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Published online by Cambridge University Press: 06 March 2019
Robert Kagan's article and book on the future of transatlantic relations have gained much prominence in the debate on the reasons for and impact of the transatlantic rift on the war against Iraq. However, and regrettably, Kagan's work confirms rather than challenges the prejudices and stereotypes of both sides. After putting Kagan's approach in a political perspective, I intend to show that the antinomies used by Kagan and other participants in the debate, such as might and right, unilateralism and multilateralism, prevention and repression, hegemony and sovereign equality, democratic imperialism and pluralism, constitute useful analytical tools, but do not in any way capture the divergence of values and interests between the United States and Europe. However, the result of such an analysis does not lead to the adoption of one or the other extreme, but to the realization that international law occupies the space between them, allowing for the permanent re-negotiation of the place of “Mars” and “Venus” in international affairs.
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