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The Participation of the German Länder in Formulating German EU-policy

Published online by Cambridge University Press:  06 March 2019

Magdalena Suszycka-Jasch  and
Hans-Christian Jasch

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On the 30 June 2009 the German Federal Constitutional Court (Bundesverfassungsgericht, FCC) has passed its long-awaited decision on the compatibility of the Act approving the Treaty of Lisbon and the accompanying legislation with the Basic law (Grundgesetz). The FCC's decision according to which the ratification law is compatible with the Basic law was greeted with relief by many German and European policy makers. It has removed another obstacle for the adoption of the Treaty of Lisbon in the European Union (EU), which still has to be ratified by Ireland, Poland and the Czech Republic, though. But also Germany's ratification still depends on the amendment of the accompanying “Act Extending and Strengthening the Rights of the Bundestag and the Bundesrat in European Union Matters” (“Extending Act”) which the FCC has declared incompatible with the Basic law insofar as the legislature, Bundestag and Bundesrat, have not been accorded sufficient rights of participation in European law-making and treaty amendment procedures. The FCC has therefore ruled that the Federal Republic of Germany's instrument of ratification of the Treaty of Lisbon may not be deposited as long as the constitutionally required legal elaboration of the parliamentary rights of participation has not entered into force. This puts pressure on German law-makers to amend the accompanying “Extending Act” possibly before the referendum in Ireland and before German elections in autumn 2009.

Type
Articles
Information
German Law Journal , Volume 10 , Issue 9 , 01 September 2009 , pp. 1215 - 1255
Copyright
Copyright © 2009 by German Law Journal GbR 

References

1 FCC decision 2 BvE 2/08 of 30 June 2009, paragraphs 1 – 421, a preliminary English translation, is available at: http://www.bverfg.de/entscheidungen/es20090630_2bve000208en.html, last accessed on 29 July 2009. See the discussion in: Grosser, The Federal Constitutional Court's Lisbon Case: Germany's “Sonderweg”: An Outsider's Perspective, 8 the German Law Journal (GLJ) (2009).Google Scholar

2 On 24 April 2008, the German Bundestag adopted the Act Approving the Treaty of Lisbon by 515 of 574 votes cast (Minutes of Bundestag plenary proceedings – BT-Plenarprot. 16/157, p. 16483 A). On 23 May 2008, the Bundesrat approved the Act Approving the Treaty of Lisbon by a two-thirds majority (Minutes of Bundesrat plenary proceedings – BR-Plenarprot. 844, p. 136 B). On 8 October 2008, the Federal President signed the Act Approving the Treaty of Lisbon. The Act approving the Treaty of Lisbon (Vertragsgesetz) has been published in the Federal Gazette (Bundesgesetzblatt) II on 14 October 2008 (pp. 1038 et seq.) and entered into force the next day (Art. 2.1 of the Act Approving the Treaty of Lisbon).Google Scholar

3 The Act Extending and Strengthening the Rights of the Bundestag and the Bundesrat in European Union Matters (Extending Act, Gesetz über die Ausweitung und Stärkung der Rechte des Bundestages und des Bundesrates in Angelegenheiten der Europäischen Union; see: Bundestag document 16/8489), has not yet been signed and published in the Bundesgesetzblatt since its content required the amendment of Art. 23 and Art. 45 of the Basic Law. It is to enter into force on the day following its publication in the Federal Gazette, at the earliest, however, on the day following the day on which the Amending Act will have entered into force (Art. 3 of the Extending Act). The previous version of the Extending Act of 17 November 2005 under the constitutional treaty was published in: Bundesgesetzblatt I Nr. 71 of 25 November 2005.Google Scholar

4 For debate, see: http://www.spiegel.de/politik/deutschland/0,1518,636324,00.html, last accessed on 15 September 2009; Möllers, in: http://www.faz.net/s/Rub117C535CDF414415BB243B181B8B60AE/Doc~E77620A14A6AA46F591B447D40973EF54~ATpl~Ecommon~Scontent.html; Pinzler, in: 30 Die Zeit 6 (16 July 2009) last accessed on 15 September 2009; Rüttgers, in: www.sueddeutsche.de/v5×38X/2967268/Mehr-Macht-fuer-Europa.html, last accessed on 15 September 2009. The first discussion in the Bundestag of the amended version of the Extending Act (Integrationsverantwortungsgestz) was scheduled for 26 August 2009 (drafts available under: http://dip.bundestag.de, last accessed on 26 August 2009).Google Scholar

5 Both before and after the Treaty of Lisbon, EU treaty law provides that the “Council shall consist of a representative of each Member State at ministerial level, who may commit the government of the Member State in question and cast its vote,” (Lisbon Treaty, Art. 16 Sec. 2). “The way in which national Parliaments scrutinise their governments in relation to the activities of the Union is a matter for the particular constitutional organisation and practice of each Member State” (First recital in the Preamble to the protocol on the role of national parliaments in the EU [originally inserted in the Treaty of Amsterdam and largely reproduced under the Treaty of Lisbon]. See: Protocol on the Role of National Parliaments in the European Union [Treaty of Amsterdam], First Recital, 16 December 2004, 2004 O.J. (C 310) 204).Google Scholar

6 On the history of German federalism, see: Heinz Laufer and Ursula Münch, Das föderative System der Bundesrepublik DeutschLand (1997), 33-75; Sturm, Roland, Föderalismus in DeutschLand (2001); Umbach, Maiken (Ed.), German Federalism. Past, Present, Future (2002); Ziblatt, Daniel, Structuring the State. The Formation of Italy and Germany and the Puzzle of Federalism (2006), 32-56.Google Scholar

7 The Deutscher Bund was a loose association of the sovereign German States with some characteristics of a federal state: the legislative powers were distributed between the regions and the centre, the members established central organs such as the Federal Diet “Bundestag” in Frankfurt/M. as a permanent Congress of delegates from the German principalities. A customs union, the “Zollverein”, was established between 18 German states in 1833/34, which promoted economic development. The political climate however remained oppressive, since the Confederation concentrated largely on the implementation of measures, which had been agreed in 1819 between the powers of the Saint Alliance in order to quench any revolutionary tendencies in Central Europe. In March 1848 in the course of a popular revolt everywhere in the country a National Assembly was established in Saint Paul's Church in Frankfurt which worked out a model constitution for a newly united German Empire but eventually failed to establish a lasting administration. This led to the restoration of the old monarchic powers. The Deutscher Bund broke apart in 1866 when a war broke out between its two dominating powers, the Austrian Empire and the Kingdom of Prussia. For further details, see: Zilblatt (note 6), 32-40.Google Scholar

8 The 25 states of the German Empire were the kingdoms (“Königreiche”) of Bavaria (“Bayern”), Prussia (“Preußen”), Saxony (“Sachsen”) and Württemberg; the Grand-Duchies (“Großherzogtümer”) of Baden, Hessen, Mecklenburg-Schwerin, Mecklenburg-Strelitz, Oldenburg, Saxony-Weimar-Eisenach (“Sachsen-Weimar-Eisenach”); the duchies (“Herzogtümer”) of Anhalt; Brunswick (“Braunschweig”), Saxony-Altenburg (“Sachsen-Altenburg”), Saxony-Coburg-Gotha (“Sachsen-Coburg und Gotha”), Saxony-Meiningen (“Sachsen-Meiningen”), the Principalities (“Fürstentümer”) of Lippe, Reuss-Gera (“Reuß jüngere Linie”), Reuss-Greiz (“Reuß ältere Linie”), Schaumburg-Lippe, Schwarzburg-Rudolstadt, Schwarzburg-Sondershausen, Waldeck-Pyrmont; the “Free Cities” (“Freie Hansestädte”): Hamburg, Breme, Lubec and the imperial territory of Alsace-Loraine (“Reichsland Elsaß-Lothringen”). On the history of the German Länder, see: Die deutschen Länder. Geschichte, Politik, Wirtschaft (Wehling, Hans-Georg ed., 2000).Google Scholar

9 Klaus von Beyme, Das Politische System der Bundesrepublik DeutschLand nach der Vereinigung (1993), 331.Google Scholar

10 While speedy economic integration in the second half of the 19th century had already lead to the adoption of a Common Commercial Code (Handelsgesetzbuch) in the German Confederation in 1861 and to the establishment of a Common Appeal Court, the Reichsoberhandelsgericht, as last instance for commercial law matters, it was only in 1871 that a new Common Penal Code (Reichsstrafgesetzbuch) was adopted. In 1877 Common Codes of Civil and Criminal Procedure (Zivilprozessordnung and Strafprozessordnung) and the Code on the Justice System (Gerichtsverfassungsgesetz) were adopted. In order to enable the Empire to replace the numerous Civil Codes, which were still in force in the German states, the constitution was amended in 1873 creating the constitutional basis for the German Civil Code, the Bürgerliches Gesetzbuch, which came into force on 1 January 1900.Google Scholar

11 The Gleichschaltung of the Länder, euphemistically labeled Neubau des Reiches (reconstruction of the Reich) was based on a series of laws passed in 1933/34 the Vorläufiges Gleichschaltungsgesetz of 31 March 1933 (Reichsgesetzblatt I, 1933, p. 153), the Zweites Gesetz zur Gleichschaltung der Länder mit dem Reich of the 7 April 1933. The latter became the Reichsstatthaltergesetz on the 25 April 1933 (Reichsgesetzblatt I, 173), by which permanent Reichsstatthalter (Administrators of the Reich) were instated in the Länder. The Law on the Neuaufbau des Reiches in Spring 1934 (Reichsgesetzblatt I, S. 75) finally abolished the Länder as political entities. The Länder parliaments and the Reichsrat were dissolved on the 14 February 1934 (RGBl. I, S. 89). The Länder became mere administrative entities of the Reich. See: Walter Baum, Die Reichsreform im Dritten Reich, in Vierteljahreshefte für Zeitgeschichte (1955), 52-53.Google Scholar

12 For further details, see: Uwe Bachnick, Die Verfassungsreformvorstellungen im nationalsozialistischen Deutschen Reich und ihre Verwirklichung (1995).Google Scholar

13 The following 16 Länder were created in the four occupation zones in 1946/47:Google Scholar

US-Zone: Bavaria, Hessen, Württemberg-Baden, Bremen.Google Scholar

British zone: North-Rhine-Westphalia, Lower Saxony, Schleswig-Holstein, Hamburg;Google Scholar

French zone: Württemberg-Hohenzollern, Rhineland-Palatinate, Baden;Google Scholar

Soviet zone: Saxony, Saxony-Anhalt, Thuringia, Brandenburg, Mecklenburg;Google Scholar

Berlin remained under a special status. In 1952 the states Baden, Württemberg-Baden and Württemberg-Hohenzollern were merged in the Land Baden-Württemberg. In 1957 the Saarland became a Land of the Federal Republic of Germany, which remained economically linked to France until 1959. On the US occupation policy in Germany, see: Arnold J. Heidenheimer, Federalism and the Party System: The Case of West Germany, 52 American Political Science Review 808-828 (1958); Merritt, Richard, Democracy Imposed: U.S. Occupation Policy and the German Public (1995) 1945-1949; Laufer (note 6) 54-68. On the history of the German Länder, Wehling, (note 8).Google Scholar

14 Beyme (note 9) 332.Google Scholar

15 The Soviet Union created the German Democratic Republic (Deutsche Demokratische Republik, DDR) in its occupational zone on 7 October 1949. Until 1952 also the DDR had been composed of Länder, which derived their configuration from pre-1933 antecedents that had been adjusted for the imposition of the Oder-Neisse line and the zonal boundaries towards the west and south. The five Länder reconstituted in 1990 were largely identical with the five Länder of the 1945 Soviet Zone of Occupation (except for Greater Berlin). In the early years of the DDR, they had constituted the states of a federal system and enjoyed representation in a weak Länderkammer, comparable with the Reichsrat of the Weimar Republic. The Länderkammer played a minor role in the initiation of legislation and survived in obscurity until its abolition in 1958. The Länderand their governments were abolished in mid-1952 and replaced by fourteen districts (Bezirke), which in the interim sent delegates to the Länderkammer. On the developments in East-Germany, see: Laufer (note 6) 71-75.Google Scholar

16 This is also the reason for its name: a “Basic Law” was not considered a “real” constitution. The old Art. 23 of the Basic Law (in force until reunification in 1990) took account of this situation by stipulating that the Basic Law would only apply to the Western Länder and was to be adopted in “other parts of Germany” after their accession (Dieses Grundgesetz gilt zunächst im Gebiete der Länder Baden, Bayern, Bremen, Groß-Berlin, Hamburg, Hessen, Niedersachsen, Nordrhein-Westfalen, Rheinland-Pfalz, Schleswig-Holstein, Württemberg-Baden und Württemberg-Hohenzollern. In den anderen Teilen Deutschlands ist es nach deren Beitritt in Kraft zu setzen.) This provision in fact obliged the Federal Republic of Germany to accept “any other parts of Germany” without any conditions if the latter chose to accede. This provision of the Basic Law had been used in 1957 to reintegrate the Saarland into the Federal Republic, and was to serve as a model for German unification in 1990.Google Scholar

17 See: Vertrag über die abschließende Regelung, in Bezug auf DeutschLand [“Zwei-plus-Vier-Vertrag”] of 12 September 1990, available at: www.documentArchiv.de/brd/2p4.html, accessed: 12 August 2007.Google Scholar

18 On 18 March 1990, for the first time in 40 years, East Germans were free to elect a new government which was headed by Lothar de Maizière with whom the West German Government under Helmut Kohl agreed on the formation of an Economic, Monetary and social Union which was established on the 1 July 1990. In August 1990 the East German Parliament, the Volkskammer, voted for a speedy unification of Germany on the basis of the Basic Law. On the unification process, see: From Bundesrepublik to DeutschLand. German Politics after Unification, (Michael G. Huelshoff, Andrei S. Markovits, and Simon Reich eds., 1993); Federalism, Unification and European Integration (Jeffery, Charlie and Ro/and Sturm eds., 1993); Beyme (note 9).Google Scholar

19 See: Vertrag zwischen der Bundesrepublik DeutschLand und der Deutschen Demokratischen Republik über die Herstellung der Einheit DeutschLands (Einigungsvertrag) (31 August 1990) in: Bundesgesetzblatt II 885 (1990), (last version of 1 July 2004, in: Bundesgesetzblatt I 718 (2004)).Google Scholar

20 On Art. 23, see: note 11. This “unification via Art. 23” required that the GDR joined the FRG Land by Land, and not as a whole. In this form, the East German People's Chamber (Volkskammer) passed the law for the reintroduction of the Länder on 22 July 1990, which was to take effect on German Unity Day, 3 October 1990. On this day, the GDR would disappear as an entity. The five new Länder would remain and, on the 14 October 1990, elections for their respective diets (Landtage) would each in turn establish a parliamentary Land government headed by a minister president just as in the West German Länder. The new Landtage and Land cabinets would then send instructed Land delegations to the enlarged Bundesrat, each to take their seats and vote en bloc alongside the Land delegations of the other German states.Google Scholar

21 This was recently stressed by the political analyst Rudolf Hrbeck in a contribution to a conference where he reminded the audience that Germany was younger than its Länder and that it was a creation of the latter (Föderalismus und Europa (2007): Konferenzbericht. Gemeinsame Konferenz der Staatskanzlei Sachsen-Anhalt, Vorsitz der Europaministerkonferenz der Länder, des Europäischen Zentrums für Föderalismusforschung Tübingen und des Instituts für Politikwissenschaft der Otto-von-Guericke Universität Magdeburg, (Magdeburg, 17th/18th of January 2007)).Google Scholar

22 The objectives of the occupation policy of the US are described by Heidenheimer (note 13); Merritt (note 13). On the discussion about federalization in the constitutional process, see: Laufer (note 6) 63-68.Google Scholar

23 If not mentioned otherwise, the cited Articles refer to the German Grundgesetz/Basic Law. The English translations used in this text were first published by Inter Nationes, translated by the Federal Ministry of the Interior and reproduced as HTML edition by Lawrence Schäfer and Gerhard Dannemann, 1999, at: http://www.iuscomp.org/gla/statutes/GG.htm, last accessed on 15 September 2009.Google Scholar

24 In the light of the experience of the Gleichschaltung of the Länder in 1933/34, Art. 79 Sec. 3 of Basic Law, the so-called “Eternity Clause” (Ewigkeitsklausel) stipulates that “Amendments to this Basic Law affecting the division of the Federation into Länder, their participation on principle in the legislative process, or the principles laid down in Articles 1 and 20 shall be inadmissible.”Google Scholar

25 These so-called principles of Bundestreue and bundesfreundliches Verhalten (loyalty/allegiance towards the federation) imply that the Länder and the Federal state have to co-operate and take each other's interests into regard (Collection of the decisions of the FCC – Bundesverfassungsgerichtsentscheidungen – BVerfGE 1, 315 f; 12, 245 ff; 42, 117 ff; 95, 266). They are obliged to keep each other duly informed, consult with each other and cooperate (BVerfGE 43, 348 f.; 61; 205; 73, 197). See also: Laufer (note 6) 94. On the role of the FCC in developing the German Constitutional order, see: donald p. kommers, The Constitutional Jurisprudence of the Federal Republic of Germany (1997).Google Scholar

26 See: Art. 28 Sec. 1: “The constitutional order in the Länder must conform to the principles of a republican, democratic, and social state governed by the rule of law, within the meaning of this Basic Law. In each Land, county, and municipality the people shall be represented by a body chosen in general, direct, free, equal, and secret elections. (…)”. Sec. 3 “The Federation shall guarantee that the constitutional order of the Länder conforms to the basic rights and to the provisions of paragraphs (1) and (2) of this Article.” Art 20 and 28 do not guarantee the existence of the 16 Länder as such but are seen as a guarantee that Germany has to be composed of at least two Länder. This can be inferred from Art. 29, which explicitly provides for the possibility to restructure the territory of the Federal Republic of Germany.Google Scholar

27 See: Art. 29 “[New delimitation of the Länder]: (1) The division of the federal territory into Länder may be revised to ensure that each Land be of a size and capacity to perform its functions effectively. Due regard shall be given in this connection to regional, historical, and cultural ties, economic efficiency, and the requirements of local and regional planning.Google Scholar

(2)Revisions of the existing division into Länder shall be effected by a federal law, which must be confirmed by referendum. The affected Länder shall be afforded an opportunity to be heard. (…)“Google Scholar

See also: Art. 118 “[New delimitation of Länder in the Southwest]:Google Scholar

The division of the territory comprising Baden, Württemberg-Baden and Württemberg-Hohenzollern into Länder may be revised, without regard to the provisions of Art. 29, by agreement between the Länder concerned. If no agreement is reached, the revision shall be effected by a federal law, which shall provide for an advisory referendum.“ While the states Baden, Württemberg-Baden and Württemberg-Hohenzollern were merged into the Land Baden-Württemberg in 1952, the Brandenburg voters rejected with a clear majority of 62,7 % in a popular referendum the merger plans of the two states of Berlin and Brandenburg on 5 May 1996.Google Scholar

28 See: Art. 30 “[Division of authority between the Federation and the Länder]: Except as otherwise provided or permitted by this Basic Law, the exercise of state powers and the discharge of state functions is a matter for the Länder.” See also: Art. 31 “[Supremacy of federal law]: Federal law shall take precedence over Land law” and Art. 32: [Foreign relations] “(1) Relations with foreign states shall be conducted by the Federation.Google Scholar

(2) Before the conclusion of a treaty affecting the special circumstances of a Land, that Land shall be consulted in timely fashion.Google Scholar

(3) Insofar as the Länder have power to legislate, they may conclude treaties with foreign states with the consent of the Federal Government.“ Art. 30 implies that within the German federation, the Länder possess their own autonomous statehood and therefore, in constitutional terms, cannot be treated as subordinate or solely administrative entities.Google Scholar

29 See: Art. 70 [Division of legislative powers between the Federation and the Länder] (1) The Länder shall have the right to legislate insofar as this Basic Law does not confer legislative power on the Federation.Google Scholar

(2) The division of authority between the Federation and the Länder shall be governed by the provisions of this Basic Law respecting exclusive and concurrent legislative powers.“Google Scholar

30 The federal government possesses exclusive legislative responsibilities in matters that concern the national security or require policy coordination on a national level. Defense, foreign trade, immigration, citizenship, transportation, communications, currency standards and some other policy areas are exclusive powers of the Bund (Federation). In other 33 policy areas – including civil law, refugee and expellee matters, public welfare, Land management, consumer protection, public health and the collection of vital statistics (births, deaths, and marriages) – the Länder and the federal government share concurrent legislative powers. In a case of conflict though, federal law takes priority (Art. 31).Google Scholar

31 Art 50: “The Länder shall participate through the Bundesrat in the legislation and administration of the Federation and in matters concerning the European Union.” On the Bundesrat, see: 40 Jahre Bundesrat (1989); Pfitzer, Albert, Der Bundesrat. Mitwirkung der Länder im Bund (1987); Reuter, Konrad, Praxishandbuch Bundesrat. Verfassungsrechtliche Grundlagen, Kommentar zur Geschäftsordnung, Praxis des Bundesrates (1991), Laufer (note 6) 108-143. Arthur B. Gunlicks, German Federalism and Recent Reform Efforst, 6 The German Law Journal 1284, 1284-1296 (see 1284, Footnote 1) stresses, that the “Bundesrat is not an ‘upper house,’ although it is frequently referred to as such by the quality press and even by many Anglo-Saxon experts on Germany. It is, instead, a unique chamber that represents the Land governments (cabinets)—not the parliaments—roughly on the basis of population (each Land has from three to six votes, which must be cast en bloc). It is not, therefore, a popularly elected body, which German constitutional experts consider to be a prerequisite for a true ‘house’ of parliament.” See Matthias Heger, Deutscher Bundesrat und Schweizer Ständerat (1990) for a comparison of the Bundesrat with the Swiss Ständerat. Google Scholar

32 Kurt Sontheimer, Grundzüge des Politischen Systems der neuen Bundesrepublik Deutschland (1993) 284-5, has therefore pointed out, that the Bundesrat is not really a second legislative body in the process of democratic decision-making, but rather an instrument of executive and bureaucratic influence. He characterizes the control which is exercised by the Bundesrat primarily as a control of the federal executive and legislative branches by the executive branches of the Länder, since the Länder parliaments do not partake at all in the decision-making process of the Bundesrat (Sontheimer 1993, p. 291). Clearly, the Bundesrat is not a co-equal, second legislative chamber of parliament. It cannot claim the same popular legitimacy as the proportionally composed and directly elected Bundestag. The states vote as a bloc; therefore, they view policy from the perspective of the state, rather than national interest. It has therefore sometimes been referred to as a “conclave of states” (Gallagher et al. 1995, p. 139) or a “permanent conference of minister presidents” (Russel J. Dalton, Politics in Germany(1993) 58).Google Scholar

33 According to Art. 51 Sec. 2, each Land has at least three votes. States with more than two million inhabitants have four votes, those with more than six million people retain five seats and Länder with more than seven million inhabitants have six votes. Hega, 2003, p. 12, has pointed out, that this system gives disproportionate weight to the smaller Länder. The Länder that represent only a third of the population control half of the votes in the Bundesrat. Google Scholar

34 This has led to the Bundesrat evolving over the years from a technical chamber which concentrated on administrative aspects of policy making to a more politicized one. While the Christian Democrats (CDU/CSU) were in opposition in the Bundestag from 1969 to 1982, the CDU/CSU-led governments formed the majority in the Bundesrat. Between 1972 and 1982, the frequency of Bundesrat objections to government legislation increased to the point were the leaders of the SPD-FDP government accused it of becoming the “extended arm” of the parliamentary opposition. It was suggested that the CDU/CSU was seeking to obstruct the government's electoral majority by turning its own majority in the Bundesrat into a politicized counter government. In 1991 the Social Democrats, after a series of victories in elections, gained control of the Bundesrat and insured that Länder would have major input into any programs proposed by the government or could block major legislative initiatives, as happened with increasing frequency in the last years of the Kohl government. After the victory of the red-green coalition in 1998 power in the Bundesrat shifted again to the opposition.Google Scholar

35 The Bundesrat normally schedules only about a dozen plenary sessions in a year. Most of its legislative activity takes place in committees (Dalton (note 33) 336). Bills from the federal government (Bundesregierung) shall first be submitted to the Bundesrat who is entitled to comment within six weeks (Art. 76, Sec. 2) before being sent to the Parliament (Bundestag). If a law is adopted by the Bundestag, it has to be submitted to the Bundesrat without delay (Art. 77, Sec. 1) with the latter having the possibility to demand that a committee for joint mediation (Vermittlungsausschuss), composed of members of the Bundestag and of the Bundesrat, be convened in order to overcome disagreements on the contents of a bill.Google Scholar

36 See: Art. 87 “[Subjects of direct federal administration]: (1) The foreign service, the federal financial administration, and, in accordance with the provisions of Art. 89, the administration of federal waterways and shipping shall be conducted by federal administrative authorities with their own administrative substructures. A federal law may establish Federal Border Police authorities and central offices for police information and communications, for the criminal police, and for the compilation of data for purposes of protection of the constitution and of protection against activities within the federal territory which, through the use of force or acts preparatory to the use of force, endanger the external interests of the Federal Republic of Germany.”Google Scholar

37 Klatt, Hartmut, Europapolitik im Föderalistischen System der Bundesrepublik, in Staatswissenschaften und Staatspraxis (1998).Google Scholar

38 The concept of “Unitarian federalism” was first described by: Konrad Hesse, Der unitarische Bundesstaat (1962). For a more recent analysis, see: Gerhard Lehmbruch, Der unitarische Bundesstaat in Deutschland (2002).Google Scholar

39 See: Laufer (note 6), 186-207. The phenomenon of “Politikverflechtung” has first been described by: Fritz W. Scharpf et al. Politikverflechtung. Theorie und Empirie des Kooperativen Föderalismus in 1 der Bundesrepublik (1976) and 2 der Bundesrepublik (1977). See also: Rudolf Hrbek, The effects of EU integration on German federalism, in Recasting German Federalism. The Legacies of German Unification 217-233 (Jeffery, C. ed., 1999), who speaks about “doppelte Politikverflechtung” taking also into account the dimension of policy-making on the European level.Google Scholar

40 Gunter M. Hega, Between Reformstau and Modernisierung: The Reform of German Federalism since Unification (2003), Paper to be presented at the Conference on “Europeanization and Integration” EU Center of the University of Oklahoma, Norman, OK, October 24-25, 2003, 1st draft, Oct. 22, 2003, available at: http://homepages.wmich.edu/~hega/German%20Federalism.pdf, last accessed on 15 September 2009.Google Scholar

41 See: former Art. 91 a which was modified by constitutional reform in 2006: “(1) In the following areas the Federation shall participate in the discharge of responsibilities of the Länder, provided that such responsibilities are important to society as a whole and that federal participation is necessary for the improvement of living conditions (joint tasks):Google Scholar

1. extension and construction of institutions of higher learning, including university clinics;Google Scholar

2. improvement of regional economic structures;Google Scholar

3. improvement of the agrarian structure and of coastal preservation.Google Scholar

(2) Joint tasks shall be defined in detail by a federal law requiring the consent of the Bundesrat. This law shall include general principles governing the performance of such tasks. (…)Google Scholar

(4) In cases to which subparagraphs 1 and 2 of paragraph (1) of this Article apply, the Federation shall finance one half of the expenditure in each Land. In cases to which subparagraph 3 of paragraph (1) of this Article applies, the Federation shall finance at least one half of the expenditure, and the proportion shall be the same for all Länder. (…)“Google Scholar

42 The former Art. 72 on the concurrent legislative power of the Federation stipulated that: “(1) On matters within the concurrent legislative power, the Länder shall have power to legislate so long as and to the extent that the Federation has not exercised its legislative power by enacting a law.”Google Scholar

(2) The Federation shall have the right to legislate on these matters if and to the extent that the establishment of equal living conditions throughout the federal territory or the maintenance of legal or economic unity renders federal regulation necessary in the national interest.Google Scholar

(3) A federal law may provide that federal legislation that is no longer necessary within the meaning of paragraph (2) of this Article may be superseded by Land law.“ Art. 72 was substantially modified in 2006 by Law on constitutional reform, BT-Drs. 16/813 in der Fassung der Beschlussempfehlung des Rechtsausschusses vom 28. June 2006, BT-Drs. 16/2010.Google Scholar

43 Hartmut Klatt, Europapolitik im föderalistischen System der Bundesrepublik, in 1 Staatswissenschaften und Staatspraxis 45, 46-47 (1998).Google Scholar

44 See the old Art. 75: “[Areas of federal framework legislation]: (1) Subject to the conditions laid down in Art. 72, the Federation shall have power to enact provisions on the following subjects as a framework for Land legislation:Google Scholar

1. the legal relations of persons in the public service of the Länder, municipalities, or other corporate bodies under public law, insofar as Art. 74a does not otherwise provide;Google Scholar

1a. general principles respecting higher education;Google Scholar

2. the general legal relations of the press;Google Scholar

3. hunting, nature conservation, and landscape management;Google Scholar

4. land distribution, regional planning, and the management of water resources;Google Scholar

5. matters relating to the registration of residence or domicile and to identity cards;Google Scholar

6. measures to prevent expatriation of German cultural assets. Paragraph (3) of Art. 72 shall apply mutatis mutandis.Google Scholar

(2) Only in exceptional circumstances may framework legislation contain detailed or directly applicable provisions.Google Scholar

(3) When the Federation enacts framework legislation, the Länder shall be obliged to adopt the necessary Land laws within a reasonable period prescribed by the law.“Google Scholar

Art. 75 was among the provisions, which were abolished by constitutional reform in 2006. See: “Gesetz zur Änderung des Grundgesetzes” (law on constitutional reform, BT-Drs. 16/813 in der Fassung der Beschlussempfehlung des Rechtsausschusses vom 28. Juni 2006, BT-Drs. 16/2010) came into force together with “Föderalismusreform-Begleitgesetz” (BT-Drs. 16/814)“ for its implementation.Google Scholar

45 Although the German states have lost much autonomy in policy making and many of their functions have been transferred to the national level, this has not weakened the power of the Bundesrat whose influence as the representative institution of the German states at the national level has increased. As the locus of policymaking has long shifted from the Land level to the national level, so has the impact of the Länder shifted from individual influence to their institution of collective representation at the national level, the Bundesrat. According to David P. Conradt, The German Polity 192 (1996), this paradoxical development can be explained in particular by party control of the two chambers of parliament, and the divided government of Germany between 1972 and 1982 and since 1991 until 2005 (see note 29). On the centralization of the German party-system, see: Jesse, Eckhard, Das Deutsche Parteiensystem nach der Vereinigung, 21 German Studies Review 69, 69-82 (1998); Lehmbruch, Gerhard, Der unitarische Bundesstaat in Deutschland: Pfandabhängigkeit und Wandel (2002). For a comparative perspective on the phenomenon of Federalism and Party Interaction in West Germany, Switzerland, and Austria, see: Charles D. Hadley, Michael Morass, and Nick Rainer, Federalism and Party Interaction in West Germany, Switzerland, and Austria, 19 Publius 81, 81-97(1989).Google Scholar

46 According to the political analyst Beyme (See beyme (note 9), 362), unification has fostered the trend towards centralization in Germany by allocating most fiscal and economic responsibility to the federal government and its agencies and thus gave the federal government a new self-consciousness concerning its steering capacity. See also: Michael Burgess and F. Gress, The Quest for a Federal Future: German Unity and European Union in Comparative Federalism and Federation: Competing Traditions and Future Directions (Michael Burgess and A.-G. Gagnon eds., 1993). Federalism, Unification and European Integration (Charlie Jeffery and Roland Sturm eds., 1993); Jeffery, C., The Non-Reform of The German Federal System After Unification, 18 West European Politics 252-272; Recasting German Federalism. The Legacies of Unification (Jeffery, C. ed., 1999).Google Scholar

47 See Klatt (note 43), 47, rightly argues, that the Länder kept loosing autonomy, while the Länder governments were compensated with more participatory powers in the Bundesrat. The strengthening of this “participatory federalism” however has not helped to reinforce the autonomy of the Länder “as states” and has in particular lead to further weakening the Länder parliaments.Google Scholar

48 Laufer (note 6), 216.Google Scholar

49 See Laufer (note 6), 216-7; Klatt (note 43), 48; Gallagher, Michael, Michael Laver, and Peter Mair, Representative Government in Modern Europe, 140 (2nd ed., 1995).Google Scholar

50 According to Art. 203 TEC the Council consists of “representatives of each member state at ministerial level authorized to commit the government of that member state”. Sub-state representatives have the right to sit at the Council table, but only on behalf of national governments.Google Scholar

51 Michael Burgess and F. Gress, The Quest for a Federal Future: German Unity and European Union in Comparative Federalism and Federation: Competing Traditions and Future Directions, 169-76 (Michael Burgess and A.-G. Gagnon eds.) 1993). Tanja Börzel's analysis (See T. A. Börzel, States and Regions in the European Union: Institutional Adaptation in Germany and Spain (2002)), which compares the effects of European integration on the relationships between national and regional government in Spain and Germany and comes to the conclusion that Europeanization has strengthened the co-operation between the German Länder and the federal government, refers only to the development after the constitutional amendments of 1992 (law of the 21 December 1992, Bundesgesetzblatt 1992, I, p. 2086).Google Scholar

52 Laufer (note 6), 217; Klatt (note 43), 48.Google Scholar

53 Laufer (note 6), 217-8.Google Scholar

54 See Laufer (note 6), 242- 260; Schultze, Rainer-Olaf, Indirekte Entflechtung: Eine Strategie für die Föderalismusreform?, 31 Zeitschrift für Parlamentsfragen 681-698 (2000).Google Scholar

55 The “federalism commission” under the joint chairmanship of Franz Müntefering and Edmund Stoiber consisted of 16 members each from the Bundesrat and the Bundestag, in addition to four representatives of the federal government and six representatives of all the Länder parliaments. In addition, there were three permanent guest members representing the national peak organizations of local governments, plus 12 experts who were appointed unanimously by the other commission members. The Commission was mandated with:Google Scholar

  • •

    • developing reform proposals to “modernize” the German federal system,

  • •

    • improving the capacity to act and make decisions of both the federal and Länder governments,

  • •

    • assigning more clearly defined political responsibilities, and

  • •

    • increasing the functional effectiveness and efficiency of the federal system.

The commission examined in particular the division of legislative competences between the federal and Länder governments, the responsibilities and rights of the Länder in the policy-making process at the federal level, and the financial relations between the federation and the Länder. The results of the work of the Commission were taken up by the grand coalition government, which was formed in autumn 2005 and adopted a wide-reaching constitutional reform. For a critical assessment of the reform, see: Arthur B. Gunlicks, German Federalism and Recent Reform Efforts, in 6 German Law Journal 1284-1296 (2006).Google Scholar

56 See: “Gemeinsam für Deutschland. Koalitionsvertrag von CDU, CSU und SPD”, 2005, p. 109: “In einem weiteren Reformschritt in der 16. Wahlperiode sollen die Bund-Länder-Finanzbeziehungen den veränderten Rahmenbedingungen inner- und außerhalb Deutschlands, insbesondere für Wachstums- und Beschäftigungspolitik, angepasst werden. Der Bund bietet den Ländern an, dazu mit Beginn des Jahres 2006 die Voraussetzungen und Lösungswege zu klären, das Grundgesetz so zu ändern, dass die Eigenverantwortung der Gebietskörperschaften und ihre aufgabenadäquate Finanzausstattung gestärkt werden kann.” For an earlier perspective on the necessity of reform of financial federalism in Germany, see: Gunlicks (note 55).Google Scholar

57 Today Art. 24 reads as follows:“(1) The Federation may by a law transfer sovereign powers to international organizations.Google Scholar

  1. (1a)

    (1a) Insofar as the Länder are competent to exercise state powers and to perform state functions, they may, with the consent of the Federal Government, transfer sovereign powers to cross-border institutions in neighboring regions.

  2. (2)

    (2) With a view to maintaining peace, the Federation may enter into a system of mutual collective security; in doing so it shall consent to such limitations upon its sovereign powers as will bring about and secure a lasting peace in Europe and among the nations of the world.

  3. (3)

    (3) For the settlement of disputes between states, the Federation shall accede to agreements providing for general, comprehensive, and compulsory international arbitration.“ Para. 1 a was introduced on the 21st of December 1992 (Bundesgesetzblatt I, 1992, p. 2086) together with the new Art. 23 on the development of the European Union.

58 Under Art. 24 the Bundesrat only had a suspensive veto and no power to definitely stop transfers of powers to the community level (see: Laufer/Münch, p. 220). In order to dissolve resistance from the Länder the adoption of the SEA in 1986 and the following amendments were nonetheless always passed with the consent of the Bundesrat, Klatt (note 43) 50.Google Scholar

59 Farewell the Third Level? The German Länder and The European Policy Process, in: The Regional Dimension of the European Union. Towards a Third Level in Europe? 56, 58 (Jeffery, C. ed., 1997); Laufer (note 6) 217-8; Hrbek (note 39), 218-9.Google Scholar

60 Jeffery (note 59), 58; Laufer (note 6) 217-8.Google Scholar

61 As early as 1951 when the ratification of the ECSC Act was being debated in the Bundestag, one Länder- Prime Minister argued that European integration was reducing the Länder to nothing more than administrative bodies (Christiansen, 1992, p. 240). North-Rhine Westphalia failed with an initiative in the Bundesrat which already foresaw to give the Bundesrat powers of directive for the German representative to the ECSC. The federal government only agreed to inform the Bundesrat on developments in the ECSC on the basis of Art. 53 of the Basic Law (Laufer (note 6), 218-9).Google Scholar

62 Jeffery (note 59), 59-62.Google Scholar

63 Law on the transposition of the TEC and EURATOM (Gesetz zu den Verträgen vom 25. März 1957 zur Gründung der Europäischen Wirtschaftsgemeinschaft und der Europäischen Atomgemeinschaft vom 27. Juli 1957, Bundesgesetzblatt II, 1957, p. 753).Google Scholar

64 According to Art. 53 Sec. 2 of the Basic Law the federal government was obliged to inform the Bundesrat about how they handle government matters anyways (see: Laufer/Münch, 1997, p. 219). For further details, see also: Gerhard Roller, Die Mitwirkung der deutschen Länder und der belgischen Regionen an EG-Entscheidungen. Eine rechtsvergleichende Untersuchung am Beispiel der Umweltpolitik, in: 123 Archiv des öffentlichen Rechts 21- 59 (1998). In state practice this information obligation has usually been implemented by an exchange of opinions, which was then taken into account in the course of the preparation of the German position for the Council meetings.Google Scholar

65 Roller (Roller (note 64), 28), who also points out, that the Zuleitungsverfahren was designed to compensate the Bundesrat as an organ of the federal state but not the Länder as such for loosing competences to the federal and respectively the European level.Google Scholar

66 Laufer (note 6), 222.Google Scholar

67 Wolfgang Wessels, Die Öffnung des Staates. Modelle und Wirklichkeit grenzüberschreitender Verwaltungspraxis 1960-1995, 280 (2000).Google Scholar

68 Klatt (note 43), 51.Google Scholar

69 Roller (note 64), 29, has pointed out that the Länderbeteiligungsverfahren from a theoretic point of view was better placed to ensure genuine Länder participation, than participation through the Bundesrat at the federal level, which serves as an additional “filter” to the positions of each single Land. Google Scholar

70 See: Law on the Single European Act of 19 February 1986, Bundesgesetzblatt 1986 II, 1102.Google Scholar

71 The agreement of 17 December 1987 supplemented the law and contained detailed procedural regulations which reflected the practice of coordination between the federal government and the Länder (Bundesrat) which had been developed until then. It carried the complicated name: “Vereinbarung zwischen der Bundesregierung und den Regierungen der Länder über die Unterrichtung und Beteiligung des Bundesrates und der Länder bei Vorlagen im Rahmen der Europäischen Gemeinschaften in Ausführung von Artikel 2 des Gesetzes vom 19. Dezember 1986 zur Einheitlichen Europäischen Akte (EEAG) vom 28. Februar 1986”. On the practical experience with the procedure, see: Heinz Eirich, Der Grundsatz der Bundestreue in der politischen Praxis: Das Zusammenwirken von Bund und Ländern in EG-Angelegenheiten, in: Föderalismus in der Bewährung, 35 (Vogel, B. & Oettinger, H. eds., 1992).Google Scholar

72 See: Laufer (note 6), 221. In the constitutional reform in 1992 in the course of the ratification of the TEU (Bundesgesetzblatt I, 1992, p. 2086) a new Art. 52 Sec. 3a was introduced, which now provides a constitutional legitimization for the establishment of the EC/EU-chamber of the Bundesrat: “For matters concerning the European Union the Bundesrat may establish a Chamber for European Affairs whose decisions shall be considered decisions of the Bundesrat; paragraph (2) and the second sentence of paragraph (3) of Art. 51 shall apply mutatis mutandis.” Laufer and Münch (note 6) point out, that the Bundesrat makes little use of the EU-Chamber since it has only referred a small number of initiatives to the Chamber. For details on the “Europakammer”, see: Paras 45 b- 45 k of the standing procedures of the Bundesrat. The new standing procedures of the Bundesrat which have been adopted on the 8 June and will enter into force on the 12 October 2007 contain the same provisions (see: Drucksache 310/07 Beschluss).Google Scholar

73 On the EC directive 89/552/ECC, see: Europäisches Medienrecht. insbesondere EG-Fernsehrichtlinie und Europarats-Fernsehübereinkommen, in Gegenüberstellung der Einzelregelungen (Höfling, Heribert ed., 1991); EG-Medienpolitik. Fernsehen in Europa zwischen Kultur und Kommerz (Kleinsteuber, Hans J. ed., 1990).Google Scholar

74 BVerfGE 92, 203 ff also printed in: Europäische Grundrechtszeitung (EuGRZ) 1995, 125-137.Google Scholar

75 See section II.Google Scholar

76 Translation by the author according to quote in: Klatt (note 43), 54.Google Scholar

77 Former Art. A of the TEU.Google Scholar

78 For further details, see: www.a-e-r.org (accessed on: 13 August 2007).Google Scholar

79 Community Charter for Regionalization, adopted by the European Parliament on 18 November 1988 (OJ C 326, 19.12.1988, p. 289).Google Scholar

80 On the Maastricht treaty and its consequences, see: George A. Bermann, Subsidiarity and the European Community, in: Europe after Maastricht. American and European Perspectives (Lützeler, Paul Michael ed. 1994).Google Scholar

81 On the regionalization of Belgium and the participation of the Belgian regions in EU-affairs, see: F. Pijnenburg, Belgium: Federalized EC Lobbying at Home, in: National Public and Private Lobbying (M.P.C.M. van Schendelen ed., 1993); A. Alen, and R. Ergec, Federal Belgium after the Fourth State Reform of 1993 (1994); Roller (note 64); Kerremans, B., Determining a European Policy in a Multi-Level Setting: The Case of Specialized Coordination, 10(1) Belgium, Regional and Federal Studies 36-61 (2000); B. Kerremans and J. Beyers, The Belgian Permanent Representation to the European Union: Mailbox, Messenger or Representative?, in: The National Co-ordination of EU Policy: The European Level, 199-210 (H. Kassim, A. Menon, B.G. Peters and V. Wright eds., 2001).Google Scholar

82 This created the necessity for EU-Member States such as Germany or Belgium which have to involve their regional entities to pre-formulate their standpoints as a Member State in an internal coordination procedure prior to the Council meetings. See: Kommentar zum EU-, EG-Vertrag, 221(Hans von der Groeben ed., 5th ed., 1997).Google Scholar

83 On subsidiarity in the EU and the situation of regional players, see: Clemens Stewing, Subsidiarität und Föderalismus in der Europäischen Union (1992); Kleffner-Riedel, Angelika, Regionalausschuß und Subsidaritätsprinzip: die Stellung der deutschen Bundesländer nach dem Vertrag über die Europäische Union (1993); Kees van Kersbergen, and Verbeek, Bertjan, The Politics of Subsidiarity in the European Union, 32 Journal of Common Market Studies 215-236 (1994); Die Subsidiarität Europas. 2nd ed. (Merten, Detlef ed., 1994); Andrew Scott, John Peterson, and David Millar, Subsidiarity: A ‘Europe of the regions’ v. the British Constitution?, 32 Journal of Common Market Studies 48-67(1994).Google Scholar

84 On the establishment of the Council of Regions, see: Kleffner (note 83); Laufer (note 6), 227-230.Google Scholar

85 Laufer (note 6), 226.Google Scholar

86 The introduction of the principle of subsidiarity had been proposed by the German delegation in January 1991 based on an earlier initiative of the Länder, see: Laufer (note 6), 230.Google Scholar

87 Laufer (note 6), 236-7; Roller (note 64), 34.Google Scholar

88 The ratification of the Maastricht-treaty followed shortly after German reunification in 1990. Both events were reflected in the Basic Law in a series of constitutional amendments, which had been elaborated by the Joint Constitutional Commission of the Bundestag and the Bundesrat (Gemeinsame Verfassungskommission, GVK) established in December 1991 on the basis of Art. 5 of the Reunification-treaty. Apart from constitutional amendments which had become necessary in order to integrate the new EU-citizenship (in Art. 28, Sec. 1), the creation of the monetary union and the establishment of the European Central Bank (modification of Art. 88), the GVK followed the opinion of many legal scholars and policy-makers, who believed that the existing “opening-clause” of the Basic Law, Art. 24 (s.a.), was insufficient as constitutional basis for creating a political European Union. The GVK therefore suggested a catalogue of constitutional amendments which were eventually adopted on 1 November 1993 after complicated negotiations between the federal government and the Länder and the rejection of a constitutional complaint which had been brought against the Maastricht treaty (decision of the FCC of 12 October 1993, in: BVerfGE 89, pp. 155–213). For further details, see: Laufer (note 6) Klatt, (note 37), 55, stresses the links between German reunification, the ratification of the Maastricht treaty and the constitutional reform process which was triggered by these events: German reunification had only been acceptable to Germany's neighbors on the condition of an ever closer European integration.Google Scholar

89 Laufer (note 6), 237-8.Google Scholar

90 The ‘European amendments’ (in particular Art. 23 and changes in Art. 24, Art. 50 and the introduction of Art. 52 Sec. 3a on the European Chamber of the Bundesrat) were introduced by the law of 21 December 1992 (Bundesgesetzblatt 1992 I, p. 2086). See: Jeffery (note 59), 61; Kommers (note 25), 107-109; Hrbek (note 39), 221-4, 230.Google Scholar

91 On the genesis of the new Art. 23 and its implications for policy-making at the EU-level, see: Rupert Scholz, Europäische Union und deutscher Bundesstaat, in Neue Zeitschrift für Verwaltungsrecht, 817, 819 (1993); Schede, Christian, Bundesrat und Europäische Union: Die Beteiligung des Bundesrates nach dem neuen Artikel 23 des Grundgesetzes (1994); Donoth, Hans-Peter, Die Bundesländer in der Europäischen Union: die bundesstaatliche Ordnung in der Bundesrepublik Deutschland bei der Verwirklichung der Europäischen Union – eine Analyse unter besonderer Berücksichtigung des neugefassten Art. 23 GG (1996); Klaus, Henning, Die deutschen Bundesländer und die Europäische Union, Die Mitwirkung der Länder am EU-Integrationsprozeß seit dem Vertrag von Maastricht (1996); Lang, Ruth, Die Mitwirkungsrechte des Bundesrates und der Bundestages, in Angelegenheiten der Europäischen Union gemäß, p. 2–7 (1997); Roller (note 64); Müller-Terpitz, Ralf, Die Beteiligung des Bundesrates am Willensbildungsprozeß der Europäischen Union: das Bundesratsverfahren nach Art. 23 Abs. 2, 4 bis 7 GG unter besonderer Berücksichtigung seiner verfahrensrechtlichen Ausgestaltung (1999); Sturm, Roland, Föderalismus in Deutschland (2001) 117-137.Google Scholar

92 This has also been stressed by the FCC in its recent decision: 2 BvE 2/08 of 30 June 2009, paragraphs 1 – 421, a preliminary English translation, is available at: http://www.bverfg.de/entscheidungen/es20090630_2bve000208en.html, last accessed on 15 September 2009.Google Scholar

93 German scholars have characterized Art. 23 Sec. 1 as an “Integrationsöffnungsklausel” (a clause which opens the German constitutional order for European integration) which is connected with a “Struktursicherungsklausel” (a clause which preserves the constitutional structure/order of the Basic Law). For further details, see: Laufer (note 6), 238; Ossenbühl, F., Maastricht und das Grundgesetz- eine verfassungsrechtliche Wende? in: Deutsches Verwaltungsblatt (1993) 629,632.Google Scholar

94 Art. 50: “The Länder shall participate through the Bundesrat in the legislation and administration of the Federation and in matters concerning the European Union.”Google Scholar

95 Roller (note 64), 31.Google Scholar

96 Id. Google Scholar

97 The participation of the Länder in defining German EU-policy has also been a central topic in the discussions in the run-up to constitutional reform in 2006: while representatives of the federal state have argued that the increasing role of the Länder had become a threat to the capability of Germany to act as a player on the European level (“Europafähigkeit”), the Länder were arguing in favor of disentanglement of tasks also with regard to interest representation on the European level. These positions have been summarized in the contribution of Rudolf Hrbek to the joint conference “Föderalismus in Europa” organized in Magdeburg in 2007 (Föderalismus in Europa 13 (2007)) who also points out that both positions could not have been reconciled with the character of German federalism which relies on mutual cooperation.Google Scholar

98 “Gesetz über die Zusammenarbeit von Bund und Ländern in Angelegenheiten der Europäischen Union” of 12 March 1993 (Bundesgesetzblatt I, 1993, p. 313) modified by Art. 2 of the law of 5 September 2006 (Bundesgesetzblatt I, 2006, p. 2098). For further details, see: Roller, (note 64), 32- 33.Google Scholar

99 See: “Vereinbarung zwischen der Bundesregierung und den Regierungen der Länder über die Zusammenarbeit in Angelegenheiten der Europäischen Union in Ausführung von § 9 des Gesetzes über die Zusammenarbeit von Bund und Ländern in Angelegenheiten der Europäischen Union” (“Agreement between the Federal Government and the Governments of the Länder on Cooperation in Matters relating to the European Union in Implementation of Section 9 of the Act on Cooperation between the Federal Government and Länder in Matters relating to the European Union of the 29 October 1993”), in: Bundesanzeiger of 2 December 1993, p. 10425.Google Scholar

100 For a discussion, see: Roller (note 64), 33.Google Scholar

101 Jeffery (note 59), 62, 63,72; Hrbek (note 39), 225-6.Google Scholar

102 Hrbek (note 39), 225.Google Scholar

103 M. Keating, The New Regionalism in Western Europe 169-70(1998); Roller (note 64), 37-8.Google Scholar

104 See, Jeffery (note 59).Google Scholar

105 Keating (note 103), 169-70.Google Scholar

106 Given their role, it is not surprising that the information offices have sometimes had a difficult relationship with the federal governments. Federal government fears of regional encroachment into foreign policy have proved particularly contentious. Initially, the German federal government criticized the Länder information offices as instruments of ‘auxiliary foreign policy’ (Hrbek (note 39), 225). However, in the abovementioned 1993 cooperation law and the supplementing cooperation agreement the federation has committed itself explicitly to supporting the Länder information offices, particularly through the German Permanent Representation.Google Scholar

107 Council Document 11218/07, Annex, marginal no. 1. The Treaty of Lisbon dissolves the European Union's “three-pillar concept” (Art. 1.3 sentence 1 TEU). The Treaty on European Union retains its name (see: for a consolidated version “TEU Lisbon” OJ 2008 no. C 115/13); the Treaty establishing the European Community is renamed Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union (TFEU) (see for a consolidated version OJ 2008 no. C 115/47). The European Union replaces and succeeds the European Community (Art. 1 Sec. 3 sentence 3 TEU Lisbon), and it attains legal personality (Art. 47 TEU Lisbon). The European Atomic Energy Community is removed from the former umbrella organization of the European Union, and it continues to exist – outside the institutional linkage to the EU – as an independent international organization. For discussion, see: Ingolf Pernice, Der Vertrag von Lissabon - Das Ende des Verfassungsprozesses der EU?, in: Europäische Zeitschrift für Wirtschaftsrecht (EuZW), 65 (2008).Google Scholar

108 See also for the following explanations the FCC decision on the ratification of the Lisbon treaty: 2 BvE 2/08 of 30 June 2009, paragraphs 1 – 421, a preliminary English translation, is available at: http://www.bverfg.de/entscheidungen/es20090630_2bve000208en.html, last accessed on 15 September 2009.Google Scholar

109 Id. Google Scholar

110 Id. Google Scholar

111 Id. Google Scholar

112 Id. Google Scholar

113 Id. Also the Committee of the Regions may bring actions against legislative acts for the adoption of which it is to be consulted under the new Treaty.Google Scholar

114 Gesetz über die Ausweitung und Stärkung der Rechte des Bundestages und des Bundesrates in Angelegenheiten der Europäischen Union, in: 16/8489Bundestagsdrucksache 7, § 2-4.Google Scholar

115 An amended draft-version of the Extending Act (Integrationsverantwortungsgesetz) is available under: http://dip.bundestag.de, last accessed on 15 September 2009 – Bundestagsdrucksache 16/13923 of 21 August 2009.Google Scholar

116 The initial draft of the Extending-Act declared incompatible by the FCC in its sentence was to create the national preconditions for the exercise of the above-mentioned rights of participation that are granted to the Bundestag and to the Bundesrat:Google Scholar

Art. 1, § 2 Sec. 1 of the Extending Act essentially stipulated that the Federal Government shall submit detailed information on draft legislative acts of the EU to the Bundestag and the Bundesrat “at the earliest possible date”, at the latest, however, two weeks after the beginning of the eight-week period. Art. 1 § 2 Sec. 2 granted the Bundestag and the Bundesrat powers to regulate in their rules of procedure the adoption of decisions concerning “subsidiarity-checks”. Art. 1 § 2 Sec. 3 set out that the President of the Bundestag or respectively the President of the Bundesrat sends such a decision to the presidents of the European Parliament, the Council and the Commission and informs the Federal Government about it.Google Scholar

Art. 1 § 3 of the Extending Act regulated the procedure of the “subsidiarity action”. The Bundestag is obliged, in particular pursuant to its section 2 in analogy to Art. 44 Sec. 1 sentence 1 and Art. 93 Sec. 1 no. 2 of the Basic Law, new version, to bring action upon the application of one fourth of its Members; pursuant to Art. 1 § 3 Sec. 3, the Bundesrat can regulate in its Rules of Procedure how to bring about the adoption of a decision on a subsidiarity action. Pursuant to paragraph 4, the Federal Government sends the action on behalf of the body that adopted the decision of bringing such action “without delay” to Court of Justice of the European Union.Google Scholar

Art. 1 § 4 Sec. 3 of the Extending Act the interaction of Bundestag and Bundesrat have been regulated when exercising the right to voice opposition pursuant to Art. 48 Sec. 7 (3) TEU Lisbon taking into account the national allocation of responsibilities:Google Scholar

If an initiative essentially affects exclusive legislative competences of the Federation, opposition to the initiative shall be made known if the Bundestag so decides by a majority of votes cast.Google Scholar

If an initiative essentially affects exclusive legislative competences of the Länder, opposition to the initiative shall be made known if the Bundesrat so decides by a majority of its votes.Google Scholar

In all other cases, the Bundestag or the Bundesrat may, within four months after notification of the initiative of the European Council, decide to make known their opposition against this initiative. In these cases, opposition to the initiative shall only be made known if such a decision has not been rejected two weeks before the expiry of the time-limit of six months pursuant to Art. 48 Sec. 7 (3 sentence 2 of the Treaty on European Union by the other body. Opposition to an initiative shall also not be made known if one body rejects the other body's decision insofar as it holds the view that there is not a case under number 1 or number 2. If the Bundestag adopted its decision on making known its opposition to the initiative by a majority of two thirds, rejection by the Bundesrat requires a majority of at least two thirds of its votes. If the Bundesrat adopted its decision on making known its opposition to the initiative by a majority of at least two thirds of its votes, rejection by the Bundestag shall require a majority of two thirds, at least the majority of the Members of the Bundestag.Google Scholar

According to paragraph 6, paragraph 3 sentence 1 no. 3 shall apply mutatis mutandis to the right of opposition pursuant to Art. 81 Sec. 3 (3) TFEU. Paragraph 4 provides that the Presidents of the Bundestag and the Bundesrat shall jointly send a decision reached pursuant to paragraph 3 to the Presidents of the European Parliament, of the Council and the Commission, and that they shall inform the Federal Government accordingly.Google Scholar

Art. 1 § 6 of the Extending Act determined that details about information according to this Act shall be regulated in the Agreement between the Bundestag and the Federal Government Pursuant to § 6 of the Act on the Cooperation of the Federal Government and the German Bundestag in European Union Affairs and according to the Agreement between the Federal Government and the Länder Pursuant to § 9 of the Act on the Cooperation of the Federation and the Länder in European Union Matters (s.a.).Google Scholar

117 Pursuant to Art. 1 no. 1 of the Amending Act of 8 October 2008 (Bundesgesetzblatt I of 16 October 2008 (p. 1926), Art. 23 Sec. 1a of the Basic Law, new version, has the following wording: “The Bundestag and the Bundesrat shall have the right to bring action before the Court of Justice of the European Union on account of a legislative act of the European Union infringing the principle of subsidiarity. The Bundestag shall be obliged to do so on the application of one fourth of its Members. An Act requiring the approval of the Bundesrat may admit of exceptions to Article 42.2 sentence 1 and Article 52.3 sentence 1 for the exercise of the rights granted to the Bundestag and the Bundesrat in the Treaties constituting the basis of the European Union.”Google Scholar

118 The most prominent example for a bridging-clause is the so-called passerelle (or simplified treaty revision procedure), allowing the European Council unanimously, and with the European Parliament's assent, to introduce qualified majority voting and co-decision in areas where this does not yet apply i.e. when matters of EU-policy on Justice and Home Affairs were “communitarised” by being shifted from the third pillar (intergovernmental cooperation) to the “first pillar” under the Amsterdam Treaty. National parliaments are informed six months in advance and each of them may cast a binding veto, but ordinary positive ratification in all member states is not required.Google Scholar

119 See: 2 BvE 2/08 of 30 June 2009, paragraphs 414, a preliminary English translation, is available at: http://www.bverfg.de/entscheidungen/es20090630_2bve000208en.html, last accessed on 15 September 2009.Google Scholar

120 See also: Kiiver, Philipp, German Participation in EU Decision-Making after the Lisbon Case: A Comparative View on Domestic Parliamentary Clearance Procedures, 10 German Law Journal 1287, 1291 (2009).Google Scholar

121 Id. Google Scholar

122 See: Point 10 of the 14-Points Plan of the CSU or “Leitlinien für die Stärkung der Rechte des Bundestages und des Bundesrates in EU-Angelegenheiten”, available at: http://www.ilse-aigner.de/download/europa_papier_leitlinien_bt_mitwirkungsrechte_europa.pdf, last accessed on 15 September 2009.Google Scholar

123 See: Kiiver (note 120), 1295.Google Scholar

124 See, Roller (note 64), 41-2.Google Scholar

125 See contribution of Claus-Peter Clostermeyer from the government of Baden-Württemberg in: Claus-Peter Clostermeyer, Föderalismus und Europa, 28 (2007).Google Scholar

126 A Länder review of the operation of the cooperation agreement, conducted in February 1997, found the regulations to ‘… have proved themselves without exception and [to] represent a suitable framework for good and trusting cooperation’ (Hrbek (note 39), 222-3).Google Scholar

127 See, Roller (note 64), 38-40; Johne, Roland, Die deutschen Landtage im Entscheidungsprozeß der Europäischen Union, Parlamentarische Mitwirkung im europäischen Mehrebenensystem (2000).Google Scholar

128 Hrbek (note 39), 226.Google Scholar

129 See: 2 BvE 2/08 of 30 June 2009, paragraphs 247, preliminary English translation, is available at: http://www.bverfg.de/entscheidungen/es20090630_2bve000208en.html, last accessed on 15 September 2009.Google Scholar