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Published online by Cambridge University Press: 06 March 2019
1 50 Years is Enough: the Case Against the World Bank and the International Monetary Fund (Kevin Danaher ed., 1994). The institution that was created at Bretton Woods was not known as the World Bank but it was the International Bank for Reconstrution and Development. However, the World Bank group is now composed of 5 different entities, including the IBRD, there are the International Development Association, International Finance Corporation, the Multilateral Investment Guarantee Agency and the International Center for the Settlement of Investment Disputes. The IFC and MIGA are responsible for private sector investment and as such are accountable to the Office of the ComplianceAdvisor/Ombudsman.Google Scholar
2 For examples see: Joseph E. Stiglitz, Globalization and its discontents (2000), Jonathan A. Fox, The Struggle for Accountability: The World Bank, NGOs, and Grassroots Movements (1998), Peter Gibbon, The World Bank and the New Politics of Aid, 5 European Journal of Development Research, 35 (1993), Richard Peet, Unholy Trinity: The IMF, World Bank and WTO (2003)Google Scholar
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8 Balakrishnan Rajagopal, International Law from Below: Development, Social Movements, and Third World Resistance, 152 (2003).Google Scholar
9 Khagaram, supra, note 5.Google Scholar
10 Office of the Compliance Advisor/Ombudsman, “About Us,” available at http://www.caoombudsman.org/html-english/about.htm.Google Scholar
11 David Szablowski, Transnational Law and Local Struggles: Mining, Communities and the World Bank 170–177 (2007).Google Scholar
12 Id. Google Scholar
13 Id., 182–201.Google Scholar
14 Id., 11.Google Scholar
15 Id., 15–18.Google Scholar
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