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The vanishing banker1

Published online by Cambridge University Press:  06 March 2012

Marc Flandreau
Marc Flandreau
Affiliation:
Graduate Institute for International Studies and Development, Genevamarc.flandreau@graduateinstitute.ch
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Abstract

This article explores the relation between financial crises and economic discourse, focusing on the record of foreign debt crises. I identify a curious migration of discourse across social groups. Discourse that was previously proffered by bankers is now part of the production of economic ‘science’. I argue that this migration can be interpreted as an attempt to manage ‘speech-liability’.

Keywords

reputationdebt crisesmerchant banksMoney TrustNew Dealsubprime crisis

JEL classification

G01: Financial Crises N20: General, International, or Comparative
Type
The past mirror: notes, surveys, debates
Information
Financial History Review , Volume 19 , Issue 1 , April 2012 , pp. 1 - 19
Copyright
Copyright © European Association for Banking and Financial History e.V. 2012

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