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Equilibrium, Demoi-cracy, and Delegation in the Crisis of European Integration

Published online by Cambridge University Press:  06 March 2019

Peter L. Lindseth

Abstract

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As my work has argued previously, European integration enjoys an “administrative, not constitutional” legitimacy. This view is in obvious tension with the deeply-rooted conceptual framework—what we might call the “constitutional, not international” perspective—that has dominated the public-law scholarship of European integration over many decades. Although the alternative presented in my work breaks from that traditional perspective, we should not view it as an all-or-nothing rejection of everything that has come before it. The administrative alternative can be seen, rather, as providing legal-historical micro-foundations for certain theories that also emerged out of the traditional perspective even as they too are in tension with it. I am referring in particular to Joseph Weiler's classic notion of European “equilibrium”—now updated as “constitutional tolerance”—as well as Kalypso Nicolaïdis's more recently developed theory of European “demoi-cracy” on which this article focuses in particular. The central idea behind the “administrative, not constitutional” interpretation—the historical-constructivist principal-agent framework rooted in delegation, as well as the balance demanded between supranational regulatory power and national democratic and constitutional legitimacy— directly complements both theories. The administrative alternative suggests how the relationship between national principals and supranational agents is one of “mediated legitimacy” rather than direct control. It has its origins in the evolution of administrative governance in relation to representative government over the course of the twentieth century (indeed before). By drawing on the normative lessons of that history—notably the need for some form of national oversight as well as enforcement of outer constraints on supranational delegation in order to preserve national democratic and constitutional legitimacy in a recognizable sense—this article serves an additional purpose. It suggests how theories of European equilibrium and demoi-cracy might be translated into concrete legal proposals for a more sustainable form of integration over time—a pressing challenge in the context of the continuing crisis of European integration.

Type
Articles
Information
German Law Journal , Volume 15 , Issue 4 , 01 July 2014 , pp. 529 - 567
Copyright
Copyright © 2014 by German Law Journal GbR 

References

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110 For a suggestive overview of trans-Atlantic developments in “social politics,” see Daniel Rodgers, Atlantic Crossings: Social Politics in a Progressive Age (1998). For corresponding shifts in law and legal thought, compare Duncan Kennedy, Three Globalizations of Law and Legal Thought: 1850-1968, in The New Law and Economic Development: A Critical Appraisal 19 (David Trubek & Alvaro Santos eds., 2006). On the complex interplay between democratization, regulation, and administration in modern societies, see also Pierre Rosanvallon, L'Etat en France de 1789 à Nos Jours 276–80 (1990). Indeed, some argue that over the last quarter century this process has now led to the emergence of an “administrative space” decoupled from the nation-state entirely, not merely regional in character (as in the EU) but also “global” in many respects. See generally Benedict Kingsbury et al., The Emergence of Global Administrative Law, in 68 L. & Contemp. Probs. 15–61 (2005); Sabino Cassese, What Is Global Administrative Law and Why Study It? in Global Administrative Law: An Italian Perspective 1 (Sabino Cassese, et al., eds., 2012) (Robert Schuman Ctr. for Advanced Studies, Global Governance Programme, RSCAS Policy Paper No. 2012/04), available at cadmus.eui.eu/handle/1814/22374; see also Joshua Cohen & Charles Sabel, Directly-Deliberative Polyarchy, 3 Eur. L.J. 767–68 (1997). For a critique of this approach, see infra notes 128–30 and accompanying text.Google Scholar

111 See generally Lindseth, , The Paradox of Parliamentary Supremacy, supra note 17; see also Lindseth, supra note 15, at 61–90.Google Scholar

112 On the specific sense in which I am using the term “cultural” here, as well as my broader theory of institutional change, see Lindseth, supra note 15, at 13–14.Google Scholar

113 See supra notes 71–78 and accompanying text.Google Scholar

114 See generally Lindseth, , supra note 32.Google Scholar

115 See generally Lindseth, , supra note 15, at 133–88.Google Scholar

116 Rasmussen, Carlsen v., Case No. I-361/1997, 1998 UfR 800, reprinted in 2 Andrew Oppenheimer, The Relationship Between European Community Law and National Law: The Cases 191 (2d ed. 2003).Google Scholar

117 See Lindseth, , supra note 15, at 86–87, 133–34, 184–85.Google Scholar

118 See generally id., at 133–88.Google Scholar

119 Bundesverfassungsgericht [BVerfG - Federal Constitutional Court] Case No. 2 BvR 987/10 (Sep. 7, 2011), http://www.bundesverfassungsgericht.de/en/decisions.html [hereinafter Judgment of Sept. 7, 2011]; Bundesverfassungsgericht [BVerfG - Federal Constitutional Court] Case No. 2 BvE 8/11 (Feb. 28, 2012), http://www.bundesverfassungsgericht.de/en/decisions.html [hereinafter Judgment of February 28, 2012]; Bundesverfassungsgericht [BVerfG - Federal Constitutional Court] Case No. 2 BvE 4/11 (June 19, 2012), http://www.bundesverfassungsgericht.de/en/decisions.html [hereinafter Judgment of June 19, 2012]; Bundesverfassungsgericht [BVerfG - Federal Constitutional Court] Case No. 2 BvR 1390/12 (Sept. 12, 2012), http://www.bundesverfassungsgericht.de/en/decisions.html; OMT Reference, supra note 20; Bundesverfassungsgericht [BVerfG - Federal Constitutional Court] Case No. 2 BvR 1390/12 (Mar. 18, 2014), http://www.bundesverfassungsgericht.de/en/decisions.html.Google Scholar

120 See, in particular, Judgment of Sept. 7, 2011, supra note 119, at para. 124 (“if supranational legal obligations were created without a corresponding decision by the free will of the Bundestag, then the parliament would find itself in the roll of a mere rubber-stamp [a Nachvollzug—literally a ‘re-enacting'] and could no longer exercise overall responsibility for spending policy within the framework of its budgetary rights”), as well as para. 125 (“in particular [the Bundestag] is not permitted, even by statute, to subject itself [sich ausliefern—literally to ‘deliver itself up'] to any mechanism of financial effect, which—whether on the basis of its overall conception or an overall assessment of its individual measures—could lead to unclear burdens of budgetary significance, be they expenditures or revenue losses, without prior constitutive consent” of the Bundestag). Translation by author.Google Scholar

121 See especially Judgment of February 28, 2012, supra note 119; Judgment of June 19, 2012, supra note 199.Google Scholar

122 Lindseth, Peter, Greek “Sovereignty” and European “Democracy”—A Bit of a Walk-Back, Due to Some “Colossal” Concerns, EUtopialaw.com (Feb. 15, 2012), www.eutopialaw.com/2012/02/15/greek-sovereignty-and-european-democracy-a-bit-of-a-walk-back-due-to-some-colossal-concerns/.Google Scholar

123 The Idea of European Demoicracy, supra note 9; European Demoicracy and Its Crisis, supra note 9.Google Scholar

124 See Bellamy, , supra note 9; see also Scharpf, supra note 32.Google Scholar

125 The Idea of European Demoicracy, supra note 9, at 265.Google Scholar

126 See Lindseth, , supra note 15, at 47–48. I owe this concept to Ernest Young, Constitutional Avoidance, Resistance Norms, and the Preservation of Judicial Review, 78 Tex. L. Rev. 1549–1614 (2000).Google Scholar

127 Nicolaïdis, Kalypso & Shaffer, Gregory, Transnational Mutual Recognition Regimes: Governance Without Global Government, 68 L. & Contemp. Probs. 263–317 (2005).Google Scholar

128 Id. at 314 (emphasis in original).Google Scholar

129 Somek, Alexander, Administration Without Sovereignty, in The Twilight of Constitutionalism? 267 (Petra Dobner & Martin Loughlin eds., 2010).Google Scholar

130 See generally Agents Without Principals, supra note 17.Google Scholar

131 Cf. Scharpf, , supra note 32.Google Scholar

132 The Idea of European Demoicracy, supra note 9; European Demoicracy and Its Crisis, supra note 9; see also Sustainable Integration, supra note 9.Google Scholar

133 Understanding the EU and its Crisis through the Lens of Demoicracy: A Conversation, NYU Law School, Mar. 7– 8, 2013.Google Scholar

134 See generally Sustainable Integration, supra note 9.Google Scholar

135 European Demoicracy and Its Crisis, supra note 9, at 364.Google Scholar

136 Id. Google Scholar

137 Lindseth, Peter, “Demoicracy” Follow-up: Reflections on the Legal and Institutional Implications of the Concept, Europæus|law (Mar. 19, 2013), www.europaeuslaw.blogspot.com/2013/03/demoicracy-follow-up-reflections-on.html.Google Scholar

138 The Community System, supra note 8; The Transformation of Europe, supra note 8. See also Lindseth, supra note 18.Google Scholar

139 Halberstam, Daniel, Rescue Package for Fundamental Rights: Comments by Daniel Halberstam, Verfassungsblog (Feb. 22, 2012), www.verfassungsblog.de/rescue-package-fundamental-rights-comments-daniel-halberstam/#.U3doI1hdVqk.Google Scholar

140 Kischel, Uwe, Delegation of Legislative Power to Agencies: A Comparative Analysis of United States and German Law, 46 Admin. L. Rev. 239 (1994) (“the striking down of statutes on delegation grounds [in Germany] is considered a normal event that frequently occurs”). See also Lindseth, supra note 15, at 134. But see Rob van Gestel, The ‘Deparliamentarisation’ of Legislation: Framework Laws and the Primacy of the Legislature, 9 Utrecht L. Rev. 106–22 (2013) (analyzing the Dutch case as a counter-example). But van Gestel also notes that the Dutch Constitution is not wholly devoid of delegation constraints, “such as Article 104 determining that imposed by the state shall be levied pursuant to an Act of Parliament” as well as “restrictions on delegation in the sphere of fundamental rights.” Id. at 111.Google Scholar

141 See Lindseth, Peter, Rescue Package for Fundamental Rights: Further Comments from Peter Lindseth, Verfassungsblog (Feb. 28, 2012), www.verfassungsblog.de/rescue-package-fundamental-rights-comments-peter-lindseth-2/#.U3dpFFhdVqk (citing Cass Sunstein, Nondelegation Canons, 67 U. Chi. L. Rev. 315–43 (2000); John Manning, The Nondelegation Doctrine as a Canon of Avoidance, 2000 Sup. Ct. Rev. 223–77 (2000)).Google Scholar

142 See, e.g., European Demoicracy and Its Crisis, supra note 9, at 364. (“Subsidiarity under democratic interdependence calls for cities, regions and other sub-state entities to govern in horizontal consideration of each other. It may sometimes necessitate devolving back competences from the EU level”).Google Scholar

143 Democratic Legitimacy, supra note 17, at 641.Google Scholar

144 For a discussion, see Lindseth, supra note 15, at 197–98.Google Scholar

145 Id. at 198–201.Google Scholar

146 Democratic Legitimacy, supra note 17, at 717–18; Lindseth, supra note 15, at 196.Google Scholar

147 Bermann, George, Taking Subsidiarity Seriously: Federalism in the European Community and the United States, 94 Colum. L. Rev. 391 (1994).Google Scholar

148 See, e.g., Bignami, Francesca, The Democratic Deficit in European Community Rulemaking: A Call for Notice and Comment in Comitology, 40 Harv. Int'l L.J. 451–515 (1999).Google Scholar

149 Joerges, Christian & Neyer, Jürgen, From Intergovernmental Bargaining to Deliberative Political Processes: The Constitutionalisation of Comitology, 3 Eur. L.J. 273–99 (1997); Michelle Everson, The Constitutionalization of European Administrative Law: Legal Oversight of a Stateless Internal Market, in EU Committees: Social Regulation, Law and Politics 281 (Christian Joerges & Ellen Vos eds., 1999). More recently, see Dierdre Curtin et al., Constitutionalising EU Executive Rule-Making Procedures: A Research Agenda, 19 Eur. L.J. 1–21 (2013).Google Scholar

150 Sabel, Charles & Zeitlin, Jonathan, Learning from Difference: The New Architecture of Experimentalist Governance in the EU, 14 Eur. L.J. 313–15 (2008).; Charles Sabel & William Simon, Epilogue: Accountability Without Sovereignty, in Law and New Governance in the EU and the US 402 (Grainne De Burca & Joanne Scott eds., 2006).Google Scholar

151 Cohen, & Sabel, , supra note 110, at 313. On the way in which Sabel and his co-authors seem to be backing away from this “democratic” claim in the strongest sense, see Lindseth, supra note 15, at 260. For a recent, more nuanced statement, see Charles Sabel & Jonathan Zeitlin, Experimentalism in the EU: Common Ground and Persistent Differences, 6 Regulation & Governance 410, 424 (2012) (claiming not “to assert that current parliamentary institutions could not, [but] indeed probably would have to, play a role in a re-imagined form of representative democracy that can respond to the world as it is”). Moreover, Sabel and Zeitlin equally acknowledge, id. at 423–24, that interests, culture, and history “matter” in a manner that begins to approach the theory of institutional change outlined in Lindseth, supra note 15, at 13–14.Google Scholar

152 “Weak” Constitutionalism?, supra note 17, at 157.Google Scholar

153 See generally Lindseth, , supra note 15, at 261–62.Google Scholar

154 Id. at 199–201.Google Scholar

155 See Curtin, et al., supra note 149, at 5.Google Scholar

156 For an overview, see Lindseth, supra note 15, at 135–37, 270–72.Google Scholar

157 For an overview, see id. at 168–87.Google Scholar

158 See generally Lindseth, Peter, Barking vs. Biting: Understanding the German Constitutional Court's OMT Reference … and its implications for EU Reform, EUtopialaw.com (Feb. 10, 2014), eutopialaw.com/2014/02/10/barking-vs-biting-understanding-the-german-constitutional-courts-omt-reference-and-its-implications-for-eu-reform (drawing on Arthur Dyevre, Judicial Non-Compliance in a Non-Hierarchical Legal Order: Isolated Accident or Omen of Judicial Armageddon? (June 15, 2012), available at papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=2084639.Google Scholar

159 See, e.g., Mayer, , supra note 7, at 117 (“Considering the clear wording of the EU treaties and the role attributed to the ECJ as final arbiter, the ultra vires doctrine of the German Constitutional Court is … incompatible with Germany's obligations under EU law”).Google Scholar

160 See supra note 136 and accompanying text.Google Scholar

161 Bundesverfassungsgericht [BVerfG – Federal Constitutional Court], Case No. 2 BvR 687/85, BVerfGE 75, 223 (Apr. 8, 1987); [1988] 3 C.M.L.R. 1 (interpreting Article 101 of the Basic Law in the context of integration). But see the Court's judgment (First Senate) in Antiterrordatei [Counter-Terrorism Database], Case No. 1 BvR 1215/07, para. 91 (April 24, 2013) [hereinafter Antiterrordatei] (holding that the ECJ could not, by virtue of its expansive interpretation of its authority under Article 51 of the Charter of Fundamental Rights in Årkerberg Fransson, be deemed the “lawful judge” under Article 101 GG because the ECJ's interpretation of its own authority would constitute either an ultra vires act or potentially a violation of Germany's constitutional identity) (I thank Ingrid Leijten of the Leiden University for bringing this passage to my attention). As summarized in the Court's English-language press-release: European fundamental rights are from the outset not applicable [to this case], and the European Court of Justice is not the lawful judge according to Art. 101 sec. 1 sentence 2 of the Basic Law (Grundgesetz – GG). The European Court of Justice's decision in the case Åkerberg Fransson (judgment of 26 February 2013, C-617/10) does not change this conclusion. As part of a cooperative relationship, this decision must not be read in a way that would view it as an apparent ultra vires act or as if it endangered the protection and enforcement of the fundamental rights in the member states in a way that questioned the identity of the Basic Law's constitutional order. The Senate acts on the assumption that the statements in the ECJ's decision are based on the distinctive features of the law on value-added tax, and express no general view. The Senate's decision on this issue was unanimous.Google Scholar

Federal Constitutional Court - Press Office, Press Release No. 31/2013 (Apr. 24, 2013) www.bundesverfassungsgericht.de/en/press/bvg13-031en.html. This would appear to be an application, albeit in the context of interpreting a judicial decision, of the so-called “nondelegation canons” that the U.S. Supreme Court sometimes finds it necessary to apply in the interpretation of statutes. See generally Sunstein, supra note 141. For the most famous example, see the “Benzene” decision, Industrial Union Dep't v. American Petroleum Inst., 448 U.S. 607, 646 (1980). For a discussion of how this case might provide guidance in interpreting the scope of delegated normative power in the integration context, see Democratic Legitimacy, supra note 17, at 721.Google Scholar

162 On the definition of that principle of deference and its limits in the case law of the German Federal Constitutional Court, see Lindseth, supra note 15, at 133–88.Google Scholar

163 OMT Reference, supra note 20, at para. 24 (quoting Honeywell, Bundesverfassungsgericht [BVerfG – Federal Constitutional Court], Case No. BvR 2661/06, paras. 60–61 (July 6, 2010) (citations omitted), http://www.bundesverfassungsgericht.de/en/decisions.html).Google Scholar

164 Id. at para. 26. Admittedly, from a separation of powers perspective, the German Constitutional Court must be careful to manage (and, if necessary) limit the standing doctrine under Article 38 GG. Cf. Id. at para. 19:Google Scholar

Art. 38 sec. 1 sentence 1 GG does not extend this right any further and does not grant citizens a right to have the lawfulness of democratic majority decisions reviewed by the Federal Constitutional Court. The right to vote does not serve to monitor the content of democratic processes, but is intended to facilitate them.Google Scholar

Nevertheless, the Court's more lenient standing doctrine in the integration is arguably justified. See Lindseth, supra note 15, at 178:Google Scholar

In the parliamentary systems of Europe, the legislative majority (even a coalition) will usually be hesitant to oppose the government's support for a European measure except in rare circumstances. Consequently, the incentive of other institutional players to mount a challenge is significantly weaker in the democracy-protection context, thus necessitating a more aggressive judicial role.Google Scholar

165 Democratic Legitimacy, supra note 17, at 731. Compare also the discussion of Antiterrordatei, supra note 161, at para. 91.Google Scholar

166 See, e.g., Goldmann, Matthias, Adjudicating Economics? Central Bank Independence and the Appropriate Standard of Judicial Review, 15 German L.J. 265 (2014); Thomas Beukers, The Bundesverfassungsgericht Preliminary Reference on the OMT Program: “In the ECB We Do Not Trust. What About You?,” 15 German L.J. 343 (2014).Google Scholar

167 See, e.g., Joerges, Christian, Unity in Diversity as Europe's Vocation and Conflicts Law as Europe's Constitutional Form (LEQS Paper, Nov. 28, 2013), available at papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=1723249.Google Scholar

168 For the most complete outline of the proposal, see Democratic Legitimacy, supra note 17, at 726–34; for a more abbreviated discussion, see Lindseth, supra note 15, at 275–77.Google Scholar

169 See, e.g., Weiler, & Trachtman, , supra note 35, at 391–92; Joseph Weiler, The Reformation of European Constitutionalism, 35 J. Common Mkt. Studies 127 (1997).Google Scholar

170 See Democratic Legitimacy, supra note 17, at 729–34.Google Scholar

171 Cf. Sustainable Integration, supra note 9.Google Scholar

172 MacCormick, Neil, The Maastricht-Urteil: Sovereignty Now, 1 Eur. L.J. 265 (1995).Google Scholar

173 Germany as Europe, supra note 9, at 791.Google Scholar

174 Id. Google Scholar

175 Sustainable Integration, supra note 9, at 41.Google Scholar

176 See Agents Without Principals?, supra note 17.Google Scholar

177 See Lindseth, , supra note 32, at 1354 (the postwar constitutional settlement “required, paradoxically, the weakening of elected legislatures—through the imposition of delegation constraints—in order to ensure their place in an evolving, but still democratic, system of separation of powers”).Google Scholar

178 The Idea of European Demoicracy, supra note 9, at 274.Google Scholar

179 Sustainable Integration, supra note 9, at 41.Google Scholar

180 Habermas, Jürgen, Lecture at KU Leuven, Belgium: Democracy, Solidarity and the European Crisis (Apr. 26, 2013), www.kuleuven.be/communicatie/evenementen/evenementen/jurgen-habermas/en/democracy-solidarity-and-the-european-crisis.Google Scholar

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183 See supra notes 31–34 and accompanying text.Google Scholar