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Published online by Cambridge University Press: 01 January 2025
The period of 2018–19 threw up political crises in Australia and the United Kingdom that raised circumstances in which the reserve powers of the Queen or the Governor-General might have been exercised. This article discusses in depth the 2018 challenge to Prime Minister Turnbull’s leadership, including how the Governor-General should have responded if he had been asked to dissolve Parliament in the midst of the challenge or if he had been advised not to appoint Dutton as Prime Minister due to concerns about his eligibility to sit in Parliament. The second part deals with the question of whether royal assent should be refused, upon ministerial advice, to a bill, such as the Medevac Bill in Australia and two Brexit delay bills in the United Kingdom, which were passed against the wishes of the relevant government, including when procedural or non-justiciable constitutional requirements were breached in the passage of the bills. It concludes that the best way of resolving such issues is to resort to the application of fundamental constitutional principles.
This article is a revised version of the Geoffrey Sawer Lecture delivered at ANU in November 2019.
1. Hugh Riminton, ‘Constitutional Cloud Emerges Over Peter Dutton’s Business Interests’, 10 Daily News (online), 20 August 2018 <https://10daily.com.au/news/politics/a180820xwi/constitutional-cloud-emerges-over-peter-duttons-business-interests-20180820>; Michael Koziol, ‘Leadership Twist as Report Claims Peter Dutton Could Be Ineligible to Sit in Parliament’, Sydney Morning Herald (online), 20 August 2018 <https://www.smh.com.au/politics/federal/leadership-twist-as-report-claims-peter-dutton-could-be-ineligible-to-sit-in-parliament-20180820-p4zyn1.html>. The author notes, for transparency, that she had been interviewed by Riminton about the constitutional issue on the previous Wednesday, before any leadership speculation had commenced, but that the interview was not aired until the evening of Monday 20 August when such speculation was rife.
2. Stephen Donaghue QC, ‘In the Matter of the Eligibility of Mr Dutton Pursuant to Section 44(v) of the Constitution’, SG No 21 of 2018, 24 August 2018 <https://parlinfo.aph.gov.au/parlInfo/download/media/pressrel/6166529/upload_binary/6166529.PDF;fileType=application%2Fpdf#search=%22media/pressrel/6166529%22>.
3. See further Graeme Orr, ‘Fertilising a Thicket: Section 44, MP Qualifications and the High Court’ (2018) 29(1) Public Law Review 17; James Morgan, ‘Dual Citizenship and Australian Parliamentary Eligibility: A Time for Reflection or Referendum?’ (2018) 39(2) Adelaide Law Review 439; Gerard Carney, ‘Disqualification of Members of the Australian Parliament — Recent Developments and the Case for Reform’ (2018) 24 James Cook University Law Review 89; Rayner Thwaites and Helen Irving, ‘Allegiance, Foreign Citizenship and the Constitutional Right to Stand for Parliament’ (2020) Federal Law Review 299.
4. Re Day (No 2) (2017) 263 CLR 201.
5. See further Graeme Orr, ‘Parliamentary Disqualification for Financial Conflicts’ (2019) 47(4) Federal Law Review 583; Carney, above n 3.
6. For an analysis of the legal issues and various opinions, see Anne Twomey, ‘Dressing Dutton Up as Lamb — Section 44 and the Competing Arguments for Disqualification and Exoneration of Peter Dutton’, AUSPUBLAW (online), 5 September 2018 <https://auspublaw.org/2018/09/section-44-and-the-competing-arguments-for-disqualification-and-exoneration-of-peter-dutton/>.
7. Malcolm Turnbull, A Bigger Picture (Hardie Grant Books, 2020) 632.
8. Ibid 633.
9. Ibid.
10. Donaghue QC, above n 2, [9]–[10].
11. Ibid [64]–[69].
12. Turnbull, above n 7, 635.
13. See further Twomey, above n 6.
14. Turnbull, above n 7, 635.
15. Ibid 634.
16. Niki Savva, Plots and Prayers (Scribe, 2019) 182; David Crowe, Venom — Vendettas, Betrayals and the Price of Power (Harper Collins, 2019) 260–1.
17. Turnbull, above n 7, 634.
18. Crowe, above n 16, 279.
19. Turnbull, above n 7, 633.
20. Savva, above n 16, 182.
21. It was the Attorney-General’s attempt to control access to the Solicitor-General which resulted in the conflict between the former Attorney-General, George Brandis, and the then Solicitor-General, Justin Gleeson, concerning the Legal Services Amendment (Solicitor-General Opinions) Direction 2016. See Senate Legal and Constitutional References Committee, ‘Nature and Scope of the Consultations Prior to the Making of the Legal Services Amendment (Solicitor-General Opinions) Direction 2016’ (8 November 2016).
22. Turnbull, above n 7, 632.
23. Anne Twomey, ‘Advice to Vice-Regal Officers by Crown Law Officers and Others’ (2015) 26 Public Law Review 193.
24. Anne Twomey, The Veiled Sceptre — Reserve Powers of Heads of State in Westminster Systems (CUP, 2018) 4–30.
25. Jennings, in his definition of a convention, stated that they were precedents, which constitutional actors considered binding on themselves, and for which there was a good ‘reason’: Sir Ivor Jennings, The Law and the Constitution (University of London Press, 2nd ed, 1938) 131.
26. Crowe, above n 16, 250; Savva, above n 16, 114.
27. Turnbull, above n 7, 633 and 647.
28. G L Davies and C D Gilbert, ‘Ex parte National Party of Australia, Queensland — Joint Opinion’, 12 October 1987.
29. Letter by Sir William Heseltine, Buckingham Palace, to Sir Walter Campbell, Governor of Queensland, 3 February 1988.
30. Twomey, above n 24, 17–19.
31. Ibid 446–51.
32. Ibid 434–6.
33. Ibid 379–80.
34. Note the ongoing debate about whether the Governor-General of Canada, Lord Byng, should have refused a dissolution to Mackenzie King in 1926 and appointed Arthur Meighen as Prime Minister. The fact that someone else appears to have the confidence of the lower House is not sufficient to entitle them to automatic appointment, nor is the mere fact that a Prime Minister who has lost, or is about to lose, confidence has requested a dissolution sufficient to entitle them to one. See further Twomey, above n 24, 388–402.
35. Sir Ivor Jennings, Cabinet Government (CUP, 3rd ed, 1961) 86.
36. Turnbull, above n 7, 635.
37. See, eg, Letter by Malcolm Turnbull, Prime Minister, to Sir Peter Cosgrove, Governor-General, 24 August 2018, recommending (not ‘advising’) that the Governor-General send for Mr Morrison to form a government: <https://www.gg.gov.au/sites/default/files/2019-06/24_august_2018.pdf>.
38. See, eg, Geoffrey Marshall, Constitutional Conventions (Clarendon Press, 1984) 30; Vernon Bogdanor, The Monarchy and the Constitution (Clarendon Press, 1976) 78; S de Smith and R Brazier, Constitutional and Administrative Law (Penguin Books, 8th ed, 1998) 171; Philip Joseph, Constitutional and Administrative Law in New Zealand (Thomson Reuters, 4th ed, 2014) 731 and 734–5; Twomey, above n 24, 118–29.
39. Turnbull, above n 7, 635.
40. H E Renfree, The Executive Power of the Commonwealth of Australia (Legal Books, 1984) 19; Ian Killey, Constitutional Conventions in Australia (Australian Scholarly Publishing, 2009) 133; J R Nethercote, ‘Parliament’ in Brian Galligan and Scott Brenton (eds), Constitutional Conventions in Westminster Systems (CUP, 2015) 137, 149.
41. See, eg, Letter by Scott Morrison to Sir Peter Cosgrove, Governor-General, 24 August 2018, giving the assurance that he commanded majority support in the House and could guarantee supply, based upon an assurance given by the Leader of the National Party that it would support him.
42. Rupert Murdoch gave up Australian citizenship in 1985 when he acquired US citizenship in order to be entitled to own US media outlets. Whether he later regained Australian citizenship, once Australia recognised dual citizenship, is unknown. Dual citizenship, however, if held at the date of nomination, would disqualify him from standing for the Commonwealth Parliament due to the application of s 44(i) of the Commonwealth Constitution.
43. Note that it is not enough to take all reasonable steps to renounce foreign citizenship before nominating as a candidate for election. The renunciation of citizenship must be complete under the foreign law, prior to nomination (unless the foreign law irremediably prevents renunciation): Re Gallagher [2018] HCA 17; (2018) 263 CLR 460, [11].
44. Note that the principle of representative government is more marked in Australia, than in many other Realms, as a consequence of ss 7 and 24 of the Constitution which require that the two Houses of Parliament be directly chosen by the people. This constitutional requirement has provided the textual anchor for implications concerning voting rights and an implied freedom of political communication. In countries such as the United Kingdom and New Zealand, the distinction between responsible government and representative government is not as clear and the two are often merged into the one constitutional principle.
45. S P Anand v H D Deve Gowda 1996 6 SCC 734.
46. Article 164(1) of the Indian Constitution provides that the Chief Minister shall be appointed by the Governor and art 164(4) provides that a Minister shall not hold office for any period longer than 6 months if he or she is not a Member of the Legislature. Section 164(2) also refers to the collective responsibility of Ministers to the Legislative Assembly.
47. B R Kapoor v State of Tamil Nadu (2001) 7 SCC 231 <https://www.casemine.com/judgement/in/5609ad93e4b0149711411bd1>.
48. Ibid [22]–[23] (Bharucha J, with whom Y K Sabharwal and Ruma Pal JJ agreed).
49. Ibid [46]–[48] (Bharucha J).
50. Ibid [50] (Bharucha J).
51. Ibid [51]. A writ of quo warranto requires a decision maker to show by what authority they exercise a power.
52. Ibid [51].
53. For a discussion of the doctrine in Australia, see Clifford Pannam, ‘Unconstitutional Statutes and De Facto Officers’ (1966) 2 Federal Law Review 37-71.
54 B R Kapoor v State of Tamil Nadu (2001) 7 SCC 231 [57].
55. S R Chaudhuri v State of Punjab (2001) 7 SCC 126.
56. Ibid [32]. See also the discussion of this case in B R Kapoor v State of Tamil Nadu (2001) 7 SCC 231 [19] (Bharucha J).
57. B R Kapoor v State of Tamil Nadu (2001) 7 SCC 231 [69] (Pattanaik J).
58. Commonwealth of Australia, Parliamentary Debates, 10 June 1931, 2595–6.
59. Most legal opinions on Dutton’s potential disqualification, including those by Bret Walker SC, David Bennett QC and Guy Reynolds SC, were based upon facts concerning Commonwealth benefits that flowed from a statutory scheme, raising the issue of whether there was a relevant ‘agreement’ with the Public Service. However, the Opinion by Stephen Donaghue QC later revealed there was an additional agreement which would clearly have met the description of an ‘agreement’ with the Public Service. Turnbull stated that he and his ‘legal team’ considered that this resulted in a breach of s 44(v): Turnbull, above n 7, 635. In addition, the Solicitor-General conceded that he did not have the full facts either: Donaghue QC, above n 2, [9]. Only court proceedings would have flushed out all the relevant facts.
60. See Commonwealth Electoral Act 1918 (Cth), ss 353, 355, and 376. See also Alley v Gillsepie [2018] HCA 11, (2018) 264 CLR 328.
61. Commonwealth, House of Representatives, Parliamentary Debates, 23 August 2018, 8261.
62. The motion was defeated by 69 votes to 68.
63. Turnbull, above n 7, 634.
64. Note that Dutton later divested himself of the relevant interest before nominating as a candidate at the next general election, so that his election could not be challenged before the Court of Disputed Returns in the 40 days after the return of the writs for that election. See Sarah Martin, ‘Peter Dutton Says He Renounced Financial Interest that Could Have Disqualified Him’, The Guardian (online), 27 June 2019 <https://www.theguardian.com/australia-news/2019/jun/27/christian-porter-confirms-tense-exchange-with-turnbull-over-duttons-tilt-at-pm>.
65. National Party MP, Kevin Hogan, moved to the cross bench on 27 August 2018. Turnbull’s seat was lost to the Independent, Kerryn Phelps, in a by-election on 20 October 2018. Julia Banks resigned from the Liberal Party, moving to the cross-bench on 27 November 2018.
66. Turnbull, above n 7, 635.
67. Keith, for example, considered the action of the Tasmanian Premier, John Earle, in breaching an assurance he had made to the Governor prior to his appointment as Premier, as being ‘beneath contempt’ but not affecting his continuance in office: A B Keith, Responsible Government in the Dominions (Clarendon Press, 2nd ed, 1928) 171.
68. Letter by Malcolm Turnbull to Sir Peter Cosgrove, Governor-General, 24 August 2018 <https://www.gg.gov.au/sites/default/files/2019-06/24_august_2018.pdf>.
69. The following examples are all discussed in detail in Anne Twomey, ‘Advice to the Governor-General on the appointment of Kevin Rudd as Prime Minister’ (2013) 24 PLR 289, 293–301.
70. Tasmania, 1914 — see further H V Evatt, The King and His Dominion Governors (Frank Cass & Co Ltd, 2nd ed, 1967) 30–6; Geoffrey Sawer, Federation Under Strain (Melbourne University Press, 197) 144.
71. New South Wales, 1921; Victoria 1945; Commonwealth 1975.
72. New South Wales, 1927.
73. Commonwealth, 1975.
74. New South Wales, 1911.
75. Queensland, 1987.
76. Tasmania, 1989 and regular practice at the Commonwealth level regarding coalition governments.
77. ‘Dutton Dismisses Reports He’s Ineligible to sit in Parliament’, SBS News (online), 20 August 2018 <https://www.sbs.com.au/news/dutton-dismisses-reports-he-s-ineligible-to-sit-in-parliament>.
78. For an analysis of the need for an absolute majority to amend the Standing Orders in order to get a Private Member’s Bill debated and voted upon, see Anne Twomey, ‘Minority Government and the Validity of Standing Order Requirements for Absolute Majority Votes’ (2019) 30 Public Law Review 142.
79. Upon receiving royal assent, it became the European Union (Withdrawal) Act 2019 (UK).
80. Upon receiving royal assent, it became the European Union (Withdrawal) (No 2) Act 2019 (UK).
81. It is possible that governments were informally warned not to take such action. Turnbull, for example, has revealed that he was warned by the Governor-General that he should not expect the Governor-General to agree to prorogue Parliament, if asked to do so, while Turnbull’s government was temporarily in minority: Turnbull, above n 7, 554–5. Such warnings are rarely publicly revealed, so may have occurred and remain secret.
82. Sir Stephen Laws, ‘The risks of the “Grieve amendment” to remove precedence for Government business’, Policy Exchange Research Note, 6–7 <https://policyexchange.org.uk/wp-content/uploads/2019/01/The-risks-of-the-Grieve-Amendment.pdf>.
83. UK, Parliamentary Debates, House of Commons, 3 April 2019, Vol 657, col 1128.
84. Ibid, cols 1130–1.
85. UK, Parliamentary Debates, House of Commons, 4 September 2019, Vol 664, col 211.
86. UK, House of Commons Political and Constitutional Reform Committee, The Impact of Queen’s and Prince’s Consent on the Legislative Process (HC 784) (London: The Stationary Office, 2014) [25].
87. UK, Parliamentary Debates, House of Commons, 3 April 2019, Vol 657, col 1130; 4 September 2019, Vol 664, cols 211–12.
88. Robert Craig, ‘Proponents of the New Bill to Stop No Deal Face a Significant Dilemma Over Queen’s Consent’, LSE Brexit Blog, 2 September 2019 <https://blogs.lse.ac.uk/brexit/2019/09/02/proponents-of-the-new-bill-to-stop-no-deal-face-a-significant-dilemma-over-queens-consent/>.
89. But note Craig’s distinction between the two bills, with the first arguably not an exercise of the prerogative, because it only involved ‘seeking’ an extension and did not have a direct legal effect, whereas the second bill required not only seeking an extension but agreeing to it: Craig, above n 88.
90. R (Jackson) v Attorney General [2005] UKHL 56; [2006] 1AC 262.
91. Rodney Brazier, Constitutional Practice (OUP, 3rd ed, 1999) 194; Rodney Brazier, ‘Royal Assent to Legislation’ (2013) 129 LQR 184, 201–2; Marshall, above n 38, 22–3.
92. David Natzler (ed), Erskine May’s Treatise on the Law, Privileges, Proceedings and Usage of Parliament (25th ed, 2019, online) [20.96] <https://erskinemay.parliament.uk/section/4837/orders-and-standing-orders-and-resolutions/>.
93. Note that in the case of these bills, the procedural issues were raised and addressed by the Speaker, and a deliberate vote was passed by the House. Different questions would arise if the breach were inadvertent and the Government later sought to advise the Sovereign to refuse assent because of an inadvertent defect in the procedure for the passage of the Bills.
94. ‘The issue of consent is entirely a matter of House procedure and becomes irrelevant once a bill has received Royal Assent’: UK, Office of the Parliamentary Counsel, Queen’s or Prince’s Consent (September 2018), [7.13].
95. Note that art 9 of the Bill of Rights 1689 prevents the courts from inquiring into the procedural validity of what happens during the passage of a bill, and due to the principle of parliamentary sovereignty, a court could not find the resulting Act to be invalid due to procedural irregularities.
96. There may, of course, still be a dispute about the interpretation of the application of the convention and the legitimacy of House of Commons altering the application of the convention, if it did so. A convention, however, is only such, according to Jennings, if the constitutional actors consider themselves bound by it: Sir Jennings, above n 25, 131. In this case, those actors include the Speaker and a majority of the House of Commons, so their understanding of the extent of the application of the convention is relevant to its status and application as a convention.
97. Laws, above n 82, 7.
98. Sir Stephen Laws and Richard Ekins, ‘Endangering Constitutional Government — The risks of the House of Commons Taking Control’, Policy Exchange (online), 31 March 2019, 12 <https://policyexchange.org.uk/wp-content/uploads/2019/03/Endangering-Constitutional-Government.pdf>.
99. Richard Ekins, ‘Constitutional Government, Parliamentary Democracy and Judicial Power’, Judicial Power Project Blog, Policy Exchange, 5 April 2019 <https://judicialpowerproject.org.uk/constitutional-government-parliamentary-democracy-and-judicial-power-richard-ekins/>.
100. John Finnis, ‘Only One Option Remains — Prorogue Parliament and Allow Ministers to Take Us Out of the EU with No Deal on April 12’, Daily Telegraph (London), 1 April 2019, 4.
101. Paul Craig et al, ‘Queen’s Role in Brexit Stalemate’, The Times (London), 3 April 2019, 18.
102. See the more detailed discussion in Anne Twomey, ‘The Refusal or Deferral of Royal Assent’ [2006] Public Law (Autumn) 579.
103. For example, a change in the road rules in Nova Scotia in 1922 would have resulted in different changes coming into effect on different dates, potentially resulting in chaotic road usage for a period of time, and the possibility of injuries and deaths.
104. If the Act would not commence until proclamation or a future fixed date, then the appropriate course is to amend the Act before it commences. If, however, the Act commences upon royal assent, and the damage or danger would be immediate, occurring before Parliament could make any amendment, then the withholding or deferral of assent might be considered.
105. Canada, Ontario, Journals of the Legislative Assembly of the Province of Ontario, Vol 31, 17 January 1898, 188.
106. Or the House of Commons alone, if the Parliament Acts 1911–1949 apply.
107. Adam Tomkins, Public Law (OUP, 2003) 63–4.
108. See Twomey, above n 24, 647.
109. Mark Elliott, ‘Can the Government Veto Legislation by Advising the Queen to Withhold Royal Assent?’, Public Law for Everyone Blog, 21 January 2019 <https://publiclawforeveryone.com/2019/01/21/can-the-government-veto-legislation-by-advising-the-queen-to-withhold-royal-assent/>. See also his further discussion of this issue in Mark Elliott, ‘Royal Assent and Constitutional Principle: A Further Response to John Finnis’, Public Law For Everyone Blog, 10 April 2019 <https://publiclawforeveryone.com/2019/04/10/royal-assent-and-constitutional-principle-a-further-response-to-john-finnis/>.
110. Jeff King, ‘Can Royal Assent to a Bill Be Withheld If So Advised by Ministers?’, UKCLA Blog, 5 April 2019 <https://ukconstitutionallaw.org/2019/04/05/jeff-king-can-royal-assent-to-a-bill-be-withheld-if-so-advised-by-ministers/>.
111. Paul Bowen, ‘Could Ministerial Advice to the Queen to Prorogue Parliament or to Refuse Assent to a Parliamentary Bill Be Challenged in the Courts?’, Brexit Law Blog, Brick Court Chambers, 8 April 2019 <https://brexit.law/2019/04/08/could-ministerial-advice-to-the-queen-to-prorogue-parliament-or-to-refuse-assent-to-a-parliamentary-bill-be-challenged-in-the-courts/>.
112. Thomas Poole, ‘The Executive Power Project’, LRB Blog, 2 April 2019 <https://www.lrb.co.uk/blog/2019/april/the-executive-power-project>.
113. [2019] UKSC 41, [2020] AC 373.
114. Ibid 407 [50].
115. Note the argument concerning the application of art 9 of the Bill of Rights 1688. While the art 9 argument was rejected in R (Miller) v The Prime Minister and Cherry v Advocate General for Scotland [2019] UKSC 41, [2020] AC 373, 410–11 [63]–[69] with respect to prorogation, if royal assent were regarded as a legislative act (rather than an executive act), it might remain protected from judicial review: Bank Mellat v Her Majesty’s Treasury (No 2) [2013] UKSC 39; [2014] AC 700, [48]. See further Anne Twomey, ‘Article 9 of the Bill of Rights 1688 and Its Application to Prorogation’, UK Constitutional Law Blog, 4 October 2019 <https://ukconstitutionallaw.org/2019/10/04/anne-twomey-article-9-of-the-bill-of-rights-1688-and-its-application-to-prorogation/>. However, if royal assent were regarded as a legislative act, then the executive would have no right to advise the Queen to refuse assent anyway.
116. See, eg, discussions of whether the Queen could refuse royal assent to a bill that would subvert the democratic basis of the Constitution: Jennings, above n 35, 412; Marshall, above n 38, 26–7; Graham Wheeler, ‘Royal Assent in the British Constitution’ (2016) 132 LQR 495, 498; Brazier, above n 91, 194–5.
117. See further Twomey, above n 24, 17–19.
118. Wilkie v Commonwealth [2017] HCA 40; (2017) 263 CLR 487, 523–4 [63] (Kiefel CJ, Bell, Gageler, Keane, Nettle, Gordon and Edelman JJ).
119. Section 53 has also been held to be non-justiciable. A breach of it will not lead a court to hold that the resulting legislation is invalid: Western Australia v Commonwealth (1995) 183 CLR 373, 482 (Mason CJ, Brennan, Deane, Toohey, Gaudron and McHugh JJ).
120. Letter by Christian Porter, Attorney-General, to Tony Smith, Speaker, 10 February 2019 <https://parlinfo.aph.gov.au/parlInfo/download/publications/tabledpapers/ca8e9dc6-02de-4d16-93b5-6f5030a0d7fe/upload_pdf/Letter%20to%20Speaker%20from%20Christian%20Porter,%20Attorney-General%20enclosing%20Solicitor%20General%C3%A2%C2%80%C2%99s%20Opinion%20SG%20No.%201%20of%202019,%2010%20February%202019.pdf;fileType=application%2Fpdf#search=%222010s%202019%2002%2012%20house%20of%20reps%22>.
121. Commonwealth, Parliamentary Debates, House of Representatives, 12 February 2019, 64.
122. Remuneration Act 1973 (Cth), s 7(13).
123. See the categorisation of bills as ‘special appropriation bills’ if they do not themselves appropriate money but affect the amount paid out of the Consolidated Revenue Fund under an appropriation in another Act: B C Wright (ed), House of Representatives Practice (Dept of the House of Representatives, 6th ed, 2012) 423. Note the different approach taken by the Senate and the ongoing conflict between the Houses as to whether such a bill amounts to an appropriation bill and requires a message from the Governor-General: Odgers, Australian Senate Practice, 381–3 and 389–98. Note also that the High Court in Western Australia v Commonwealth (1995) 183 CLR 373, 482, rejected an argument that s 53 of the Constitution had been breached by a Senate amendment that established a parliamentary committee, which would have had the effect of increasing expenditure from a standing appropriation contained in the Remuneration Tribunal Act 1973, but it did not explain why.
124. Note that the same position is put in Wright, above n 123, 424.
125. Letter by Christian Porter, Attorney-General, to Tony Smith, Speaker, 10 February 2019.
126. Commonwealth, Parliamentary Debates, House of Representatives, 12 February 2019, 102.
127. See, eg, The King v The Governor of South Australia [1907] HCA 31; (1907) 4 CLR 1497; Hicks v Ruddock [2007] FCA 299; (2007) 156 FCR 574, [62]–[67].
128. See Opinion by Sydney Tilmouth QC and Henry Heuzenroeder, tabled in South Australia, Parliamentary Debates, House of Assembly, 11 October 2004, 274.
129. See Parliamentary Remuneration (Restoration of Provisions) Amendment Act 2004 (SA).
130. Letter by Sir Martin Charteris, Buckingham Palace, to Sir John Kerr, Governor-General, 4 November 1975: National Archives of Australia (‘NAA’) AA1984/609, pt 2.
131. There have, of course, been many subsequent refusals of royal assent by the Sovereign to bills passed by the Parliaments of British colonies and dependencies. In relation to Australia, as late as 1979 the Governor of NSW was advised in a despatch by the British Foreign Secretary that if a bill to terminate Privy Council appeals was passed by the NSW Parliament and reserved for the Queen’s assent, royal assent would be refused. See further Anne Twomey, The Chameleon Crown — The Queen and Her Australian Governors (Federation Press, 2006) 175–90.