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Book Review: Alexander Morell's (Behavioral) Law and Economics im europäischen Wettbewerbsrecht

Published online by Cambridge University Press:  06 March 2019

Rupprecht Podszun

Extract

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Imagine your local supermarket invites you to get a 10% reduction on all food bills at the end of the year if you buy 90% of all food there throughout the year. Would you accept? If your supermarket is dominant in the sense of European competition law—and if it is located at the, say, Belgian-Dutch border—it may face an antitrust investigation. The rebate may turn into an exclusivity arrangement that hinders free competition for your money; welcome to the world of target rebates. The book under review deals with the handling of target rebates in European competition law. Above all, however, it is a study of the possible information to be drawn from economics and behavioral studies for the law.

Type
Developments
Information
German Law Journal , Volume 15 , Issue 3 , 01 May 2014 , pp. 495 - 500
Copyright
Copyright © 2014 by German Law Journal GbR 

References

1 Morell, Alexander, (Behavioral) Law and Economics im Europäischen Wettbewerbsrecht: Missbrauchsaufsicht über Zielrabatte (2011).Google Scholar

2 See also Bodenstein, Ines, Kartellrechtliche Bewertung von Rabatten marktbeherrschender Unternehmen (2013) (discussing the topic).Google Scholar

3 Case T-342/99, Airtours v. Comm'n, 2002 E.C.R. II-2585; Case T-310/01 & 77/02, Schneider Elec. v. Comm'n, 2002 E.C.R. II-4071; Case T-5/02 & 80/02, Tetra Laval v. Comm'n, 2002 E.C.R. II-4381.Google Scholar

4 Bien, & Rummel, , Ende des More Economic Approach bei der Beurteilung von Rabattsystemen?, EuZW (2012), at 737; Frenz, , Abschied vom more economic approach, WRP (2013), at 428.Google Scholar

5 See also Drexl et al., Competition Policy and the Economic Approach: Foundations and Limitations (2011) (undertaking this endeavor).Google Scholar

6 Morell, , supra note 1, at 33 f.Google Scholar

7 Id. at 41ff.Google Scholar

8 Id. at 61.Google Scholar

9 Case 85/76, Hoffmann-La Roche v. Comm'n, 1979 E.C.R. 461, ¶ 91.Google Scholar

10 Morell, , supra note 1, at 64 (translation by Rupprecht Podszun).Google Scholar

11 Id. at 147 ff.Google Scholar

12 Id. at 176.Google Scholar

13 Id. at 178.Google Scholar

14 Id. at 185.Google Scholar

15 See Niels, et al., Behavioural Economics and its Impact on Competition Policy: A Practical Assessment, Competition L.J. 374 (2013) (providing a recent overview).Google Scholar

16 Morell, , supra note 1, at 191.Google Scholar

17 Id. at 215.Google Scholar

18 Id. at 215f.Google Scholar

19 Morell, et al., Sticky Rebates: Rollback Rebates Induce Non-Rational Loyalty in Consumers – Experimental Evidence (Max Planck Inst. for Research on Collective Goods, Working Paper No. 23, 2009), available at http://www.econstor.eu/handle/10419/32243.Google Scholar

20 Id. at 246.Google Scholar

21 Case 322/81, Michelin v. Comm'n, 1983 E.C.R.-3461.Google Scholar

22 Case T-203/01, Michelin v. Comm'n, 2003 E.C.R. II-4071.Google Scholar

23 Case C-95/04 P, British Airways v. Comm'n, 2007 E.C.R. I-2331.Google Scholar

24 Case C-549/10 P, Tomra v. Comm'n, 2012 (not yet reported).Google Scholar

25 Case COMP/37.990, Intel v. Comm'n, 2009 (pending at CFI, Case T-286/09).Google Scholar