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The Significant Role of the Australia Acts in Australian Public Law

Published online by Cambridge University Press:  01 January 2025

Liam Boyle
Liam Boyle*
Affiliation:
Australian Government Solicitor (AGS)
*
The author may be contacted at liam.boyle@outlook.com.
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Abstract

The Australia Acts accomplished more than symbolic change. They brought about a super-structural change to Australian constitutional law, and shortly afterwards a fundamental change to the public law jurisprudence in Australia emerged. This article presents an argument that these changes are inextricably intertwined and that the Australia Acts provided a significant catalyst and a tipping point for fundamental change to the Australian legal system.

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Articles
Information
Federal Law Review , Volume 47 , Issue 3 , September 2019 , pp. 358 - 389
Copyright
Copyright © 2019 The Author(s)

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Footnotes

The views expressed in this article are my personal views and not necessarily those of AGS. The article is based on a dissertation submitted as part of the LLM at the University of Cambridge. I thank Professor Peter Cane of Christ’s College, Cambridge, and the anonymous reviewers for their helpful criticism. Any errors, of course, are mine.

References

Notes

1. See Paul Mitchell, ‘Patterns of Legal Change’ (2012) 65(1) Current Legal Problems 177.

2. Ibid 201.

3. John Bell and David Ibbetson, European Legal Development: The Case of Tort (Cambridge University Press, 2012) 48; see also David Ibbetson, ‘Comparative Legal History: A Methodology’ in Anthony Musson and Chantal Stebbings (eds), Making Legal History: Approaches and Methodologies (Cambridge University Press, 2012) 122, 140.

4. Perhaps because ‘the indeterminacy of the law at any point in time means that without the benefit of hindsight we cannot always know that an important tipping point has occurred until long afterwards’: Ibbetson, above n 3, 142.

5. Professor Peter Cane’s book, Controlling Administrative Power: An Historical Comparison (Cambridge University Press, 2016), appears to be the only work tying these themes across different areas of public law together.

6. Nicholas Aroney, ‘The Structure of Constitutional Revolutions: Are the Lange, Levy and Kruger Cases a Return to Normal Science?’ (1998) 21(3) University of New South Wales Law Journal 645, 651; Michael McHugh, ‘The Constitutional Jurisprudence of the High Court: 1989–2004’ (2008) 30(1) Sydney Law Review 5, 7–8; Cheryl Saunders, The Constitution of Australia: A Contextual Analysis (Hart Publishing, 2011) 54, 87, 90.

7. This article considers and develops in further detail some of the ideas and hypotheses raised most directly by Professor Cane: see Cane, Controlling Administrative Power, above n 5.

8. See also Brendan Lim, ‘Legitimacy’ in Cheryl Saunders and Adrienne Stone (eds), The Oxford Handbook of the Australian Constitution (Oxford University Press, 2018) 315, 324.

9. In this respect, the analysis involves ‘abstraction from the unending complexity of reality’: JWF Allison, A Continental Distinction in the Common Law: A Historical and Comparative Perspective on English Public Law (Clarendon Press, 1996) 31.

10. Several landmarks are well known (see, eg, the 1926 Balfour Report, Statute of Westminster 1931 (Imp), Royal Style and Titles Act 1953 (Cth)), and the story is told elsewhere: Leslie Zines, ‘The Growth of Australian Nationhood and its Effect on the Powers of the Commonwealth’ in Leslie Zines (ed), Commentaries on the Australian Constitution: a tribute to Geoffrey Sawer (Butterworths, 1977) 1; Saunders, The Constitution of Australia, above n 6, 13; Peter C Oliver, The Constitution of Independence: The Development of Constitutional Theory in Australia, Canada, and New Zealand (Oxford University Press, 2005).

11. The background is discussed in Twomey, The Australia Acts 1986: Australia’s Statutes of Independence, chs 1 and 2.

12. Tony Blackshield, ‘Australia Acts’ in Michael Coper, Tony Blackshield, George Williams (eds), Oxford Companion to the High Court of Australia (Oxford University Press, 2001) 43, 43.

13. The story is comprehensively told in Twomey, The Australia Acts 1986, above n 11.

14. Australia Act 1986 (Cth); Australia Act 1986 (UK).

15. RD Lumb, ‘The Bicentenary of Australian Constitutionalism: The Evolution of Rules of Constitutional Change’ (1988) 15(1) University of Queensland Law Journal 3, 26. Professor Twomey has also described the political considerations that were relevant to this decision: see Anne Twomey, ‘Independence’ in Cheryl Saunders and Adrienne Stone (eds), The Oxford Handbook of the Australian Constitution (Oxford University Press, 2018) 96, 112.

16. Justice William Gummow, ‘Book Review: The Australia Acts 1986’ (2011) 33(2) Sydney Law Review 319, 319.

17. Constitutional Commission, First Report of the Constitutional Commission (1988) vol 1, 187.

18. Whether there is now a Queen for each state is a difficult question: see Twomey, The Australia Acts 1986, above n 11, ch 6.

19. See, eg, Kable v DPP (NSW) (1996) 189 CLR 51, 113 (McHugh J) (‘Kable’).

20. HP Lee, ‘The Australia Act 1986 — Some Legal Conundrums’ (1988) 14(4) Monash University Law Review 298, 304.

21. Twomey, The Australia Acts 1986, above n 11, 479.

22. Cf Bistricic v Rokov (1976) 135 CLR 552, 566–7 (Murphy J); A-G (WA) v Marquet (2003) 217 CLR 545, 612–13 [203] (Kirby J) (‘Marquet’).

23. Shaw v Minister for Immigration and Multicultural Affairs (2003) 218 CLR 28, 85 [177] (Callinan J); see also at 48 [51] (McHugh J). Cf Twomey, ‘Independence’, above n 15, 115–16.

24. Twomey, The Australia Acts 1986, above n 11, 379–82.

25. Leslie Zines, Constitutional Change in the Commonwealth (Cambridge University Press, 1991) 1.

26. Twomey, The Australia Acts 1986, above n 11, 1.

27. See, eg, Adams v ETA Foods Ltd (1987) 19 FCR 93, 95 (English common law now foreign law); Nolan v Minister for Immigration and Ethnic Affairs (1988) 165 CLR 178 (a British subject who was not a citizen but had resided in Australia for many years was nevertheless an ‘alien’ under the Constitution); Sue v Hill (1999) 199 CLR 462 (the United Kingdom now a ‘foreign power’, an issue that even recently was not adequately appreciated by some parliamentarians: see, eg, Re Canavan (2017) 349 ALR 534); Imperial laws of paramount application were removed from the composite body of Australian law (see comments in Rizeq v Western Australia (2017) 262 CLR 1, 21–2 [48] (Bell, Gageler, Keane, Nettle and Gordon JJ).

28. Chief Justice Anthony Mason, ‘Future Directions in Australian Law’ (1987) 13(3) Monash University Law Review 149, 149.

29. James Crawford, ‘Australian Law After Two Centuries’ (1988) 11(3) Sydney Law Review 444, 450.

30. Ibid.

31. Justice William Gummow, ‘The Constitution: Ultimate Foundation of Australian Law?’ (2005) 79(3) Australian Law Journal 167, 171.

32. Cane, Controlling Administrative Power, above n 5, 145.

33. Twomey, The Australia Acts 1986, above n 11, 424.

34. As foreshadowed in Geoffrey Sawer, ‘Constitutional Law’ in GW Paton (ed), The Commonwealth of Australia: The Development of its Laws and Constitutions (Stevens & Sons, 1952) vol 2, 38, 78. This would appear to be the view of popular sovereignty described in McGinty v Western Australia (1996) 186 CLR 140, 237 (McHugh J), 275 (Gummow J) (‘McGinty’).

35. On the vagaries and scope this concept, see Lim, above n 8, 318–19, 332–5.

36. Breavington v Godleman (1989) 169 CLR 41, 123 (Deane J); Nationwide News Pty Ltd v Wills (1992) 177 CLR 1, 71 (Deane and Toohey JJ) (‘Nationwide News’); Australian Capital Television Pty Ltd v Commonwealth (1992) 177 CLR 106, 138 (Mason CJ) (‘ACTV’); Theophanous v Herald and Weekly Times Ltd (1994) 182 CLR 104, 171 (Deane J) (‘Theophanous’); McGinty, above n 34, 236–7 (McHugh J); Chief Justice Gerard Brennan, ‘Speech on Swearing in as Chief Justice’ (Speech, High Court of Australia, 21 April 1995); Marquet, above n 22, 612–13 [203] (Kirby J).

37. Geoffrey Lindell, ‘Why Is Australia’s Constitution Binding? — The Reasons in 1900 and Now, and the Effect of Independence’ (1986) 16(1) Federal Law Review 29; Harley Wright, ‘Sovereignty of the People — The New Constitutional Grundnorm?’ (1998) 26(1) Federal Law Review 165.

38. Aroney, above n 6, 651–2.

39. See Gummow, ‘The Constitution’, above n 31, 171; Cane, Controlling Administrative Power, above n 5, 231–2; William Gummow, ‘Common Law’ in Cheryl Saunders and Adrienne Stone (eds), The Oxford Handbook of the Australian Constitution (Oxford University Press, 2018) 190. See also Marquet, above n 22, 570 [67] (Gleeson CJ, Gummow, Hayne, Heydon JJ). Interestingly, the plurality in Marquet stated that the Australia Act 1986 (Cth) was to be ‘traced to its Australian source — the Constitution of the Commonwealth’: at 570 [67]. Thus, there was no need to rely on the UK version: at 612–13 [203] (Kirby J). See also Sue v Hill, above n 27, 490 [59] (Gleeson CJ, Gummow and Hayne JJ). Cf Aroney, above n 6, 649.

40. To extend the metaphor in Cane, Controlling Administrative Power, above n 5, 205.

41. See, eg, Michael Wait, ‘The Slumbering Sovereign: Sir Owen Dixon’s Common Law Constitution Revisited’ (2001) 29(1) Federal Law Review 57.

42. John Quick and Robert Garran, The Annotated Constitution of the Australian Commonwealth (Angus & Robertson, 1901) 736. See also Sonali Walpola, ‘The Development of the High Court’s Willingness to Overrule Common Law Precedent’ (2017) 45(2) Federal Law Review 291, 306–10.

43. Chief Justice Murray Gleeson, ‘The Privy Council — An Australian Perspective’ (Speech, Anglo-Australasian Lawyers Society, Commercial Bar Association and Chancery Bar Association, 18 June 2008) <http://www.hcourt.gov.au/assets/publications/speeches/former-justices/gleesoncj/cj_18jun08.pdf>.

44. Ibid citing Justice Francis Hutley, ‘The Legal Traditions of Australia Contrasted with Those of the United States’ (1981) 55(2) Australian Law Journal 63, 69. See also Sir Anthony Mason, ‘The Break with the Privy Council and the Internationalization of the Common Law’ in Peter Cane (ed), Centenary Essays for the High Court of Australia (Butterworths, 2004) 66, 80–1; Susan Kenny, ‘Evolution’ in Cheryl Saunders and Adrienne Stone (eds), The Oxford Handbook of the Australian Constitution (Oxford University Press, 2018) 119, 139.

45. Chief Justice Murray Gleeson, ‘The Birth, Life and Death of Section 74’ (Speech, Samuel Griffith Society, 14 June 2002) <http://www.hcourt.gov.au/assets/publications/speeches/former-justices/gleesoncj/cj_griffith2.htm>.

46. The Privy Council had for many years, and in a vast number of cases, constrained the interpretation of s 92 of the Constitution, which contributed to the mess s 92 was in before Cole v Whitfield (1988) 165 CLR 360: see, eg, the High Court’s review of the authorities in Miller v TCN Channel Nine Pty Ltd (1986) 161 CLR 556; Philip Ayres, Owen Dixon (Miegunyah Press, 2nd ed, 2007) 79–82. See also the Privy Council decisions that were critical of High Court decisions, see, eg, Candlewood Navigation Co Ltd v Mitsui OSK Lines Ltd [1986] AC 1.

47. Various common law examples can be seen, see, eg, Dugan v Mirror Newspapers Ltd (1978) 142 CLR 583, 586 (Barwick CJ), 591 (Gibbs J); Viro v The Queen (1978) 141 CLR 88, 121 (Gibbs J), 132 (Stephen J); Port Jackson Stevedoring Pty Ltd v Salmond & Spraggon (Aust) Pty Ltd (1978) 139 CLR 231, 274 (Mason and Jacobs JJ) (overturned on appeal to the Privy Council: (1980) 144 CLR 300).

48. Tony Blackshield, Michael Coper and John Goldring, ‘Privy Council, Judicial Committee of the’ in Michael Coper, Tony Blackshield and George Williams (eds), Oxford Companion to the High Court of Australia (Oxford University Press, 2001) 560, 563.

49. See, eg, Mabo v Queensland [No 2] (1992) 175 CLR 1, 29 (Brennan J); ACTV, above n 36, 138 (Mason CJ); Ridgeway v The Queen (1995) 184 CLR 19, 91 (McHugh J).

50. Kable, above n 19, 138 (Gummow J), 113 (McHugh J).

51. Twomey, The Australia Acts 1986, above n 11, 381–2. See also Sue v Hill, above n 27, 490 [59].

52. Twomey, The Australia Acts 1986, above n 11, 382, 475.

53. Sir Owen Dixon, Jesting Pilate and Other Papers and Addresses, ed Judge Woinarski (William S Hein & Co Inc, 2nd ed, 1997) 88.

54. Lindell, above n 37, 47–9. The plurality in Marquet, above n 22, noted the ‘changes in constitutional arrangements’ brought about by the Australia Acts: at 570 [67]. See also Union Steamship Co of Australia Pty Ltd v King (1988) 166 CLR 1, 13–14 (Mason CJ, Wilson, Brennan, Deane, Dawson, Toohey and Gaudron JJ).

55. See, eg, Tasmania v Commonwealth (1904) 1 CLR 329, 338 (Griffith CJ); Deakin v Webb (1904) 1 CLR 585, 630 (O’Connor J); Amalgamated Society of Engineers v Adelaide Steamship Co Ltd (1920) 28 CLR 129, 148–54 (Knox CJ, Isaacs, Rich and Starke JJ), 161–2 (Higgins J) (‘Engineers’). Although in some of the earliest decisions of the High Court, the Court took a broader purposive approach to interpreting the Constitution: see Anne Twomey, ‘The Knox Court’ in Rosalind Dixon and George Williams (eds), The High Court, the Constitution and Australian Politics (Cambridge University Press, 2015) 98, 108.

56. Engineers, above n 55, 143 (Knox CJ, Isaacs, Rich and Starke JJ); see also at 162 (Higgins J).

57. Municipal Council of Sydney v Commonwealth (1904) 1 CLR 208, 213–14.

58. A-G (Cth) ex rel McKinlay v Commonwealth (1975) 135 CLR 1, 17 (Barwick CJ) (‘McKinlay’). Cf R v Pearson; Ex parte Sipka (1983) 152 CLR 254, 262 (Gibbs CJ, Mason and Wilson JJ).

59. McKinlay, above n 58, 17.

60. Engineers, above n 55). Adherence to legalism was also connected with the role of the Privy Council: see Kenny, above n 44, 139.

61. Mason, ‘Future Directions in Australian Law’, above n 28, 149. No doubt deliberately, this phrase reflects the misleading assertion in the 1926 Balfour Report that ‘every self-governing member of the Empire is now the master of its own destiny’: at 3.

62. Justice Anthony Mason, ‘The Role of a Constitutional Court in a Federation: A Comparison of the Australian and the United States Experience’ (1986) 16(1) Federal Law Review 1, 5.

63. Ibid 28.

64. McHugh, above n 6, 6 (emphasis added).

65. See the various cases referred to in Part II.

66. JJ Doyle, ‘Constitutional Law: “At the Eye of the Storm”’ (1993) 23(1) University of Western Australia Law Review 15, 32. See also Saunders, The Constitution of Australia, above n 6, 87–8.

67. PH Lane, A Manual of Australian Constitutional Law (Law Book, 6th ed, 1995) 37.

68. Mason, ‘Future Directions in Australian Law’, above n 28, 149.

69. John Doyle, ‘Implications of Judicial Law-Making’ in Cheryl Saunders (ed), Courts of Final Jurisdiction: The Mason Court in Australia (Federation Press, 1996) 84, 90.

70. Justice Michael Kirby, ‘Sir Anthony Mason Lecture: A F Mason — From Trigwell to Teoh’ (1996) 20(4) Melbourne University Law Review 1087, 1089.

71. See, eg, Rosalind Dixon, ‘The Functional Constitution: Re-reading the 2014 High Court Constitutional Term’ (2015) 43(3) Federal Law Review 455. Cf New South Wales v Commonwealth (2006) 229 CLR 1 (‘Work Choices Case’).

72. Sawer, above n 34, 78.

73. Mason, ‘The Role of a Constitutional Court in a Federation’, above n 62, 25–6.

74. (1988) 165 CLR 360, 385.

75. Justice Michael Kirby, ‘Living with Legal History in the Courts’ (2003) 7(1) Australian Journal of Legal History 17, 20; Doyle, ‘Constitutional Law: “At the Eye of the Storm”’, above n 66, 18.

76. ‘Now of course it’s all undone, the High Court, no longer bound by the Council’s decisions, have ignored them’: Tom Molomby and Paul Donohoe, ‘Bar News Interviews Sir Garfield Barwick GCMG’ [1989] (Summer) Bar News 9, 17.

77. Helen Irving, ‘Constitutional Interpretation, the High Court, and the Discipline of History’ (2013) 41(1) Federal Law Review 95, 109.

78. Theophanous, above n 36, 171.

79. Justice Dyson Heydon, ‘Theories of Constitutional Interpretation: A Taxonomy’ in Nye Perram and Rachel Pepper (eds), The Byers Lectures 2000–2012 (Federation Press, 2012) 132, 157.

80. Breavington v Godleman, above n 36, 132 (Deane J).

81. See, eg, the use that was made of the Debates in Street v Queensland Bar Association (1989) 168 CLR 461 (‘Street’) and Williams v Commonwealth [No 1] (2012) 248 CLR 156 (‘Williams [No 1]’).

82. Nationwide News, above n 36.

83. ACTV, above n 36. The argument had been prematurely (or presciently) advanced over a decade earlier by Murphy J: Ansett Transport Industries (Operations) Pty Ltd v Commonwealth (1977) 139 CLR 54, 88.

84. Nationwide News, above n 36, 47–53 (Brennan J).

85. Ibid 47 (Brennan J).

86. Ibid. See also 94–5 (Gaudron J); ACTV, above n 36, 209–12, 214–18 (Gaudron J).

87. Nationwide News, above n 36, 94–5; ACTV, above n 36, 209–12, 214–18.

88. Nationwide News, above n 36, 72 (Deane and Toohey JJ) (emphasis added).

89. University of Wollongong v Metwally (1984) 158 CLR 447, 477 (Deane J); Kirmani ν Captain Cook Cruises Pty Ltd (1985) 159 CLR 351, 442 (Deane J); Breavington v Godleman, above n 36, 123 (Deane J).

90. ACTV, above n 36, 138; see also 168 (Deane and Toohey JJ).

91. Theophanous, above n 36, 171, 180 (Deane J); McGinty, above n 34, 201 (Toohey J), 230, 237 (McHugh J).

92. See, eg, McCloy v New South Wales (2015) 257 CLR 178 (‘McCloy’). Sovereignty of course is a murky concept. To take an approach in which sovereignty refers to the legal authority to change the constitutional order, then under the Constitution today it is a shared concept — distributed between the various Australian arms of government and the people.

93. See, eg, Mason, ‘Future Directions in Australian Law’, above n 28; Lindell, above n 37; Zines, Constitutional Change in the Commonwealth, above n 25, 27.

94. Cheryl Saunders, ‘The Mason Court in Context’ in Cheryl Saunders (ed), Courts of Final Jurisdiction: The Mason Court in Australia (Federation Press, 1996) 2, 4.

95. Anthony Blackshield, ‘The Implied Freedom of Communication’ in Geoffrey Lindell (ed), Future Directions in Australian Constitutional Law (Federation Press, 1994) 232, 267 (emphasis in original).

96. Lim, above n 8, 335–7.

97. While nation-building narratives could of course be seen in various judgments before the Australia Acts (eg, Victoria v Commonwealth (1971) 122 CLR 353, 395–6 (Windeyer J)), I argue that the narrative was accelerated by the Australia Acts.

98. Mason, ‘Future Directions in Australian Law’, above n 28, 163. This evolution of the democratic process was also a key feature of the reasoning of Gummow J in McGinty, above n 34, 287; see also Roach v Electoral Commissioner (2007) 233 CLR 162, 174 [7] (Gleeson CJ), 188 [53] (Gummow, Kirby and Crennan JJ) (‘Roach’).

99. Justice John Toohey, ‘A Government of Laws, and Not of Men?’ (1993) 4(3) Public Law Review 158, 153. See also Justice Gerard Brennan, ‘Courts, Democracy and the Law’ (1991) 65(1) Australian Law Journal 32, 35, 42; Cane, Controlling Administrative Power, above n 5, 200.

100. Leighton McDonald, ‘The Denizens of Democracy: The High Court and the “Free Speech” Cases’ (1994) 5(3) Public Law Review 160, 173.

101. Elisa Arcioni and Adrienne Stone, ‘The Small Brown Bird: Values and Aspirations in the Australian Constitution’ (2016) 14(1) International Journal of Constitutional Law 60.

102. See, eg, the approach taken by the majority in McCloy, above n 92.

103. Cane, Controlling Administrative Power, above n 5, 232.

104. Street, above n 81, 168 CLR 461.

105. (1973) 128 CLR 482.

106. Amelia Simpson, ‘The (Limited) Significance of the Individual in Section 117 State Residence Discrimination’ (2008) 32(2) Melbourne University Law Review 639, 671.

107. See Street, above n 81, 485–6 (Mason CJ), 503–5 (Brennan J), 522 (Deane J), 541 (Dawson J), 555 (Toohey J), 566–7 (Gaudron J).

108. Ibid 489 (Mason CJ).

109. Ibid 519.

110. Ibid 510, 512, 518. Justice Gaudron was to similar effect: at 566, 572.

111. Ibid 522.

112. Ibid 522; see also Gaudron J at 569.

113. Ibid 531.

114. Zines, Constitutional Change in the Commonwealth, above n 25, 64. See also the similar comments in Michael Coper and George Williams (eds), How Many Cheers for Engineers? (Federation Press, 1997) 108.

115. (1994) 179 CLR 463 (‘Goryl’).

116. (2006) 226 CLR 362.

117. Ibid 409 [65]–[66] (Gleeson CJ, Gummow, Kirby and Hayne JJ).

118. See also Simpson, above n 106, 640, 654, 658; Kirby, ‘Sir Anthony Mason Lecture: A F Mason’, above n 70, 1096.

119. A theme that can also be seen in Street: see Simpson, above n 106.

120. Polyukhovich v Commonwealth (1991) 172 CLR 501; Leeth v Commonwealth (1992) 174 CLR 455; Chu Kheng Lim v Minister for Immigration (1992) 176 CLR 1; Kable, above n 19. See also Fiona Wheeler, ‘Due Process, Judicial Power and Chapter III in the New High Court’ (2004) 32(2) Federal Law Review 205; Leslie Zines, The High Court and the Constitution (Federation Press, 5th ed, 2008) 273–5.

121. Condon v Pompano Pty Ltd (2013) 252 CLR 38, 71 [67] (French CJ); Wheeler, above n 120.

122. Ridgeway v The Queen, above n 49, 91 (McHugh J).

123. Kable, above n 19, 138–9 (Gummow J); Rizeq v Western Australia, above n 27, 431 [49] (Bell, Gageler, Keane, Nettle and Gordon JJ).

124. See Cane, Controlling Administrative Power, above n 5, 232–4. Professor Goldsworthy has argued that this is an example of ‘judicial statesmanship’: Jeffrey Goldsworthy, ‘Kable, Kirk and Judicial Statesmanship’ (2014) 40(1) Monash University Law Review 75.

125. Kirmani ν Captain Cook Cruises Pty Ltd, above n 89, 442 (Deane J).

126. See, eg, the dissenting judgment of Gageler J in North Australian Aboriginal Justice Agency Ltd v Northern Territory (2015) 256 CLR 569, 611–12 [98]–[103], 621 [134].

127. Mabo v Queensland [No 2], above n 49, 42 (Brennan J).

128. Ibid 30.

129. Chief Justice Robert French, ‘Law Making in a Representative Democracy: The Durability of Enduring Values’ (Speech delivered at the Catherine Branson Lecture, Adelaide, 14 October 2016) <http://www.hcourt.gov.au/assets/publications/speeches/current-justices/frenchcj/frenchcj14Oct2016.pdf>.

130. Cooper v Stuart (1889) 14 App Cas 286.

131. Mabo v Queensland [No 2], above n 49, 29.

132. Roach, above n 98, 233 CLR 162.

133. (2010) 243 CLR 1 (‘Rowe’).

134. Roach, above n 98, 176–7 [11]–[12] (Gleeson CJ).

135. Ibid 174 [7] (Gleeson CJ) (emphasis added). Similarly, the other members of the majority, Gummow, Kirby and Crennan JJ, asked whether the disqualification was for a ‘substantial reason’, and added that ‘[a] reason will answer that description if it be reasonably appropriate and adapted to serve an end which is consistent or compatible with the maintenance of the constitutionally prescribed system of representative government’: at 199 [85].

136. Ibid 174 [7] (Gleeson CJ).

137. Rowe, above n 133, 38 [78] (French CJ), 56–61 [151], [161], [167] (Gummow and Bell JJ), 120–1 [384] (Crennan J).

138. Ibid 107 [328], 117 [368] (Crennan J).

139. See, eg, Ibid 18 [19]–[20] (French CJ), 117 [367] (Crennan J).

140. Jonathan Crowe and Peta Stephenson, ‘An Express Constitutional Right to Vote? The Case for Reviving Section 41’ (2014) 36(2) Sydney Law Review 205, 207.

141. Murphy v Electoral Commissioner (2016) 334 ALR 369.

142. See McHugh, above n 6.

143. George Winterton, ‘Popular Sovereignty and Constitutional Continuity’ (1998) 26(1) Federal Law Review 1, 10.

144. Leslie Zines, ‘Legalism, Realism and Judicial Rhetoric in Constitutional Law’ in Nye Perram and Rachel Pepper (eds), The Byers Lectures 2000–2012 (Federation Press, 2012) 44, 63. In addition to Roach, above n 98, examples may include: Sue v Hill, above n 27; Re Wakim; Ex Parte McNally (1999) 198 CLR 511; Abebe v Commonwealth (1999) 197 CLR 510; Shaw v Minister for Immigration and Multicultural Affairs, above n 23. See also Leslie Zines, ‘Gleeson Court’ in Tony Blackshield, Michael Coper and George Williams (eds), Oxford Companion to the High Court of Australia (Oxford University Press, 2001) 307, 308.

145. Cane, Controlling Administrative Power, above n 5, 235, see also at 501.

146. Including via controlling the Australian common law, see Liam Boyle, ‘An Australian August Corpus: Why There Is Only One Common Law in Australia’ (2015) 27(1) Bond Law Review 27, 55.

147. Zines, Constitutional Change in the Commonwealth, above n 25, 3–5.

148. See, eg, Farey v Burvett (1916) 21 CLR 433, 452 (Isaacs J); New South Wales v Bardolph (1934) 52 CLR 455, 475 (Evatt J). See also the background in Williams [No 1], above n 81, 199–200 [50]–[55] (French CJ), 297–302 [349]–[358] (Heydon J).

149. Zines, Constitutional Change in the Commonwealth, above n 25, 6. See also Zines, ‘The Growth of Australian Nationhood’, above n 10, 22–42. For the relevance of s 2 of the Constitution to the evolution of Commonwealth executive power, see William Gummow, ‘The Australian Constitution and the End of Empire — a Century of Legal History’ (2015) 33 Law in Context 74, 80.

150. It was not until December 1987 that the Queen revoked the Instructions by which she had delegated powers to the Governor-General pursuant to s 2 of the Constitution: see Commonwealth, Gazette: Special, No S 270, 9 September 1988. See also Gummow, ‘The Australian Constitution’, above n 149, 80. The view was taken that the powers in these assignments were now part of s 61 and hence unnecessary.

151. George Winterton, Parliament, the Executive and the Governor-General (Melbourne University Press, 1983) 24, cf at 45; Leslie Zines, The High Court and the Constitution (Federation Press, 4th ed, 1997) 251–6. See also Zines, ‘The Growth of Australian Nationhood’, above n 10, 22–42; Gummow, ‘The Australian Constitution’, above n 149, 76–80.

152. Pape v Commissioner of Taxation (2009) 238 CLR 1, 84 [217] (Gummow, Crennan and Bell JJ) (‘Pape’); Cheryl Saunders, ‘The Concept of the Crown’ (2015) 38(3) Melbourne University Law Review 873, 888–9.

153. Leslie Zines, ‘The Inherent Executive Power of the Commonwealth’ (2005) 16(4) Public Law Review 279, 280.

154. Davis v Commonwealth (1988) 166 CLR 79, 93, 109 (Brennan J); Ruddock v Vadarlis (2001) 110 FCR 491, 540–2 [183]–[192] (French J), cf 500–1 [26]–[32] (Black CJ). See later Pape, above n 152, 60 [127] (French CJ), 83 [214]–[217] (Gummow, Crennan and Bell JJ). Though the influence of notions of nationhood had been developing since at least Victoria v Commonwealth (1975) 134 CLR 338, 397, 406 (Jacobs J); see also Leslie Zines, ‘Nationhood and the Powers of the Commonwealth’ in Leslie Zines (ed), Commentaries on the Australian Constitution: A Tribute to Geoffrey Sawyer (Butterworths, 1977) 1.

155. See the cases considered in Peter Gerangelos, ‘The Executive Power of the Commonwealth of Australia: Section 61 of the Commonwealth Constitution, “Nationhood” and the Future of the Prerogative’ (2012) 12(1) Oxford University Commonwealth Law Journal 97.

156. See, eg, Nicholas Condylis, ‘Debating the Nature and Ambit of the Commonwealth’s Non-Statutory Executive Power’ (2015) 39(2) Melbourne University Law Review 385; Peter Gerangelos, ‘Section 61 of the Commonwealth Constitution and an “Historical Constitutional Approach”: An Excursus on Justice Gageler’s Reasoning in the M68 Case’ (2018) 43(2) University of Western Australia Law Review 103.

157. Williams v Commonwealth [No 2] (2014) 252 CLR 416, 468 [79] (French CJ, Hayne, Kiefel, Bell and Keane JJ) (emphasis in original) (‘Williams [No 2]’).

158. Ibid 469 [83] (French CJ, Hayne, Kiefel, Bell and Keane JJ). See also CPCF v Minister for Immigration and Border Protection (2015) 255 CLR 514, 538 [42] (French CJ); Williams [No 1], above n 81, 238 [157] (Gummow and Bell JJ), 249–51 [193]–[198] (Hayne J), 373–4 [595] (Kiefel J); Pape, above n 152, 60 [127] (French CJ), 89 [233]–[234] (Gummow, Crennan and Bell JJ). This confirms Gummow J’s observation in Re Ditfort (1988) 19 FCR 347, 369, approved by Kirby J in Thorpe v Commonwealth [No 3] (1997) 144 ALR 677.

159. Williams [No 2], above n 157, 468–9 [79]–[81] (French CJ, Hayne, Kiefel, Bell and Keane JJ).

160. See Cheryl Saunders, ‘The Scope of Executive Power’ Papers on Parliament, No 59 (2013).

161. Williams [No 1], above n 81, 234 [143], [147] (Gummow and Bell JJ), 270 [251] (Hayne J), 346–7 [495]–[496], [500], [522] (Crennan J).

162. Ibid 178 [1], quoting Alfred Deakin, ‘Channel of Communication with Imperial Government: Position of Consuls: Executive Power of Commonwealth’ in Patrick Brazil and Bevan Mitchell (eds), Opinions of Attorneys-General of the Commonwealth of Australia (Australian Government Publishing Service, 1981) vol 1, 129, 132.

163. Williams [No 1], above n 81, 203–5 [58], [61] (French CJ), 232–5 [136] (Gummow and Bell JJ), 259–60 [219] (Hayne J), 349–52 [508]–[517] (Crennan J), 369–70 [579]–[580], cf 370 [582] (Kiefel J).

164. R v Kirby; Ex parte Boilermakers’ Society of Australia (1956) 94 CLR 254, 276 (Dixon CJ, McTiernan, Fullagar and Kitto JJ); cf KM Hayne, ‘Executive Power’ (2017) 28(3) Public Law Review 236.

165. Williams [No 1], above n 81, 205 [61]; see also 234 [143] (Gummow and Bell JJ). See also Ronald Sackville, ‘An Age of Judicial Hegemony’ (2013) 87(2) Australian Law Journal 105, 107.

166. Williams [No 1], above n 81, 193 [38], 213 [77] (French CJ), 352 [521] (Crennan J). See also Saunders, ‘The Concept of the Crown’, above n 152; Gabrielle Appleby and Stephen McDonald, ‘Looking at the Executive Power through the High Court’s New Spectacles’ (2013) 35(2) Sydney Law Review 253, 259, 267; Cane, Controlling Administrative Power, above n 5, 471.

167. Cane, Controlling Administrative Power, above n 5, 232, 258, 497, 519. Though, relying on early authorities, some have argued that s 61 being the ultimate and only source of executive power is and was an ‘unremarkable proposition’: see, eg, Hayne, ‘Executive Power’, above n 164, 241.

168. See Gerangelos, above n 155.

169. Saunders, ‘The Concept of the Crown’, above n 152, 888–9. See also Cheryl Saunders, ‘Separation of Legislative and Executive Power’ in Cheryl Saunders and Adrienne Stone (eds), The Oxford Handbook of the Australian Constitution (Oxford University Press, 2018) 617, 641.

170. Hayne, ‘Executive Power’, above n 164, 241, referring to Commonwealth v Colonial Combing, Spinning and Weaving Co Ltd (1922) 31 CLR 421, 437.

171. Sackville, ‘An Age of Judicial Hegemony’, above n 165, 107.

172. See, eg, Cane, Controlling Administrative Power, above n 5, 497; Daniel Stewart, ‘Statutory Authority to Contract and the Role of Judicial Review’ (2014) 33(1) University of Queensland Law Journal 43.

173. Mark Leeming, Authority to Decide: The Law of Jurisdiction in Australia (Federation Press, 2012) [3.8].

174. Deputy Commissioner of Taxation v Richard Walter Pty Ltd (1995) 183 CLR 168, 178 (Mason CJ); R v Federal Court of Australia; Ex parte WA National Football League (Inc) (1979) 143 CLR 190, 201 (Barwick CJ).

175. See Peter Cane, ‘The Making of Australian Administrative Law’ in Peter Cane (ed), Centenary Essays for the High Court of Australia (Butterworths, 2004) 315–16.

176. Ibid.

177. The story is described in Cane, ‘The Making of Australian’, above n 175, and Stephen Gageler, ‘Impact of Migration Law on the Development of Australian Administrative Law’ (2010) 17(2) Australian Journal of Administrative Law 92.

178. Cane, ‘The Making of Australian’, above n 175, 330.

179. Gageler, above n 177, 105.

180. Re McJannet; Ex parte Minister for Employment, Training and Industrial Relations (Qld) (1995) 184 CLR 620, 653 (Toohey, McHugh and Gummow JJ).

181. Re Jarman; Ex parte Cook [No 1] (1997) 188 CLR 595, 646–7 (Kirby J).

182. See, eg, Re Minister for Immigration and Multicultural and Indigenous Affairs; Ex parte Lam (2003) 214 CLR 1, 24 [76] (McHugh and Gummow JJ).

183. See, eg, A-G (Qld) v Riordan (1997) 192 CLR 1, 33–68 (Kirby J); Abebe v Commonwealth, above n 144, 581–95 (Kirby J).

184. Re Refugee Review Tribunal; Ex parte Aala (2000) 204 CLR 82, 92 [19]–[21] (Gaudron and Gummow JJ), 135 [143] (Kirby J).

185. (2003) 211 CLR 476 (‘Plaintiff S157’).

186. Ibid 511–12 [98] (Gaudron, McHugh, Gummow, Kirby and Hayne JJ).

187. Ibid 513–14 [103]–[104] (Gaudron, McHugh, Gummow, Kirby and Hayne JJ).

188. Leeming, above n 173 [3.1].

189. (2010) 239 CLR 531 (‘Kirk’).

190. Ibid 581 [99] (French CJ, Gummow, Hayne, Crennan, Kiefel and Bell JJ).

191. Ibid.

192. Ronald Sackville, ‘The Constitutionalisation of State Administrative Law’ (2012) 19(3) Australian Journal of Administrative Law 127.

193. Gageler, above n 177.

194. Cane, Controlling Administrative Power, above n 5, 196, 360, 498, 501.

195. Gageler, above n 177, 93.

196. Ibid 104.

197. Ibid.

198. John Basten, ‘The Supervisory Jurisdiction of the Supreme Courts’ (2011) 85(5) Australian Law Journal 273, 281, 294.

199. Cane, Controlling Administrative Power, above n 5, 498.

200. Sackville, ‘The Constitutionalisation of State Administrative Law’, above n 192, 137.

201. See, eg, Cheryl Saunders, ‘Constitution as Catalyst: Different Paths within Australasian Administrative Law’ (2012) 10(2) New Zealand Journal of Public and International Law 143, 156; Basten, above n 198, 294.

202. Abebe v Commonwealth, above n 144, 584 [210]. Gleeson CJ and McHugh J relied on the practical and social effects if the law were declared invalid, particularly Parliament’s right to have specialist federal courts: at 531 [41].

203. Cane, Controlling Administrative Power, above n 5, 231.

204. Grain Pool of WA v Commonwealth (2000) 202 CLR 479, 523–4 [113] (Kirby J).

205. Marquet, above n 22, 612 [203] (Kirby J).

206. Paul Daly, ‘A Supreme Court’s Place in the Constitutional Order: Contrasting Recent Experiences in Canada and the United Kingdom’ (2015) 41(1) Queen’s Law Journal 1, 40.

207. Rosalind Dixon, above n 71; Arcioni and Stone, above n 101. See also French, above n 129.

208. Zines, ‘Legalism, Realism’, above n 144, 63. Examples may include: Sue v Hill, above n 27; Re Wakim; Ex Parte McNally, above n 144; Roach, above n 98.

209. Cf Sue v Hill, above n 27, 490 [59] (Gleeson CJ, Gummow and Hayne JJ).

210. Twomey, The Australia Acts 1986, above n 11, 381–2.

211. See James Stellios, ‘The Centralisation of Judicial Power within the Australian Federal System’ (2014) 42(2) Federal Law Review 357, 387.

212. For instance, statutory interpretation may be moving away from notions of parliamentary intent: see Justice Kenneth Hayne, ‘Statutes, Intentions and the Courts: What Place Does the Notion of Intention (Legislative or Parliamentary) Have in Statutory Construction?’ (2013) 13(2) Oxford University Commonwealth Law Journal 271.

213. To borrow Milsom’s felicitous expression: SFC Milsom, Historical Foundations of the Common Law (Butterworths, 2nd ed, 1981) 151.

214. See, eg, JH Baker, ‘English Law and the Renaissance’ (1985) 44(1) Cambridge Law Journal 46, 47; Robert C Palmer, English Law in the Age of the Black Death, 1348–1381: A Transformation of Governance and Law (University of North Carolina Press, 1993) 6.

215. Peter Stein, Legal Evolution: The Story of an Idea (Cambridge University Press, 2009) 126.

216. SFC Milsom, A Natural History of the Common Law (Columbia University Press, 2003) 107. And as Gummow J put it, ‘the Constitution continues to speak to the present by taking into account the operation of the Australia Act 1986 (UK)’: Kable, above n 19, 139.