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Rewriting the Social Contract? The SSAT, the AAT and the Contracting Out of Employment Services

Published online by Cambridge University Press:  24 January 2025

Rachel Bacon
Rachel Bacon*
Affiliation:
Australian National University; Attorney-General's Department
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Extract

In 1998 Australia's public employment service was replaced with a national network of public, private and community agencies—the Job Network—which compete for contracts to deliver services to unemployed people. This development represents the encroachment of competition policy and market ideology into one of the most fundamental areas of government responsibility—the welfare of citizens. The broader ramifications of the contracting out of employment services in terms of quality, efficiency, social costs and accountability are only beginning to be explored. This article examines the impact these changes have had upon one important feature of the social security system—the accessibility and effectiveness of external merits review.

Type
Research Article
Information
Federal Law Review , Volume 30 , Issue 1 , March 2002 , pp. 39 - 68
Copyright
Copyright © 2002 The Australian National University

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Footnotes

The views expressed in this article are the author's own, and do not necessarily reflect the views of the Attorney-General's Department. The author would like to thank Professor Terry Carney, University of Sydney, for his guidance and comments on drafts of this article.

References

1 Tony, Eardley, David, Abello Helen, Macdonald, Is the Job Network Benefiting Disadvantaged Job Seekers? Preliminary Evidence from a Study of Non-Profit Employment Services (2001) 1Google Scholar.

2 See, for instance, Eardley, Abello and Macdonald, ibid; Mark, Considine, 'Markets, Networks and the New Welfare State: Employment Assistance Reforms in Australia' (1999) 28(2) Journal of Social Policy 183Google Scholar; Mark, Considine, 'Selling the Unemployed: The Performance of Bureaucracies, Firms, and Non-profits in the new Australian “Market” for Unemployment Assistance' (2000) 34 Social Policy and Administration 274Google Scholar; Terry, Carney Gaby, Ramia, 'From Citizenship to Contractualism: the Transition from Unemployment Benefits to Employment Services in Australia' (1999) 6 Australian Journal of Administrative Law 117Google Scholar; Terry, Carney Gaby, Ramia, 'Contractualism and Citizenship: Rivals or Bedfellows?' (Paper presented at Contractualism, Citizenship and the Human Services, Women's College, University of Sydney, October 7-8, 2001)Google Scholar; Terry, Carney Gaby, Ramia, 'Contractualism, Managerialism and Welfare: the Australian Experiment with a Marketised Employment Services Network' (2001) 29 Policy and Politics 59Google Scholar; Department of Employment, Workplace Relations and Small Business, Job Network: A Net Impact Study <http://www.dewrsb.gov.au>; Margaret, Allars, 'Citizenship Rights, Review Rights and Contractualism' (2001) 18 Law in Context 79Google Scholar.

3 The statutes that currently form the 'social security law' are the Social Security Act 1991 (Cth), the Social Security (Administration) Act 1999 (Cth) ('Administration Act') and the Social Security (International Agreements) Act 1999 (Cth).

4 The parties to a proceeding before the SSAT are, generally speaking, the applicant and the Secretary of the Departments 156(1) of the Administration Act. Note, however, that the Secretary does not participate in hearings before the SSAT.

5 See below n 53 and n 63.

6 See, for instance, Considine, 'Markets, Networks and the New Welfare State', above n 2, 185-7; Anthony, O'Donnell, 'The Public Employment Service in Australia: Regulating Work or Regulating Welfare?' (2000) 13 Australian Journal of Labour Law 143Google Scholar. In relation to the US position, see Matthew, Diller, 'The Revolution in Welfare Administration: Rules, Discretion & Entrepreneurial Government' (2000) 75 New York University Law Review 1121Google Scholar.

7 O'Donnell, above n 6, 157.

8 Considine, 'Markets, Networks and the New Welfare State', above n 2, 189.

9 James, Goodman, 'New Deals and Privatising Unemployment in Australia' (1997) 40 Journal of Australian Political Economy 27, 31Google Scholar.

10 Considine, 'Markets, Networks and the New Welfare State', above n 2, 194.

11 Ibid 201.

12 Select Committee on Education and Employment, Active Labour Market Policies and Their Delivery: Lessons from Australia (1999) paragraph 14.

13 Eardley, Abello and Macdonald, above n 1, 9.

14 Flex 1 job seekers are deemed job ready and simply require job matching services. Flex 2 job seekers have appropriate work-related skills but require training in job searching skills, such as CV writing and interview techniques. Flex 3 job seekers require intensive, individualised employment assistance and are further classified into 3 levels of disadvantage. Flex 3.1 is the classification given to those who are recently unemployed but face a strong risk of becoming long-term unemployed; flex 3.2 job seekers are long-term unemployed; and flex 3.3 is the classification given to people with disabilities or who come from Aboriginal and Torres Strait Islander backgrounds. See Carney, Ramia, , 'Contractualism, Managerialism and Welfare', above n 2, 67Google Scholar; O'Donnell, above n 6, 159-60.

15 O'Donnell, above n 6, 160.

16 This is because the Reform of Employment Services Bill 1996 (Cth) and the Reform of Employment Services (Consequential Provisions) Bill 1996 (Cth), which contained many of the Government's Job Network reforms in legislative form (including revised accountability measures) were held up by Parliament–see Tom, Brennan, 'Newstart Activity Agreements: Are They Contracts?' in Robin, Creyke Michael, Sessalla, (eds), Targeting Accountability and Review: Current Issues in Income Support Law (1998) 87, 88Google Scholar. In response, the Government announced it would proceed with its reforms without legislative amendment-Senator Amanda Vanstone, Senate Won't Delay Government's Reforms to Employment Assistance, Media Release, (1 July 1997) 1.

17 Kate, Owens, 'The Job Network: How Legal and Accountable are its (Un)employment Services?' (2001) 8 Australian Journal of Administrative Law 49, 56Google Scholar.

18 Select Committee on Education and Employment, above n 12, Annex A.

19 Eardley, Abello and Macdonald, above n 1, 12.

20 Terry, Carney Gaby, Ramia, 'Mutuality, Mead and McClure: More 'big M's' for the Unemployed?' (Paper presented at Mutual Obligations and Welfare States in Transition in Australia, the US and the UK, Session 5, a conference organised by Australian Academy of Social Sciences, Sydney University, 2001) 12Google Scholar; Owens, above n 17, 59.

21 Select Committee on Education and Employment, above n 12, paragraph 35.

22 Eardley, Abello and Macdonald, above n 1, 32; Considine, 'Selling the Unemployed', above n 2, 290.

23 Select Committee on Education and Employment, above n 12, paragraph 22.

24 O'Donnell, above n 6, 160, and Select Committee on Education and Employment, above n 12, paragraph 19.

25 Considine, 'Selling the Unemployed', above n 2, 292; Eardley, Abello and Macdonald, above n 1, 42-3.

26 Goodman, above n 9, 35.

27 Social Security Act s 606(1).

28 Considine, 'Selling the Unemployed', above n 2, 189.

29 Eardley, Abello and Macdonald, above n 1, 52.

30 Considine, 'Selling the Unemployed', above n 2, 290.

31 Ibid 289-90.

32 Terry, Carney, 'Merits Review of Contractual Social Security Payments' (1998) 5 Journal of Social Security Law 18, 32Google Scholar; Owens, above n 17, 56.

33 As set out in Owens, ibid, n 141:

The Freedom of Information Act 1982 (Cth) applies to government departments, prescribed authorities or eligible case managers: ss 4(1) and 11. An eligible case manager is a case manager contracted under the Employment Services Act. A 'prescribed authority' is defined in a similar way as under the Ombudsman Act and is largely confined to bodies established for a public purpose under an enactment.

34 The provisions introduced by the Privacy Amendment (Private Sector) Act 2000 (Cth) (the Privacy Amendment Act) came into effect on 21 December 2001. The effect of these provisions is to extend the operation of privacy law to organisations operating in the private sector. 'Organisation' is defined to include individuals, bodies corporate, partnerships, unincorporated associations and trustsPrivacy Amendment Acts 6C(1). Significantly, s 6C(1) states that the term 'organisation' does not include 'small business operators'that is, businesses that have an annual turnover of less than $3 million (Privacy Amendment Acts 6D). Thus, the new private sector provisions do not apply (except on a voluntary basis) to organisations falling within the 'small business' exemption. This exemption would presumably have applied to most Job Network providers, were it not for a further exemption to the definition of 'small business operator'. Section 6D(4)(e) provides that organisations that are contracted service providers for a Commonwealth contract are not 'small business operators'. 'Contracted service provider' is defined in s 6(1) as 'an organisation that is or was a party to the government contract and that is or was responsible for the provision of services to an agency or a State or Territory authority under the government contract'. While it seems clear that Job Network providers should fall within this exception, there is a further qualification to the application of privacy law to contracted service providers. That is, s 6A(2) provides that an act does not breach a National Privacy Principle if the act is done for the purposes of meeting an obligation under a Commonwealth contract that is inconsistent with the Principles. Moreover, s 7B(2) provides that contracted services providers are in the same position as small business operators as far as their activities that are not for the purposes of a Commonwealth contract are concerned, so they need not comply with the National Privacy Principles or a binding approved privacy code in relation to those activities. The inevitable conclusion is that the application of the Privacy Act to Job Network providers is likely to be limited.

35 This point was affirmed by the recent report of the House of Representatives Standing Committee on Family and Community Affairs into the competitive tendering of welfare service delivery–see, for instance, House of Representatives Standing Committee on Family and Community Affairs, What Price Competition? A Report on the Competitive Tendering of Welfare Service Delivery (1998) xiii. See also Jim, Chalmers Glyn, Davis, 'Rediscovering Implementation: Public Sector Contracting and Human Services' (2001) 60 Australian Journal of Public Administration 74, 80Google Scholar.

36 Administrative Review Council, The Contracting Out of Government Services (1997) 15; Tony, Prosser, 'Public Service Law: Privatization's Unexpected Offspring' (2000) 63 Law and Contemporary Problems 63, 65Google Scholar.

37 Considine, 'Selling the Unemployed', above n 2 , 290.

38 Linda, McGuire, 'Service Delivery Contracts: Quality for Customers, Clients and Citizens' in Glyn, Davis, Barbara, Sullivan, Anna, Yeatman (eds), The New Contractualism? (1997) 102, 112Google Scholar.

39 Administrative Review Council, The Contracting Out of Government Services (1997) 26.

40 The limitations of private law remedies are discussed in more detail in ibid 38─40.

41 Select Committee on Education and Employment, above n 12, Annex A. The type of sanction referred to in agencies' contracts with DEWR involves suspending referrals of job seekers, reducing the contracted capacity of an agency, or termination of the contract─Owens, above n 17, 56.

42 Schoombee has argued that hybrid public/private law remedies would be the most effective in providing citizens with a means of redress in circumstances where government functions are contracted out to the private sector. See Hannes, Schoombee, 'Privatisation and Contracting Out–Where Are We Going?' (1998) 87 Canberra Bulletin of Public Administration 89, 92–3Google Scholar. See also Prosser, above n 36, for an example of how this kind of hybrid model has emerged in the United Kingdom in relation to privatised utilities and the role of industry regulators.

43 Murray, Hunt, 'Constitutionalism and the Contractualisation of Government in the United Kingdom' in Michael, Taggart (ed), The Province of Administrative Law (1997) 21, 34Google Scholar.

44 Helen, Murphy, 'Administrative Review Rights and Changes to Commonwealth Government Service Provision' (1998) 2 Flinders Journal of Law Reform 235, 242Google Scholar.

45 Jenny, Stewart, 'Administrative Law in the Age of the Contract' in John, McMillan (ed), Administrative Law under the Coalition Government (1997) 152, 154Google Scholar.

46 Ibid 155. See also Hunt, above n 43, 38 who talks of the increased opportunities of courts to assert general public law principles over all exercises of power, regardless of whether the source of that power is the public or private sector.

47 Prosser, above n 42, 63, 72.

48 The 'separation of powers' doctrine, which is implicit in the structure of the Constitution, is one means by which official power is controlled and managed within our Westminster system of government. The tasks of making laws, exercising the powers conferred by those laws, and reviewing the legality of that activity are each performed by the separate branches of government. Thus, only the courts may exercise judicial power. The separation of powers doctrine was reaffirmed in R v Kirby; Ex parte Boilermakers' Society of Australia (1956) 94 CLR 254. See also, Kevin, Ryan QC, 'Judges, Courts and Tribunals', (Paper presented at The Australian Judicial Conference Symposium on Judicial Independence and the Rule of Law at the Turn of the Century, Canberra, Australian National University, November 1996)Google Scholar.

49 See Mark, Freedland, 'Government by Contract and Public Law' [1994] Public Law 86, 100 for a discussion of similar issues in the British contextGoogle Scholar.

50 There is some precedent for this concept in the extension of privacy legislation to the private sector–see the Privacy Amendment (Private Sector) Act 2000 (Cth) which came into effect on 21 December 2001–12 months after receiving the Royal Assent. Privacy Amendment (Private Sector) Act 2000 (Cth) s 2(1)(a). Graham Greenleaf, 'Private sector privacy Act passed (at last)' (2000) 7 Privacy Law and Policy Reporter 125. See n 34 for an explanation of how the amended legislation applies to Job Network agencies.

51 Administrative Review Council, The Contracting Out of Government Services (1997) 74.

52 For instance, it could be argued that providers such as Job Network agencies are acting as agents for the Commonwealth (Owens, above n 17, 56; Nick Seddon, 'Public Accountability of Government Services Provided by Private Contractors', Submission to the Senate Finance and Public Administration References Committee, 13); that Courts should imply terms in contracts relating to remedies for unfair dealing or unconscionable conduct (Hughes Aircraft Systems International v Airservices Australia (1997) 146 ALR 1); or that the arbitrary distinctions between powers exercised under statute and powers exercised under contract should simply be collapsed (Sue Arrowsmith, , 'Judicial Review and the Contractual Powers of Public Authorities' (1990) 106 Law Quarterly Review 277, 291, 292)Google Scholar.

53 See Administrative Review Council, Better Decisions: Review of Commonwealth Merits Review Tribunals (1995), 12; Second Reading Speech to the Administrative Review Tribunal Bill 2000 (Cth) and the Administrative Review Tribunal (Consequential and Transitional Provisions Bill, Commonwealth, Parliamentary Debates, Senate, 26 February 2001, 21841 onwards (Senator Bolkus).

54 The term 'officer' is not restricted to employees of a government department or body. An 'officer' is defined in the Social Security Act as:

[A] person performing duties, or exercising powers or functions under or in relation to this Act, the Administration Act, the Farm Household Support Act 1992 or subsection 91A(3) of the Child Support (Assessment) Act 1989 and, in the case of sections 1312 to 1321 of this Act, includes:

(a) person who has been such a person; and

(b) person who is or has been appointed, or employed by the Commonwealth and who, as a result of that appointment or employment may acquire or has acquired information concerning a person under this Act or the Farm Household Support Act 1992; and

(c) person who, although not appointed or employed by the Commonwealth, performs or did perform services for the Commonwealth and who, as a result of performing those services may acquire or has acquired information concerning a person under this Act or the Farm Household Support Act 1992.

This means that remedies such as merits review are not necessarily restricted to decisions made by Commonwealth employees.

55 Allars, above n 2, 94.

56 Section 151 of the Administration Act.

57 There is some debate over whether the task of the AAT is to review the original decision, or the decision of the SSAT to affirm, vary or set aside the original decision. The weight of current authority holds that the task of the AAT is to review the 'operative' decision–see Re Hawat and SDSS (1992) 28 ALD 805; Re Beigman and SDSS (1992) 29 ALD 332; Re Trewin and SDSS (1993) 31 ALD 629; Yolbir v AAT and SDSS (1994) 48 FCR 246; Lee v SDSS (1996)

58 AAT Acts 43(1).

59 Drake v Minister for Immigration and Ethnic Affairs (1979) 24 ALR 577.

60 See s 33 of the AAT Act and s 141 of the Administration Act.

61 Rachel, Bacon, 'Are the Babies being Thrown Out with the Bathwater? Retaining the Benefits of Specialist Tribunals within the ART' in Chris, Finn, Sunrise or Sunset? Administrative Law for the New Millennium (2000) 150, 160-161Google Scholar. Other aspects of SSAT procedure, such as the ability to make oral applications for review by telephone (Administration Act s 154(1)(c)), the ability to reimburse some costs to applicants–for instance travel and accommodation costs–which are incurred in connection with the review (Administration Act s 177), and the fact that hearings are conducted in private (Administration Act s 168(1)) contribute to the accessibility and informality of SSAT review.

62 Bacon, ibid, 158.

63 See, for instance, Sandra Koller, in Commonwealth, Senate Legal and Constitutional Legislation Committee, Seminar: Administrative Law in Transition–The Proposed Administrative Review Tribunal, Senate Committee, 25 October 2000, 33, 42–6, 54; Sandra, Koller, 'The Holes but not The Cheese: An Overview of Trends in Income Support Law' in Robin, Creyke Michael, Sessalla (eds), Targeting Accountability and Review: Current Issues in Income Support Law (1998) 59Google Scholar.

64 Administrative Review Council, Better Decisions: Review of Commonwealth Merits Review Tribunals (1995) 10.

65 That is, the person is actively seeking and willing to undertake suitable paid employment–Social Security Act s 601.

66 Social Security Act s 593(1).

67 Administration Act s 63(3).

68 Social Security Act ss 631 and 644B.

69 See Social Security Act ss 593(1)(e) and 607.

70 Social Security Act ss 624(1) and 626(1).

71 This is not an exhaustive statement of the circumstances in which a Newstart recipient may nonetheless be found to be taking reasonable steps to comply with the terms of their Agreement–Secretary, DEETYA v Ferguson (1997) 76 FCR 426.

72 Social Security Actss 624(1A), 625(1A) and 626(1A). In 1999 the penalties for failing to meet obligations were an 1873% reduction in allowance for a period of 26 weeks for the first breach in a 2 year period; a 24% reduction over 26 weeks for the second breach; and 8 weeks non- payment of benefit for any further breach in that 2 year period. (Select Committee on Education and Employment, above n 12, Annex A; see also ss 644AE, 644 B Social Security Act.)

73 Goodman, above n 9, 30.

74 Similar provisions were in place prior to the amendments contained in the Administration Act. See, for instance, Social Security Act s 660IA, which was in place prior to 20 March 2000.

75 See Regulation 19(6) of the Administrative Appeals Tribunal Regulations 1976 (Cth).

76 Note that the AAT's procedures are modified to some extent by the social security law–see Subdivision C, Part 4 of the Administration Act.

77 Administration Act s 149(1); AAT Act s 43(1).

78 AAT Act s 44; ADJR Act; Judiciary Act 1901 (Cth) s 39B; Australian Constitution s 75(v).

79 Social Security Act s 143(2).

80 Social Security Act s 150. The power to substitute a new decision or make directions is not available.

81 Koller, , 'The Holes but not The Cheese', above n 63, 64Google Scholar.

82 Ibid 65.

83 Eardley, Abello and Macdonald, above n 1, 52.

84 Statistics from the Australian Council of Social Services and DEWR, cited in Carney and Ramia, above n 20, 13.

85 Social Security Appeals Tribunal, Annual Report 1998–99 (1999) 16.

86 This is largely because the legislation, which was drafted to give effect to the Job Network reforms and which included provisions expanding the application of freedom of information and privacy legislation, was not passed by Parliament. Instead, the scheme was implemented on the basis of administrative and contractual arrangements–see the Reform of Employment Services Bill 1996 (Cth) and Owens, above n 17, 50–1. Interestingly, the Bill would have dramatically narrowed the scope of external merits review.

87 Carney, Ramia, , 'Contractualism, Managerialism and Welfare', above n 2, 71Google Scholar.

88 Carney Ramia, above n 20, 20; Eardley, Abello and Macdonald, above n 1, 36.

89 Considine, 'Markets, Networks and the New Welfare State', above n 2, 194.

90 Eardley, Abello and Macdonald, above n 1, 36.

91 Koller, , 'The Holes but not The Cheese', above n 63, 64Google Scholar.

92 Carney, above n 32, 32.

93 It may be that discretion enhances the ability of decision-makers to deal with difficult cases where strict legislative criteria fail to make provision for the unique and otherwise legitimate circumstances of individuals. Indeed, discretion is often included in legislation precisely because it is impossible 'to foresee accurately all the permutations and combinations of circumstance which might arise for decision'. ( Stephen, Skehill, 'The Impact of the AAT on Commonwealth Administration: A View from the Administration' in John, McMillan (ed), The AAT–Twenty Years Forward (1998) 56, 62Google Scholar.) However, the extent to which the creation of the Job Network opens up 'private negotiating spaces' goes well beyond simply providing decision-makers with the flexibility to make better decisions.

94 Terry, Carney, 'Welfare Appeals and the ARC Report: To SSAT or not to SSAT: Is that the Question?' (1996) 4 Australian Journal of Administrative Law 25, 26Google Scholar.

95 Chalmers and Davis discuss the complexity of managing 'vast networks of community organisations with varied goals, priorities and methods'– Jim, Chalmers Glyn, Davis, 'Rediscovering Implementation: Public Sector Contracting and Human Services' (2001) 60 Australian Journal of Public Administration 74, 81Google Scholar.

96 Carney and Ramia, above n 20.

97 Ibid 17.

98 Ibid 25.

99 House of Representatives Standing Committee on Family and Community Affairs, What Price Competition? A Report on the Competitive Tendering of Welfare Service Delivery (1998) 39.

100 Eardley, Abello and Macdonald, above n 1, 11.

101 Freedland, above n 49, 104. Discussion about whether this is a good or a bad thing in the context of the delivery of employment services is beyond the scope of this article.

102 Carney, Ramia, , 'From Citizenship to Contractualism', above n 2, 133Google Scholar.

103 Carney, Ramia, , 'Contractualism, Managerialism and Welfare', above n 2, 70–1Google Scholar.

104 Tom Brennan, quoted in ibid, 71.

105 The activity of Job Network agencies in negotiating Agreements with job seekers, or in deciding to recommend breaches, may constitute 'conduct' within the meaning of s 6 of the ADJR Act. Arguably, this kind of activity constitutes steps or findings made in the process of reaching a final or operative decision under the Social Security Act–see Australian Broadcasting Tribunal v Bond (1990) 170 CLR 321. See Owens, above n 17, 57-8 for a more detailed discussion of this issue.

106 See Considine, 'Selling the Unemployed', above n 2, 289–90.

107 Dale, Boucher, 'The Commonwealth as a Litigant: an Insider's View II' (1999) 92 Canberra Bulletin of Public Administration 29, 31–2Google Scholar.

108 See below n 119.

109 Carney Ramia, above n 20, 17.

110 Ibid 18.

111 Ibid 13.

112 Carney and Ramia cite an example where the SSAT overturned a breach penalty after telephoning the Job Network provider to find that no attempt had been made to ascertain why a job seeker failed to attend an appointment–see Carney and Ramia, above n 32, 18–19.

113 Social Security Act s 593(2A).

114 Administration Act s 165.

115 Administration Act s 164.

116 Administration Act s 141.

117 AAT Act s 40.

118 Goodman, above n 9, 39.

119 Eardley, Abello and Macdonald, above n 1, 19; House of Representatives Standing Committee on Family and Community Affairs, above n 99, 41–3.

120 Murphy, above n 44, 239.

121 Koller, , 'The Holes but not The Cheese', above n 63, 64Google Scholar.

122 Eardley, Abello and Macdonald, above n 1, 51.

123 Ibid 47.

124 Considine, 'Selling the Unemployed', above n 2 , 283.

125 Ibid 292.

126 Goodman, above n 9, 31.

127 Carney, Ramia, , 'Mutuality, Mead and McClure', above n 20, 13Google Scholar.

128 See, for instance, Arrowsmith, above n 52; Freedland, above n 49.

129 See L, Neville Brown John, S Bell, French Administrative Law (4th ed 1993)Google Scholar. See also Prosser, above n 36, 75.

130 Murphy, above n 44, 243.

131 Indeed, Professor Margaret Allars has argued that the civil right to merits review of welfaredecisions by the SSAT and the AAT should be constitutionally entrenched–Allars, above n 2.

132 Prosser, above n 36.

133 Hannes, Schoombee, 'Contracting Out and its Legal Implications' (Paper presented at Law Society of Western Australia, Contracting with Government–Legal and Practical Implications, Perth, 19 November 1997) 14Google Scholar.

134 Arrowsmith, above n 52.

135 Koller, , 'The Holes but not The Cheese', above n 63, 64Google Scholar.

136 Note that the AAT has already implemented mediation and conferencing processes as either optional or compulsory steps in the review process–see AAT General Practice Direction.

137 Carney, above n 94, 35.

138 Koller, , 'The Holes but not The Cheese', above n 63, 65–6Google Scholar.

139 Carney, above n 94, 35–6.

140 Terry, Carney, 'Merits Review of Contractual Social Security Payments' (1998) 5 Journal of Social Security Law 18, 24Google Scholar.

141 Administrative Decisions Tribunal Act 1997 (NSW), Chapter 2, Part 5.

142 For instance, costs could be reduced by engaging assessors who are paid at lower rates than Tribunal members. Time could be saved by clarifying issues in a flexible manner, with Tribunal officers dealing directly with the sources of relevant information.

143 See, by way of contrast, Freedland, above n 49, 101.