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Making General Exceptions: The Spell of Precedents in Developing Article XX GATT into Standards for Domestic Regulatory Policy

Published online by Cambridge University Press:  06 March 2019

Ingo Venzke

Extract

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Judicial lawmaking in the GATT/WTO context has for some time drawn considerable attention. Some are inclined to show a sense of existentialist anxiety in view of the fact that legal practice does not neatly live up to the orthodox doctrinal order of things. Others see judicial lawmaking as (theoretically or practically) inevitable and tend to readily embrace it as a way of overcoming defunct political processes. Whatever its normative appraisal, as a matter of fact adjudicatory practice has developed some of trade law's cardinal norms. The rise and increasing sophistication of adjudication in the GATT/WTO context has also gone hand in hand with a surge of authority on the part of adjudicators and a larger overall detachment of the law from politico-legislative politics.

Type
II. Judicial Lawmaking for Economic Governance: The ICSID and the WTO
Information
German Law Journal , Volume 12 , Issue 5: Beyond Dispute: International Judicial Institutions as Lawmakers , 01 May 2011 , pp. 1111 - 1140
Copyright
Copyright © 2011 by German Law Journal GbR 

References

1 Good contributions on this issue are usually more nuanced, but still come with diverging emphases along these lines. See, e.g., Joel P. Trachtman, The Domain of WTO Dispute Resolution, 40 Harvard International Law Journal 333 (1999) (portraying judicial lawmaking as a matter of fact); Armin von Bogdandy, Law and Politics in the WTO -Strategies to Cope with a Deficient Relationship, 5 Max Planck Yearbook of United Nations Law 609 (2001) (canvassing different understandings and looking above all at attempts for dealing with legitimatory implications); Lorand Bartels, The Separation of Powers in the WTO: How to Avoid Judicial Activism?, 53 International and Comparative Law Quarterly 861 (2004); Steinberg, Richard H., Judicial Lawmaking at the WTO: Discursive, Constitutional, and Political Constraints, 98 AJIL 247 (2004); Howse, Robert, Moving the WTO Forward - One Case at a Time, 42 Cornell International Law Journal 223 (2009) (pointing to a number of instances where adjudicators advanced the law in view of political deadlock).Google Scholar

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