have no effect whatever'; Re Application of Tan Boon Liat; Tan Boon Liat v Menteri Hal Ehwal Dalam Negri, Malaysia & Ors [1976] 2 Malayan Law Journal 83, 85 (Abdoolcader J): ‘Where the enacting part is explicit and unambiguous the preamble cannot be resorted to, to control, qualify or restrict it.'

61 Wacando v Commonwealth (1981) 148 CLR 1, 23 (Mason J); M, Handler, B, Leiter and C, Handler, ‘A Reconsideration of the Relevance and Materiality of the Preamble in Constitutional Interpretation’ (1990) 12 Cardozo Law Review 117, 128Google Scholar; Anne, Winckel, ‘The Contextual Role of a Preamble in Statutory Interpretation’ (1999) 23 Melbourne University Law Review 184, 187–91Google Scholar; Elmer, A Driedger, The Construction of Statutes, (Butterworths, Toronto, 2nd ed, 1983) 146Google Scholar.

62 See the distinction drawn by Anne Winckel between the contextual role of a preamble and its constructive role: Winckel, above n 61, 185.

63 Wacando v Commonwealth (1981) 148 CLR 1. See also Heydon, above n 4, 16.

64 Wacando v Commonwealth (1981) 148 CLR 1, 15–16 (Gibbs CJ). See also Salkeld v Johnson (1848) 2 Exch 256; 154 ER 487, 499, where it was stated by Pollock CB that while the preamble is undoubtedly part of the Act and may be used to explain it, ‘it cannot control the enacting part, which may, and often does, go beyond the preamble'; Powell v Kempton Park Racecourse Co [1899] AC 143, 157 where the Earl of Halsbury stated that ‘if an enactment is itself clear and unambiguous, no preamble can qualify or cut down the enactment'.

65 Wacando v The Commonwealth (1981) 148 CLR 1, 23 (Mason J). See also D C, Pearce and R S, Geddes, Statutory Interpretation in Australia (LexisNexis Butterworths, 6th ed, 2006), 153Google Scholar.

66 Union Steamship Co of Australia Pty Ltd v King (1988) 166 CLR 1, 10.

67 Durham Holdings Pty Ltd v New South Wales (2001) 205 CLR 399, 408-9 [9] (Gaudron, McHugh, Gummow and Hayne JJ) and 424-5 [55] (Kirby J) rejecting the approach of the English Court of Appeal in R v Secretary of State for the Foreign and Commonwealth Office; Ex parte Bancoult [2011] QB 1067, [57] (Laws LJ) and [71] Gibbs J.

68 Durham Holdings Pty Ltd v New South Wales (2001) 205 CLR 399, 425 [55] (Kirby J).

69 Bank of New South Wales v Commonwealth (1948) 76 CLR 1, 186 (Latham CJ). See also New South Wales v Commonwealth (1990) 169 CLR 482, 498 (Mason CJ, Brennan, Dawson, Toohey, Gaudron and McHugh JJ) and 506 (Deane J); Re F; Ex parte F (1986) 161 CLR 376, 388 (Mason and Deane JJ).

70 See, eg, the right to ‘self-determination’ conferred upon ‘peoples’ by the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, and the controversy concerning the use of ‘peoples’ in the Declaration on the Rights of Indigenous Peoples: Megan, Davis, ‘Indigenous Struggles in Standard-Setting: The United Nations Declaration on the Rights of Indigenous Peoples’ (2008) 9(2) Melbourne Journal of International Law 439Google Scholar.

71 R v Public Vehicles Licensing Appeal Tribunal (Tas); Ex parte Australian National Airways Pty Ltd (1964) 113 CLR 207, 225 (Dixon CJ, Kitto, Taylor, Menzies, Windeyer and Owen JJ). See also New South Wales v Commonwealth (1990) 169 CLR 482, 498 (Mason CJ, Brennan, Dawson, Toohey, Gaudron and McHugh JJ); Grain Pool (WA) v Commonwealth (2000) 202 CLR 479, 492 [16] (Gleeson CJ, Gaudron, McHugh, Gummow, Hayne and Callinan JJ); Singh v Commonwealth (2004) 222 CLR 322, 384 [155] (Gummow, Hayne and Heydon JJ).

72 Shaw v Minister for Immigration and Multicultural Affairs (2003) 218 CLR 28, 43 [32] (Gleeson CJ, Gummow and Hayne JJ); Kartinyeri (1998) 195 CLR 337, 380-1 [87]–[88] (Gummow and Hayne JJ); Singh v Commonwealth (2004) 222 CLR 322, 384 [155] (Gummow, Hayne and Heydon JJ).

73 Note that the acknowledgement of a ‘continuing’ relationship with ‘traditional’ lands and waters may be intended to affect native title laws — eg to avoid the need to prove such a continuing relationship, because it is recognised by the Constitution itself.

74 International Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Racial Discrimination, opened for signature 21 December 1965, 660 UNTS 195 (entered into force 4 January 1969) art 1(4).

75 Committee on the Elimination of Racial Discrimination, General Recommendation No 32: The Meaning and Scope of Special Measures in the International Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Racial Discrimination’ 75th sess, UN Doc CERD/C/GC/32 (24 September 2009)

76 Shireen, Morris, ‘Indigenous Constitutional Recognition, Non-Discrimination and Equality Before the Law — Why Reform is Necessary’ (2011) 7(26) Indigenous Law Bulletin 7, 10Google Scholar. See also Geoffrey, Lindell, ‘The Races Power Problem: Other Observations’ (1998) 9 Public Law Review 265, 275Google Scholar.

77 See Morton v Queensland Police Service (2010) 240 FLR 269; and R v Maloney (2012) 262 FLR 172.

78 R v Maloney (2012) 262 FLR 172, 194-5 [62] (McMurdo P); Bropho v Western Australia [2007] FCA 519, [577] (Nicholson J).

79 Gerhardy v Brown (1985) 159 CLR 70, 135 (Brennan J).

80 Bropho v Western Australia [2007] FCA 519, [570] (Nicholson J); Morton v Queensland Police Service (2010) 240 FLR 269, 280 [31] (McMurdo P) and 298 [114] (Chesterman JA); R v Maloney (2012) 262 FLR 172, 205-6 [104] (Chesterman JA).

81 Bropho v Western Australia [2007] FCA 519, [570] (Nicholson J).

82 Western Australia v Commonwealth (1995) 183 CLR 373, 460 (Mason CJ, Brennan, Deane, Toohey, Gaudron and McHugh JJ); Kartinyeri (1998) 195 CLR 337, 365 [38] (Gaudron J).

83 Gerhardy v Brown (1985) 159 CLR 70, 138 (Brennan J).

84 Castlemaine Tooheys Ltd v South Australia (1990) 169 CLR 436, 473 (Mason CJ, Brennan, Deane, Dawson and Toohey JJ).

85 Gerhardy v Brown (1985) 159 CLR 70, 138 (Brennan J).

86 Kartinyeri (1998) 195 CLR 337, 358 [19] (Brennan CJ and McHugh J) and 368-70 [47]–[49] (Gaudron J).

87 Kartinyeri (1998) 195 CLR 337, 357 [16] (Brennan CJ and McHugh J).

88 Kartinyeri (1998) 195 CLR 337, 358 [19] (Brennan CJ and McHugh J), quoting Kirmani v Captain Cook Cruises Pty Ltd [No 1] (1985) 159 CLR 351, 459 (Dawson J).

89 Kartinyeri (1998) 195 CLR 337, 422 [175] (Kirby J).

90 Note also the argument put by the Solicitor-General of South Australia that the amending Act must be read with the principal Act when assessing benefit in order to avoid this absurd result: Transcript of Proceedings, Kartinyeri v Commonwealth [1998] HCATrans 13 (6 February 1998) 48-9 (Mr Selway).

91 Western Australia v Commonwealth (1995) 183 CLR 373, 460 (Mason CJ, Brennan, Deane, Toohey, Gaudron and McHugh JJ).

92 Kartinyeri (1998) 195 CLR 337, 368 [45] See also: 366-7 [41]–[42] (Gaudron J).

93 Kartinyeri (1998) 195 CLR 337, 378-9 [82] and 381 [89] (Gummow and Hayne JJ).

94 Kartinyeri (1998) 195 CLR 337, 411 [152]. See also 414-17 [159]–[165].

95 Gerhardy v Brown (1985) 159 CLR 70, 138 (Brennan J).

96 Gerhardy v Brown (1985) 159 CLR 70, 161–2 (Dawson J).

97 Gerhardy v Brown (1985) 159 CLR 70, 149 and 153 (Deane J).

98 Gerhardy v Brown (1985) 159 CLR 70, 105 (Mason J).

99 Morton v Queensland Police Service (2010) 240 FLR 269, [32] (McMurdo P); Aurukun Shire Council v CEO Office of Liquor Gaming and Racing [2010] QCA 37, [75] (McMurdo P) (although note that she also appeared to apply a proportionality test at [90]); [210]–[211] (Keane JA) (who rejected the application of a proportionality test as exalting judicial power over the legislature); and Bropho v Western Australia [2007] FCA 519, [573] (Nicholson J). Note, however, the far more comprehensive test set out by Bell J in Lifestyle Communities Ltd (No 3) (Anti Discrimination) [2009] VCAT 1869 at [266]: ‘In summary, the purpose must be necessary, genuine, objective and capable of justification by positive proof. Measures not reasonably likely to achieve the remedial purpose are not regarded as being for that purpose. Nor will measures which are a disproportionate means of achieving that end.’ See also Jacomb v Australian Municipal Administrative Clerical and Services Union (2004) 140 FCR 149, [47] and [61]–[62] where Crennan J took a subjective and objective approach, which also involved a proportionality test.

100 Note Gageler's view that ‘manifest abuse’ will only arise ‘where Parliament fails to form the necessary judgment at all or fails to form that judgment on rational grounds': Stephen, Gageler, ‘The Races Power Problem: The Case for Validity’ (1998) 9 Public Law Review 270, 272Google Scholar. Compare Reilly's view that this test allows the court to rely on natural or moral authority to strike down a law that would otherwise be within power: Alex Reilly, above n 10, 497.

101 Note the transcript in Kartinyeri which shows an attempt by counsel for the Plaintiff to argue that the race power was a purposive power because of the use of the word ‘special', and McHugh J's objection that it could not be purposive because it was expressed in the passive voice: Transcript of Proceedings, Kartinyeri v Commonwealth [1998] HCATrans 13 (5 February 1998) 26.

102 Cunliffe v Commonwealth (1994) 182 CLR 272, 322 (Brennan J); Re Tracey; Ex parte Ryan (1989) 166 CLR 518, 596–7 (Gaudron J); Davis v Commonwealth (1988) 166 CLR 79, 100 (Mason CJ, Deane and Gaudron JJ).

103 Leask v Commonwealth (1996) 187 CLR 579, 606 (Dawson J).

104 Re Tracey; Ex parte Ryan (1989) 166 CLR 518, 597 (Gaudron J); Langer v Commonwealth (1996) 186 CLR 302, 325 (Dawson J). Note, however, that this proportionality test for purposive powers was at its height during the Mason Court. Later cases concerning the defence power and the nationhood power, such as Thomas v Mowbray (2007) 233 CLR 307 and Pape v Commissioner of Taxation (2009) 238 CLR 1, while not overruling this test, have not applied it either.

105 Stenhouse v Coleman (1944) 69 CLR 457, 470 (Dixon J).

106 Polyukhovich v Commonwealth (1991) 172 CLR 501, 593 (Brennan J).

107 Stenhouse v Coleman (1944) 69 CLR 457, 471 (Dixon J).

108 Byrnes v Kendle (2011) 243 CLR 253, 283 [97] (Heydon and Crennan JJ).

109 Castlemaine Tooheys Ltd v South Australia (1990) 169 CLR 436, 473–4 (Mason CJ, Brennan, Deane, Dawson and Toohey JJ), 480 (Gaudron and McHugh JJ).

110 Permanent Trustee Australia Ltd v Commissioner of State Revenue (Vic) (2004) 220 CLR 388, 424-25 [89]–[91] (Gleeson CJ, Gummow, Hayne, Callinan and Heydon JJ).

111 Street v Queensland Bar Association (1989) 168 CLR 461, 571–3 (Gaudron J).

112 Street v Queensland Bar Association (1989) 168 CLR 461, 574 (Gaudron J).

113 On severance, see: Pidoto v Victoria (1943) 68 CLR 87; Australian National Airways Pty Ltd v Commonwealth (1945) 71 CLR 29.

114 Western Australia v Commonwealth (1995) 183 CLR 373, 462.

115 Kartinyeri (1998) 195 CLR 337, 370 [49] (Gaudron J).

116 Kartinyeri (1998) 195 CLR 337, 420-21 [172] (Kirby J).

117 The concept of tacking most commonly arises in relation to money bills where the Senate's powers are restricted. See s 55 of the Constitution.

118 (2005) 147 FCR 299.

119 Clark v Vanstone (2004) 211 ALR 412, 448-49 [115] (Gray J).

120 Vanstone v Clark (2005) 147 FCR 299, 354 [209] (Weinberg J).

121 A similar problem arises with the defence power, and Gaudron J also thought it arises in relation to the race power: Kartinyeri (1998) 195 CLR 337, 367 [43] (Gaudron J).

122 Kartinyeri (1998) 195 CLR 337, 356 [15] (Brennan CJ and McHugh J).

123 Kartinyeri (1998) 195 CLR 337, 368-9 [47] (Gaudron J).

124 Kartinyeri (1998) 195 CLR 337, 370 [49] (Gaudron J).

125 Air Caledonie International v The Commonwealth (1988) 165 CLR 462.

126 Commissioner of Taxation v Clyne (1958) 100 CLR 246, 267 (Dixon CJ). For another example, see Queensland Electricity Commission v Commonwealth (1985) 159 CLR 192, where even though the amending Act was required to be read as one with the principal Act, only the amending Act was held invalid.

127 Transcript of Proceedings, Kartinyeri v Commonwealth [1998] HCATrans 13 (5 February 1998) 16–17 (Mr Spigelman).

128 Transcript of Proceedings, Kartinyeri v Commonwealth [1998] HCATrans 13 (5 February 1998) 63–4 (Mr Katz).

129 Kartinyeri (1998) 195 CLR 337, 368 [46] (Gaudron J) and 377 [76] (Gummow and Hayne JJ).

130 Commonwealth v Tasmania (1983) 158 CLR 1, 274 (Deane J). See also: Eastick, above n 16, 519.

131 Kartinyeri (1998) 195 CLR 337, 377-8 [77] (Gummow and Hayne JJ).

132 Kartinyeri (1998) 195 CLR 337, 378 [78] (Gummow and Hayne JJ).

133 Kartinyeri (1998) 195 CLR 337, 379 [84] (Gummow and Hayne JJ).

134 Kartinyeri (1998) 195 CLR 337, 368 [46] (Gaudron J).

135 Kartinyeri (1998) 195 CLR 337, 395 [122] (Kirby J).

136 Anthony Dillon, ‘Closing the Gap must Re-Focus', The Australian (Sydney), 23 April 2012, 12. A similar view has been expressed by Marcia Langton: Marcia Langton, ‘Indigenous Exceptionalism and the Constitutional “race power“’ (Speech delivered at the Melbourne Writers Festival, Melbourne, 26 August 2012) <http://www.youmeunity.org.au/downloads/8f2d6396820886086f16.pdf>.

137 Expert Panel on Constitutional Recognition of Indigenous Australians, above n 1, 151.

138 Ibid 152 (citations omitted).

139 Ibid.

140 Ibid.

141 Wurridjal v Commonwealth (2009) 237 CLR 309, 314 (argument by R Merkel QC).

142 Teori Tau v Commonwealth (1969) 119 CLR 564 ('Teori Tau’).

143 Wurridjal (2009) 237 CLR 309, 359 [86] (French CJ), 388 [189] (Gummow and Hayne JJ) and 419 [287] (Kirby J).

144 Note in particular that powers with respect to ‘persons’ such as the race power and the aliens power, tend not to be affected by limitations built in to other heads of power: Jennifer Eastick, above n 16, 521.

145 (2006) 229 CLR 1.

146 Work Choices Case (2006) 229 CLR 1, 208-9 [494]–[496] (Kirby J), relying on the authority of Bourke v State Bank of New South Wales (19990) 170 CLR 276.

147 Work Choices Case (2006) 229 CLR 1, 211-13 [501]–[507] (Kirby J) relying on Nintendo Co Ltd v Centronics Systems Pty Ltd (1994) 181 CLR 134, 160 (Mason CJ, Brennan, Deane, Toohey, Gaudron and McHugh JJ).

148 Work Choices Case (2006) 229 CLR 1, 214-220 [510]–[525] (Kirby J).

149 Work Choices Case (2006) 229 CLR 1, 127 [219] (Gleeson CJ, Gummow, Hayne, Heydon and Crennan JJ), quoting from Bourke v State Bank of New South Wales (1990) 170 CLR 276, 285.

150 Work Choices Case (2006) 229 CLR 1, 127 [221] (Gleeson CJ, Gummow, Hayne, Heydon and Crennan JJ).