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Published online by Cambridge University Press: 01 January 2025
A collateral challenge impugns the validity of an administrative decision in a proceeding that is not specifically designed for the modification or setting aside of that decision. On the current state of the law, there is a presumption in favour of collateral challenge in an inferior court, which can be displaced by a contrary legislative intention. I argue, however, that the current presumption lacks a clear doctrinal basis, and that it places too much emphasis on statutory interpretation as a useful tool for rebutting, or indeed vindicating, the starting presumption (let alone determining what administrative law ‘grounds’ a collateral challenge might encompass). I suggest a rearticulation of the presumption as an expression of a defendant’s entitlement to vindicate legal rights. I point out, however, that contemporary norms of administrative law may otherwise demand a stricter approach to permitting collateral challenges. On this alternative view, a challenger must identify clear legislative authorisation for what is essentially a judicial review function.
1. Will Bateman and Leighton McDonald, ‘The Normative Structure of Australian Administrative Law’ (2017) 45(2) Federal Law Review 153, 153.
2. Ibid 178.
3. See Amnon Rubinstein, Jurisdiction and Illegality: A Study in Public Law (Clarendon Press, 1965) 37–8.
4. Mark Aronson, ‘Criteria for Restricting Collateral Challenge’ (1998) 9 Public Law Review 237, 238.
5. (1997) 192 CLR 69 (‘Ousley’).
6. Ibid 98–9 (McHugh J). See also Davy v Spelthorne [1984] AC 262.
7. See, eg, Federal Airports Corporation v Aerolineas Argentinas (1997) 76 FCR 582.
8. See ibid 587–8 (Lehane J).
9. (2013) 23 Tas R 264 (‘Krulow’).
10. Ibid 270–3 [5]–[10] (Estcourt J).
11. (1989) 167 CLR 94 (‘Murphy’).
12. Ibid 105 (Mason CJ and Toohey J).
13. Ibid 106.
14. Toohey J would clarify this in Ousley (n 5) 79.
15. Ibid 79 (Toohey J), 87 (Gaudron J), 124 (Gummow J).
16. Ibid 120 (Gummow J), 100–5 (McHugh J).
17. Ibid 100.
18. Ibid 100. See also Mark Aronson, Matthew Groves and Greg Weeks, Judicial Review of Administrative Action and Government Liability (Thomson Reuters, 6th ed, 2017) 751.
19. Ousley (n 5) 147–8.
20. See Aronson (n 4) 241–2; Aronson, Groves and Weeks (n 18) 754.
21. (2011) 33 VR 559 (‘Sudi’).
22. Ibid 565–6.
23. Ousley (n 5) 127.
24. Aronson (n 4) 242. See also Aronson, Groves and Weeks (n 18) 754.
25. (1999) 197 CLR 83 (‘Breckler’).
26. Ibid 108 (Gleeson CJ, Gaudron, McHugh, Gummow, Hayne and Callinan JJ).
27. See, eg, Gedeon v Commissioner of the New South Wales Crime Commission (2008) 236 CLR 120, 139–40 (Gummow, Kirby, Hayne, Heydon, Crennan and Kiefel JJ).
28. Public Service Association of South Australia Inc v Industrial Relations Commission (SA) (2012) 249 CLR 398, 424 [66] (Gummow, Hayne, Crennan, Kiefel, Bell JJ).
29. Notable exclusions are: Federal Airports Corporation v Aerolineas Argentinas (1997) 76 FCR 582; Frugtniet v Attorney-General (NSW) (1997) 41 NSWLR 588; John Holland Pty Ltd v Construction, Forestry, Mining and Energy Union [2009] FCA 1128; Corruption and Crime Commission v Wallace [2010] WASC 390; Australian Crime Commission v Marrapodi (2012) 42 WAR 351; Police v Stacy (2016) 125 SASR 50.
30. (1971) 1 SASR 512 (‘Hinton Demolitions’).
31. Ibid 520.
32. Ibid 522.
33. Ibid.
34. Aronson, Groves and Weeks (n 18) 751.
35. Hinton Demolitions (n 30) 549.
36. Ibid 548–9.
37. (2006) 93 SASR 568 (‘Jacobs’).
38. Ibid 593–4 [93].
39. Ibid 591 [89].
40. Ibid [87].
41. Sudi (n 21).
42. Pursuant to the Residential Tenancies Act 1997 (Vic).
43. Re Director of Housing and Sudi (2010) 33 VAR 139, 171–2 (Bell J).
44. Sudi (n 21) 563–4.
45. Ibid.
46. Ibid.
47. Ibid 565.
48. Ibid 565–6.
49. Ibid 567.
50. Ibid 569.
51. Ibid 572.
52. See above Part II(A) for facts.
53. Krulow (n 9) 282, 299–300.
54. Ibid 300.
55. Ibid 283.
56. See Enid Campbell, ‘Collateral Challenge of the Validity of Government Action’ (1998) 24(2) Monash University Law Review 272, 275–6.
57. Ousley (n 5) 99–100 (McHugh J).
58. Murphy (n 11) 106 (Mason CJ and Toohey J).
59. Ousley (n 5) 79 (Toohey J).
60. Hinton Demolitions (n 30) 523 (Bray CJ).
61. Jacobs (n 37) 591 [82] (Besanko J).
62. See Aronson (n 4) 242–3. See also Campbell (n 56) 286–8.
63. Aronson (n 4) 237.
64. Bateman and McDonald (n 1) 158–63. See also Lord Woolf, Jeffrey Jowell and AP Le Sueur, De Smith, Woolf and Jowell’s Principles of Judicial Review (Sweet & Maxwell, 5th rev ed, 1999) 147–9.
65. Kioa v West (1985) 159 CLR 550, 576–7 (‘Kioa’).
66. Peter Cane, Administrative Law (Oxford University Press, 5th ed, 2011) 13.
67. Ibid 161. See also Woolf, Jowell and Le Sueur (n 64) 5–14.
68. SAAP v Minister for Immigration and Multicultural and Indigenous Affairs (2005) 228 CLR 294, 353–4 (Hayne J).
69. Bateman and McDonald (n 1) 165.
70. Kioa (n 65) 611.
71. Bateman and McDonald (n 1) 169; (1998) 194 CLR 355 (‘Project Blue Sky’).
72. Ibid 388–9 (McHugh, Gummow, Kirby and Hayne JJ).
73. Bateman and McDonald (n 1) 169.
74. As recently as 2019, the High Court has reinforced the ongoing relevance of common law principles to administrative law analysis: see Minister for Immigration and Border Protection v SZMTA (2019) 363 ALR 599, 603 [9], 608 [27] (Bell, Gageler and Keane JJ), 620 [83] (Nettle and Gordon JJ).
75. Bateman and McDonald (n 1) 173.
76. Ibid. See also ibid 165.
77. Hinton Demolitions (n 30) 520 (Bray CJ), 548–9 (Wells J).
78. Frugtniet v Attorney-General (NSW) (1997) 41 NSWLR 588, 602 (Beazley JA).
79. Sudi (n 21) 566 [28].
80. Krulow (n 9) 299 [154].
81. (2002) 209 CLR 597 (‘Bhardwaj’).
82. Ibid 614–5 [51] (Gaudron and Gummow JJ).
83. Ibid 647 [153] (Hayne J).
84. Sudi (n 21) 565 [23], quoting Smith v East Elloe Rural District Council [1956] AC 736, 769 (Lord Radcliffe).
85. Sudi (n 21) 567 [31], quoting Bhardwaj (n 81) 647 [153] (Hayne J).
86. Krulow (n 9) 299 [154].
87. Cooper Brookes (Wollongong) Pty Ltd v Federal Commissioner of Taxation (1981) 147 CLR 297, 320.
88. Ibid.
89. Zheng v Cai (2009) 239 CLR 446, 455–6 [28] (French CJ, Gummow, Crennan, Kiefel and Bell JJ).
90. Lacey v Attorney-General (Qld) (2011) 242 CLR 573, 592 [43] (French CJ, Gummow, Hayne, Crennan, Kiefel and Bell JJ).
91. Weiss v The Queen (2005) 224 CLR 300, 312–3 (Gleeson CJ, Gummow, Kirby, Hayne, Callinan and Heydon JJ).
92. Alcan (NT) Alumina Pty Ltd v Commissioner of Territory Revenue (NT) (2009) 239 CLR 27, 47 [47] (Hayne, Heydon, Crennan and Kiefel JJ).
93. Momcilovic v The Queen (2011) 245 CLR 1, 141 [341] (Hayne J) (‘Momcilovic’).
94. Project Blue Sky (n 71) 384 [78] (McHugh, Gummow, Kirby and Hayne JJ).
95. For a positive account, see Joseph Campbell and Richard Campbell, ‘Why Statutory Interpretation Is Done as It Is Done’ (2014) 39(1) Australian Bar Review 1; for a more critical account, see Dale Smith, ‘Is the High Court Mistaken about the Aim of Statutory Interpretation?’ (2016) 44(2) Federal Law Review 227.
96. Taylor v The Owners (2014) 253 CLR 531, 548 [38] (French CJ, Crennan and Bell JJ), 556–7 [65] (Gageler and Keane JJ) (‘Taylor’).
97. Environment Protection Act 1970 (Vic) s 28B(1) (‘EPA Act’).
98. County Court Act 1958 (Vic) s 37(2) (‘County Court Act’).
99. EPA Act (n 97) s 28B(5).
100. County Court Act (n 98) s 37(2)(c).
101. Ibid s 36A(1).
102. EPA Act (n 97) s 28B(4).
103. Ibid s 28B(5).
104. Ibid s 1B(2).
105. Ibid s 1B(3).
106. Krulow (n 9) 283 [51] (Estcourt J), quoting Krulow v Glarmorgan Spring Bay Council (2013) 196 LGERA 347, 362 [60] (Wood J).
107. Krulow (n 9) 284 [58].
108. See Taylor (n 96) 548 [38].
109. Consideration (1) will be discussed further in Part IV.
110. Bateman and McDonald (n 1) 178.
111. See, eg, He Kaw Teh v The Queen (1985) 157 CLR 523.
112. Ousley (n 5) 120 (Gummow J), 100–5 (McHugh J).
113. See, eg, R v Wicks [1998] AC 92; Boddington v British Transport Police [1999] 2 AC 143 (‘Boddington’).
114. Boddington (n 113) 161.
115. Sir William Wade and Christopher Forsyth, Administrative Law (Oxford University Press, 10th ed, 2009) 238.
116. Potter v Minahan (1908) 7 CLR 277, 304 (O’Connor J).
117. (2004) 221 CLR 309 (‘Electrolux’).
118. Electrolux (n 117) 329 [21]; recently, this statement was cited with approval in Australian Education Union v General Manager of Fair Work Australia (2012) 246 CLR 117, 134–5 [30] (French CJ, Crennan and Kiefel JJ).
119. See recently Francis Cardell-Oliver, ‘Parliament, the Judiciary and Fundamental Rights: The Strength of the Principle of Legality’ (2017) 41(1) Melbourne University Law Review 30, 31–2; Lisa Burton-Crawford et al, Public Law and Statutory Interpretation: Principles and Practice (Federation Press, 2018) 265–7.
120. Lisa Burton-Crawford, The Rule of Law and the Australian Constitution (Federation Press, 2017) 35; contra Trevor Allan, Constitutional Justice: A Liberal Theory of the Rule of Law (Oxford University Press, 2003) 264.
121. See, eg, Plaintiff S157/2002 v Commonwealth (2003) 211 CLR 476, 483–4 (Gleeson CJ) (‘Plaintiff S157’).
122. Boddington (n 113) 161.
123. Graham v Minister for Immigration and Border Protection (2017) 263 CLR 1, 24–7 [38]–[48] (Kiefel CJ, Bell, Gageler, Keane, Nettle, Gordon JJ) (‘Graham’).
124. See Civil Procedure Rules 1998 (UK) O 53 r 3.
125. Dietrich v The Queen (1992) 177 CLR 292, 298 (Mason CJ and McHugh J).
126. Brown v Scott [2003] 1 AC 681, 719.
127. Electrolux (n 117) 328.
128. See Bateman and McDonald (n 1) 176–7.
129. See Jeremy Waldron, ‘The Rule of Law and the Importance of Procedure’ in James E Fleming (ed), Getting to the Rule of Law, Nomos, No 50 (New York University Press, 2011) 3.
130. Wade and Forsyth (n 115) 20.
131. Ibid 34.
132. (2010) 239 CLR 531 (‘Kirk’).
133. Ibid 580 [97].
134. Ibid 580–1 [98].
135. See recently Graham (n 123) 24–7 [38]–[48].
136. Kirk (n 132) 580–1 [97]–[100].
137. Ibid 583 [107].
138. Re Director of Housing and Sudi (2010) 33 VAR 139, 171 [158] (Bell J).
139. Sudi (n 21) 563.
140. Jacobs (n 37) 591 [82].
141. Hinton Demolitions (n 30) 520–1.
142. See, eg, Bateman’s Bay Local Aboriginal Council v Aboriginal Community Benefit Fund Pty Ltd (1998) 194 CLR 247, 256 (Gaudron, Gummow and Hayne JJ); see also Michael Walt, ‘Pursuing Declaratory Relief to Evade Time Limits Applicable to Judicial Review: The Emergence of an Australian Alternative to the Rule of Procedural Exclusivity’ (2010) 64 Australian Institute Administrative Law Forum 10, 11–12.
143. See, eg, Commissioner of Taxation (Cth) v Futuris Corp Ltd (2008) 237 CLR 146.
144. See, eg, Bhardwaj (n 81); Kirk (n 132); Plaintiff S157 (n 121).
145. See, eg, Ainsworth v Criminal Justice Commission (1992) 175 CLR 564, 597 (‘Ainsworth’).
146. Enfield City v Development Assessment Commission (2000) 199 CLR 135, 156–7 [54]–[57] (Gaudron J).
147. Leigh Howard, ‘Declaratory Relief and Public Law Litigation in the 21st Century’ (2018) 25(3) Australian Journal of Administrative Law 181, 182–3.
148. Ainsworth (n 145) 581–2; Momcilovic (n 93) 61 [81] (French CJ), 94–5 [179] (Gummow J).
149. Administrative Decisions (Judicial Review) Act 1977 (Cth) s 8(2).
150. Ibid s 9A(1).
151. See, eg, O’Reilly v Mackman [1983] 2 AC 237.
152. Jacobs (n 37) 591 [82] (Besanko J).