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Financial revolution and economic modernisation in Sweden

Published online by Cambridge University Press:  18 March 2009

Anders Ögren
Anders Ögren
Affiliation:
EHFF – Institute for Economic and Business History at the Stockholm School of Economics and Histoire et Théorie Economique – EconomiX Université Paris X La Defense Nanterreanders.ogren@hhs.se
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Abstract

The development of a well-adapted financial system was a main part of the successful Swedish economic modernisation in the latter half of the nineteenth century. In this article it is shown that this development followed the pattern of a financial revolution. Major institutional and organisational changes that took place roughly between the late 1850s and early 1870s led to a rapid increase in liquidity and financial services. This financial revolution preceded the acceleration in economic growth in general and in the modern, industrial sector in particular. Monetisation especially encouraged growth, both in the industrial sector and in GDP as a whole. The basis of the financial system, measured as commercial bank assets and equity capital, affected overall GDP growth. The results also clearly promoted the importance of the development of the financial sector and monetisation as an interlinked and complementary process.

Résumés

Le développement d'un système financier bien adapté a constitué la partie principale de la modernisation économique suédoise réussie dans la deuxième partie du dix-neuvième siècle. Cette communication montre que ce développement a suivi le modèle d'une révolution financière. Les changements majeurs institutionnels et organisationnels qui ont eu lieu en gros entre la fin des années 1850 et le début des années 1870 ont conduit à une augmentation rapide de la liquidité et des services financiers Cette révolution financière a précédé l'accélération de la croissance économique en général et dans le secteur moderne industriel en particulier. Spécialement, la monétisation a encouragé la croissance, à la fois dans le secteur industriel et dans le PIB entier. La base du système financier, mesurée par les biens bancaires commerciaux et les capitaux propres, a touché la croissance totale du PIB. Les résultats ont également clairement promu l'importance du développement du secteur financier et la monétisation comme processus reliés et complémentaires.

Abstrakte

Die Entwicklung eines gut angepassten Finanzsystems bildete einen Hauptbestandteil der erfolgreichen Modernisierung der schwedischen Wirtschaft in der zweiten Hälfte des 19.Jahrhunderts. Diese Studie zeigt, dass diese Entwicklung dem Muster einer finanziellen Revolution folgte. Wichtige institutionelle und organisationelle Veränderungen, die ungefähr zwischen den späten 1850-er Jahren und den frühen 1870-er Jahren stattfanden, führten zu einer schnellen Erhöhung der Liquidität und des Angebots im Bereich Finanzdienstleistungen. Diese finanzielle Revolution ging dem beschleunigten Wirtschaftswachstum im Allgemeinen und insbesondere dem beschleunigten Wachstum im modernen industriellen Bereich voraus. Insbesondere die Monetarisierung bewirkte eine Wachstumsförderung – sowohl im industriellen Bereich und auch in Bezug auf das Bruttoinlandsprodukt (BIP) insgesamt. Die Basis des Finanzsystem – die in Form von gewerblichem Bankkapital und Aktienkapital gemessen wurde – beeinflusste das allgemeine Wachstum des BIP. Die Ergebnisse dessen unterstrichen ebenfalls die große Bedeutung, die der Entwicklung des Finanzbereiches zukommt, sowie der Monetarisierung als damit verkettetem Komplementärprozess.

Resúmenes

El desarrollo de un sistema financiero bien adaptado fue una parte principal de la exitosa modernización económica sueca en la última mitad del siglo diecinueve. En esta ponencia se muestra que su desarrollo siguió la pauta de una revolución financiera. Los grandes cambios institucionales y organizativos que tuvieron lugar aproximadamente entre la década de los 50 y principios de la década de los 70 condujeron a un rápido aumento en liquidez y servicios financieros. Esta revolución financiera precedió la aceleración en crecimiento económico, en general, y en el moderno sector industrial, en particular. La monetización en especial favoreció el crecimiento, tanto en el sector industrial como en el producto interior bruto en conjunto. La base del sistema económico, medido en bienes de banco comercial y en neto patrimonial afectó el crecimiento global del PIB. Además los resultados claramente promocionaron la importancia del desarrollo del sector financiero y de la monetización como un proceso interrelacionado y complementario.

Type
Articles
Information
Financial History Review , Volume 16 , Issue 1 , April 2009 , pp. 47 - 71
Copyright
Copyright © European Association for Banking and Financial History e.V. 2009

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