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The Reception of Structured Proportionality in Australian Constitutional Law

Published online by Cambridge University Press:  01 January 2025

Murray Wesson Open the ORCID record for Murray Wesson [Opens in a new window]
Murray Wesson*
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University of Western Australia
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The author may be contacted at murray.wesson@uwa.edu.au.
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Abstract

A majority of the High Court has incorporated a test of structured proportionality into its implied freedom of political communication case law. Structured proportionality developed in the context of constitutional rights adjudication and requires courts to engage in substantive, values-based reasoning. The Australian Constitution does not contain a Bill of Rights and the High Court is known for its commitment to legalism and textualism. Against this background, one might think that the High Court would interpret the elements of structured proportionality so that they assume a highly distinctive form in Australian constitutional law. However, a close reading of recent implied freedom of political communication case law demonstrates that generally this is not the case. Admittedly, the High Court’s approach to the necessity and balancing stages departs from the case law of the Federal German Constitutional Court. However, once a broader comparative perspective is adopted, it becomes apparent that the High Court’s approach is not unusual, especially for courts that are new to applying structured proportionality. By adopting structured proportionality, the High Court may have aligned the implied freedom of political communication with a global model of constitutional rights enforcement. The Australian constitutional context may also be less distinctive than is sometimes supposed.

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Federal Law Review , Volume 49 , Issue 3 , September 2021 , pp. 352 - 379
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Copyright © 2021 The Author(s)

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Footnotes

I would like to thank the participants in a panel on proportionality at the International Society of Public Law conference ‘Public Law in Times of Change?’ held in Santiago, Chile, from 1 to 3 July 2019 for helpful feedback, as well as the participants in the conference ‘The Past, Present and Future of Rights’ held at the University of Western Australia on 28 November 2019. I would especially like to thank Dr Ned Curthoys, Dr Dylan Lino and Professor Sarah Murray.

References

1. (2015) 257 CLR 178 (‘McCloy’).

2. (2019) 267 CLR 373 (‘Banerji’).

3. Alec Stone Sweet and Jud Mathews, ‘Proportionality Balancing and Global Constitutionalism’ (2008) 47 Columbia Journal of Transnational Law 72, 73.

4. See, most recently, Banerji (n 2), 925 [97] (Gageler J) and 935 [161] (Gordon J).

5. Rosalind Dixon, ‘Calibrated Proportionality’ (2020) 48(1) Federal Law Review 92; Evelyn Douek, ‘All Out of Proportion: The Ongoing Disagreement About Structured Proportionality in Australia’ (2019) 47(4) Federal Law Review 551; Adrienne Stone, ‘Proportionality and Its Alternatives’ (2020) 48(1) Federal Law Review 123. For discussion of these articles, see Anne Carter, ‘Bridging the Divide? Proportionality and Calibrated Scrutiny’ (2020) 48(2) Federal Law Review 282; Sir Anthony Mason, ‘Proportionality and Calibrated Scrutiny: A Commentary’ (2020) 48(2) Federal Law Review 286; Carlos Bernal, ‘The Migration of Proportionality to Australia’ (2020) 48(2) Federal Law Review 288.

6. See, eg, Moshe Cohen-Eliya and Iddo Porat, Proportionality and Constitutional Culture (Cambridge University Press, 2013).

7. Clubb v Edwards; Preston v Avery (2019) 267 CLR 171, 199–202 [61]–[74] (Kiefel CJ, Keane and Bell JJ), 264–8 [266]–[275] (Nettle J), 311 [408], 329–34 [461]–[471] (Edelman J) (‘Clubb/Preston’).

8. Aharon Barak, ‘Proportionality (2)’ in Michel Rosenfeld and András Sajó (eds), The Oxford Handbook of Comparative Constitutional Law (Oxford University Press, 2012) 739, 741. See also McCloy (n 1) 215 [72] (French CJ, Kiefel, Bell and Keane JJ).

9. The seminal work in this regard is Robert Alexy, A Theory of Constitutional Rights, tr Julian Rivers (Oxford University Press, 2009).

10. Sweet and Mathews (n 3).

11. Rosalind Dixon argues that at a federal level, Australia has a ‘partial’ Bill of Rights. See ‘An Australian (Partial) Bill of Rights’ (2016) 14(1) International Journal of Constitutional Law 80.

12. See, most recently, Banerji (n 2) 910 [20] (Kiefel CJ, Bell, Keane and Nettle JJ).

13. Roach v Electoral Commission (2007) 233 CLR 162, 178–9 [17] (Gleeson CJ) (‘Roach’). For discussion, see Adrienne Stone, ‘Judicial Reasoning’ in Cheryl Saunders and Adrienne Stone (eds), The Oxford Handbook of the Australian Constitution (Oxford University Press, 2018) 472, 484–6.

14. Cohen-Eliya and Porat, Proportionality and Constitutional Culture (n 6).

15. Jeffrey Goldsworthy, ‘Australia: Devotion to Legalism’ in Jeffrey Goldsworthy (ed), Interpreting Constitutions: A Comparative Study (Oxford University Press, 2007) 106; Cheryl Saunders, The Constitution of Australia: A Contextual Analysis (Hart Publishing, 2011) 91; Stone (n 13) 475.

16. Douek (n 5) 564–5; Stone, ‘Proportionality and Its Alternatives’ (n 5) 125.

17. Kai Möller, The Global Model of Constitutional Rights (Oxford University Press, 2012) 1.

18. Alexy (n 9).

19. Aharon Barak, Proportionality: Constitutional Rights and Their Limitations (Cambridge University Press, 2012).

20. See, eg, Niels Petersen, Proportionality and Judicial Activism: Fundamental Rights Adjudication in Canada, Germany and South Africa (Cambridge University Press, 2017); Mordechai Kremnitzer, Andrej Lang and Talya Steiner (eds), Proportionality in Action: Comparative and Empirical Perspectives on the Judicial Practice (Cambridge University Press, 2020).

21. David Bilchitz, ‘Necessity and Balancing: Towards a Balanced Approach?’ in Liora Lazarus, Christopher McCrudden and Nigel Bowles (eds), Reasoning Rights: Comparative Judicial Engagement (Hart Publishing, 2014) 41, 43.

22. McCloy (n 1) 193–4 [2].

23. See, eg, Clubb/Preston (n 7) 343 [495] (Edelman J).

24. Kai Möller, ‘Constructing the Proportionality Test’ in Liora Lazarus, Christopher McCrudden and Nigel Bowles (eds), Reasoning Rights: Comparative Judicial Engagement (Hart Publishing, 2014) 31, 34; Andrej Lang, ‘Proportionality Analysis by the German Federal Constitutional Court’ in Mordechai Kremnitzer, Andrej Lang and Talya Steiner (eds), Proportionality in Action: Comparative and Empirical Perspectives on the Judicial Practice (Cambridge University Press, 2020) 12, 103–29.

25. Petersen (n 20).

26. Ibid 98–106; Lorian Hardcastle, ‘Proportionality Analysis by the Canadian Supreme Court’ in Mordechai Kremnitzer, Andrej Lang and Talya Steiner (eds), Proportionality in Action: Comparative and Empirical Perspectives on the Judicial Practice (Cambridge University Press, 2020) 134, 152–7.

27. Dixon (n 5); Carter (n 5).

28. For an overview, see Sir Anthony Mason, ‘The Use of Proportionality in Australian Constitutional Law’ (2016) 27(2) Public Law Review 109.

29. Ibid 114.

30. Lange v Australian Broadcasting Corporation (1997) 189 CLR 520, 567 n 272 (Brennan CJ, Dawson, Toohey, Gaudron, McHugh, Gummow and Kirby JJ) (‘Lange’).

31. Coleman v Power (2004) 220 CLR 1, 37 [50] (McHugh J) (‘Coleman’).

32. McCloy (n 1) 193–5 [2] (French CJ, Kiefel, Bell and Keane JJ).

33. Brown v Tasmania (2017) 261 CLR 328, 363–4 [104] (Kiefel CJ, Bell and Keane JJ) (‘Brown’).

34. McCloy (n 1) 238 [150] (Gageler J).

35. Ibid 282 [310] (Gordon J).

36. Brown (n 33) 376–9 [158]–[166] (Gageler J), 464–7 [426]–[438] (Gordon J); Unions New South Wales v New South Wales (2019) 264 CLR 595, 633 [101] (Gageler J), 649–50 [150] (Gordon J) (‘Unions NSW [No 2]’); Clubb/Preston (n 7) 224–5 [158]–[162] (Gageler J), 304–9 [389]–[404] (Gordon J); Banerji (n 2) 422 [97] (Gageler J), 440 [161] (Gordon J).

37. McCloy (n 1) 259 [222] (Nettle J).

38. Brown (n 33) 416–25 [278]–[295] (Nettle J).

39. Unions NSW [No 2] (n 36) 638 [110] (Nettle J).

40. Clubb/Preston (n 7) 264–9 [266]–[275] (Nettle J).

41. Banerji (n 2) 906–16 [1]–[47] (Kiefel CJ, Bell, Keane and Nettle JJ).

42. Clubb/Preston (n 7) 329–34 [461]–[471] (Edelman J).

43. Banerji (n 2) 941–5 [188]–[206] (Edelman J).

44. Stone, ‘Proportionality and Its Alternatives’ (n 5) 140.

45. Australian Capital Television Pty Ltd v Commonwealth (1992) 177 CLR 106, 150, 157 (Brennan J) (‘ACTV’).

46. Unions NSW v New South Wales (2013) 252 CLR 530, 577 [133] (Keane J) (‘Unions NSW [No 1]’).

47. There is no reference to suitability or rational connection review as a distinct step in the majority judgments in ACTV (n 45), which instead rely on necessity testing. Likewise in McCloy (n 1), Gordon J, applying the traditional appropriate and adapted formula, did not mention suitability but instead said that application of the Lange test ‘may involve and be assisted by a consideration of whether there are alternative, reasonably practicable and less restrictive means of achieving the same end which are obvious and compelling’, 285 [328] (emphasis in original).

48. Stone, ‘Proportionality and Its Alternatives’ (n 5) 140.

49. ACTV (n 45) 146 (Mason J).

50. Coleman (n 31) 48 [88] (McHugh J). For a defence of McHugh J’s position, see Nicholas Aroney, ‘Justice McHugh, Representative Government and the Elimination of Balancing’ (2006) 28(3) Sydney Law Review 505.

51. Adrienne Stone, ‘The Limits of Constitutional Text and Structure: Standards of Review and the Freedom of Political Communication’ (1999) 23(3) Melbourne University Law Review 668, 682 (‘Limits of Constitutional Text’). See also Stone, ‘Proportionality and Its Alternatives’ (n 5) 141.

52. Stone, ‘Proportionality and Its Alternatives’ (n 5) 140.

53. Douek (n 5) 561.

54. Banerji (n 2) 395 [20] (Kiefel CJ, Bell, Keane and Nettle JJ).

55. Ibid.

56. Ibid.

57. Roach (n 13) 179 [17] (Gleeson CJ). See also Brown (n 33) 466 [433]–[434] (Gordon J). For discussion, see Stone, ‘Judicial Reasoning’ (n 13) 484–6.

58. Banerji (n 2) 396 [20] (Kiefel CJ, Bell, Keane and Nettle JJ).

59. See, eg, McCloy (n 1) 202 [29], 205 [40] (French CJ, Kiefel, Bell and Keane JJ), 258 [219] (Nettle J); Clubb/Preston (n 7) 346–7 [504] (Edelman J); Banerji (n 2) 441–2 [164] (Edelman J).

60. There is an extensive literature on the relationship between the categorical approach to constitutional rights and structured proportionality. For an argument that the differences are overstated, see Paul Yowell, ‘Proportionality in United States Constitutional Law’ in Liora Lazarus, Christopher McCrudden and Nigel Bowles (eds), Reasoning Rights: Comparative Judicial Engagement (Hart Publishing, 2014) 87. For arguments for greater use of structured proportionality in US constitutional law, see Vicki Jackson, ‘Constitutional Law in an Age of Proportionality’ (2015) 124 (8) Yale Law Journal 3094; Jamal Greene, ‘Rights as Trumps?’ (2018) 132(1) Harvard Law Review 28.

61. Möller (n 17) 1.

62. Ibid.

63. Barak (n 19) 175–210.

64. Alexy (n 9). For a useful discussion, see Mattias Kumm, ‘Constitutional Rights as Principles: On the Structure and Domain of Constitutional Justice’ (2004) 2(3) International Journal of Constitutional Law 574. For discussion of Alexy’s theory of constitutional rights relating to the implied freedom of political communication, see Stone, ‘Judicial Reasoning’ (n 13) 484–6.

65. Alexy (n 9) 47.

66. Ibid.

67. Ibid 48 (emphasis in original).

68. Kumm (n 64) 579.

69. Lang (n 24) 48–53.

70. Hardcastle (n 26) 157–60.

71. Talya Steiner, ‘Proportionality Analysis by the Israeli Supreme Court’ in Mordechai Kremnitzer, Andrej Lang and Talya Steiner (eds), Proportionality in Action: Comparative and Empirical Perspectives on the Judicial Practice (Cambridge University Press, 2020) 312–14.

72. In South Africa constitutional law, rights are interpreted and their scope circumscribed in light of the core constitutional values of openness, democracy, human dignity, equality and freedom. This can lead to a more restrictive approach to the scope of rights. See Richard Stacey, ‘Proportionality Analysis by the South African Constitutional Court’ in Mordechai Kremnitzer, Andrej Lang and Talya Steiner (eds), Proportionality in Action: Comparative and Empirical Perspectives on the Judicial Practice (Cambridge University Press, 2020) 232–6.

73. Möller (n 17) 3; see also Barak (n 19) 45–82.

74. Julian Rivers, ‘A Theory of Constitutional Rights and the British Constitution’ in Robert Alexy (ed), A Theory of Constitutional Rights, tr Julian Rivers (Oxford University Press, 2009) xvii, xxxi.

75. Ibid xxxii.

76. Ibid xxxi.

77. Ibid xxxi.

78. Alexy (n 9) 394–425.

79. Alan Brady, Proportionality and Deference under the UK Human Rights Act: An Institutionally Sensitive Approach (Cambridge University Press, 2012) 1.

80. Aileen Kavanagh, ‘Defending Deference in Public Law and Constitutional Theory’ (2010) 126(April) Law Quarterly Review 222, 223.

81. Jeffrey Jowell, ‘Judicial Deference: Servility, Civility or Institutional Capacity?’ [2003] (Winter) Public Law 592, 598; Aileen Kavanagh, ‘Deference or Defiance? The Limits of the Judicial Role in Constitutional Adjudication’ in Grant Huscroft (ed), Expounding the Constitution: Essays in Constitutional Theory (Cambridge University Press, 2008) 184, 197.

82. Jowell (n 81) 597.

83. Mark Elliott, ‘Proportionality and Deference: The Importance of a Structured Approach’ in Christopher Forsyth et al (eds), Effective Judicial Review: A Cornerstone of Good Governance (Oxford University Press, 2010) 264.

84. Unions NSW [No 1] (n 46).

85. Attorney-General (SA) v Corporation of the City of Adelaide (2013) 249 CLR 1.

86. Levy v Victoria (1997) 189 CLR 579, 622 (McHugh J).

87. (1994) 182 CLR 104, 124 (Mason CJ, Toohey and Gaudron JJ) quoting Eric Barendt, Freedom of Speech (Clarendon Press, 1985) 152.

88. For an exception, see Brown v Members of Classification Review Board of Office of Film & Literature Classification (1998) 82 FCR 225.

89. Clubb/Preston (n 7) 191 [29]–[31] (Kiefel CJ, Bell and Keane JJ), 256–7 [249] (Nettle J).

90. Clubb/Preston (n 7) 190 [25] (Kiefel CJ, Bell and Keane JJ), 215 [131] (Gageler J), 242 [218] (Nettle J), 286–7 [328] (Gordon J), 312–13 [413] (Edelman J).

91. Clubb/Preston (n 7) 256 [249] (Nettle J).

92. (2013) 249 CLR 92, 139 [93] (Hayne J).

93. Banerji (n 2) 398 [29] (Kiefel CJ, Keane, Bell and Nettle JJ).

94. Alexy (n 9) 211; Barak (n 19) 102.

95. Banerji (n 2) 396 [20] (Kiefel CJ, Bell, Keane and Nettle JJ).

96. Douek (n 5) 564.

97. Ibid 565.

98. Stone, ‘Proportionality and Its Alternatives’ (n 5) 125.

99. Ibid.

100. Cohen-Eliya and Porat, Proportionality and Constitutional Culture (n 6).

101. Matthew SR Palmer, ‘New Zealand Constitutional Culture’ (2007) 22 New Zealand Universities Law Review 565, 568.

102. Lawrence Friedman, ‘The Place of Legal Culture in the Sociology of Law’ in Michael Freeman (ed), Law and Sociology (Oxford University Press, 2006) 189.

103. Roger Cotterrell, ‘Comparative Law and Legal Culture’ in Mathias Reimann and Reinhard Zimmermann (eds), The Oxford Handbook of Comparative Law (Oxford University Press, 2006) 709.

104. David Nelken, ‘Defining and Using the Concept of Legal Culture’ in David Nelken and Esin Örücü (eds), Comparative Law: A Handbook (Hart Publishing, 2007) 109, 117.

105. Palmer (n 101) 565. It is possible to distinguish between ‘internal’ legal culture (which describes the legal culture of judges, lawyers and law academics) and ‘external’ legal culture (which refers to the legal culture of the general population). See Friedman (n 102). In this article, the term constitutional culture is used in the internal sense.

106. Jeffrey Goldsworthy, ‘Australia: Devotion to Legalism’ in Jeffrey Goldsworthy (ed), Interpreting Constitutions: A Comparative Study (Oxford University Press, 2006) 106, 109.

107. Sir Anthony Mason, ‘The Australian Constitution in Retrospect and Prospect’ in Robert French, Geoffrey Lindell and Cheryl Saunders (eds), Reflections on the Australian Constitution (Federation Press, 2003) 8.

108. George Williams, Human Rights under the Australian Constitution (Oxford University Press, 1999) 26.

109. Goldsworthy (n 106) 148.

110. Elisa Arcioni and Adrienne Stone, ‘The Small Brown Bird: Values and Aspirations in the Australian Constitution’ (2016) 14(1) International Journal of Constitutional Law 60.

111. Goldsworthy (n 106) 113, 133.

112. Swearing in of Sir Owen Dixon as Chief Justice (1952) 85 CLR xi, xiv.

113. Cheryl Saunders, The Constitution of Australia: A Contextual Analysis (Hart Publishing, 2011) 91.

114. HLA Hart, The Concept of Law (Oxford University Press, 2nd ed, 1994) 128.

115. Stone, ‘Judicial Reasoning’ (n 13) 475.

116. Goldsworthy (n 106) 153.

117. (1920) 28 CLR 129, 142.

118. Stone, ‘Judicial Reasoning’ (n 13) 475.

119. See, eg, Nationwide News Pty Ltd v Wills (1992) 177 CLR 1, 80 [69] (Deane and Toohey JJ).

120. Theunis Roux, ‘Reinterpreting “the Mason Court Revolution”: An Historical Institutionalist Account of Judge-Driven Constitutional Transformation in Australia’ (2015) 43(1) Federal Law Review 1, 22.

121. Rosalind Dixon and Sean Lau, ‘The Gleeson Court and the Howard Era: A Tale of Two Conservatives (and isms)’ in Rosalind Dixon and George Williams (eds), The High Court, the Constitution and Australian Politics (Cambridge University Press, 2015) 284.

122. Barak (n 19) 251.

123. Stone, ‘Limits of Constitutional Text’ (n 51) 682.

124. Barak (n 19) 340.

125. McCloy (n 1) 216–17 [77]–[78] (French CJ, Kiefel, Bell and Keane JJ); Douek (n 5) 557.

126. Moshe Cohen-Eliya and Iddo Porat, ‘Proportionality and the Culture of Justification’ (2011) 59(2) The American Journal of Comparative Law 463 (‘Culture of Justification’). The term ‘culture of justification’ has its origin in Etienne Mureinik, ‘A Bridge to Where? Introducing the Interim Bill of Rights’ (1994) 10(1) South African Journal on Human Rights 31. See further David Dyzenhaus, ‘Law as Justification: Etienne Mureinik’s Conception of Legal Culture’ (1998) 14(1) South African Journal on Human Rights 11.

127. Cohen-Eliya and Porat, ‘Culture of Justification’ (n 126) 475.

128. Re F; Ex Parte F (1986) 161 CLR 376, 388 (Mason and Deane JJ).

129. Cohen-Eliya and Porat, ‘Culture of Justification’ (n 126) 476.

130. David Dyzenhaus, ‘The Politics of Deference: Judicial Review and Democracy’ in Michael Taggart (ed), The Province of Administrative Law (Hart Publishing, 1997) 279, 305.

131. Jeff A King, ‘Institutional Approaches to Judicial Restraint’ (2008) 28(3) Oxford Journal of Legal Studies 409, 441.

132. Lange (n 30) 567 (Brennan CJ, Dawson, Toohey, Gaudron, McHugh, Gummow and Kirby JJ).

133. See McCloy (n 1) 239 [155] (Gageler J); Brown (n 33) 390–1 [204] (Gageler J); Clubb/Preston (n 7) 232 [185] (Gageler J); Banerji (n 2) 422 [97] (Gageler J).

134. Barak (n 19) 245.

135. Ibid.

136. Ibid 251.

137. Ibid 259.

138. Lang (n 24) 68–71.

139. A difference in Canada is that the emphasis is on whether the purpose is ‘pressing and substantial’ as opposed to consistent with the values in the Charter of Rights and Freedoms. See Hardcastle (n 26) 167–9.

140. Steiner (n 71) 328–35.

141. Stacey (n 72) 247–50.

142. See, eg, McCloy (n 1) [2] (French CJ, Kiefel, Bell and Keane JJ).

143. Brown (n 33) 363–4 [104] (Kiefel CJ, Bell and Keane JJ).

144. McCloy (n 1) 285 [325] (Gordon J).

145. Brown (n 33) 461 [413] (Gordon J).

146. Clubb/Preston (n 7) 303 [381] (Gordon J). But see the more detailed analysis of representative and responsible government and analysis of why the maintenance of an apolitical public service is a legitimate aim in Gordon J’s judgment in Banerji (n 2) 439 [155].

147. Brown (n 33) 363 [102] (Kiefel CJ, Bell and Keane JJ).

148. Unions NSW [No 2] (n 36) 613 [38] (Kiefel CJ, Bell and Keane JJ), 648 [146] (Gordon J).

149. Murray Wesson, ‘Unions NSW v New South Wales [No 2]: Unresolved Issues for the Implied Freedom of Political Communication’ (2019) 23(1) Media and Arts Law Review 93.

150. Election Funding, Expenditure and Disclosures Act 1981 (NSW) Pt 6 Divs 2A, 4A, s 96E.

151. Particular reliance was placed on Citizens United v Federal Election Commission 558 US 310 (2010).

152. The phrase is drawn from W Harrison Moore, The Constitution of the Commonwealth of Australia (John Murray, 1902) 329.

153. McCloy (n 1) 207 [45] (Kiefel CJ, Bell and Keane JJ).

154. Aharon Barak, The Judge in a Democracy (Princeton University Press, 2008).

155. Clubb/Preston (n 7) 196 [51] (Kiefel CJ, Bell and Keane JJ).

156. McCloy (n 1) 241–9 [165]–[184] (Gageler J).

157. Unions NSW [No 2] (n 36) 623–31 [69]–[92] (Gageler J).

158. Banerji (n 2) 412–20 [66]–[88], 423 [100]–[101] (Gageler J).

159. Barak (n 19) 303; McCloy (n 1) 193 [2] (French CJ, Kiefel, Bell and Keane JJ).

160. Barak (n 19) 305.

161. Clubb/Preston (n 7) 335 [473] (Edelman J).

162. Dieter Grimm, ‘Proportionality in Canadian and German Constitutional Jurisprudence’ (2007) 57(2) University of Toronto Law Journal 383, 389.

163. Barak (n 19) 307.

164. Lang (n 24) 77–89.

165. Hardcastle (n 26) 172–7.

166. Steiner (n 71) 338–47.

167. Stacey (n 72) 252–60.

168. See, eg, Unions NSW [No 1] (n 46) 577 [133] (Keane J).

169. Brown (n 33) 363 [101] (Kiefel CJ, Bell and Keane JJ).

170. Ibid 371 [135].

171. Ibid [136].

172. Ibid 418 [281] (Nettle J).

173. Ibid.

174. Ibid 457 [404] (Gordon J).

175. Barak (n 19) 317.

176. Alexy (n 9) 67–8.

177. Bundesverfassungsgericht [German Constitutional Court], 2 BvR 2031/92, 9 March 1994 reported in (1994) BVerfGE 90, 145 [172]. See Lang (n 24) 89–103.

178. Bilchitz (n 21).

179. Ibid 48.

180. Cannabis decision (n 177) [173].

181. Lang (n 24) 89–90.

182. Barak (n 19) 324.

183. Ibid.

184. Lang (n 24) 89.

185. McCloy (n 1) 193 [2] (French CJ, Kiefel, Bell and Keane JJ).

186. See, eg, Unions NSW [No 2] (n 36) 614–15 [41] (Kiefel CJ, Bell and Keane JJ).

187. See, eg, Brown (n 33) 371 [139] (Kiefel CJ, Bell and Keane JJ); Clubb/Preston (n 7) 264 [266] (Nettle J), 337 [479] (Edelman J); Banerji (n 2) 401 [35] (Kiefel CJ, Bell, Keane and Nettle JJ), 452 [194] (Edelman J). A minor qualification is that Edelman J refers to alternative measures that achieve Parliament’s purpose to ‘the same or a similar extent’.

188. McCloy (n 1) 220 [91] (French CJ, Kiefel, Bell and Keane JJ).

189. Brown (n 33) 371 [139] (Kiefel CJ, Bell and Keane JJ).

190. [1986] 1 SCR 103, 106.

191. R v Edwards Books and Art Ltd [1986] 2 SCR 713 [131] (Dickson CJ, Chouinard and Le Dain JJ).

192. Quebec (Attorney-General) v A [2013] 1 SCR 61 [439] (McLachlin CJ). See Hardcastle (n 26) 178.

193. Steiner (n 71) 360–5.

194. Talya Steiner, ‘Proportionality Analysis by the Israeli Supreme Court’ in Mordechai Kremnitzer, Talya Steiner and Andrej Lang (eds), Proportionality in Action: Comparative and Empirical Perspectives on the Judicial Practice (Cambridge University Press, 2020) 285, 360 nn 274.

195. HCJ 11437/05 Kav LaOved v Ministry of the Interior [2011] IsrSC 64(3) 122 (Supreme Court of Israel sitting as the High Court of Justice).

196. HCJ 389/80 Dapei Zahav v Broadcasting Authority [1980] IsrSC 35(1) 421 (Supreme Court of Israel).

197. De Reuck v Director of Public Prosecutions [2004] 1 SA 406 (Constitutional Court) [83]. See Stacey (n 72) 265–8.

198. S v Mamabolo [2001] 3 SA 409 (Constitutional Court) [49] (Kriegler J).

199. McCloy (n 1) 220 [91] (French CJ, Kiefel, Bell and Keane JJ).

200. Kavanagh (n 81).

201. Dyzenhaus (n 130) 286.

202. Douek (n 5) 558–61; Murray Wesson, ‘Crafting a Concept of Deference for the Implied Freedom of Political Communication’ (2016) 27(2) Public Law Review 101, 105–6.

203. On the advantages of a ‘doctrinal’ approach to deference, see Jeff A King, ‘Institutional Approaches to Judicial Restraint’ (2008) 28(3) Oxford Journal of Legal Studies 409.

204. Hardcastle (n 26) 177.

205. Brown (n 33) 372 [143] (Kiefel CJ, Bell and Keane JJ).

206. Ibid 373 [146] (Kiefel CJ, Bell and Keane JJ).

207. Ibid 373 [145] (Kiefel CJ, Bell and Keane JJ).

208. Barak (n 19) 340.

209. Julian Rivers, ‘Proportionality and the Variable Intensity of Review’ (2006) 65(1) Cambridge Law Journal 174, 200.

210. Bernhard Schlink, ‘Proportionality (1)’ in Michel Rosenfeld and András Sajó (eds), The Oxford Handbook of Comparative Constitutional Law (Oxford University Press, 2012) 719, 724.

211. Timothy Endicott, ‘Proportionality and Incommensurability’ in Grant Huscroft, Bradley W Miller and Grégoire Webber (eds), Proportionality and the Rule of Law: Rights, Justification, Reasoning (Cambridge University Press, 2014) 311, 317. Methodologies have been proposed to render balancing more objective. See, eg, Barak (n 19) 349–50; Robert Alexy, ‘The Construction of Constitutional Rights’ (2010) 4(1) Law and Ethics of Human Rights 19; David M Beatty, The Ultimate Rule of Law (Oxford University Press, 2004). However, Schlink argues that the process of balancing remains ‘methodologically obscure’: Schlink (n 210) 725.

212. See, eg, Clubb/Preston (n 7) 306 [393] (Gordon J).

213. Brown (n 33) 377 [160] (Gageler J).

214. McCloy (n 1) 236 [145] (Gageler J).

215. Ibid 287 [336] (Gordon J).

216. Brown (n 33) 466 [434] (Gordon J).

217. McCloy (n 1) 193–5 [2] (French CJ, Kiefel, Bell and Keane JJ).

218. Ibid 219 [89] (French CJ, Kiefel, Bell and Keane JJ).

219. Banerji (n 2) 402 [38] (Kiefel CJ, Bell, Keane and Nettle JJ).

220. Brown (n 33) 422 [290] (Nettle J).

221. Clubb/Preston (n 7) 343 [495] (Edelman J).

222. Lord Steyn, ‘Deference: A Tangled Story’ [2005] Public Law 346.

223. Dyzenhaus (n 130).

224. Clubb/Preston (n 7) 343 [495] (Edelman J).

225. Brown (n 33) 425 [290] (Nettle J).

226. Stone, ‘Proportionality and Its Alternatives’ (n 5) 133.

227. Clubb/Preston (n 7) 209 [99] (Kiefel CJ, Bell and Keane JJ).

228. Ibid (n 7) 209 [102] (Kiefel CJ, Bell and Keane JJ).

229. Petersen (n 20).

230. Bundesverfassungsgericht [German Constitutional Court], 1 BvR 596/56, 11 June 1958 reported in (1958) 7 BVerfGE 377.

231. Petersen (n 20) 91.

232. Ibid 102–4; Hardcastle (n 26) 185–92.

233. Petersen (n 20) 106; Hardcastle (n 26) 185–92.

234. Grimm (n 162); Hardcastle (n 26) 188.

235. Mark Zion, ‘Effecting Balance: Oakes Analysis Restaged’ (2012) 43(3) Ottawa Law Review 431, 447.

236. Steiner (n 71) 302–12.

237. S v Manamela [2000] 3 SA 1 (Constitutional Court) [32].

238. Petersen (n 20) 110. For a contrary view, Stacey (n 72) 217–25.

239. Petersen (n 20) 114.

240. Dixon (n 5).

241. Carter (n 5) 283.