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The niche in the universal banking system: the role and significance of private bankers within German industry, 1900–19331

Published online by Cambridge University Press:  12 September 2008

Harald Wixforth  and
Dieter Ziegler
Harald Wixforth
Affiliation:
University of Bielefeld
Dieter Ziegler
Affiliation:
University of Bielefeld
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Financial History Review , Volume 1 , Issue 2 , October 1994 , pp. 99 - 119
Copyright
Copyright © European Association for Banking and Financial History 1994

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References

2 See most recently on this topic Ziegler, D., ‘The origins of the “Macmillan Gap”: comparing Britain and Germany in the early twentieth century’, in Cottrell, P. L. et al. (eds), Finance and Industry in the Age of the Corporate Economy: Britain and Japan (Leicester, forthcoming 1994).Google Scholar

3 As opposed to Daems and Chandler, who have defined ‘private business’ not by its legal status in terms of a partnership, but as an ‘Owner-operated’ (in contrast to a management-operated) enterprise: Chandler, A. D. and Daems, H., ‘Introduction’, in Daems, H. and van der Wee, H. (eds), The Rise of Managerial Capitalism (The Hague, 1974), pp. 5–6).Google ScholarKommanditisten have not been included in the sample of private bankers, although, like private bankers, they did not enjoy the privilege of limited liability, unlike their joint stock bank director counterparts. For an appropriate definition of ‘private banker’ see Neumann, R., Der deutsche Privatbankier (Wiesbaden, 1965), p. 18.CrossRefGoogle Scholar

4 See Treue, W., ‘Das Privatbankwesen im 19. Jahrhundert’, in Coing, H. and Wilhelm, W. (eds), Wissenschaft und Kodifikation des Privatrechts im 19. Jahrhundert, 5 (Frankfurt-a.-Main, 1980), pp. 102–3;Google ScholarObermann, K., ‘Zur Beschaffung des Eisenbahnkapitals in Deutschland in den Jahren 1835–1855’, Revue Internationale d'Histoire de la Banque, 5 (1972), p. 317Google Scholar; and Hoth, W., ‘Zur Finanzierung des Eisenbahnstreckenbaus im 19. Jahrhundert’, Scripta Mercaturae, 12 (1978), pp. 4–13.Google Scholar

5 Several examples of rivalry, and cooperation, in international syndicates are given in Young, G. F. W., ‘Anglo-German banking syndicates and the issue of South American government loans in the era of high imperialism’, Bankhistorisches Archiv, 16 (1990), pp. 3–38.Google Scholar

6 Korach, E., ‘Das deutsche Privatbankgeschäft’, unpublished PhD thesis (University of Berlin, 1910), p. 40.Google Scholar

7 Gerlach, W., ‘Die Wirkung der deutschen Börsensteuergesetzgebung’, Zeitschrift für die gesamte Staatswissenschaft, 61 (1905), pp. 461–520Google Scholar; Wallich, P., Die Konzentration im deutschen Bankwesen (Stuttgart, 1905), pp. 81–92Google Scholar; Riesser, J., Die deutschen Groβbanken und ihre Konzentration (Jena, 1912), pp. 502–7Google Scholar; and Schwartz, P., ‘Die Entwicklungstendenzen im deutschen Privatbankiergewerbe’, unpublished PhD thesis (University of Strasbourg, 1915), pp. 74–6.Google Scholar

8 Oppenheim still led the syndicate for a Phoenix stock issue in 1890, but in 1896 was replaced by the Discontogesellschaft. See Feldenkirchen, W., ‘Kölner Banken und die Entwicklung des Ruhrgebietes’, Zeitschrift für Untemehmensgeschichte, 27 (1982), p. 99, n. 96.Google Scholar

9 Several examples in Donaubauer, K. A., Privatbankiers und Bankenkonzentration in Deutschland von der Mitte des 19. Jahrhunderts bis 1932 (Frankfurt-a.-Main, 1988).Google Scholar

10 Hertner, P., ‘German banks abroad before 1914’, in Jones, G. (ed.), Banks as Multinationals (London, 1990). PP. 100–11Google Scholar; and Tilly, R., ‘International aspects of the development of German banking’, in Cameron, R. and Bovykin, V. I. (eds), International Banking 1870–1914 (Oxford, 1991).Google Scholar

11 Goldschmidt, R. W., Das deutsche Groβbankkapital in seiner neueren Entwicklung (Berlin, 1928), p. 186Google Scholar; Grüger, F., ‘Die Wirkungen des Krieges und der Kriegsfolgen auf das deutsche Bankwesen’, Untersuchungen des Bankwesens 1933, 1 (Berlin, 1933), p. 55.Google Scholar

12 Ziegler, R., ‘Das Netzwerk der Personen- und Kapitalverflechtungen deutscher und österrei chischer Wirtschaftsuntemehmen 1976’, Working Paper (University of Munich, Institut für Soziologie, 1983)Google Scholar; and Pappi, F. U., ‘Die Struktur der Untemehmensverflechtungen in der Bundesrepublik’, Kölner Zeitschrift für Soziologie und Sozialpsychologie, 38 (1987), p. 714Google Scholar. See also Tilly, R., ‘Zur Entwicklung der deutschen Groβbanken als Universalbanken im 19. und 20. Jahrhundert. Wachstumsmotor oder Machtkartell?’, in Pollard, S. and Ziegler, D. (eds), Markt, Staat, Planung. Historische Erfahrungen mit Regulierungs- und Deregulierungsversuchen der Wirtschaft (St Katharinen, 1992), pp. 129–32.Google Scholar

13 For the particulars of the Interessengemeinschaft, see Riesser, , Groβbanken, pp. 541–4Google Scholar; Pohl, M., ‘Festigung und Ausdehnung des deutschen Bankwesens zwischen 1870 und 1914’, Deutsche Bankgeschichte, 2 (1982), pp. 272–7Google Scholar; and idem, Konzentration im deutschen Bankwesen (1848–1980) (Frankfurt-a.-Main, 1982), pp. 195–228.

14 Unfortunately, there is little information about either Hagen or his bank; the only exception is Kellenbenz, H., ‘Louis Hagen’, Rheinisch-Westfälische Wirtschaftsbiographien, 10 (Münster, 1974).Google Scholar

15 For Oppenheim see Stürmer, M., Teichmann, G. and Treue, W., Wägen und Wagen: Sal. Oppenheim jr. & Cie. Geschichte einer Bank und einer Familie (Munich, 1989).Google Scholar

16 For biographical details see Treue, W., ‘Robert Pferdmenges’, Rheinische Lebensbilder, 7 (Cologne, 1977)Google Scholar; and idem, Wägen und Wagen, pp. 348–54.

17 Mendelssohn, on principle, refused to be a member of any supervisory board, but delegated such positions to a confidant. See Treue, W., ‘Das Bankhaus Mendelssohn als Beispiel einer Privatbank im 19. und 20. Jahrhundert’, Mendelssohn Studien, 1 (Berlin, 1972), p. 56.Google Scholar

18 Mannesmann AG, Düsseldorf, Historical Archive [henceforth MA]; P 1 25.33; P 1 25.38, correspondence between Oppenheim and Beukenberg, Jan.-July 1920.

19 See, for example, the amalgamation of Vereinigte Stahlwerke van der Zypen/Wissener Eisenhütte and Phoenix, which was initiated by Hagen, MA, P 1 26–29; and see also Kunze, W., Der Aufbau des Phoenix-Konzerns (Frankfurt-a.-Main, 1925), p. 125.Google Scholar

20 See Wellhöner, V., Groβbanken und Groβindustrie im Kaiserreich (Göttingen, 1989), pp. 181, 187.CrossRefGoogle Scholar

21 After the take-over of Schulz-Knaudt AG (Huckingen) by Mannesmann, and where the Deutsche Bank at times held a dominant position, Mannesmann had to ask the Deutsche Bank whether the Schulz-Knaudt department was allowed to keep its connections with the private banking house von der Heydt-Kersten. See Wellhöner, , Groβbanken, p. 137.Google Scholar

22 In this case, however, Hagen was not successful, since a major shareholder opposed the amalgamation for personal reasons. See MA, P 1 26.29, memorandum by Fahrenhorst; Thyssen, Duisburg-Hamborn, Historical Archive [henceforth TA], RSW 166D, correspondence between Hagen and Haβlacher, and between Hagen, and Krawehl, , 10. 1922–04. 1923.Google Scholar

23 TA; RSW 170/00/1/b/1, RSW 170/00/1/b/2, minutes of the negotiations; RSW 170/00/1/a/2, Baum to Haβlacher, 14 Dec. 1925.

24 For the extent and importance of private bankers' access to inside information, as exemplified by the role of Mendelssohn's Amsterdam associate Mannheimer during the crisis of 1931, see James, H., ‘The causes of the German banking crisis of 1931’, Economic History Review, 37 (1984), p. 77.CrossRefGoogle Scholar

25 Augustine, D., ‘The banker in German society’, in Cassis, Y. (ed.), Finance and Financiers in European History, 1880–1960 (Cambridge, 1992), p. 172.Google Scholar For Max Warburg's political influence see also Vagts, A., ‘M. M. Warburg & Co. Ein Bankhaus in der deutschen Weltpolitik 1905–1933’, Vierteljahrschrift für Sozial- und Wirtschaftsgeschichte, 45 (1958), pp. 289–388Google Scholar; and Rosenbaum, E. and Sherman, A. J., M. M. Warburg & Co. 1789–1938 (London, 1979).Google Scholar For Mendelssohn-Bartholdy see Treue, , ‘Bankhaus Mendelssohn’, p. 49.Google Scholar

26 Haniel, Duisburg-Ruhrort, Historical Archive [henceforth HA], 400/101/251/0, Reusch to Warburg, several letters.

27 TA, A 712/2, A 771/1, Thyssen to Warburg, several letters.

28 Fried. Krupp GmbH, Essen, Historical Archive [henceforth HA Krupp], WA VII f 1083, memo Busemann, HA 400/101/2002/9.

29 British Parliamentary Papers, VIII (1847/1848)Google Scholar, Select Commitee on Commercial Distress, part 3, evidence of Gurney, S., q. 1324.Google Scholar

30 The compositions of Zentralausschuβ and Bezirksausschüsse are given in the Verwaltungsberichte of the Reichsbank. For the reform of the internal organisation of the Reichsbank in 1924 see Die Reichsbank 1901–1925 (Berlin, 1925), pp. 161–2.Google Scholar The banking law of 1933 abolished the Generalrat, while the Zentralausschuβ was abolished in 1939.Google Scholar See also Holtfrerich, C-L., ‘Relations between monetary authorities and governmental institutions from the 19th century to the present’, in Toniolo, G. (ed.), Central Banks' Independence in Historical Perspective (Berlin, 1988), pp. 133–4.Google Scholar

31 HA, 400/101/2002/9, correspondence between GHH and Hirschland.

32 Ulrich, K., ‘Das Privatbankhaus Simon Hirschland im Nationalsozialismus’, in Köhler, M. and Ulrich, K. (eds), Banken, Konjunktur und Politik. Beiträge zur Geschichte der deutschen Banken im 19. und 20. Jahrhundert (Essen, forthcoming 1994).Google Scholar

33 Hoesch-Archive, , A 3 a 4, supervisory board minutes, 7 Mar. 1926.Google Scholar

34 See HA Krupp, WA 41/2–253, memo of the Krupp directorate, Nov. 1924.

35 HA Krupp, WA VII f 1083, memo Busemann; and further details in Wixforth, H., ‘Banken und Schwerindustrie in der Weimarer Republik’, unpublished PhD thesis (University of Bielefeld, 1990), pp. 77–9.Google Scholar

36 See, for example, MA, M 11.026 – the request by the chairman of the administrative board of Mannesmannröhren-Werke AG, Bierwes, to the chairman of the supervisory board, Steinthal, ‘to elect Dr Georg Hirschland onto the supervisory board with regard to his most valuable support when our company had certain difficulties in raising credits’.

37 TA, A/83O/1, A/83O/2, A/831/1; see also Rosenbaum, and Sherman, , M. M. Warburg, pp. 126, 134.Google Scholar

38 TA, VSt 3891.

39 In 1925 four leading private banking houses (Hirschland, Oppenheim, Warburg and Levy) went as far as concluding an alliance to facilitate and coordinate their respective international businesses. See Ulrich, ‘Privatbankhaus Simon Hirschland’.

40 As early as 1910 an observer concluded that only those who were unable to obtain a loan elsewhere approached a private banker. See Korach, , ‘Privatbankgeschäft’, p. 39.Google Scholar

41 TA, VSt RSW 170/00/b/1, Discontogesellschaft to Vereinigte Stahlwerke, 31 Mar. 1926.

42 Wittkowski, M., Groβbanken und Industrie in Deutschland 1924–1931 (Tampere, 1937), p. 70Google Scholar; James, H., The German Slump: Politics and Economics 1924–1936 (Oxford, 1986), pp. 139–46Google Scholar; and Wixforth, H., ‘The banks and their customers: the German case in the Weimar Republic’, mimeo, 1991.Google Scholar

43 Lansburgh, A., ‘Die Finanzierung des Kapitalbedarfs der Mittel- und Kleinindustrie’, in Harms, B. (ed.), Kapital und Kapitalismus (Berlin, 1931), p. 134Google Scholar; and Walb, E., ‘Übersetzung und Konkurrenz im deutschen Kreditapparat’, Untersuchungen 1933, 1, p. 145Google Scholar: while for more recent commentary see Pohl, H., ‘Formen und Phasen der Industriefinanzierung bis zum Zweiten Weltkrieg’, Bank historisches Archiv, 9 (Frankfurt-a.-Main, 1983), p. 30Google Scholar; James, H., ‘Banks and bankers in the German interwar depression’, in Cassis, Finance and Financiers, p. 269Google Scholar; and Ziegler, , ‘Origins of the “Macmillan Gap”’.Google Scholar

44 See, for example, von Moller, H., ‘Der deutsche Privatbankiersstand’, Untersuchungen 1933, 1, pp. 197–243.Google Scholar

45 Fischer, O. C., ‘Die fehlerhafte Kreditpolitik’, Untersuchungen 1933, 1, p. 529.Google Scholar

46 See the complaints concerning savings banks' competition made by a provincial private banker as early as 1933: Moller, , ‘Privatbankiersstand’, p. 229Google Scholar; see also Balderston, T., ‘German banking between the wars: the crisis of the credit banks’, Business History Review, 65 (1991), p. 603.CrossRefGoogle Scholar

47 For this shamefully neglected topic see most recently Kopper, C., ‘Die Arisierung jüdischer Privatbanken im Nationalsozialismus’, Sozialwissenschaftliche Information für Unterricht und Studium, 20 (1991), pp. 111–7Google Scholar; and idem, ‘Privates Bankwesen im Nationalsozialismus. Das Hamburger Bankhaus M. M. Warburg & Co.’, in Plumpe, W. and Kleinschmidt, C. (eds), Unternehmen zwischen Markt und Macht (Essen, 1992), pp. 61–73Google Scholar; see also Wandel, E., ‘Das deutsche Bankwesen im Dritten Reich (1933–1945)’, Deutsche Bankengeschichte, 3 (1983), pp. 179–81Google Scholar; and Pohl, , Konzentration, pp. 406–8.Google Scholar

48 See Ulrich, ‘Privatbankhaus Simon Hirschland’.