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Europe's Economic Constitution in Crisis and the Emergence of a New Constitutional Constellation

Published online by Cambridge University Press:  06 March 2019

Christian Joerges

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The European Union rides through troubled waters. Its original reliance on law as the object and agent of the integration project and on the “economic constitution,” which the Economic and Monetary Union (EMU)—as accomplished by the Treaty of Maastricht— expected to complete, have proven unsustainable. Following the financial and sovereign debt crises, individuals perceive the EMU, with its commitments to price stability and monetary politics, as a failed construction precisely because of its reliance on inflexible rules. The European crisis management seeks to compensate for these failures by means of regulatory machinery which disregards the European order of competences, takes power from national institutions, and burdens—in particular—Southern Europe with austerity measures; it establishes pan-European commitments to budgetary discipline and macroeconomic balancing. This abolishes the ideal of a legal ordering of the European economy, while the economic and social prospects of these efforts appear gloomy and the Union's political legitimacy becomes precarious. A fictitious debate between Carl Schmitt and Jürgen Habermas addresses the present critical constellation, where a number of Schmittian notions seem alarmingly realistic. This essay pleads for a more modest Europe committing itself to “unity in diversity,” the motto of the ill-fated Constitutional Treaty of 2003.

Type
Special Issue EU Citizenship: Twenty Years On
Information
German Law Journal , Volume 15 , Issue 5: Special Issue EU Citizenship: Twenty Years On , 01 August 2014 , pp. 985 - 1027
Copyright
Copyright © 2014 by German Law Journal GbR 

References

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57 Suffice it here to refer to just a few examples from the torrent of literature. Christian Calliess, Perspektiven des Euro zwischen Solidarität und Recht—Eine rechtliche Analyse der Griechenlandhilfe und des Rettungsschirms, Zeitschrift für Europarechtliche Studien 213 (2011); Matthias Ruffert, The European Debt Crisis and European Union Law, 49 Common Mkt. L. Rev. 1777 (2011); Paul Craig, The Lisbon Treaty: Law, Politics, and Treaty Reform 457–517 (2013) (forthcoming, Chapter 12 on “Financial Crisis, Response, and Europe's Future”). See also Nicole Scicluna, EU Constitutionalism in the Twenty-first Century: Politics and Law in Crisis (2013) (unpublished Ph.D. thesis, La Trobe University) (analyzing Europe's present constitutional constellation, its Vefassungswirklichkeit, in Chapter 5).Google Scholar

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67 Lorz, R. Alexander & Sauer, Heiko, Ersatzunionsrecht und Grundgesetz – Verfassungsrechtliche Zustimmungsgrundlagen für den Fiskalpakt, den ESM-Vertrag und die Änderung des AEUV, in 65 Die Öffentliche Verwaltung 573–612 (2012), cited in the judgment of the German Constitutional Court of Sept. 12, 2012, infra note 89, at para. 257 of the German version, and para. 226 of the English version.Google Scholar

68 Pertinent practices have been exercised by central banks and the IMF long before the financial crisis. They have been characterised as a feature of the global capital market: “The new conditionality of the global economic system—the requirements that need to be met for a country to become integrated into the global capital market — … facilitates the task of instituting a certain kind of monetary policy.” Saskia Sassen, De-Nationalized State Agendas and Privatized Norm-Making, in Public Governance in the Age of Globalization 51, 56 (Karl-Heinz Ladeur ed., 2004).Google Scholar

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73 Dawson, Mark & Witte, Floris de, Constitutional Balance in the EU After the Euro-Crisis, 76 Mod. L. Rev. 817-844 (2013) at 838. They conclude that “the rise of executive control via the European Council, the increasing ease of making Treaty and legislative reforms without consulting smaller member states, and the creation of eternal fiscal rules uncontrollable by national parliaments, unable to be fully discussed and legitimated, is now in danger of desensitising the Union. …” Id.at 842. Indeed, and it is true “that the Union's existing response … does not bode well for the future.” Id. at 844. What remains to be explained is Europe's apparent political inability to organize a legally robust response to these insights. See discussion infra.Google Scholar

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78 Thym, Daniel, Euro-Rettungsschirm: zwischenstaatliche Rechtskonstruktion und verfassungsgerichtliche Kontrolle, 25 Europäische Zeitschrift für Wirtschaftsrecht 167–71 (2011); Daniel Thym, Annotation to GCC, Judgment of 7.9.2011, 66 Juristenzeitung 1011, 1014 (Christian Joerges trans., 2011). This is, by now, the dominant position in European constitutionalism. This is a recent acquis, however. As late as 2011—and hence in the middle of the crisis—De Witte considered that the German constitutional court might declare the EFSF to be incompatible with German constitutional law and an ultra vires act in contravention of the “no-bailout” provision of Article 125 TFEU. Bruno de Witte, The European Treaty Amendment for the Creation of a Financial Stability Mechanism, in Eur. Pol'y Analysis 1, 6 (2011). This was, indeed, a widely-shared concern; see, e.g., Nikolas Busse, Unter Aufsicht. Nicht nur im Fall Griechenland: Die Deutsche Europapolitik wartet auf Karlsruhe, Frankfuter Allgemeine Zeitung (2010). Bruno de Witte has clarified his position on various occasions, particularly succinctly in Loïc Azoulai et al., Another Legal Monster? An EUI Debate on the Fiscal Compact Treaty, in EUI Working Papers Law No. 09, 6–8 (Anna Kocharov ed., 2012). His argument is far more sophisticated than the one cited in the text. But is not possible to come to terms with the TSCG simply because that Treaty states in Article 2 No. 2: “This Treaty shall apply in full to the Contracting Parties whose currency is the euro. It shall also apply to the other Contracting Parties to the extent and under the conditions set out in Article 14.” In the draft circulated until 2 March 2012, one could read: “This Treaty shall apply insofar as it is compatible with the Treaties on which the European Union is founded and with European Union law. It shall not encroach upon the competence of the Union to act in the area of the economic union.” What happened to the compatibility with the Union's primary law, one wonders. We must reckon with conflicts between the law of the Union as enshrined in the Treaties on the one hand, and the Fiscal Compact and the regulatory machinery established in response to the crisis on the other. The Fiscal Compact in its latest version simply assumes that, in such conflicts, it will prevail.Google Scholar

79 See David, M. & Trubek, Luise G., Hard and Soft Law in the Construction of Social Europe: The Role of the Open Method of Co-ordination, 11 Eur. L. J. 343–64 (2005), and the critique in Christian Joerges, Integration Through De-Legalisation?, 33 Eur. L. Rev. 219–312 (2008).Google Scholar

80 By contrast, the proponents of the OMC relied on the well premises of deliberative polyarchy and/or democratic experimentalism: “In deliberative polyarchy, problem-solving depends not on harmony and spontaneous co-ordination, but on the permanent disequilibrium of incentives and interests imperfectly aligned, and on the disciplined, collaborative exploration of the resulting differences.” Joshua Cohen & Charles F. Sabel, Sovereignty and Solidarity: EU and US, in Public Governance in the Age of Globalization 157, 168 (Karl-Heinz Ladeur ed., 2004). This is a formula which is very close to many methodological pronouncements within the conflicts-law approach and its plea for a proceduralisation. See supra notes 31, 33. The proponents of the latter approach diagnose, sadly, that conflicts-law constitutionalism has become a critic which can no longer be presented as a re-constructive approach. See Christian Joerges & Maria Weimer, A Crisis of Executive Managerialism in the EU: No Alternative?, in Critical Legal Perspectives on Global Governance: Liber Amicorum for David M Trubek (Gráínne de Búrca, Claire Kilpatrick & Joanne Scott eds., 2013). The most prominent proponents of OMC and democratic experimentalism see, apparently, no reason for such modesty and re-design. See Charles F. Sabel & Jonathan Zeitlin, Experimentalism in the EU: Common Ground and Persistent Differences, in 6 Regulation & Governance 410–426 (2012).Google Scholar

81 For a deepened analysis, see Giandomenico Majone, Rethinking European Integration After the Debt Crisis, UCL Working Paper No. 3, at 19 (2012), available at http://www.ucl.ac.uk/european-institute/highlights/majone; Fritz W. Scharpf, Monetary Union, Fiscal Crisis and the Preemption of Democracy, MPIfG Discussion Paper 11/11, Cologne 2011; Fritz W. Scharpf, Legitimacy Intermediation in the Multilevel European Polity and its Collapse in the Euro Crisis, MPIfG Discussion Paper 12/6, Cologne 2012. What both authors implicitly confirm is the validity of Polanyi's insights in the social embeddedness of the economy. See supra notes 25–28.Google Scholar

82 The following passages on the crisis jurisprudence of the GCC and the CJEU draw on Michelle Everson & Christian Joerges, Who is the Guardian for Constitutionalism in Europe After the Financial Crisis?, in Political Representation in the European Union: Still Democratic in Times of Crisis? 400–28 (Sandra Kröger ed., 2014).Google Scholar

83 See Piqani, Darinka, Supremacy of EU Law and the Jurisprudence of Constitutional Reservations in Central Eastern Europe and the Western Balkans: Towards a ‘Holistic’ Constitutionalism (June 11, 2010) (Ph.D thesis, EUI Florence), and Federico Fabbrini, The Euro-Crisis and the Courts: Judicial Review and the Political Process in Comparative Perspective, Berkeley J. Int'l L. (forthcoming 2014).Google Scholar

84 Weiler, Joseph H.H., The ‘Lisbon Urteil’ and the Fast Food Culture, 20 Eur. J. Int'l L. 505, 505 (2009), commenting on Bundesverfassungsgericht [BVerfG – Federal Constitutional Court], Case No. 2 BvE 2/08, 2 BvE 5/08, 2 BvR 1010/08, 2 BvR 1022/08, 2 BvR 1259/08, 2 BvR 182/09 (June 30, 2009), http://www.bverfg.de/entscheidungen/es20090630_2bve000208en.html [hereinafter Judgment of June 30, 2009].Google Scholar

85 See infra Part D.I.Google Scholar

86 Judgment of June 30, 2009. Google Scholar

87 See infra Part D.I.Google Scholar

88 Bundesverfassungsgericht [BVerfG – Federal Constitutional Court], Case No. 2 BvR 987/10, 2 BvR 1485/10, 2 BvR 1099/10 (Sept. 7, 2011), http://www.bverfg.de/entscheidungen/rs20110907_2bvr098710en.html [hereinafter Judgment of Sept. 7, 2011]. Google Scholar

89 Bundesverfassungsgericht [BVerfG – Federal Constitutional Court], Case No. 2 BvR 1390/12 (Sept. 12, 2012), http://www.bundesverfassungsgericht.de/entscheidungen/rs20120912_2bvr139012en.html [English translation], http://www.bundesverfassungsgericht.de/entscheidungen/rs20120912_2bvr139012.html [German] [hereinafter Judgment of Sept. 12, 2012].Google Scholar

90 Namely, , the Währungsunion-Finanzstabilisierungsgesetz, (Monetary Union Financial Stabilisation Act), which grants the authorization to provide aid to Greece, and the Gesetz zur Übernahme von Gewährleistungen im Rahmen eines europäischen Stabilisierungsmechanismus, (Act Concerning the Giving of Guarantees in the Framework of a European Stabilisation Mechanism).Google Scholar

91 Judgment of Sept. 7, 2011 at paras. 121–23.Google Scholar

92 Id. at para. 124.Google Scholar

93 Id. at paras. 130–32.Google Scholar

94 Id. at para. 116 (referencing the decisions on Maastricht [BVerfGE 89, 155, 175] and Honeywell [BVerfGE 126, 286, 302 et seq.]); in the Maastricht decision, see also paras. 129 & 137 on commitment to the stability concept.Google Scholar

95 Bundesverfassungsgericht [BVerfG – Federal Constitutional Court], Case No. 2 BvR 2661/06 (July 6, 2010), https://www.bundesverfassungsgericht.de/entscheidungen/rs20100706_2bvr266106en.html.Google Scholar

96 Judgment of Sept. 7, 2011 at para. 129. The court adds: “In this connection, particular mention should be made of the prohibition of direct purchase of debt instruments of public institutions by the European Central Bank, the prohibition of accepting liability (bailout clause) and the stability criteria for sound budget management (Articles 123 to 126, Article 136 TFEU).” Id. This remark attracted considerable attention but has not been taken too seriously by the ECB.Google Scholar

97 Id. at para. 98.Google Scholar

98 Ruffert, Mattias, Die europäische Schuldenkrise vor dem Bundesverfassungsgericht – Anmerkung zum Urteil vom 7. September 2011, Europarecht 842, 844 (2011).Google Scholar

99 Judgment of Sept. 7, 2011 at para. 109.Google Scholar

100 Id. at para. 116.Google Scholar

101 See Thym, Daniel, Annotation to GCC, Judgment of 7.9.2011, 66 Juristenzeitung 1015 (2011).Google Scholar

102 Judgment of Sept. 12, 2012 at para. 180.Google Scholar

103 See Geyer, Christian, Anatomie einer Hintergehung [Anatomy of a Deceit], Frankfurter Allgemeine Zeitung, June 21, 2012, at 29.Google Scholar

104 The German version reads:Google Scholar

Die haushaltspolitische Gesamtverantwortung des Deutschen Bundestags wird in Ansehung der Übertragung der Währungshoheit auf das Europäische System der Zentralbanken namentlich durch die Unterwerfung der Europäischen Zentralbank under die strengen Kriterien des Vertrages über die Arbeitsweise der Europäischen Union und der Satzung des Europäischen Systems der Zentralbanken hinsichtlich der Unabhängigkeit der Zentralbank und die Priorität der Geldwertstabilität gesichert. Ein wesentliches Element zur unionsrechtlichen Absicherung der verfassungsrechtlichen Anforderungen aus Art. 20 Abs. 1 und Abs. 2 in Verbindung mit Art. 79 Abs. 3 GG ist insoweit das Verbtot monetärer Haushaltsfinanzierung durch die Europäische Zentralbank. Google Scholar

Judgment of Sept. 12, 2012 at para. 116. Paragraph 220 in the English translation reads:Google Scholar

In view of the transfer of monetary sovereignty to the European System of Central Banks, the German Bundestag's overall budgetary responsibility is safeguarded particularly by the fact that the European Central Bank subjects itself to the strict criteria of the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union and of the Statute of the European System of Central Banks with regard to the independence of the Central Bank and to the priority of monetary stability (see BVerfGE 89, 155 <204-205, 207 et seq.>; 129, 124 <181-182>). In this context, an essential element of safeguarding the constitutional requirements resulting from Article 20(1) and (2) in conjunction with Article 79(3) of the Basic Law in European Union Law is the prohibition of monetary financing by the European Central Bank (see BVerfGE 89, 155 <204-205>; 129, 124 <181-182>).;+129,+124+<181-182>).+In+this+context,+an+essential+element+of+safeguarding+the+constitutional+requirements+resulting+from+Article+20(1)+and+(2)+in+conjunction+with+Article+79(3)+of+the+Basic+Law+in+European+Union+Law+is+the+prohibition+of+monetary+financing+by+the+European+Central+Bank+(see+BVerfGE+89,+155+<204-205>;+129,+124+<181-182>).>Google Scholar

Id. at para 220. Paragraph 170 is not yet translated. The German original reads: “Da der Bundestag durch seine Zustimmung zu Stabilitätshilfen den verfassungsrechtlich gebotenen Einfluss ausüben und Höhe, Konditionalität und Dauer der Stabilitätshilfen zugunsten hilfesuchender Mitgliedstaaten mitbestimmen kann, legt er selbst die wichtigste Grundlage für später möglicherweise erfolgende Kapitalabrufe nach Art. 9 Abs. 2 ESMV.” Id. at para. 170.Google Scholar

105 See id. paras. 219–20, 232–33, 239–79, 300–19.Google Scholar

106 Id. at para. 206 in the English extract, para. 222 in the German original.Google Scholar

107 See supra Part F.I.Google Scholar

108 Judgment of Sept. 12, 2012 at para 169 [English version].Google Scholar

109 Id. at paras. 201.Google Scholar

110 Habermas, Jürgen, Drei Gründe für ‘Mehr Europa‘ [Three Reasons for “More Europe”] (2012), reprinted in Jürgen Habermas, Im Sog der Technokratie 132–37 (2013).Google Scholar

111 For a similar critique, see Henning Deters, National Constitutional Jurisprudence in a Post-National Europe: The ESM Ruling of the German Federal Constitutional Court, 20 Eur. L. J. 204–20 (2014).Google Scholar

112 Pringle, CJEU Case C-370/12.Google Scholar

113 Id. Google Scholar

114 Id. at para. 135.Google Scholar

115 Id. at 116.Google Scholar

116 See supra note 22, Part C with the reference to Hans Peter Ipsen.Google Scholar

117 See, on the defence of the CJEU, Paul Craig, Pringle: Legal Reasoning, Text, Purpose and Teleology, 20 Maastricht J. of Comp. & Eur. L. 3-11, 10 (2013). Craig characterises the Court's reasoning on Art. 15 as “tenuous” and then uses the two authors cited in the text to strengthen the judicial argumentation whereas I feel that they reveal its weaknesses further. Id. at 8.Google Scholar

118 Tuori, Kaarlo Heikki, The European Financial Crisis – Constitutional Aspects and Implications, in EUI Working Paper LAW 2012/28, 34 (Nov. 1, 2012).Google Scholar

119 “[T]he activation of financial assistance by means of a stability mechanism such as the ESM is not compatible with Article 125 TFEU unless it is indispensable for the safeguarding of the financial stability of the euro area as a whole and subject to strict conditions,” Pringle v. Ireland, CJEU Case C-370/12, 2012 E.C.R. I-000, para. 135.Google Scholar

120 Everson, Michelle, The Fault of (European) Law in (Political and Social) Economic Crisis, 24 L. & Critique 107 (2013).Google Scholar

121 View of Advocate General Kokott at paras. 139-140; Pringle, CJEU Case C-370/12.Google Scholar

122 Steindorff, Ernst, Politik des Gesetzes als Auslegungsmaßstab im Wirtschaftsrecht, in Festschrift Karl Larenz 217 (1973); Ernst Steindorff, Wirtschaftsordnung und Steuerung durch Privatrecht?, in Festschrift Ludwig Raiser 621 (1974).Google Scholar

123 See generally Beck, Gunnar, The Legal Reasoning of the Court of Justice of the EU (2012).Google Scholar

124 See Ioannidis, Michael, EU Financial Assistance Conditionality after “Two Pack”, 74 Heidelberg Journal of International Law (ZaöRV) (forthcoming 2014); Michelle Everson, An Exercise in Legal Honesty: Re-writing the Court of Justice and the Bundesverfassungsgericht, in 136 Political Science Series (Institute for Advanced Studies, Vienna 2014), http://www.ihs.ac.at/publications/pol/pw_136.pdf; [C]onditionality irrevocably undermines the status of the Member States as ‘Masters of the Treaties’ … Just as the Federal Government within Germany respects the democratic integrity of the Länder which make up the federal state, the Federal Republic of Germany cannot, in its relations within the European Union, contract with ‘slaves’. It cannot enter into partnership with anything other than fully sovereign states.Google Scholar

Id. at 30.Google Scholar

125 Dyzenhaus, David, The Constitution of Law: Legality in a Time of Emergency 103 (2006).Google Scholar

126 Eric Posner and Adrian Vermeule have underlined that they seek to reconstruct Schmitt's work in “generizable social-scientific terms”; see Demystifying Schmitt, (Harvard Public Law Working Paper No. 10-47, 2010, Univ. of Chicago, Public Law Working Paper No. 333, 2010) available at: http://ssrn.com/abstract=1723191.Google Scholar

127 An explanatory follow-up to the remarks on Ersatzunionsrecht in Part III.1 above may be in place here. For obvious reasons, Germans are particularly concerned about the lasting impact of Schmitt and another “hour of the executive.” This is by no means to say that the search for administrative legitimacy of European rule as pursued by Peter L. Lindseth (see the references to his work in footnote 143 and his recent Equilibrium, Demoicracy, and Delegation in the Crisis of European Integration, 15 German L.J. (2014) or by Deirdre Curtin (see her Chorley Lecture on The Challenge of Executive Democracy in Europe, 77 Mod. L. Rev. 1, 1-32 (2014) would operate in the shadow of that legacy.Google Scholar

128 See Joerges, Christian, The Science of Private Law and the Nation-State 47-82 (Florence: European University Institute, Law Department, Working Paper No. 98/4, 1998); Christian Joerges, Reflections on Habermas' Postnational Constellation, in Jürgen Habermas, Vol. 2 XI-XXI (Camil Ungureanu, Klaus Guenther & Christian Joerges eds., 2011).Google Scholar

129 The lecture was published as early as April 1939 in the Institute's series; its 4th edition of 1941 refers to translations into five languages. The quotations in the following are either our own translations of the extremely carefully annotated reprint in Günter Maschke, Carl Schmitt, Staat, Großraum, Nomos. Arbeiten aus den Jahren 1916-1969 269-320 (1995) or, as the title reproduced in this text, Carl Schmitt, Writings on War 75-124 (Timothy Nunan ed. & trans., 2011).Google Scholar

130 For more detail on the following, see Christian Joerges, Europe a Großraum? Shifting Legal Conceptualisations of the Integration Project, in Darker Legacies of Law in Europe: The Shadow of National Socialism and Fascism over Europe and its Legal Traditions 167-191 (Christian Joerges & Navraj S. Ghaleigh eds., 2003).Google Scholar

131 See Schmitt, Carl, Writings on War 110 (Timothy Nunan ed. and trans., 2011). Contemporary reactions attested to how the theory of the Großraum with its “German Monroe doctrine” suited Nazi policy; for this reason, the theory is considered Schmitt's way of indicating his return as a leading legal thinker; see Lothar Gruchmann, Nationalsozialistische Großraumordnung. Die Konstruktion einer “deutschen Monroe-Doktrin” 11 (1962); William E. Scheuerman & Carl Schmitt: The End of Law 161, 169 (1965).Google Scholar

132 On the theoretical understanding, but also the determination with which Schmitt championed this claim of leadership, lucidly Hasso Hofmann, Legitimität gegen Legalität. Der Weg der politischen Philosophie Carl Schmitts 215 (1992); later Oliver Eberl, Großraum und Imperium. Die Entwicklung der ‘Völkerrechtlichen Großraumordnung’ aus dem Geiste des totalen Krieges, in Großraum-Denken. Carl Schmitts Kategorie der Großraumordnung 185-206 (Rüdiger Voigt ed., 2008). More complacently, in contrast, see Horst Dreier's appreciation in Wirtschaftsraum – Großraum – Lebensraum. Facetten eines belasteten Begriffs, in Festschrift 600 Jahre Würzburger Juristenfakultät 47, 66-73 (Horst Dreier, Hans Forkel & Klaus Laubenthal eds., 2002).Google Scholar

133 Schmitt, , supra note 131, at 107.Google Scholar

134 Koskenniemi, Martti, Constitutionalism as Mindset: Reflections on Kantian Themes About International Law and Globalization, 8 Theoretical Inquiries in L. 9, 16 (2007); Martti Koskenniemi, Miserable Comforters: International Relations as New Natural Law, 15 Euro. J. of Int'l Rel. 395, 411 (2009).Google Scholar

135 Schmitt, , supra note 131, at 111; see John P. McCormick, Carl Schmitt's Critique of Liberalism. Against Politics as technology 42-46, 92-105 (1997) (noting the technicity).Google Scholar

136 Infamous and important, Carl Schmitt, Starker Staat und gesunde Wirtschaft. Ein Vortrag vor Wirtschaftsführern (delivered on Nov. 23, 1932), 2 Volk und Reich 81-94 (1933).Google Scholar

137 The preliminary remarks to the 4th edition (Berlin 1941) include the famous motto: “We are like mariners on a continuing journey, and no book can be more than a log book.”Google Scholar

138 Schmitt, Carl, Der Nomos der Erde im Völkerrecht des Jus Publicum Europaeum (1950); Carl Schmitt, The Nomos of the Earth in the International Law of the Jus Publicum Europaeum (G.L. Ulmen trans., Telos Press 2003).Google Scholar

139 Schmitt, Carl, Die legale Weltrevolution. Politischer Mehrwert als Prämie auf juristische Legalität und Superlegalität, in 17 Der Staat 321-339 (1978). In this tribute to the French economic theorist François Perroux, who examined apparently related economic dimensions of space, we read at 328:Google Scholar

Today, the issue is about the political system for society adequate in relation to scientific-technical-industrial developments. Today, the adage cujus industria, ejus regio or cujus regio, ejus industria applies“, and on the following page Schmitt went on: ”The industrialised society is bound to rationalisation, including the transformation of law into legality.Google Scholar

140 Schmitt, Carl, Vergleichender Überblick über die neueste Entwicklung des Problems gesetzgeberischer Ermächtigungen (legislative Delegationen), 6 Zeitschrift für ausländisches öffentliches Recht und Völkerrecht 252-288 (1938); on this, of course under the impression of the American understanding of the executive, see Peter L. Lindseth, Power and Legitimacy: Reconciling Europe and the Nation-State 62 (2010). Lindseth has underlined the importance and topicality of this aspect of Schmitt's work already in his essay, Peter L. Lindseth, The Paradox of Parliamentary Supremacy: Delegation, Democracy and Dictatorship in Germany and France, 1920s–1950s, 113 Yale L.J., 1343, 1354, 1382 (2004).Google Scholar

141 McCormick, John P., Carl Schmitt's Critique of Liberalism. Against Politics as technology 122–156 (1997); Ellen Kennedy, Emergency Government Within the Bounds of the Constitution: An Introduction to Carl Schmitt, ‘The Dictatorship of the Reich president according to Article 48 R.V.,' 18 Constellations 284–297 (2011).Google Scholar

142 Schmitt, Carl, Die Diktatur. Von den Anfängen des modernen Souveränitätsgedankens bis zum proletarischen Klassenkampf [1921] (1989). As examples of the copious literature compare the explanations in Hasso Hofmann, Legitimität gegen Legalität. Der Weg der politischen Philosophie Carl Schmitts (1992).Google Scholar

143 Ernst-Wolfgang Böckenförde, Kennt die europäische Not kein Gebot? Die Webfehler der EU und die Notwendigkeit einer neuen politischen Entscheidung, Neue Züricher Zeitung, June 21, 2010; also Ernst-Wolfgang Böckenförde, Wissenschaft, Politik, Verfassungsgericht, in 67 JuristenZeitung 197 (2012).Google Scholar

144 Hufeld, Ulrich, Zwischen Notrettung und Rütlischwur: der Umbau der Wirtschafts- und Währungsunion in der Krise, 34 Integration 117, 122 (2011).Google Scholar

145 Schmitt, Carl, Verfassungslehre 107 (1928) (this author's translation, 2010).Google Scholar

146 Schorkopf, Frank, Gestaltung mit Recht – Prägekraft und Selbststand des Rechts in einer Rechtsgemeinschaft, 136 Archiv des öffentlichen Rechts 136, 323, 341 (2011); Frank Schorkopf, Finanzkrisen als Herausforderung der internationalen, europäischen und nationalen Rechtssetzung, 71 Veröffentlichungen der Vereinigung der Deutschen Staatsrechtslehrer 183 (2012).Google Scholar

147 Id. at 225.Google Scholar

148 Kaiser, Anna-Bettina, Die Verantwortung der Staatsrechtslehre in Krisenzeiten – Art. 48 WRV im Spiegel der Staatsrechtslehrertagung und des Deutschen Juristentages 1924, in Zur Aktualität der Weimarer Staatsrechtslehre 119–142 (Ulrich Jan Schröder & Antje V. Ungern-Sternberg eds., 2011).Google Scholar

149 Id. at 140.Google Scholar

150 See supra Parts D.III & D.IV.Google Scholar

151 Posner, Eric A. & Vermeule, Adrian, The Executive Unbound. After the Madisonian Republic 8 (2010): “When emergencies occur, legislatures acting under real constraints of time, expertise, and institutional energy typically face the choice between doing nothing at all or delegating new powers to the executive to manage the crisis.” This book is riddled with such pronouncements; on this, see Nadia Urbinati, Democracy Disfigured: Opinion, Truth, and the People 171–227 (2012); for a critical discussion of the empirical dimensions and claims of The Executive Unbound, see Aziz Z. Huq, Binding the Executive (by Law or by Politics), 79 U. Chi. L. Rev. 777 (2012). In an earlier essay, Posner and Vermeule have underlined that they seek to re-construct Schmitt's work in “generizable social-scientific terms”; see Posner & Vermeule, supra note 126. I am by no means the only one to underline, and to relativize, the topicality of Schmittian notions in the present state of the European project: “Without a modicum of legitimacy derived from any European treaties, the austerity dictates of the Troika (comprised of the EU, the ECB, and the IMF) have insinuated themselves as the sovereign acts in the distinctly Schmittian sense of the term, i.e., as extra-legal decisions on the exception.” Id. Thus, Michael Marder, Carl Schmitt and the De-Constitutionalisation of Europe, contribution to Conference on “Europe after the Euro-crisis: Legitimacy, Democracy and Justice, organised by the Institute for Democratic Governance, Bilbao, September 2–3, 2013 (ms. on file with the author).Google Scholar

152 Schmitt, Carl, Die Wendung zum totalen Staat (The turn to the total state), reprinted in Carl Schmitt: Positionen und Begriffe im Kampf mit Weimar-Genf-Versailles, 1923-1939, 146-153 (1988) (quoted according the the reprint). On this see also Carl Schmitt, Der Hüter der Verfassung 78 (1969); on this William E. Scheuerman, Carl Schmitt: The End of Law 85 (1965).Google Scholar

153 Schmitt, Carl, Die legale Weltrevolution. Politischer Mehrwert als Prämie auf juristische Legalität und Superlegalität, 17 Der Staat 335 (1978).Google Scholar

154 Italics are use for German terms and a book title Italics added. On the recourse to the duality of legality and legitimacy in the present context, see Reinhard Mehring, Der ‘Nomos’ nach 1945 bei Carl Schmitt und Jürgen Habermas, in Forum historiae iuris, paras. 20-26.Google Scholar

155 On the theory of the Rechtsstaat, see Ingeborg Maus, Rechtstheorie und Politische Theorie im Industriekapitalismus 40 (1986). Schmitt's differentiation of the categories of “formal” and “political” concepts of law and legislation, see Carl Schmitt, Verfassungslehre 143 (1928) (reprinted in 2010), between the generality of laws and the concrete political act of will, leads him to executive and governmental law-making in the Carl Schmitt, Vergleichender Überblick über die neueste Entwicklung des Problems gesetzgeberischer Ermächtigungen (legislative Delegationen), 6 Zeitschrift für ausländisches öffentliches Recht und Völkerrecht 252 (1938); see Hasso Hofmann, Legitimität gegen Legalität. Der Weg der politischen Philosophie Carl Schmitts 83 (1992).Google Scholar

156 Schmitt, Carl, Verfassungslehre 223 (1928) (reprinted in 2010); see Ulrich K. Preuß, Die Weimarer Republik - ein Laboratorium für neues verfassungsrechtliches Denken, in Metamorphosen des Politischen: Grundfragen politischer Einheitsbildung seit den 20er Jahren 177, 180. (Andreas Göbel ed., 1995).Google Scholar

157 This exploration is no contribution to the les-extrêmes-se-touchent debate around the relationship of Habermas to Schmitt [for an attempt to update it, see Ernst Vollrath, Proteus und Medusa. Die politische Apperzeption der deutschen Staatsrechtslehre im Werk von Jürgen Habermas, 37 Politische Vierteljahresschrift 197 (1996); see also Reinhard Mehring, Der ‘Nomos’ nach 1945 bei Carl Schmitt und Jürgen Habermas, in Forum historiae iuris, para. 26.Google Scholar

158 See e.g., Rettet die Würde der Demokratie, Frankfurter Allgemeine Zeitung, Nov. 4, 2011. A number of these statements are reprinted in Jürgen Habermas, Zur Verfassung Europas: Ein Essay 97-129 (2011); a more recent example can be found in his essay in Le Monde of Oct. 27, 2011 (English version available at http://www.presseurop.eu/en/content/article/1106741-juergen-habermas-democracy-stake). Habermas' entire work is comprehensively documented and updated weekly in the Habermas Forum: http://www.habermasforum.dk, the most recent being, Jürgen Habermas, Merkel's European Failure: Germany Dozes on a Volcano, in Der Spiegel, 5 (July 2013). A great number of his pertinent essays haverecently been reprinted in the Journal Blätter für deutsche und internationale Politik 3/2014, 85–416 under the title Drer Aufklärer Jürgen Habermas at the occasion of his 85th birthday on June 18, 2014. They can be downloaded freely at http://habermas-rawls.blogspot.dk/2014/06/e-book-der-aufklarer-jurgen-habermas.html.Google Scholar

159 See Habermas, Jürgen, A Pact for or against Europe? in What does Germany Think about Europe? 83–89 (Ulrike Guérot & Jacqueline Hénard eds., 2011).Google Scholar

160 Habermas, Jürgen, Citizenship and National Identity, in Staatsbürgerschaft und nationale Identität (1991), reprinted in Between Facts and Norms: Contributions to a Discourse Theory of Law and Democracy 491–516 (1999).Google Scholar

161 Id. In German: Faktizität und Geltung. Beiträge zur Diskurstheorie des Rechts und des demokratischen Rechtsstaats (1992).Google Scholar

162 For a reconstruction of Habermas' works, which, however, seeks to (re-) interpret the author for his own ends, see Christian Joerges, Reflections on Habermas' Postnational Constellation, in Jürgen Habermas, Vol. 2 XI–XXI (Camil Ungureanu, Klaus Guenther & Christian Joerges eds., 2011).Google Scholar

163 Habermas, Jürgen, The Crisis of the European Union in the Light of a Constitutionalization of International Law, 23 Euro. J. of Int'l L. 335, 335-348 (2012). One can no longer be sure about the seriousness of this distinction. In the preface to his most recent book, Jürgen Habermas, Im Sog der Technokratie. Kleine Politische Schriften XII 8 n. 2 (2013), Habermas expresses some discontent with the fact that his public interventions did not make it into the general academic discourses.Google Scholar

164 Pringle, CJEU Case C-370/12 at para. 296.Google Scholar

165 See, e.g., Jürgen Habermas, Bringing the Integration of Citizens into Line with the Integration of States, 18 Euro. L. J. 485, 487 (2012).Google Scholar

166 See Armin von Bogdandy, Basic Principles, in Principles of European Constitutional Law 13, 44 (Armin von Bogdandy & Jürgen Bast eds., 2010); Claudio Franzius, Europäisches Verfassungsdenken 49 (2010); Claudio Franzius & Ulrich K, Preuß, Die Zukunft der Europäischen Demokratie 33 (2012).Google Scholar

167 See Nicole Scicluna, EU Constitutionalism in the Twenty-first Century: Politics and Law in Crisis 101 (2013) (unpublished Ph.D Thesis, La Trobe University):Google Scholar

So far it has proved difficult, if not impossible, to have a full and inclusive debate on the lofty ideal of ‘political union’ while the Eurozone crisis is still in its emergency phase. As long as this state of emergency persists, European politicians and officials will continue to be heavily focused on the pragmatic, day-to-day steps that (in their opinions) are necessary to save it.Google Scholar

See also Nicole Scicluna, EU constitutionalism in flux? Is the Eurozone crisis precipitating centralisation or diffusion?, 18 Euro. L. J. 489, 500 (2012).Google Scholar

168 McCormick, John P., Carl Schmitt's Europe: Cultural, Imperial and Spatial, Proposals for European Integration, 1923-1955, in Darker Legacies of L. in Euro. 133, 141 (Christian Joerges & Navraj S. Ghaleigh eds., 2003).Google Scholar

169 The contrast between Verfassungsrecht (constitutional law) and Verfassungsswirklichkeit (constitutional reality) is another problematical German legacy—again with root in Carl Schmitt, Verfassungslehre 107 (1928) (reprinted in 2010).Google Scholar

170 Habermas, Jürgen, A Pact for or against Europe?, in What does Germany Think about Europe? 83–89 (Ulrike Guérot & Jacqueline Hénard eds., 2011).Google Scholar

171 Chalmers, Damian, The European Redistributive State and the Need for a European Law of Struggle, 18 European Law Journal 667 (2012) and Damian Chalmers, European Restatements of Sovereignty, (LSE Working Paper No. 10, 2013).Google Scholar

172 Streeck, Wolfgang, Buying Time: The Delayed Crisis of Democratic Capitalism 97–164 (2014).Google Scholar

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174 Scharpf, Fritz W., Political Legitimacy in a Non-optimal Currency Area, in Adjusting to European Diversity: Adjusting to European Diversity: The End of the Eurocrats' Dream (Damian Chalmers, Markus Jachtenfuchs & Christian Joerges eds. (forthcoming 2015).Google Scholar

175 Curtin, Deirdre, The Challenge of Executive Democracy in Europe, 77 Modern L. Rev. 1, 1–32 (2014).Google Scholar

176 Hans-Jürgen Bieling, Das Projekt der Euro-Rettung und die Widersprüche des europäischen Krisenkonstitutionalismus, 20 Zeitschrift für Internationale Beziehungen 89, 89–103 (2013).Google Scholar

177 For a critique of the European “political culture of total optimism” and its weak underpinnings, see Giandomenico Majone, Rethinking the Union of Europe Post-crisis. Has Integration Gone Too Far? 74–80 (2014).Google Scholar

178 Friedrich A. von Hayek, Nobel Memorial Lecture (Dec. 11, 1974), http://pavroz.ru/files/hayekpretence.pdf.Google Scholar

179 This is why law should not be called the culprit here; but see K.A. Armstrong, New Governance and the European Union: An Empirical and Conceptual Critique, in Critical Legal Perspectives on Global Governance: Liber Amicorum David M Trubek n. 10 and accompanying text (Gráínne de Búrca, Claire Kilpatrick & Joanne Scott eds., 2013), http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=2244762-.Google Scholar

180 See Everson, Michelle, A very cosmopolitan citizenship; but who pays the price? in Michael Dougan, Niamh Nic Shuibhne and Eleanor Spaventa, Empowerment and Disempowerment of the European Citizen 145 (2013).Google Scholar

181 Giubboni, Stefano, European citizenship, labour law and social rights in times of crisis?, this GLJ Special Issue.Google Scholar

182 It is worth noting that very similar disappointments are also becoming a concern in the accession states; see for an instructive analysis Bojan Bugaric, Europe Against the Left? On Legal Limits to Progressive Politics (LEQS Paper No. 61, 2013).Google Scholar

183 Hölderlin, Friedrich, note 9 supra. Google Scholar

184 For a thorough reconstruction see Beate Braams, Koordinierung als Kompetenzkategorie 15–49 (2013).Google Scholar

185 See supra notes 31 & 33. For an evaluation see the contributions in Conflicts Law as Constitutional Form in the Postnational Constellation, 2:2 Transnational Legal Theory (Christian Joerges, Poul F. Kjaer & Tommi Ralli eds., 2011). The core premises of the approach are explained in the introductory chapter by the three editors on “A New Type of Conflicts Law as Constitutional Form in the Postnational Constellation,” 153–165.Google Scholar

186 Draft European Constitutional Treaty arts. 1–8 (Dec. 16, 2004).Google Scholar

187 It seems worth noting that Habermas expresses the same ideas in his recent work on the constitutionalisation of international law:Google Scholar

Nation-states … encumber each other with the external effects of decisions that impinge on third parties who had no say in the decision-making process. Hence, states cannot escape the need for regulation and coordination in the expanding horizon of a world society that is increasingly self-programming, even at the cultural level.Google Scholar

See Jürgen Habermas Does the Contitutionalization of International Law still have a Chance?, in Jürgen Habermas, The Divided West 113, 176 (Ciaran Cronin trans., 2007).Google Scholar

188 See Joerges, Christian, Poul F. Kjaer & Tommi Ralli A New Type of Conflicts Law as Constitutional Form in the Postnational Constellation, in Conflicts Law as Constitutional Form in the Postnational Constellation, 2:2 Transnational Legal Theory 159–160.Google Scholar

189 See supra notes 73, 76.Google Scholar

190 See Joerges, Christian & Weimer, Maria, A Crisis of Executive Managerialism in the EU: No Alternative?, in Critical Legal Perspectives on Global Governance: Liber Amicorum David M Trubek 295 (Gráínne de Búrca, Claire Kilpatrick & Joanne Scott eds., 2013).Google Scholar