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Taking Process-Based Theory Seriously: Could ‘Discrete and Insular Minorities’ Be Protected Under the Australian Constitution?

Published online by Cambridge University Press:  01 January 2025

Amelia Loughland Open the ORCID record for Amelia Loughland [Opens in a new window]
Amelia Loughland*
Affiliation:
UNSW Sydney; Gilbert + Tobin Centre of Public Law
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The author may be contacted at a.loughland@gmail.com.
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Abstract

The High Court is committed to protecting the substantive rights necessary for the effective functioning of the constitutionally entrenched system of representative and responsible government. This is consistent with a ‘representation-reinforcing’ approach to constitutional review as advocated by John Hart Ely in the United States, in which judicial intervention is limited to protecting the ordinary political processes established by the Constitution rather than adjudicating on its outcomes. While the High Court has demonstrated an Elyian commitment to keeping open the channels of political change, it has not engaged with the protection of minority rights or equality concerns more broadly which were a key element of process-based theory. In this article, I argue that the judicial protection of minority rights is a necessary and desirable corollary of the constitutional entrenchment of representative government in the Australian Constitution. I explore how this could arise through either a freestanding guarantee of equality or in a weaker form by inflecting other areas of constitutional practice. Ultimately, I acknowledge that while the High Court’s current interpretive approach may not support a broad protection of equality, its process-based protection of representative government provides an available means to recognise minority rights under the Australian Constitution.

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Articles
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Federal Law Review , Volume 48 , Issue 3 , September 2020 , pp. 324 - 349
Copyright
Copyright © 2020 The Author(s)

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Footnotes

This article began as an undergraduate thesis supervised by Professors Rosalind Dixon and Gabrielle Appleby and I thank them both for their exceptional feedback and insights. I also thank Lachlan Peake and the anonymous reviewers for their helpful comments on earlier versions of this article.

References

1. Commonwealth of Australia Constitution Act 1900 (Imp) 63 & 64 Vict, c 12 (‘Constitution’).

2. Stephen Gageler, ‘Beyond the Text: A Vision of the Structure and Function of the Constitution’ [2009] (Winter) Bar News 30, 37.

3. John Hart Ely, Democracy and Distrust: A Theory of Judicial Review (Harvard University Press, 1980).

4. Ibid 103.

5. See, eg, Roach v Electoral Commissioner (2007) 233 CLR 162; Lange v Australian Broadcasting Corporation (1997) 189 CLR 520.

6. United States v Carolene Products Co, 304 US 144, 152–3 n 4 (1938) (‘Carolene Products’).

7. Ely (n 3) 17–18.

8. Ibid ch 3; Daniel Ortiz, ‘Pursuing a Perfect Politics: The Allure and Failure of Process Theory’ (1991) 77(4) Virginia Law Review 721, 724.

9. Ely (n 3) 87.

10. Ibid 103.

11. 304 US 144, 152–3 n 4 (1938).

12. Ibid.

13. Ibid.

14. Alexander M Bickel, The Least Dangerous Branch (Yale University Press, 1972) 16.

15. Jesse H Choper and Stephen F Ross, ‘The Political Process, Equal Protection and Substantive Due Process’ (2018) 20(5) University of Pennsylvania Journal of Constitutional Law 983, 984–5.

16. Ibid 986.

17. Ely (n 3) 77.

18. Ibid 103.

19. Ibid.

20. Ibid 120.

21. Ibid 122–3.

22. Ibid 152.

23. Kenji Yoshino, ‘Suspect Symbols: The Literary Argument for Heightened Scrutiny for Gays’ (1996) 96(7) Columbia Law Review 1753, 1764, citing Bruce Ackerman, ‘Beyond Carolene Products’ (1985) 98(4) Harvard Law Review 713, 720.

24. Ely (n 3) 153.

25. Ibid 159.

26. Ortiz (n 8) 736.

27. Ely (n 3) 157.

28. Ibid 170.

29. Ibid 159–60.

30. Ibid 161–2.

31. Ortiz (n 8) 739.

32. Jane Schachter, ‘Ely and the Idea of Democracy’ (2004) 57(3) Stanford Law Review 737, 741.

33. Ibid 752.

34. Ackerman (n 23) 720.

35. Laurence Tribe, ‘The Puzzling Persistence of Process-Based Constitutional Theories’ (1980) 89(6) Yale Law Journal 1063, 1071.

36. Ibid 1071–2.

37. Ibid 1075.

38. Schachter (n 32) 754; see also Paul Brest, ‘The Substance of Process’ (1981) 42(1) Ohio State Law Journal 131, 142.

39. Ackerman (n 23) 740; Ortiz (n 8) 728.

40. Ackerman (n 23) 719–20.

41. Ibid 726–8.

42. Ibid 724.

43. Ibid 742.

44. Yoshino (n 23) 1808–9.

45. Ibid 1811.

46. Rosalind Dixon, ‘The Supreme Court of Canada and Constitutional (Equality) Baselines’ (2013) 50(3) Osgoode Hall Law Journal 637, 653 (‘Equality Baselines’).

47. Ibid 663.

48. Harksen v Lane NO [1998] 1 SA 300 [49] (Goldstone J) (Constitutional Court), cited in Dixon, ‘Equality Baselines’ (n 46) 662–4.

49. Dixon, ‘Equality Baselines’ (n 46) 646.

50. [1999] 1 SCR 497.

51. Dixon ‘Equality Baselines’ (n 46) 647.

52. Ortiz (n 8) 733–4.

53. Claudia Geiringer, ‘When Constitutional Theories Migrate: A Case Study’ (2019) 67(2) American Journal of Comparative Law 281, 289.

54. Ibid 304.

55. See, eg, the forthcoming ‘Globalizing Democracy and Distrust’ symposium in the International Journal of Constitutional Law (2020).

56. Geiringer (n 53).

57. See, eg, Choper and Ross (n 15) 1004; Geiringer (n 53) 284.

58. See Rosalind Dixon and Amelia Loughland, ‘Comparative Constitutional Adaptation: Democracy and Distrust in the High Court of Australia’ (2020) (Unpublished).

59. Rosalind Dixon and Gabrielle Appleby, ‘Constitutional Implications in Australia: Explaining the Structure–Rights Dualism’ in Rosalind Dixon and Adrienne Stone (eds), The Invisible Constitution in Comparative Perspective (Cambridge University Press, 2018) 343, 345, 347.

60. Ibid 345.

61. Ibid 373.

62. (1992) 177 CLR 106.

63. Ibid 138 (Mason CJ).

64. This was alluded to by Geiringer when observing that Ely’s theory may more accurately describe some constitutions more than others: Geiringer (n 53) 312.

65. Alumni Focus, ‘Stephen Gageler LL.M. ‘87 appointed to Australia’s High Court’ Harvard Law Today (Blog Post, 30 August 2012) <https://today.law.harvard.edu/stephen-gageler-ll-m-87-appointed-to-australias-high-court/>.

66. Stephen Gageler, ‘Foundations of Australian Federalism and the Role of Judicial Review’ (1987) 17(3) Federal Law Review 162, 189 (‘Foundations’).

67. Amalgamated Society of Engineers v Adelaide Steamship Co Ltd (1920) 28 CLR 129 (‘Engineer’s Case’).

68 Ibid 142 (Knox CJ, Isaacs, Rich and Starke JJ).

69. Gageler, ‘Foundations’ (n 66) 184.

70. (2015) 257 CLR 178 (‘McCloy’).

71. Ibid 194–5 [2] (French CJ, Kiefel, Bell and Keane JJ).

72. Ibid 235 [142].

73. Tajjour v New South Wales (2014) 254 CLR 508, 580 [151] (‘Tajjour’).

74. Rosalind Dixon, ‘Calibrated Proportionality’ (2020) 48(1) Federal Law Review 92, 93.

75. Ibid 6; Tajjour (n 73) 584 [164].

76. Tajjour (n 73) 580–1 [151]. Cf. Clubb v Edwards [2019] HCA 11, [177], [183].

77. McCloy (n 70) 226–7 [112].

78. Ibid 227 [114].

79. Murphy v Electoral Commissioner (2016) 261 CLR 28, 72 [101] (‘Murphy’).

80. Ibid 69–70 [93].

81. Rosalind Dixon, ‘An Australian (Partial) Bill of Rights’ (2016) 14(1) International Journal of Constitutional Law 80, 87.

82. (1998) 195 CLR 337 (‘Kartinyeri’).

83. Ibid 358 [20].

84. Ibid 357 [16].

85. Ibid 380 [86]–[87].

86. Kartinyeri (n 82) 366–7 [41]–[43].

87. Lange v Australian Broadcasting Corporation (1997) 189 CLR 520, 560 (Brennan CJ, Dawson, Toohey, Gaudron, McHugh, Gummow and Kirby JJ); Unions NSW v New South Wales (2013) 252 CLR 530, 548 [17] (French CJ, Hayne, Crennan, Kiefel and Bell JJ); McCloy (n 70) 206 [42] (French CJ, Kiefel, Bell and Keane JJ), 257 [215]–[216] (Nettle J), 280 [303], 283–4 [317]–[318] (Gordon J).

88. Jeremy Waldron, ‘The Core of the Case against Judicial Review’ (2006) 115(6) Yale Law Journal 1346, 1403–4.

89. Ibid.

90. Ibid 1397, 1403.

91. Rosalind Dixon, ‘The Core Case for Weak-Form Judicial Review’ (2017) 38(6) Cardozo Law Review 2193, 2196–7.

92. Ibid 2208–9.

93. Dixon, ‘The Core Case for Weak-Form Judicial Review’ (n 91) 2209–10.

94. 410 US 113 (1973).

95. Dixon, ‘The Core Case for Weak-Form Judicial Review’ (n 91) 2212.

96. Ibid 2210.

97. Waldron (n 88) 1405; Kent Roach, ‘Constitutional and Common Law Dialogues between the Supreme Court and Canadian Legislatures’ (2001) 80(1–2) Canadian Bar Review 481, 529.

98. Dixon, ‘The Core Case for Weak-Form Judicial Review’ (n 91) 2217.

99. Ibid 2218.

100. (2016) 261 CLR 28 (‘Murphy’).

101. Ibid 39 (French CJ and Bell J).

102. Ibid 73 [105] (Gageler J).

103. Roach v Electoral Commissioner (2007) 233 CLR 162 (‘Roach’).

104. Murphy (n 100) 73 [107].

105. Ibid.

106. Jeffrey Goldsworthy, ‘Originalism in Constitutional Interpretation’ (1997) 25(1) Federal Law Review 1, 20.

107. Jeremy Kirk, ‘Constitutional Implications (II): Doctrines of Equality and Democracy’ (2001) 25(1) Melbourne University Law Review 24, 27, 38.

108. Aharon Barak, Purposive Interpretation in Law, tr Sari Bashi (Princeton University Press, 2005) 377.

109. Aharon Barak, ‘On Constitutional Implications and Constitutional Structure’ in David Dyzenhaus and Malcolm Thorburn (eds), Philosophical Foundations of Constitutional Law (Oxford University Press, 2016) 53.

110. Rosalind Dixon, ‘The Functional Constitution: Re-Reading the 2014 High Court Constitutional Term’ (2015) 43(3) Federal Law Review 455; Rosalind Dixon, ‘Functionalism and Australian Constitutional Values’ in Rosalind Dixon (ed), Australian Constitutional Values (Hart Publishing, 2018) 3 (‘Functionalism’).

111. Dixon, ‘Functionalism’ (n 110) 9.

112. Dixon, ‘Calibrated Proportionality’ (n 74) 3.

113. Ibid.

114. Ibid 24.

115. Ibid.

116. Clubb v Edwards (2019) 93 ALJR 448.

117. Ibid 472 [82] (Kiefel CJ, Bell and Keane JJ).

118. Ibid 475 [98] (Kiefel CJ, Bell and Keane JJ).

119. McGinty v Western Australia (1996) 186 CLR 140, 171 (Brennan CJ).

120. Lange v Australian Broadcasting Corporation (1997) 189 CLR 520 (‘Lange’).

121. Ibid 557–9 (the Court). The characteristics of representative government were also sourced from ss 64 and 128 of the Constitution, while ss 1, 7, 8, 13, 24, 25, 28 and 30 gave effect to the purpose of self-government.

122. Adrienne Stone, ‘The Limits of Constitutional Text and Structure: Standards of Review and the Freedom of Political Communication’ (1999) 23(3) Melbourne University Law Review 668, 674 (‘Limits’).

123. Jeremy Kirk, ‘Constitutional Implications from Representative Democracy’ (1995) 23(1) Federal Law Review 37, 44 (‘Representative Democracy’).

124. Ibid 45.

125. Ibid 64.

126. Ibid 49.

127. Adrienne Stone, ‘Incomplete Theorizing in the High Court’ (1998) 26(1) Federal Law Review 195, 204.

128. Stone, ‘Limits’ (n 122) 699.

129. Adrienne Stone, ‘The Limits of Constitutional Text and Structure Revisited’ (2005) 28(3) University of New South Wales Law Journal 842, 845.

130. McCloy (n 70) 202 [28], 207 [45] (French CJ, Kiefel, Bell and Keane JJ).

131. Joo-Cheong Tham, ‘Political Equality as a Constitutional Principle: Cautionary Lessons from McCloy v New South Wales’ in Rosalind Dixon (ed), Australian Constitutional Values (Hart Publishing, 2018) 151, 160–1.

132. Ibid 164.

133. Lael Weis, ‘Constituting “the People”’ in Richard Albert, Xenophon Contiades and Alkmene Fotiadou (eds), The Foundations and Traditions of Constitutional Amendment (Hart Publishing, 2017) 195, 267.

134. See above Part V(B)(1)(b).

135. Dylan Lino, ‘Indigenous Recognition’ in Rosalind Dixon (ed), Australian Constitutional Values (Hart Publishing, 2018) 243, 246.

136. Weis (n 133) 267.

137. Lino (n 135) 258–9.

138. Weis (n 133) 268.

139. Kartinyeri (n 82) 383 [94] as discussed in Weis (n 133) 268.

140. Lino (135) 255–6.

141. Rosalind Dixon and Gabrielle Appleby, ‘Constitutional Implications in Australia: Explaining the Structure–Rights Dualism’ in Rosalind Dixon and Adrienne Stone (eds), The Invisible Constitution in Comparative Perspective (Cambridge University Press, 2018) 343, 344.

142. Kirk (n 107) 27, 38.

143. Dixon and Appleby (n 141) 345.

144. Kirk (n 107) 29–30.

145. Ibid 41.

146. Attorney-General (Cth); Ex rel McKinlay v Commonwealth (1975) 135 CLR 1. I am grateful to Professor Gabrielle Appleby for this observation.

147. JA La Nauze, The Making of the Australian Constitution (Melbourne University Press, 1972) 230–2.

148. Dixon and Appleby (n 141) 344.

149. Amelia Simpson, ‘Equal Treatment and Non-Discrimination through the Functionalist Lens’ in Rosalind Dixon (ed), Australian Constitutional Values (Hart Publishing, 2018) 195, 201.

150. Kirk (n 107) 28–9.

151. Dixon and Appleby (n 141) 345.

152. Tajjour (n 73) 566–7 [95] (Hayne J); 578 [143] (Gageler J); 605–6 [242]–[245] (Keane J).

153. Simpson (n 149) 207.

154. Kruger v Commonwealth of Australia (1997) 190 CLR 1, 45 (Brennan CJ), 64–65 (Dawson J), 113–14 (Gaudron J), 155–6 (Gummow J) (‘Kruger’).

155. (1992) 174 CLR 455 (‘Leeth’).

156. Ibid 466 (Mason CJ, Dawson and McHugh JJ).

157. Simpson (n 149) 202.

158. Ibid.

159. For discussion see above Part V.

160. See, eg, Janina Boughey and Greg Weeks, ‘Government Accountability as a “Constitutional Value”’ in Rosalind Dixon (ed), Australian Constitutional Values (Hart Publishing, 2018); Lisa Burton Crawford, ‘The Rule of Law’ in Rosalind Dixon (ed), Australian Constitutional Values (Hart Publishing, 2018).

161. See especially ss 51(ii), 99, 102 and 117.

162. (1989) 168 CLR 461 (‘Street’).

163. Ibid 570 (Gaudron J); Simpson (n 149) 207.

164. Simpson (n 149) 198.

165. Dixon, ‘Functionalism’ (n 110) 11.

166. Ibid 7–8; McCloy (n 70) 195 [2] (French CJ, Kiefel, Bell and Keane JJ).

167. (2004) 220 CLR 1.

168. Ibid 53–4 [102] (McHugh J), 79 [200] (Gummow and Hayne JJ), 99 [257] (Kirby J).

169. Ibid 54 [105] (McHugh J), 98–9 [256] (Kirby J).

170. Ibid 91 [238]–[239] (Kirby J).

171. McCloy (n 70) 239 [153] (Gageler J).

172. (2013) 249 CLR 92 (‘Monis’).

173. Criminal Code Act 1995 (Cth) sch 1 (‘Commonwealth Criminal Code’).

174. After a 3:3 split between the judges, resulting in the decision of the Supreme Court of NSW being affirmed.

175. Monis (n 172) 106 (French CJ).

176. Ibid 214–15 [348]–[349].

177. Iris Marion Young, ‘Communication and the Other: Beyond Deliberative Democracy’ in Seyla Benhabib (ed), Democracy and Difference: Contesting the Boundaries of the Political (Princeton University Press, 1996) 120, 120.

178. Ibid 122.

179. Monis (n 172) 131–2 [67]–[68] (French CJ).

180. Wendy Brown, Regulating Aversion: Tolerance in the Age of Identity and Empire (Princeton University Press, 2006) 10.

181. Young (n 177) 124.

182. See, eg, Gail Mason, ‘A Picture of Bias Crime in New South Wales’ (2019) 11(1) Cosmopolitan Civil Societies 47; Jeffrey Fagan, ‘Race and the New Policing’ (2017) (Columbia Public Law Research Paper No 14-561, Columbia Law School, 2017) 83.

183. Such as laws permitting immigration detention of asylum seekers: Chu Kheng Lim v Minister for Immigration, Local Government and Ethnic Affairs (1992) 176 CLR 1 (‘Chu Kheng Lim’); and state laws for the preventative detention of serious sex offenders and paedophiles: Fardon v Attorney-General (Qld) (2004) 223 CLR 575 (‘Fardon’); Baker v The Queen (2004) 223 CLR 513.

184. Rosalind Dixon and Brigid McManus, ‘Detaining Non-Citizens: Political Competition and Weak v. Strong Judicial Review’ (2018) 57(3) Virginia Journal of International Law 591, 594.

185. Ibid.

186. Chu Kheng Lim (n 183) 33 (Brennan, Deane and Dawson JJ).

187. Ibid 57 (Gaudron J).

188. Ibid 34 (Brennan, Dean and Dawson JJ), 71 (McHugh J).

189. Al-Kateb v Godwin (2004) 219 CLR 562 (‘Al-Kateb’).

190. Re Woolley; Ex parte Applicants M276/2003 (2004) 225 CLR 1 (‘Re Woolley’).

191. Ibid 33 [78] (McHugh J), 60 [163] (Gummow J), 77 [227] (Hayne J), 87 [270] (Heydon J).

192. Falzon v Minister for Immigration and Border Protection (2018) 262 CLR 333, 344 [32] (Kiefel CJ, Bell, Keane and Edelman JJ), 359–60 (Nettle J).

193. Ely (n 3) 84.

194. Ibid.

195. Ibid.

196. Dixon and McManus (n 184) 601.

197. See, eg, Assistant Commissioner Condon v Pompano Pty Ltd (2013) 252 CLR 38.

198. Fardon (n 183) 628 [142] (Kirby J).

199. Ely (n 3) 154.

200. Fardon (n 183).

201. Ibid 586 [2] (Gleeson CJ).

202. Burton v Honan (1952) 86 CLR 169.

203. Ibid 177 (Dixon CJ).

204. Nationwide News Pty Ltd v Wills (1992) 177 CLR 1 (‘Nationwide News’).

205. Constitution s 51(xxxv); Nationwide News (n 204) 34 (Mason CJ), 91 (Dawson J), 102–3 (McHugh J).

206. Nationwide News (n 204) 31 (Mason CJ).