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Published online by Cambridge University Press: 06 March 2019
Whether or not the prohibition of torture allows exemptions is controversial not only in Germany but worldwide. The European Court of Human Rights (ECHR) had to answer this question in the case of Gäfgen versus Germany (App. 22978/05). The Grand Chamber of the Strasbourg court delivered its judgment on 1 June 2010. It held that the prohibition of torture (Article 3 of the European Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms) does not grant any exemptions, even if the life of another is at risk. The present case commentary agrees with this result of the judgment. The next question is even more interesting from the legal point of view: What are the legal consequences of a violation of Article 3 of the Convention, especially with regard to criminal court cases against the offender and the victim of torture? The ECHR emphasizes the necessity of the effectiveness of the protection of the fundamental rights under the Convention. As a result, it argues for a thorough investigation and deterrent punishment of the offenders on the one hand and for an extensive exclusion of evidence obtained as a consequence of torture from the proceedings against the victim of torture on the other.
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16 Explicitly stated in Article 15 para. 2 of the Convention and Article 2 para. 2 of the UN Convention Against Torture. See also Article 5 of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights, Article 7 of the UN Convenant on Civil and Political Rights and common Article 3 para. 1 a and c of the Geneva Convention.Google Scholar
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26 Gäfgen v. Germany, para. 125 with further references.Google Scholar
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34 Gäfgen v. Germany para. 128, 129.Google Scholar
35 Article 6 of the Convention is quoted in the Introduction of this case note.Google Scholar
36 Gäfgen v. Germany, para. 163–165.Google Scholar
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39 One could understand the judgment in an alternative way. Possibly the ECHR assumes only hypothetically rules of the second kind and denies anyway the impact of the breach of these rules on the results of the proceeding. However, by reading the judgment it seems that that the court does not assume these rules only hypothetically.Google Scholar
40 For a detailed analysis, see Gaede, Karsten, Fairness als Teilhabe – Das Recht auf konkrete und wirksame Teilhabe durch Verteidigung gemäß Art. 6 EMRK 804, 813 (2007).Google Scholar
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43 The ECHR has already decided that statements obtained as a result of ill-treatment in breach of Art. 3 are generally inadmissible, as well as real evidence obtained as a direct result of acts of violence. See Gäfgen v. Germany, para. 166–168; Harris, et. al., supra note 9, at 257. The most important judgment in this context is Jalloh v. Germany, 2006-IX Eur. Ct. H.R., para. 105–108. The U.S. Supreme Court, to which the ECHR refers, in Gäfgen v. Germany, para. 73, accepts the doctrine of the “fruit of the poisonous tree.” Nix v. Williams, 467 U.S. 431 441 (1984).Google Scholar
44 Gäfgen v. Germany, para. 175.Google Scholar
45 Gäfgen v. Germany, para. 176–178.Google Scholar
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54 Gäfgen v. Germany, para. 180.Google Scholar
55 Gäfgen v. Germany (Rozakis, J., dissenting).Google Scholar
56 In conformity with 27 BGHSt 355, 358.Google Scholar
57 Gäfgen v. Germany, para. 180.Google Scholar
58 Gäfgen v. Germany, para. 178.Google Scholar