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The ‘Three RS’ in Malaysia’s Struggle for Constitutional Democracy

Published online by Cambridge University Press:  01 January 2025

Dian Shah Open the ORCID record for Dian Shah [Opens in a new window]
Dian Shah*
Affiliation:
Faculty of Law, National University of Singapore, Singapore
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Abstract

Race, religion and royalty (the Three ‘Rs’) have been salient aspects of Malaysia’s constitutional struggle. These elements have defined the country’s constitutional settlements during the pre-independence constitution-making process, generated constitutional crises and continued to figure into day-to-day governance and constitutional practice. There have been instances where operation of and compromises around the Three Rs have facilitated constitution-building. Yet, more often than not, as this article illustrates, the constellation of these three forces have challenged the building and sustaining of a constitutional democracy. Since the historic political change in May 2018 in particular, the Three Rs have become even more significant in shaping the critical junctures in Malaysia’s constitutional journey. To illuminate a more comprehensive understanding of the role of race, religion and royalty in Malaysia’s struggle for constitutional democracy, this article explains how these elements have defined (and continued to define) controversies relating to the distribution of political power and the protection of fundamental rights. Fundamentally, these aspects implicate checks and balances and constraints on political power. This article also demonstrates the ways in which the struggle for constitutional democracy implicates a range of actors and interests: aside from individual citizens, there are the monarchy, the elected government, the courts and group (ethnic) interests. This article then draws on institutional and political explanations in accounting for Malaysia’s constitutional struggle. In particular, aside from changing political fundamentals, it argues that the Constitution provides the opportunity structure and institutional resources for the Three Rs to shape Malaysia's struggle for constitutional democracy.

Type
Special Issue (Part 1): Constitutional Struggles in Asia
Information
Federal Law Review , Volume 50 , Issue 2: Special Issue (Part 1): Constitutional Struggles in Asia , June 2022 , pp. 137 - 155
Copyright
Copyright © 2022 The Author(s)

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Footnotes

The author may be contacted at dian.ahshah@nus.edu.sg.

References

1. See generally Dian AH Shah and Andrew Harding, ‘Constitutional Quantum Mechanics and a Change of Government in Malaysia’, Blog of the International Journal of Constitutional Law (Blog Post, 8 April 2020) http://www.iconnectblog.com/2020/04/constitutional-quantum-mechanics-and-a-change-of-government-in-malaysia/.

2. Elkins posits that the most pressing concerns for constitutional democracies revolve around executive transgressions of legal constraints, and thus, a meaningful democracy has to include ‘some element of executive constraint’. Zachary Elkins, ‘Is the Sky Falling? Constitutional Crises in Historical Perspective’ in Mark A Graber, Sanford Levinson and Mark Tushnet (eds), Constitutional Democracy in Crisis? (Oxford University Press 2018) 49, 52-3.

3. See Joseph M Fernando, ‘The Position of Islam in the Constitution of Malaysia’ (2006) 37(2) Journal of Southeast Asian Studies 249 (‘The Position of Islam’); Dian AH Shah, Constitutions, Religion and Politics in Asia: Indonesia, Malaysia and Sri Lanka (Cambridge University Press, 2017) 33-4, 45 (‘Constitutions, Religion and Politics in Asia’).

4. Andrew Harding, ‘Sharia and National Law in Malaysia’ in Jan Michiel Otto (ed), Sharia Incorporated: A Comparative Overview of the Legal Systems of Twelve Muslim Countries in Past and Present (Leiden University Press, 2010) 491, 499.

5. Charles Parkinson, Bill of Rights and Decolonization: The Emergence of Domestic Human Rights Instruments in Britain’s Overseas Territories (Oxford University Press, 2007) 74.

6. Joseph M Fernando, ‘Special Rights in the Malaysian Constitution and the Framers’ Dilemma, 1956-57’ (2015) 43(3) The Journal of Imperial and Commonwealth History 535, 541 (‘Special Rights in the Malaysian Constitution’).

7. Ibid. See also Shah, Constitutions, Religion and Politics in Asia (n 3) ch 2.

8. Department of Statistics Malaysia, ‘Current Population Estimates, Malaysia, 2020’ (Web Page, 15 July 2020) https://tinyurl.com/xrtdmmb3.

9. Kevin YL Tan, ‘The Creation of Greater Malaysia: Law, Politics, Ethnicity, and Religion’ in Andrew Harding and Dian AH Shah (eds), Law and Society in Malaysia: Pluralism, Ethnicity and Religion (Routledge, 2018) 1, 3. See also Andrew Harding, Law, Government and the Constitution in Malaysia (Kluwer Law International, 1996) 13.

10. Federal Constitution (Malaysia) art 32(1).

11. Ibid art 39.

12. Ibid art 40(1).

13. Ibid art 40(1A) (emphasis added).

14. Federal Constitution (n 10) art 3(1).

15. Shah, ‘Constitutions, Religion and Politics in Asia’ (n 3) 43, 46; Fernando, ‘The Position of Islam’ (n 3) 257, 265-6.

16. Federal Constitution (n 10) art 8(5).

17. Note that the New Economic Policy had a twenty-year time span, within which its objectives were to be achieved. See generally Equal Rights Trust and Tenaganita, Washing the Tigers: Addressing Discrimination And Inequality In Malaysia (ERT Country Report Series, November 2012) www.equalrightstrust.org/ertdocumentbank/Malaysia%20CR%201.pdf.

18. See Fernando, ‘Special Rights in the Malaysian Constitution’ (n 6).

19. See also Shad Saleem Faruqi, ‘Affirmative Action Policies and the Constitution’ (2003) 21(1–2) Kajian Malaysia 31, 36-40; Jaclyn Ling-Chien Neo, ‘Malay Nationalism, Islamic Supremacy and the Constitutional Bargain in the Multi-Ethnic Composition of Malaysia’ (2006) 13(1) International Journal on Minority and Group Rights 95, 109.

20. Donald L Horowitz, ‘Ethnic Power Sharing: Three Big Problems’ (2014) 25(2) Journal of Democracy 5, 8.

21. Ibid 5–6.

22. Aziz Huq and Tom Ginsburg, ‘How to Lose a Constitutional Democracy’ (2018) 65(1) UCLA Law Review 78, 125.

23. Andrew Harding, ‘“Nazrinian” Monarchy in Malaysia: The Resilience and Revival of a Traditional Institution’ in Andrew Harding and Dian AH Shah (eds), Law and Society in Malaysia: Pluralism, Religion, and Ethnicity (Routledge, 2018) 73.

24. Andrew Harding, The Constitution of Malaysia: A Contextual Analysis (Hart Publishing, 2012) 118 (‘The Constitution of Malaysia’).

25. Ibid 118–9.

26. See Abdul Ghani Ali Ahmad & Others v Public Prosecutor [2001] 3 MLJ 561; Teh Cheng Poh v Public Prosecutor [1979] 1 MLJ 50.

27. See Andrew Harding, ‘Acting (or Not Acting) on (Lawful or Unlawful) Advice in Malaysia: From Windsor to Kuantan and Back Again’, Blog of the International Journal of Constitutional Law (Blog Post, 20 November 2020) http://www.iconnectblog.com/2020/11/acting-or-not-acting-on-lawful-or-unlawful-advice-in-malaysia-from-windsor-to-kuantan-and-back-again; and see Dian AH Shah, ‘Constitution-Building and Political Change: Recent Lessons from Malaysia and Sri Lanka’ in Adem Abebe (eds), Annual Review of Constitution-Building (International Institute for Democracy and Electoral Assistance, 2020) 36.

28. Mahathir’s party held only 11 seats, whereas the biggest party in the coalition (People’s Justice Party) led by Dr Wan Azizah won 48 seats.

29. ‘Perak Pakatan given the first opportunity to form state government’, The Star (Web Page, 11 May 2018) https://www.thestar.com.my/news/nation/2018/05/11/perak-pakatan-given-first-opportunity-to-form-state-government.

30. Jaclyn L Neo, Dian AH Shah and Andrew Harding, ‘Introduction to I-CONnect Symposium: Malaysia Boleh! Constitutional Implications of the Malaysian Tsunami’ (International Journal of Constitutional Law Blog, 20 June 2018) http://www.iconnectblog.com/2018/06/introduction-to-i-connect-symposium-malaysia-boleh-constitutional-implications-of-the-malaysian-tsunami.

31. The Sultan relied on art 16(6) of the Perak Constitution to justify his decision. The provision states that a Chief Minister who has ceased to command the confidence of the assembly shall tender his resignation, but it does not explicitly empower the Sultan to order the Chief Minister’s dismissal, especially without a vote of no confidence.

32. See Andrew Harding, ‘The Rulers and the Centrality of Conventions in Malaysia’s “Eastminster” Constitution’ in Harshan Kumarasingham (ed), Viceregalism: The Crown as Head of State in Political Crises in the Postwar Commonwealth (Parlgrave Macmillan, 2020) 258. See generally Harshan Kumarasingham, ‘Eastminster – Decolonisation and State-Building in British Asia’ in Harshan Kumarasingham (ed), Constitution-Making in Asia – Decolonisation and State-Building in the Aftermath of the British Empire (Routledge, 2016).

33. Dato’ Seri Dr Zambry Abdul Kadir v Dato’ Seri Ir Hj Mohammad Nizar Jamaluddin; Attorney General (Intervener) [2009] 5 CLJ 265 (Court of Appeal); Dato’ Seri Ir Hj Mohammad Nizar Jamaluddin v Dato’ Seri Dr Zambry Abdul Kadir; Attorney General (Intervener) [2010] 2 MLJ 285 (Federal Court).

34. Harding, The Constitution of Malaysia (n 24) 227.

35. See Michael B Hooker, ‘The Challenge of Malay Adat Law in the Realm of Comparative Law’ (1973) 22(3) International and Comparative Law Quarterly 492.

36. In 2020, the government allocated RM1.4 billion for JAKIM’s annual budget. See Kenneth Tee, ‘In Budget 2021, Putrajaya allocates RM1.4b for Islamic affairs under PM’s Dept’, Malay Mail (Web Page, 6 November 2020) https://www.malaymail.com/news/malaysia/2020/11/06/in-budget-2021-putrajaya-allocates-rm1.4b-for-islamic-affairs-under-pms-dep/1920013.

37. Che Omar bin Che Soh v Public Prosecutor [1988] 2 MLJ 55 (Supreme Court).

38. Donald L Horowitz, ‘The Qu’ran and the Common Law: Islamic Law Reform and the Theory of Legal Change’, (1994) 42(2) American Journal of Comparative Law 233, 237.

39. Iki Putra Mubarrak v Kerajaan Negeri Selangor and Others [2021] 1 LNS 47 (Federal Court).

40. For the rationale behind art 121(1A), see Thio Li-ann, ‘Jurisdictional Imbroglio: Civil and Religious Courts, Turf Wars and Article 121(1A) of the Federal Constitution’ in Andrew Harding and HP Lee (eds), Constitutional Landmarks in Malaysia: The First 50 Years 1957-2007 (Lexis 2007) 197, 202-3; Ramizah Wan Muhammad, ‘The Administration of Syariah Courts in Malaysia, 1957–2009’ (2011) 13(2) Journal of Islamic Law and Culture 242–52.

41. Shanmuga Kanesalingam, ‘Article 121(1A) – What Does it Really Mean?’, The Malaysian Bar (Web Page, 11 December 2006) https://www.malaysianbar.org.my/article/news/legal-and-general-news/members-opinions/article-121-1a---what-does-it-really-mean.

42. Indira Gandhi a/p Mutho v Pengarah Jabatan Agama Islam Perak [2018] 1 MLJ 545 (Federal Court) (‘Indira Gandhi’).

43. Ibid 584–6.

44. Lina Joy v. Majlis Agama Islam Wilayah Persekutuan [2007] 4 MLJ 585 (‘Lina Joy’).

45. Kassim @ Osman bin Ahmad v Dato’ Seri Jamil Khir bin Baharom Menteri di Jabatan Perdana Menteri (Hal Ehwal Agama Islam) [2016] 7 MLJ 669 (Court of Appeal) (‘Kassim Ahmad’).

46. SIS Forum (M) v Jawatankuasa Fatwa Negeri Selangor & Ors [2018] 3 MLJ 706 (Court of Appeal) (‘Sisters in Islam’).

47. Using the Lina Joy case, Thio Li-ann has characterised this legal muddling as a ‘jurisdictional imbroglio’. See Thio (n 40).

48. Dalip Kaur v Pegawai Polis Daerah, Balai Polis Daerah, Bukit Mertajam & Another [1992] 1 MLJ 1 (Supreme Court); Majlis Agama Islam dan Adat Melayu Perak Darul Ridzuan v Mohamed Suffian bin Ahmad Syazali & Anor [2014] 3 MLJ 74 (Court of Appeal).

49. Lina Joy (n 44) 593. See also Menteri Dalam Negeri v Titular Roman Catholic Archbishop of Kuala Lumpur [2013] 6 MLJ 468, 493.

50. Lina Joy (n 44).

51. ZI Publications Sdn Bhd v Kerajaan Negeri Selangor [2016] 1 MLJ 153, 160.

52. ‘Constitutional culture’ here refers to the assemblage of beliefs and attitudes that people and the state hold towards the constitution. See Kevin YL Tan, The Constitution of Singapore: A Contextual Analysis (Hart Publishing, 2015), 58 and Reva B Siegel, ‘Constitutional Culture, Social Movement Conflict and Constitutional Change: The Case of the De Facto ERA’ (2006) 94(5) California Law Review 1323, 1325. In a similar vein, Ferejohn, Rakove and Riley posit that constitutional culture is the set of practices that people follow in instituting and constraining their government. Constitutional culture reflects how a commitment to constitutionalism is established. See John Ferejohn, Jack N Rakove, and Jonathan Riley (eds), Constitutional Culture and Democratic Rule (Cambridge University Press, 2001) 2, 15.

53. For a discussion of the relationship between the operation and stability of political systems with political culture, see Seymour Martin Lipset, ‘Presidents vs Parliaments: The Centrality of Political Culture’ (1990) 1(4) Journal of Democracy 80.

54. Bernama, ‘Istana Negara’s Statement on The Guardian’s Editorial’, New Straits Times (online, 8 March 2020) https://www.nst.com.my/news/nation/2020/03/572767/istana-negaras-statement-guardians-editorial.

55. Eileen Ng, ‘Malaysia’s King Rejects PM’s Proposal to Declare Emergency’, The Diplomat (online, 26 October 2020) https://thediplomat.com/2020/10/malaysias-king-rejects-pms-proposal-to-declare-emergency/.

56. Albert HY Chen, ‘The Achievement of Constitutionalism in Asia: Moving Beyond “Constitutions without Constitutionalism”’ in Albert HY Chen (ed), Constitutionalism in Asia in the Early Twenty-First Century (Cambridge University Press, 2014) 1.

57. Titular Roman Catholic Archbishop of Kuala Lumpur v Menteri Dalam Negeri [2009] 2 MLJ 78 (High Court of Malaya, Kuala Lumpur).

58. Ibid 493, 509. For an analysis of this case, see, eg, Joshua Neoh, ‘The Name of God on Trial: Narratives of Law, Religion and State in Malaysia’ (2014) 18 Law Text Culture 198.

59. Joseph M. Fernando, ‘Defending the Monarchy: The Malay Rulers and the Making of the Malayan Constitution, 1956-1957’ (2014) 88 Archipel 149.

60. See Shah, Constitutions, Religion and Politics in Asia (n 3), 237-8.

61. Mong Palatino, ‘Malaysia’s Election “Tsunami”’, The Diplomat (online, 10 May 2013) https://thediplomat.com/2013/05/malaysias-election-tsunami/.

62. Lee Kam Hing and Thock Ker Pong, ‘Thirteenth General Elections (GE13): Chinese Votes and Implications on Malaysian Politics’ (2014) 32(2) Kajian Malaysia 25, 39.

63. Ibid 42−3.

64. Dian AH Shah, ‘Malaysia’s Game of Thrones amid a Pandemic: Constitutional Implications and Political Significance of the State of Emergency’, Blog of the International Journal of Constitutional Law (Blog Post, 17 January 2020) http://www.iconnectblog.com/2021/01/malaysias-game-of-thrones-amid-a-pandemic-constitutional-implications-and-political-significance-of-the-state-of-emergency/.

65. ‘AG: Cabinet to decide when Parliament can reconvene’, New Straits Times (online, 8 March 2020) https://www.nst.com.my/news/politics/2021/06/702251/ag-cabinet-decide-when-parliament-can-reconvene.