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Judicial Self-Government in Italy: Merits, Limits and the Reality of an Export Model

Published online by Cambridge University Press:  06 March 2019

Simone Benvenuti  and
Davide Paris

Abstract

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The Italian model of judicial self-government is often presented as a successful example of institutional reform to be copied in young democracies. This paper provides a deeper and multifaceted image of it and takes stock of its performance in securing the independence and the accountability of the judiciary. It first maps the rationale and the actors of judicial self-government in Italy, stressing, in particular, that the Italian model of judicial self-government not only aims at preventing the influence of the judiciary by external powers, but it is also equally concerned by threats to judicial independence coming from within the judiciary. It then provides a longitudinal analysis of the impact of this model of judicial self-government on the values of the independence and the accountability of the judiciary after the establishment of the High Council of the Judiciary in 1958. While acknowledging the crucial role of this body in securing the independence of the judiciary, this article claims that the values of independence and accountability of the judiciary have been achieved only progressively and partially.

Type
Articles
Information
German Law Journal , Volume 19 , Issue 7: Special issue — Judicial Self-Government in Europe , 01 December 2018 , pp. 1641 - 1670
Copyright
Copyright © 2018 by German Law Journal GbR 

References

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