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Published online by Cambridge University Press: 01 January 2025
The High Court has often said that the common law must conform to the Constitution. The High Court has not completely explained why this is so. This requirement is not explicitly mentioned anywhere in the Constitution itself. A number of scholars have suggested possible answers. One is that the Constitution is the supreme law and binding on everyone. Another suggestion has been that the common law must conform because the Constitution constrains ‘state action’: something more than just an exercise of constitutionally conferred power. This latter explanation appears to deviate from the High Court's exposition of the common law's relationship with the Constitution in Lange v Australian Broadcasting Commission. This article suggests that the Constitution has a broader application to the common law, in that it constrains all uses of judicial power, not just those that are considered to be ‘state action’. It contends that it is implicit in s 71 of the Constitution that the power to develop the common law yields to constitutional imperatives. This theory is more descriptively consistent with the High Court's practice and observations about the relationship between the common law and the Constitution.
I thank Dr Lisa Burton Crawford, Dr Patrick Emerton and Mr Roger Wu for their guidance and helpful comments. All errors remain my own.
1. Tajjour v New South Wales (2014) 254 CLR 508, 547–8 [32] (French CJ).
2. Ibid 558 [59] (Hayne J).
3. (1997) 189 CLR 520 (‘Lange’).
4. (1994) 182 CLR 104 (‘Theophanous’).
5. (1994) 182 CLR 211 (‘Stephens’).
6. Theophanous (n 4) 208.
7. Lange (n 3) 556.
8. Ibid 566 (citations omitted).
9. Ibid 559–60.
10. Ibid 562.
11. Ibid 566.
12. Ibid 569 (citations omitted).
13. Ibid 570.
14. Ibid 569–70 (citations omitted).
15. Ibid 574.
16. (2010) 241 CLR 539 ('Aid/Watch').
17. Ibid 544 [1] (French CJ, Gummow, Hayne, Crennan and Bell JJ).
18. Ibid 556 [44].
19. Ibid 557 [48].
20. Ibid 557 [47]–[49]. Income Tax Special Purposes Commissioners v Pemsel [1891] AC 531 (‘Pemsel’s Case’) marked the grouping of charitable purposes into four broad categories which serve as the basis for the modern law of charitable purpose trusts.
21. Adrienne Stone, ‘The Common Law and the Constitution: A Reply’ (2002) 26(3) Melbourne University Law Review 646, 649–50 (‘A Reply’). See also Graeme Hill and Adrienne Stone, ‘The Constitutionalisation of the Common Law’ (2004) 25(1) Adelaide Law Review 67. Greg Taylor takes a different view, suggesting that the Constitution merely rules out impermissible options, but otherwise leaves Parliaments with a free hand: Greg Taylor, ‘Why the Common Law Should Only Be Indirectly Affected by Constitutional Guarantees: A Comment on Stone’ (2002) 26(3) Melbourne University Law Review 623, 626–7 (‘A Comment on Stone’); Greg Taylor, ‘The Constitution and the Common Law Again’ (2019) 40(2) Adelaide Law Review 573.
22. Stone, ‘A Reply’ (n 21) 653.
23. See, eg, Lange (n 3) 571.
24. Hill and Stone (n 21) 81–2.
25. Lange (n 3) 556 (citations omitted).
26. Ibid 564 (citations omitted).
27. Kathleen Foley, ‘The Australian Constitution’s Influence on the Common Law’ (2003) 31 Federal Law Review 131, 139.
28. Ibid, quoting Pfeiffer v Stevens (2001) 209 CLR 57, 88 [113].
29. Stone, ‘Rights, Personal Rights and Freedoms: The Nature of the Freedom of Political Communication’ (2001) 25(2) Melbourne University Law Review 374, 407–8 (‘The Nature of the Freedom’).
30. Taylor, ‘The Constitution and the Common Law Again’ (n 21) 575, citing Roberts v Bass (2002) 212 CLR 1, 51 [130] (Kirby J).
31. Ibid 578.
32. Ibid 579.
33. Ibid.
34. Ibid.
35. Stone, ‘The Nature of the Freedom’ (n 29) 407–8; Stone, ‘A Reply’ (n 21) 655; Hill and Stone (n 21) 82.
36. Stone, ‘A Reply’ (n 21) 655. Stone initially argued that the High Court’s failure in Lange to explicitly state that the common law is subject to the Constitution meant that the common law is not ‘directly’ subject to the Constitution: Stone, ‘The Nature of the Freedom’ (n 29) 405–6. In ‘A Reply’ she clarifies her position, saying that she reads the judgment in Lange as implying that the common law is, indeed, subject to the Constitution: 650–1.
37. TCL Air Conditioner (Zhongshan) Co Ltd v Judges of the Federal Court of Australia (2013) 251 CLR 533, 553 [27] (French CJ and Gageler J).
38. Huddart, Parker and Co Pty Ltd v Moorehead (1909) 8 CLR 330, 357 (Griffith CJ); The Queen v Davison (1954) 90 CLR 353, 369 (Dixon CJ and McTiernan J); The Queen v Trade Practices Tribunal; Ex parte Tasmanian Breweries Pty Ltd (1970) 123 CLR 361, 375 (Kitto J); Precision Data Holdings Ltd v Wills (1991) 173 CLR 167, 188; ibid 553 [27] (French CJ and Gageler J), 566 [75] (Hayne, Crennan, Kiefel and Bell JJ).
39. Chief Justice Robert French, ‘Litigating in a Statutory Universe’ (Speech, Victorian Bar Association 2nd Annual CPD Conference—the New Litigation Landscape—Challenges and Opportunities, Melbourne, 18 February 2012) <http://www.hcourt.gov.au/assets/publications/speeches/current-justices/frenchcj/frenchcj18feb12.pdf>.
40. Justice Michelle Gordon, ‘Analogical Reasoning by Reference to Statute: What is the Judicial Function?’ (2019) 42(1) University of New South Wales Law Journal 4, 7.
41. Momcilovic v The Queen (2011) 245 CLR 1, 156 [392].
42. Sir Owen Dixon, ‘Concerning Judicial Method’ (1956) 29 Australian Law Journal 468, 472.
43. Sir Anthony Mason, ‘The Judge as Law-maker’ (1996) 3 James Cook University Law Review 1, 3.
44. Ibid.
45. Justice Michael McHugh, ‘The Law-Making Function of the Judicial Process—Part II’ (1988) 62(2) Australian Law Journal 116, 119.
46. Taylor, ‘A Comment on Stone’ (n 21) 631, 633; Taylor, ‘The Constitution and the Common Law Again’ (n 21) 575, 585.
47. Stone, ‘The Nature of the Freedom’ (n 29) 407 n 186.
48. Lord Reid, ‘The Judge as Law Maker’ (1972) 12(1) Journal of the Society of Public Teachers of Law 22.
49. Allan Beever, ‘The Declaratory Theory of Law’ (2013) 33(3) Oxford Journal of Legal Studies 421, 423.
50. Ronald Dworkin, Law’s Empire (Hart Publishing, 1986) chs 6–8.
51. Duncan Wallace, ‘Reasoning with the Foundations of Rules’ (2018) 46(1) Federal Law Review 49.
52. R v Kirby; Ex parte Boilermakers’ Society of Australia (1956) 94 CLR 254, 267 (Dixon CJ, McTiernan, Fullagar and Kitto JJ).
53. For example, the assumption that ss 80 and 83 of the Constitution conferred the federal executive with the power to spend appropriated moneys: Pape v Federal Commissioner of Taxation (2009) 238 CLR 1.
54. Stone, ‘The Nature of the Freedom’ (n 29) 409 n 186.
55. Ibid 402.
56. Ibid 403.
57. Ibid 416.
58. Ibid 414.
59. Hill and Stone (n 21) 86.
60. Barron v Baltimore, 32 US (7 Peters) 243, 247 (1833).
61. Civil Rights Cases, 109 US 3, 10 (1883).
62. Ibid 17.
63. 376 US 254, 265 (1964) quoted in Stone, ‘The Nature of the Freedom’ (n 29) 410 (emphasis in original).
64. Stone, ‘The Nature of the Freedom’ (n 29) 410.
65. Ibid 409–10 (emphasis in original).
66. Stone, ‘A Reply’ (n 21) 655.
67. Black v Cutter Laboratories 351 US 292, 294–5 (1956).
68. Ibid 299.
69. Lloyd Corporation v Tanner 407 US 551 (1972).
70. Ibid 568–9.
71. Ibid 567.
72. Ibid 570.
73. It has most famously been described as a ‘conceptual disaster area’: Charles L Black Jr, ‘Foreword: State Action, Equal Protection, and California’s Proposition' (1967) 81 Harvard Law Review 69, 95. For a small selection of the extensive literature of criticisms and suggestions to make the doctrine more coherent, see: Herbert Weschler, ‘Toward Neutral Principles of Constitutional Law’ (1958) 73(1) Harvard Law Review 1; Alstyne Karst, ‘State Action’ (1961) 14(1) Stanford Law Review 3; Erwin Chemerinsky, ‘Rethinking State Action’ (1985) 80(3) Northwestern University Law Review 503; Cass R Sunstein, ‘State Action is Always Present’ (2002) 3(2) Chicago Journal of International Law 465; Julie K Brown, ‘Less is More: Decluttering the State Action Doctrine’ (2008) 73(2) Missouri Law Review 561; Christian Turner, ‘State Action Problems’ (2013) 65(1) Florida Law Review 281; Brookes Brown, ‘A Conceptual Disaster Zone Indeed: The Incoherence of the State and the Need for State Action Doctrine(s)’ (2015) 75(1) Maryland Law Review 328.
74. Stone, ‘The Nature of the Freedom’ (n 29) 415–16.
75. Another scholar has offered additional reasons as to why Stone’s state action doctrine should not be adopted: Patrick McCabe, ‘Contracts and the Implied Freedom of Political Communication’ (2021) 49(1) Federal Law Review 40, 61–2.
76. Lange (n 3) 563–4.
77. Stone, ‘The Nature of the Freedom’ (n 29) 411.
78. Ibid 412.
79. McCabe makes the same point: n 75, 60.
80. A point also made by Taylor: ‘The Constitution and the Common Law Again’ (n 21) 577.
81. Theophanous (n 4) 153 (Brennan J) quoted in Stone, ‘The Nature of the Freedom’ (n 29) 409.
82. Stone, ‘The Nature of the Freedom’ (n 29) 415.
83. McCabe has suggested that ‘in the overwhelming majority of (and perhaps all) instances, private property rights would be unaffected by the freedom’: n 75, 62–3.
84. Stone, ‘The Nature of the Freedom’ (n 29) 414–5.
85. Lange (n 3) 567.
86. Ibid 567–8.
87. McCabe has explored the applicability of the implied freedom to contract law, see n 75.
88. Stone, ‘The Nature of the Freedom’ (n 29) 407–8.
89. Hill and Stone (n 21) 82. However, Stone still appears to be committed to a public-private dichotomy and the state action doctrine that it demands: 85–87.
90. (2010) 243 CLR 319, 355–6 [87].
91. (1915) 19 CLR 629, 635 (Gavan Duffy and Rich JJ agreeing).
92. (1969) 119 CLR 564, 570.
93. Ibid.
94. (1997) 190 CLR 513, 606.
95. Joshua Forrester, Lorraine Finlay and Augusto Zimmerman, ‘Finding the Streams’ True Sources’ (2018) 43(2) University of Western Australia Law Review 188, 206.
96. Ibid 207.
97. Attorney-General (WA) v Marquet (2003) 217 CLR 545, 570 [66].
98. Lange (n 3) 567 (emphasis added). This approach was seemingly endorsed by the High Court in MZXOT v Minister for Immigration and Citizenship (2008) 233 CLR 601, 623 [39] (Gleeson CJ, Gummow and Hayne JJ), 635 [83] (Kirby J), 656 [171] (Heydon, Crennan and Kiefel JJ).
99. Nicholas Aroney, ‘A Seductive Plausibility: Freedom of Speech in the Constitution’ (1995) 18(2) University of Queensland Law Journal 249, 264; Goldsworthy, ‘Implications in Language, Law and the Constitution’ in Geoffrey Lindell (ed), Future Directions in Australian Constitutional Law (Federation Press, 1994) 150, 168.
100. Jeffrey Goldsworthy, ‘Constitutional Implications Revisited’ (2011) 30(1) University of Queensland Law Journal 9, 18–19.
101. Australian Capital Television v Commonwealth(1992) 177 CLR 106, 135 (Mason CJ) (‘Australian Capital Television’) cited in APLA Ltd v Legal Services Commissioner of New South Wales (2005) 224 CLR 322, 409 [240] (Gummow J) (‘APLA Ltd’); McCloy v New South Wales (2015) 257 CLR 178, 222 [100] (Gageler J); Burns v Corbett (2018) 265 CLR 304, 355 [94] (Gageler J), 383 [175] (Gordon J); Spence v Queensland (2019) 93 ALJR 643, 712 [298] (Edelman J).
102. Aroney (n 99) 264–5.
103. APLA Ltd (n 101) 453–4 [389] (Hayne J).
104. Adrienne Stone, ‘The Limits of Constitutional Text and Structure’ (1999) 23(3) Melbourne University Law Review 668; Adrienne Stone, ‘The Limits of Constitutional Text and Structure Revisited’ (2005) 28(3) University of New South Wales Law Journal 842; Rosalind Dixon, ‘The Functional Constitution: Re-reading the 2014 High Court Constitutional Term’ (2015) 43(3) Federal Law Review 455.
105. Australian Capital Television (n 101) 135. Such a view has been supported by at least one commentator, who argues that implications should not be treated any differently to any other matter of interpretation: Jeremy Kirk, ‘Constitutional Implications (I): Nature, Legitimacy, Classification, Examples’ (2000) 24(3) Melbourne University Law Review 645, 651–2.
106. (1920) 28 CLR 129, 148–50 (Knox CJ, Isaacs, Rich and Starke JJ). See also: Sir Owen Dixon, ‘The Law and the Constitution’ (1935) 51(4) Law Quarterly Review 590, 597.
107. Federal Amalgamated Government Railway and Tramway Service Association v New South Wales Railway Traffic Employés Association (1906) 4 CLR 488, 534 (Griffith CJ); Jumbunna Coal Mine NL v Victorian Coal Miners’ Association (1908) 6 CLR 309, 367–8 (O’Connor J); Victoria v Commonwealth (1971) 122 CLR 353, 394 (Windeyer J); McGinty v Western Australia (1996) 186 CLR 140, 230 (McHugh J); Chief Justice Robert French, ‘Interpreting the Constitution—Words, History and Change’ (2014) 40(1) Monash University Law Review 29, 32.
108. GJ Lindell, ‘Why is Australia’s Constitution Binding?—The Reasons in 1900 and Now, and the Effect of Independence’ (1986) 16(1) Federal Law Review 29, 32–3, 37. A number of other scholars agree with Lindell: Mark Moshinsky, ‘Re-enacting the Constitution in an Australian Act’ (1989) 18(3) Federal Law Review 134, 136; George Winterton, ‘Popular Sovereignty and Constitutional Continuity’ (1998) 26(1) Adelaide Law Review 1, 6; John W Tate, ‘Giving Substance to Murphy’s Law: The Question of Australian Sovereignty’ (2001) 27(1) Monash University Law Review 21, 27–8.
109. See Winterton (n 108) 7; Harley GA Wright, ‘Sovereignty of the People—The New Constitutional Grundnorm?’ (1998) 26(1) Federal Law Review 165, 178–9. See also: Geoff Lindell, ‘The Australian Constitution: Growth, Adaptation and Conflict—Reflections About Some Major Cases and Events’ (1999) 25(2) Monash University Law Review 257, 264.
110. CIC Insurance Ltd v Bankstown Football Club Ltd (1997) 187 CLR 384, 408 (Brennan CJ, Dawson, Toohey and Gummow JJ).
111. Justice WMC Gummow, ‘The Constitution: Ultimate Foundation of Australian Law?’ (2005) 79(3) Australian Law Journal 167, 178 quoting R v Davison (1954) 90 CLR 353, 368 (Dixon CJ and McTiernan J).
112. The judgments that led to the introduction of the Colonial Laws Validity Act 1865 (Imp) might be thought of as a counter-example, but I consider those judgments to be incorrect.
113. Judicial Committee Act 1833 3 & 4 Wm 4, c 41; Judicial Committee Act 1844 7 & 8 Vict, c 69.
114. HLA Hart, The Concept of Law (Oxford University Press, 3rd ed, 2012) 101; Jeffrey Goldsworthy, The Sovereignty of Parliament (Clarendon Press, 1999) 240 (‘Sovereignty’).
115. Michael Detmold, The Australian Constitution: A Fundamental Analysis (1985, Law Book Co) ch 13; TRS Allan, Law, Liberty, and Justice: The Legal Foundations of British Constitutionalism (1993, Oxford University Press).
116. Lisa Burton Crawford, The Rule of Law and the Australian Constitution (2017, Federation Press) 163.
117. See Goldsworthy, Sovereignty (n 114) ch 10; Jeffrey Goldsworthy, ‘The Constitution and Its Common Law Background’ (2014) 25(4) Public Law Review 265, 266–70. See also ibid ch 9.
118. However, at least one scholar has taken issue with the conclusions that Goldsworthy draws from his historical analysis: Adam Tucker, ‘Uncertainty in the Rule of Recognition and in the Doctrine of Parliamentary Sovereignty’ (2011) 31(1) Oxford Journal of Legal Studies 61, 68–70.
119. Goldsworthy, Sovereignty (n 114) 236–38.
120. Hart (n 114) 95.
121. Ibid.
122. Ibid 105.
123. Ibid 111–12; 116–17.
124. Goldsworthy, Sovereignty (n 114) 236–38.
125. Matthew D Adler provides a summary of the various views as to whose consensus matters: ‘Popular Constitutionalism and the Rule of Recognition’ (2006) 100(2) Northwestern University Law Review 719.
126. Scott J Shapiro notes that John Finnis and Joseph Raz question why it is a rule of recognition instead of rules of recognition: ‘What is the Rule of Recognition’ in Matthew Adler and Kenneth Einar Himma (eds), The Rule of Recognition and the US Constitution (Oxford University Press, 2009) 235, 246, citing John Finnis, ‘Revolutions and Continuity of Law’ in Brian Simpson (ed), Oxford Studies in Jurisprudence (Clarendon Press, 2nd ed, 1973) 44; Joseph Raz, The Concept of a Legal System (Clarendon Press, 2nd ed, 1980), 98. Others interpret Hart as suggesting that there are multiple rules of recognition: Larry Alexander and Frederick Schauer, ‘Rules of Recognition, Constitutional Controversies, and the Dizzying Dependence of Law on Acceptance’ in Matthew Adler and Kenneth Einar Himma (eds), The Rule of Recognition and the US Constitution (Oxford University Press, 2009) 175, 176–177.
127. Jeremy Waldron, for example, argues that the rule of recognition is better thought of as a rule of change: ‘Who Needs Rules of Recognition?’ in Matthew Adler and Kenneth Einar Himma (eds), The Rule of Recognition and the US Constitution (Oxford University Press, 2009) 327.
128. Dworkin (n 50) 225.
129. Goldsworthy, ‘Book Symposium: Author’s Introduction’ (2002) 27 Australian Journal of Legal Philosophy 139, 142 citing Goldsworthy, Sovereignty (n 114) 254, 261–71.
130. Sir Anthony Mason, ‘The Judge as Law-maker’ (1996) 3 James Cook University Law Review 1, 3.
131. Goldsworthy, ‘Implications in Language, Law and the Constitution’ (n 99) 163.
132. Ibid.
133. Ibid 151.
134. Ibid 166.
135. Ibid 171–2.
136. Ibid 170.
137. Ibid 152.
138. Ibid 164–5.
139. Ibid 154.
140. Ibid 168.
141. Worrall v Commercial Banking Co of Sydney Ltd (1917) 24 CLR 28, 32, cited in Goldsworthy, ‘Implications in Language, Law and the Constitution’ (n 99) 168.
142. Goldsworthy, ‘Implications in Language, Law and the Constitution’ (n 99) 170.
143. Jeffrey Goldsworthy, ‘Originalism in Constitutional Interpretation’ (1997) 25(1) Federal Law Review 1; Goldsworthy, ‘Constitutional Implications Revisited’ (n 100).
144. Goldsworthy, ‘Implications in Language, Law and the Constitution’ (n 99) 151–2.
145. Zheng v Cai (2009) 239 CLR 446, 455–6 [28] (French CJ, Gummow, Crennan, Kiefel and Bell JJ); Lacey v Attorney-General (Qld) (2011) 242 CLR 573, 591–2 [43] (French CJ, Gummow, Hayne, Crennan, Kiefel and Bell JJ).
146. Goldsworthy, ‘Implications in Language, Law and the Constitution’ (n 99) 167.
147. Richard Ekins and Jeffrey Goldsworthy, ‘The Reality and Indispensability of Legislative Intentions’ (2014) 36(1) Sydney Law Review 39.
148. Jamie Blaker, ‘Is Intentionalist Theory Indispensable to Statutory Interpretation?’ (2017) 43(1) Monash University Law Review 238.
149. Jim South, ‘Are Legislative Intentions Real?’ (2014) 40(3) Monash University Law Review 853; Lord Sales, ‘In Defence of Legislative Intention’ (2019) 48 Australian Bar Review 6.
150. Blaker (n 148) 244 nn 16.
151. Ekins and Goldsworthy (n 147) 59–60.
152. I am grateful to one of the anonymous referees for this point.
153. Constitution, s 76(i).
154. James v South Australia (1927) 40 CLR 1, 40 (Gavan Duffy, Rich and Starke JJ).
155. British American Tobacco Australia Ltd v Western Australia (2003) 217 CLR 30, 52 [39] (McHugh, Gummow and Hayne JJ).
156. Felton v Mulligan (1971) 124 CLR 367, 373 (Barwick CJ), 411–2 (Walsh J).
157. Spratt v Hermes (1965) 114 CLR 226, 243 (Barwick CJ).
158. Christopher Horan, ‘Section 122 of the Constitution: A “Disparate and Non-Federal” Power?’ (1997) 25(1) Federal Law Review 97, 113, citing Capital TV and Appliances v Falconer (1971) 125 CLR 591, 600 (Barwick CJ), 602 (McTiernan J), 607–8 (Menzies J), 609 (Windeyer J), 613 (Owen J), 622–3 (Owen J), and 627 (Gibbs J).
159. Northern Territory v GPAO (1999) 196 CLR 553, 603–5 [127]–[132] (Gaudron J); Re Governor, Goulburn Correctional Centre; Ex parte Eastman (1999) 200 CLR 322, 339–40 [33] (Gaudron J), 348–9 [63]–[67] (Gummow and Hayne JJ).
160. John Pfeiffer Pty Ltd v Rogerson (2000) 203 CLR 503, 518–19 [18] (Gleeson CJ, Gaudron, McHugh, Gummow and Hayne JJ); Blunden v Commonwealth (2003) 218 CLR 330, 335–6 [9] (Gleeson CJ, Gummow, Hayne and Heydon JJ), 359 [89] (Kirby J); North Australian Aboriginal Legal Aid Service Inc v Bradley (2004) 218 CLR 146, 163 [28] (McHugh, Gummow, Kirby, Hayne, Callinan and Heydon JJ); Putland v The Queen (2004) 218 CLR 174, 179 [178–9] (Gleeson CJ), 187–8 [33] (Gummow and Hayne JJ), 199 [73] (Kirby J); North Australian Aboriginal Justice Agency Ltd v Northern Territory (2015) 256 CLR 569, 595–6 [41] (French CJ, Kiefel and Bell JJ), 615 [111] (Gageler J), 634 [173] (Keane J).
161. Australian Law Reform Commission, The Judicial Power of the Commonwealth: A Review of the Judiciary Act 1903 and Related Legislation (Report No 92, October 2001) 632.
162. McCabe (n 75).