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Singulars, Plurals, and Section 57 of the Constitution

Published online by Cambridge University Press:  24 January 2025

Geoffrey Sawer
Geoffrey Sawer*
Affiliation:
Australian National University
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Abstract

Whether words in the singular include the plural or whether words in the plural include the singular is a common problem of statutory interpretation. Acts interpretation legislation of the States and the Commonwealth offer slightly varying presumptions for dealing with the problem. Professor Sawer analyses these presumptions and their application in numerous cases. As well, reforms that would lead to greater clarity and uniformity of such legislation are suggested.

The second part of the article explores the special problems regarding singulars and plurals in the context of the Constitution and, in particular, section 57 which provides for the resolution of deadlocks between the Senate and the House of Representatives with regard to “any proposed law”. The High Court's resolution of some of the problems raised when more than one proposed law is the subject of disagreement between the Houses of Parliament is exhaustively analysed. In addition, solutions are offered to a number of judicially unanswered questions relating to section 57 of the Constitution.

Type
Research Article
Information
Federal Law Review , Volume 8 , Issue 1 , March 1977 , pp. 45 - 56
Copyright
Copyright © 1977 The Australian National University

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References

1 13 & 14 Vic., c. 21.

2 (1868) L.R. 4 C.P. 374.

3 Female persons will enjoy Willes J.'s explanation that exclusion from the vote was a privilege and honour.

4 52 & 53 Vic. c. 63.

5 S. 1. Note that “feminine” again fails to include males.

6 Acts Interpretation Act 1958, s. 17 (Vic.).

7 Acts Interpretation Act 1954-1971, s. 32 (Qld).

8 Acts Interpretation Act 1915-1975, ss. 3, 26 (S.A.).

9 Interpretation Act 1918-1975, ss. 3, 26 (W.A.).

10 Acts Interpretation Act 1931, ss. 4, 24 (Tas.).

11 The section first mentioned in nn. 8, 9, 10.

12 The section mentioned second in nn. 8, 9, 10.

13 Tasmania inserts here “or repugnant to”.

14 Acts Interpretation Act 1901, s. 23 (Cth).

15 Acts Shortening Act 1852, s. 6 (N.S.W.); Interpretation Act 1897, s. 21 (N.S.W.) and see also s. 2(1).

16 (1892) 13 N.S.W.L.R. (L) 121.

17 [1958] V.R. 225.

18 [1958] V.R. 232.

19 Gavan Duffy J. rejected this suggestion in strong terms ([1958] V.R. 225, 229-230). He had criticised Chorlton previously, in Mason v. Teitler [1956] V.L.R. 90.

20 The result was to allow hotel keepers, pursuant to the Licensing Acts, to set aside any number of rooms in which lodgers could “treat” their guests to liquor- not one room only, as a literal reading and some policy considerations suggested.

21 [1963] Tas. S.R. 41.

22 [1962] A.C. 515 (on appeal from the Supreme Court of Ceylon).

23 Id. 527.

24 Maxwell, Interpretation of Statutes (12th ed. 1969) 306.

25 Pearce, Statutory Interpretation in Australia (1974) para. 127.

26 [1965] 1 W.L.R. 62.

27 (1969) 117 C.L.R. 651.

28 Maxwell, op. cit., 227-228.

29 Id. 228.

30 Pearce, op. cit., para. 127.

31 Re Clayton's Settled Estates [1926] Ch. 279; Fell v. Derby Leather Co. Ltd [1931] 2 Ch. 252; Re Earl of Feversham's Contract [1942] Ch. 33; Potts v. Reid [1943] A.C. 1; Baker v. Lewis [1947] K.B. 186; Mason v. Teitler [1956] V.L.R. 90; Healey v. Hambrook [1958] V.R. 232; Jarvis Motors (Harrow) Ltd v. Carabott [1964] 1 W.L.R. 1101; Sin Poh Amalgamated (H.K.) Ltd v. Attorney-General of Hong Kong [1965] 1 W.L.R. 62; Page v. Williams [1965] 1 W.L.R. 16; Jacobs v. Chaudhuri [1968] 2 Q.B. 470; The Queen of the South [1968] P. 449; Annicola Investments Ltd v. Minister of Housing and Local Government [1968] 1 Q.B. 631.

32 Re England (1892) 13 N.S.W.L.R. (L) 121; R. v. National Arbitration Tribunal; ex parte South Shields Corporation [1952] 1 K.B. 46; Mackay v. Kontos; ex parte Mackay [1951] Q.S.R. 37; Porter v. Bryant [1963] Tas. S.R. 41; Dealex Properties Ltd v. Brooks [1966] 1 Q.B. 542; Bond v. Hale (1969) 72 S.R. (N.S.W.) 201; Burns v. Paterson (1969) 90 W.N. (Pt. 1) (N.S.W.) 560; Blue Metal Industries v. Dilley (1969) 117 C.L.R. 651.

33 R. v. Industrial Disputes Tribunal; ex parte Queen Mary College, University of London [1957] 2 Q.B. 483.

34 Pearce, op. cit., para. 127.

35 [1958] V.R.232, 234.

36 (1969) 117 C.L.R. 651, 656.

37 Pearce, op. cit., para. 127.

38 The Ordinance provided for the appointment of “Commissioners” to make enquiries; a single commissioner had been appointed and this was challenged.

39 (1969) 117 C.L.R. 651.

40 A question posed, arguendo, in Re England (1892) 13 N.S.W.L.R. (L) 121, 122.

41 [1965] 1 W.L.R. 62, 66.

42 All cited in n. 32.

43 (1974) 131 C.L.R. 432.

44 McTiernan J. dissented on a ground which excused him from considering the present issue.

45 (1974) 131 C.L.R. 432, 468.

46 Id. 463-464.

47 Victoria v. Commonwealth (the Petroleum and Minerals Authority case) (1975) 50 A.L.J.R. 7.

48 May, Parliamentary Practice (19th ed., 1976) 294; House of Representatives

49 (1975) 50 A.L.J.R. 68.

50 Id. 96.

51 Id. 86.

52 Perhaps better constitutional sense could be made of the practice and of Stephen J.'s observation, if “a Parliament” in this context meant the sittings between the election for all members of both Houses at a time and another, i.e. from 1901 to 1976 there have been four completed Parliaments and we are now on a fifth. Perhaps the Stephen dictum should be expressed by reference to the House of Representatives alone; the dissolution of that House puts an end to s. 57 possibilities predating the dissolution. But if so stated it is even less obviously sound.

53 (1976) 50 A.L.J.R. 68, 80.

54 Neither the Barwick “currency of the situation” view (id. 73) nor the Stephen view that the Governor-General must act for the purpose of dealing with the “deadlocked” laws (id. 90) would necessarily solve this problem. The deadlock may remain current, and the purpose of dealing with it operative, through several double dissolutions.