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Clarifying, Creating, and Changing Meaning in Constitutional Interpretation: A Comment on András Jakab, “Constitutional Reasoning in Constitutional Courts—A European Perspective.”

Published online by Cambridge University Press:  06 March 2019

Jeffrey Goldsworthy

Abstract

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Type
Part B: Technique, Doctrine and Internal Logic of Constitutional Reasoning
Information
German Law Journal , Volume 14 , Issue 8: Special Issue - Constitutional Reasoning , 01 August 2013 , pp. 1279 - 1295
Copyright
Copyright © 2013 by German Law Journal GbR 

References

1 Two concepts that are unfamiliar to me, as a lawyer in a common law jurisdiction, are first, “objective purpose” or ratio legis, and secondly, Rechtsdogmatik. I will discuss these below.Google Scholar

2 Jakab, András, Judicial Reasoning in Constitutional Courts. A European Perspective, 14 German L.J. 1215 (2013), 1220–1224.Google Scholar

3 Id., 1224.Google Scholar

4 Id., 1261.Google Scholar

5 2 John Austin, Lectures on Jurisprudence or the Philosophy of Positive Law 610 (Robert Campbell ed., John Murray 5th ed. 1885) (1865); see also Michael Kirby, Judicial Activism 6, 11, 28–9, 35, 46, 52, 61, 69 (2004). Jerome Frank said the use of certain legal fictions was unconscious, see Jerome Frank, Law and the Modern Mind 10, 40–41 (Anchor Books 1963) (1930). But Martin Shapiro disagreed: see Martin Shapiro, Judges as Liars, 17 Harv. J.L. & Pub. Pol'y 155, 155 (1994).Google Scholar

6 The development of the common law is an exception that is regarded as quite different from legislating.Google Scholar

7 Goldsworthy, Jeffrey, Originalism in Constitutional Interpretation, 25 Fed. L. Rev. 1, 10 (1997).Google Scholar

8 Whittington, Keith, Constitutional Interpretation: Textual Meaning, Original Intent, & Judicial Review 5–9 (1999). The distinction between construction and interpretation has become a staple of recent American literature dealing with the theory called “the new originalism.” See, e.g., Amy Barrett et al., The Interpretation/Construction Distinction in Constitutional Law, 27 Const. Comment. 1, 1–150 (2010); Randy E. Barnett, Interpretation and Construction, 34 Harv. J.L. & Pub. Pol'y 65 (2011).Google Scholar

9 Jakab, , supra note 2, 1220–1222.Google Scholar

10 Hand, Learned, The Bill of Rights 29 (1958); see also id. at 14.Google Scholar

11 For further discussion, see Goldsworthy, Jeffrey, Constitutional Implications Revisited, 30 U. Queensl. L.J. 9 (2011).Google Scholar

12 Sperber, Dan & Wilson, Deirdre, Pragmatics, in The Oxford Handbook of Contemporary Philosophy 468, 477 (Frank Jackson & Michael Smith eds., 2005) (emphasis added). See also Andrei Marmor, The Immorality of Textualism, 38 Loy. L.A. L. Rev. 2063 (2005); Richard Ekins, The Nature of Legislative Intent 218–243 (2012).Google Scholar

13 Frankfurter, Felix, Some Reflections on the Reading of Statutes, 47 Colum. L. Rev. 527, 533 (1947).Google Scholar

14 See Goldsworthy, Jeffrey, Parliamentary Sovereignty: Contemporary Debates 263–38 (2010).CrossRefGoogle Scholar

15 Australian Constitution s 51(2).Google Scholar

16 Or “absolutely free from all unreasonable constraint.” See Cole v Whitfield (1988) 163 CLR 360 (Austl.).Google Scholar

17 Grice, Paul, Studies in the Way of Words 22–57, 138–43, 268–82 (1989).Google Scholar

18 Id. at 33.Google Scholar

19 Jakab, , supra note 2, 1240 and 1234 respectively.Google Scholar

20 Id., 1240.Google Scholar

21 Pearce, D.C. & Geddes, R.S., Statutory Interpretation in Australia 135–140 (7th ed. 2011).Google Scholar

22 See Goldsworthy, Jeffrey, Implications in Language, Law and the Constitution, in Future Directions in Australian Constitutional Law 150 (Geoffrey Lindell ed., 1994).Google Scholar

23 Searle, John, Literal Meaning, in Expression and Meaning 117, 127 (1979).Google Scholar

24 Bennion, Francis, Statutory Interpretation 407 (2d ed., 2003). See Jakab, supra note 2.Google Scholar

25 For many examples, see Bennion, supra note 24, at Parts XVI, XVII, XXIII, XXIV.Google Scholar

26 All this is recognized by Jakab, supra note 2, 1249.Google Scholar

27 Australian Nat'l Airways v Commonwealth (1945) 71 CLR 29, 81 (Austl.).Google Scholar

28 Tasmania v Commonwealth & Vict. (1904) 1 CLR 329, 348 (Austl.).Google Scholar

29 Australian Capital Television Pty Ltd. v Commonwealth (1992) 108 CLR 577, 650 (Austl.).Google Scholar

30 Balkin, Jack M., Living Originalism 204 (2011).Google Scholar

31 See Saunders, Cheryl, The Constitution of Australia: a Contextual Analysis 75 (2010).Google Scholar

32 Balkin, , supra note 30, at 714.Google Scholar

33 Victoria v Commonwealth (1971) 122 CLR 353, 403 (Austl.).Google Scholar

34 Some conventional implications are expressed by words.Google Scholar

35 See supra notes 17–18.Google Scholar

36 Jakab, , supra note 2, 1241–42.Google Scholar

37 Id. Google Scholar

38 Kommers, Donald P., Germany: Balancing Rights and Duties, in Interpreting Constitutions: A Comparative Study 161, 180 (Jeffrey Goldsworthy ed., 2006).Google Scholar

39 Jakab, , supra note 2, 1245.Google Scholar

40 Id. Google Scholar

41 Id. Google Scholar

42 Id. Google Scholar

43 Id., 1243–1245.Google Scholar

44 Byrnes v Kendall (2011) HCA 26, 53, 55, 57, 59, 94 (Austl.).Google Scholar

45 Byrnes v Kendall (2011) HCA 26, 107 (Austl.) (quoting Gissing v Gissing (1970) HL 3 886, 906 (UK)).Google Scholar

46 Corporate Affairs Commission (NSW) v Yuill (1991) 172 CLR 319, 345–46 (Austl.) (quoting Attorney-General v Hallet & Carey Ltd. (1952) AC 427).Google Scholar

47 See Goldsworthy, Jeffrey, Moderate Versus Strong Intentionalism: Knapp and Michaels Revisited 42 San Diego L. Rev. 669 (2005).Google Scholar

48 Goldsworthy, Jeffrey, Originalism in Constitutional Interpretation, 25 Fed. L. Rev. 1, 10–11 (1997).Google Scholar

49 Jakab, , supra note 2, 1232 and 1247; see also the similar concerns of Judge László Kiss of the Hungarian Constitutional Court, id., 1247–49.Google Scholar

50 Id., 1247.Google Scholar

51 See also infra the final paragraph of this article.Google Scholar

52 See supra section B.II.Google Scholar

53 The lawmakers might intend to incorporate objective moral values into the law. That is a different matter, but it still depends on their intention.Google Scholar

54 Dworkin's theory that imputes a collective morality to the community personified might be invoked, but that is subject to many objections. See, e.g., supra text accompanying note 43.Google Scholar

55 See Kommers, , supra note 38 at 179–83.Google Scholar

56 Jakab, , supra note 2, 1241 (title to section III).Google Scholar

57 Id., 1250–1251.Google Scholar

58 Id., 1219 (ambiguity); 1220 (gaps); 1232 (vagueness); 1234 (conflicts between provisions).Google Scholar

59 Id., 1228.Google Scholar

60 See supra note 8.Google Scholar

61 Jakab, , supra note 2, 1215 n3.Google Scholar

62 Cf. Id., 1235–1239.Google Scholar

63 See supra notes 9–10 (text).Google Scholar

64 Jakab, , supra note 2, 1257.Google Scholar

65 Id. Google Scholar

66 See Green, Christopher R., Originalism and the Sense-Reference Distinction, 50 Saint Louis U. L.J. 555 (2006); Jeffrey Goldsworthy, Original Meanings and Contemporary Understandings in Constitutional Interpretation, in Constitutional Advancement in a Frozen Continent: Essays in Honour of George Winterton 245, 245–268 (H.P. Lee & Peter Gerangelos eds., 2009).Google Scholar

67 Victoria v Commonwealth (1996) 138 ALR 129 (Austl.).Google Scholar

68 See supra section B.II.Google Scholar

69 Brown v. Bd. of Educ., 347 U.S. 483 (1954).Google Scholar

70 This has been generally accepted. See, e.g., Henry Paul Monaghan, We the People[s], Original Understanding, and Constitutional Amendment, 96 Colum. L. Rev. 12 (1996); David R. Dow, When Words Mean What We Believe They Say: The Case of Article V, 76 Iowa L. Rev. 1 (1990); John R. Vile, Legally Amending the United States Constitution: The Exclusivity of Article V's Mechanisms, 21 Cumb. L. Rev. 271 (2003).Google Scholar

71 See supra section B.I.Google Scholar

72 For an argument that judges generally have authority to change the meaning of a constitution, see Joseph Raz, On the Authority and Interpretation of Constitutions: Some Preliminaries, in Constitutionalism: Philosophical Foundations 152 (Larry Alexander ed., 1999). For a critique of Raz's argument, see Jeffrey Goldsworthy, Raz on Constitutional Interpretation, 22 L. & Phil. 167 (2003).Google Scholar

73 See supra text accompanying note 7.Google Scholar

74 For elaboration of this point, see Jeffrey Goldsworthy, The Case for Originalism, in The Challenge of Originalism, Theories of Constitutional Interpretation 42 (Grant Huscroft & Bradley W. Miller eds., 2011).Google Scholar